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HISTORY
OF
CHARLES THE BOLD,

DUKE OF BURGUNDY.

BY
JOHN FOSTER KIRK.

VOL. III.

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HISTORY

OF

CHARLES THE BOLD.

BOOK IV.

CHAPTER V.

WAR IN THE JURA; HÉRICOURT CAMPAIGN.—BERNE AND SAVOT.
—FRENCH PENSIONS.

1474—1475.

WHEN the spectators on the Rigi have watched successive groups of giant Alps rise out of the night, and receive on their icy brows warm kisses from the radiant dawn, the eye turns in quest of further marvels to the opposite quarter of the panorama, across table-lands and plains dotted with towns and lakes, and bounded by the distant chain of the Jura. But there the horizon offers none of the grand and entrancing aspects of a mountain range. That long, straight, dusky line, with no variety of form or play of color, belongs not to the picture, but to the frame. If we transfer our point of view to the Lake of .

Geneva, and choose for our comparison the evening instead of the morning light, the contrast is still more striking. For then the mountains of the Valais and of Savoy unveil themselves to the declining sun, and, as the mist rolls off, each snowy summit and gray pyramid flushes into soft crimson before his parting glance. The lake, like a conscious witness, trembles and burns. But Jura, wrapping herself in a darker mantle, interposes to cut short the glowing scene. The lingering orb is snatched away. The matchless mirror ceases to reflect. Pallid, yet serene, the majestic Alps recede into the gloom.

This outer barrier of the Jura, where the spurs and branches so flank and overlap each other as to preserve a continuous front, is the highest of a succession of ridges that lie one behind another in parallel array. There are no distinct and towering peaks, no sweeping curves, no network of ramifications. Each separate mountain is a segment corresponding in outline with the mass from which it is detached. The long, deep intervening valleys, and the narrow transverse gorges, where the ridges have been rent from side to side, give easy access in all directions; and the more frequented passes have been regularly traversed from the time when the Roman power was first established over Gaul. Four centuries ago this region was already thickly sprinkled with habitations, one class of which has now almost disappeared. If here and there a blackened tower or rear-wall of some ancient château still crowns a slope or overhangs a ravine, the restored front and embellished interior,

not less than the refined tastes and manners of the occupants, proclaim the changes that have intervened.

Yet, at the period of which we write, the proprietors of these domains were not the types of feudal barbarism which the grim relics of their extinct rule — the high battlements, the vaulted dungeons, the yawning *oubliettes* — might lead us to imagine them. If less luxurious in their habits than the perfumed cavaliers who met at the costly banquets of Brussels and Bruges, they resembled still less the needy and plundering adventurers of the neighboring Rhineland. Indefatigable huntsmen, hospitable entertainers, lovers of good cheer, drinking plentifully of the common wine of the country, having their tables abundantly supplied both from the products of the chase and the contributions of their tenantry, they led in times of peace a methodical existence, driven neither by empty stomachs nor lack of excitement to unlicensed campaigning. The prospects of the coming vintage, or the tested qualities of a former growth, furnished the staple of gossip. A well-thumbed copy of *Launcelot*, its illuminated pages brightening under a tallow light, whiled away a lonely evening. A flagon and a pasty, placed in the bed-chamber, offered a specific against restlessness; and in a catarrh or a fever, there could be no better remedy than the wine of Beaune, sugared and spiced, and made hotter and more stimulating as the symptoms grew troublesome. The rocks and the cascades, the pastoral basins and the savage solitudes,

of the Jura scenery inspired blithesome thoughts, and gave birth to fancies that still live in tradition and in rustic song. To other advantages of their situation the feudal seigneurs were more consciously alive. They found in their forests a source not only of recreation, but of profit, selling off their surplus timber, and farming out the valuable quarries from which the adjacent countries are still supplied. Their interests were thus connected with those of the communes, which, though small, were sufficiently numerous, and they lived on easy terms with the inhabitants, frequenting their fairs, borrowing from their well-lined purses, and inviting them to their castles without any sinister design upon their persons. Occasional disputes—questions of boundary or of seignorial rights—were settled, not by a trial of strength, but by appeal to the parliament of Dôle; for the strict rule of the duke of Burgundy was neither relaxed nor evaded in these remote parts of his dominions.

A few great families, the heads of which commonly filled high stations in the household of the sovereign, had attained, so to speak, an historical position. Chief among these was the illustrious house of Châlons-Orange, descended from a cadet branch of the ancient counts of Burgundy, and enriched by its succession to the immense heritage of the lords of Montfaucon. Its banner floated over numerous towns and castles scattered along both slopes of the Jura, from the heights above Geneva to Neuchâtel and Valangin, and across from Besau-

çon and from Salins far into the basin of Lemane. Its fiefs in the last-mentioned quarter it held of the dukes of Savoy, whose sovereignty, extending to the further extremity of the Lake of Morat, included all the Latinized portion of Helvetia. This double vassalage, shared by other families, Savoyard as well as Burgundian, had as yet given rise to no perplexities. A firm alliance subsisted between the two courts, and the preponderance of the stronger government, felt in all their complicated relations, excited no jealousy in the weaker.

Towards their Swiss neighbors, and particularly towards Berne, the nobles of the Jura, following the example of the sovereign, had always shown themselves full of amity and good-will. While the eastern cantons were perpetually harassed or restricted in their trade with the Austrian territory on the one side, and the Milanese on the other, Berne had prospered by its free and facile communications with Franche-Comté. It had formed engagements with the towns; and the nobles, far from discouraging the practice, had become parties to such alliances. Some of them had even enrolled themselves as citizens of Berne, and had fought under the standard of the Bear, which in turn had been unfurled for their protection, at a time when the lilies of France hung menacingly on the Burgundian borders. But these relations, all friendly intercourse, were now to be abruptly broken off. The Alps had sent a note of defiance to the Jura. A war had been proclaimed which, small as was the field and few as were the

combatants, still ranks among the most famous in history.¹

In that war the Swiss, according to their own uniform declarations from first to last, had engaged, not as principals, but as auxiliaries.² Explicitly denying that their own territory had been an object of aggression,³ never alleging any provocation of whatever nature received by themselves, never intimating any belief that the rights or the honor of the Confederacy had been involved in the origin of the contest, they, on the contrary, lost no opportunity of proclaiming that they had entered the arena in support of a cause with which as a nation they had no direct or personal concern. There was, however, an apparent discrepancy in their statements, both as to the motives by which they had been swayed and as to the party for whom they appeared as champions. In their public manifesto, and on certain convenient occasions, they set forth, as their grounds of action, the summons addressed to them by the head of the Empire, their alliance with Austria, and their obligations as an integral part of the

¹ The matter of the foregoing pages has been chiefly derived from Chambrier, *Description de la Mairie de Neuchâtel*; Duvernoy, *Esquisse des relations entre le comté de Bourgogne et l'Helvétie*; Gollut; and Gingins, *Recherches sur les Acquisitions des Seigneurs de Montfaucon et de la Maison de Châlons dans le Pays de Vaud*.

² "Unser eidgenossen von Bern sollend die absagung stellen, dz wir,

als helffer, des hertzen von Burgund vigend sin wollen." *Ämtliche Sammlung der ältern Eidgenössischen Abschiede*, B. II. s. 513.

³ "Die eidgenossen als haupt-sacher den krieg nit meynent in die hand zenemen, noch das zeunde schuldig sin, dz wyl und doch der Hertzog von Burgund uns nit, sonder den Hertzog von Oesterreich angriffen hat." *Ibid.* s. 499.

German race and confederation. But in their more private, more frequent, and more emphatic communications with the head of a different race and nation, with Louis the Eleventh of France, they averred that it was at his request and on his behalf that they had taken up arms, that they had yielded to the persuasions and the promises of his ambassadors, and that without the pledges and assurances thus given, they would not have been willing, never could have been induced, to embark in a war against the duke of Burgundy.*

To reconcile these statements, it is necessary to recollect that the treaty with Austria, which had reminded the Swiss of their allegiance to the Empire and furnished them with a pretext for their proceedings, was itself a contrivance of the French king, one of a long series of manoeuvres all conducted with the same object and through the same agency. Entered into with reluctance by most of the cantons,

* "Quod ad affirmationem et condemnationem oratorum suorum et hujus causæ domini de lige declaraverint, se ducis Burgundie inimicos, et campos manu armata petierint. Et instetis, quod ipse itidem faciat, maxime cum id in primis ad persuasionem et securitatem suorum scripturarum et oratorum actum sit" ("vñ lan vad sin sagen sy beschechen.") *Instructio in dominum Regem*, Oct. 29, 1474. *Ibid.* s. 516, 517. — "Dieselben fürmunder von uns gewuns haben verstanden, unsern eydgnossen noch uns nit zu wilsen sin, die krieg gegen dem Bur-

gundischen Herzogen zu vnderstan, es wurd dann uwer K. M. gegen Inglicher wise erhept." *Ibid.* s. 514. — "Iidem Oratores inter alia . . . semper nobis certum hoc intellexerunt, nec nobis nec Confederatis persuasibile guerram contra Burgundie ducem inniti nisi." &c. *Latinsches Missivenbuch*, A 319, a. MS. (*Archives of Bern*.) — The passages here cited are the earliest, not the strongest. Others will appear hereafter. The reason why none are cited of a contrary bearing is that we have been unable to find a single line of the sort.

by scarcely more than one of them with a hostile design against the Burgundian prince, it had lacked the inherent force to accomplish of itself the purpose with which it had been devised. During several months, while Alsace was a scene of hostilities, the Swiss remained passive. Their participation began at the moment when they had consented to another alliance, a closer and more confidential alliance than they had formed with Austria or with any other state—an alliance, namely, with Louis himself; one which had, it is true, no affiance with their national sentiments or policy, but which acted directly upon their instincts as a people and their interests as individuals, diffusing its effects through every quarter of their country and over all their subsequent history.

Unless these facts be entirely dismissed from consideration—unless mere theory be substituted for a recital of facts⁶—we must conclude that the war had its real origin not in the complications in which Charles had recently become involved with certain of the German states and with the Empire itself,

⁶ Of the extent to which a talent for theorizing has been made to supply the place of research on this subject, a remarkable instance may be found in the "Vorlesungen" of Prof. Karl Hagen, who, in January, 1858, gave a public reading, in the council hall of Berne, of his paper, "über die weltgeschichtliche Bedeutung des Burgundischen Kriegs." In this the war is represented as a struggle on the part of the Swiss,

not for their own freedom alone, but for that of Europe, of the whole human race. Not a word is said of the French pensions, although there is an incidental allusion to Louis the Eleventh as a person who had "intimate relations" with the Swiss. It is amusing to contrast this lecture with one delivered on the same spot a century ago, of which a manuscript copy is in the Library of Berne.

but in his old and ceaseless rivalry with the king of France. Whether the complications spoken of might in time have brought the same parties into the field, is a matter of pure speculation, and of idle speculation. That the Swiss were to some extent imbued with the feeling of German nationality is true.⁶ This was one of the springs touched upon, and it no doubt operated to deceive some and enable others to deceive themselves. But it was not their sympathies with the German race, nor their fidelity to the Empire, that led them to tear up their ancient treaties, and to fall upon their oldest ally. Nay, that feeling was soon found to be antagonistic to the new policy they had adopted. The German sentiment, in the degree to which it prevailed, proved a hinderance to the prosecution of the war; and in proportion as the war was prosecuted the German sentiment was weakened. In every phase of the contest and in all its results we shall find confirmation of what we learn from the evidence in the case and from the avowals of the parties—namely, that it was undertaken at the instigation of France, for the interest of France, and in the pay of France.⁷

⁶ More (Quellenammlung des badischen Landesgeschichts, 1863), while discarding the common versions of the origin of the war, considers it to have had its source in the opposition between the political systems and ideas of Germany and those of the Latinized races. His arguments are perfectly sound when the facts are applied, as they were in the second volume of this work,

to the people of the Rhineland. But among the parties to the war, it was not the Swiss, any more than it was the French king, who represented German ideas.

⁷ Much controversy on this subject might probably have been dispensed with, had Laufer lived to complete his work by the production of the testimony which had carried conviction to his own mind.

Styling themselves mere "helpers," the Swiss, ever prompt in action when deliberation was over, set about the performance of the obscure and subsidiary service for which alone they supposed themselves to have been engaged. Berne indeed knew better, and would fain have opened the conflict in a manner that should at once enlighten the Confederates as to the real magnitude of the enterprise they had undertaken, and hold them committed to its accomplishment. A campaign into the heart of Franche-Comté would bring the drama to a speedy dénouement and crowd the stage for the death-struggle. But though Lucerne, and possibly Zurich, might have been warmed up to the requisite enthusiasm, the smaller cantons were not susceptible of such flights of ambition. It was doubtful, indeed, whether they would all redeem the pledges extracted from their deputies in the diet. Glarus and Zug, though they would

Berchtold considered that he had refuted M. de Gingins by quoting the language of "a Burgundian author," one, therefore, "not to be suspected of partiality," namely, M. de Burande, — forgetting that this distinguished historian belonged to another province, and disclaimed any pretences to critical investigation; "Scribitur ad narrandum, non ad probandum." The following extract from a work undertaken at the request of the council of Berne may be cited as an expression of Swiss opinion: "Vor allen aus suchte er [Ludwig XI.] die Eidgenossen, sonderlich aber die Stadt Bern, die bey ihren Bundeaverwand-

ten in grossem Ansehen und am nechsten an den Burgunder gränzete, wider denselben mit Geld und grossen Verheissungen aufzuhetzen, Lenn auch nicht nach hies er eihem Zweck erhalten hat. So dass wann wir die Wahrheit rund geschehen wollen, nicht der Herzog, wie ihm solches von den meisten Geschicht-Federn beygemessen wird, sondern der König von Frankreich der Urstifter des schweren Burgunder-Kriegs, die Stadt Bern über denselben Beforderinn gewesen, wie wir solches aus unverweifelichen Zeugnissen darthun werden." Lauf-fer, Beschreibung helvetischer Geschichts, B. V s. 294.

not see the banners of their brethren in the field without sending out their own, had contracted no engagements, and were waiting for the unanimous action of the rest. Unterwalden, more self-determined, obstinately refused all part in the business. It would join neither in the treaty with France nor in the treaty with Austria. It would make no war in the interest of a foreign power and against a friendly power. It pointed to the Saint-Gothard as the proper avenue of Swiss enterprise. On that side alone it saw injuries to be redressed and advantages to be secured.*

Neither the ardor of Berne nor the doggedness of Unterwalden prevailed with the majority of the cantons. They would execute the special work for which they had stipulated, and they would do no more. An expedition had been planned before the letter of defiance was sent, and on the 28th of October, the third day after it had been sent, the contingent of Berne set out, under the command of Nicholas von Scharnachthal, an ex-schultheiss and a member of the old nobility, but an early convert to the French party. It consisted of three thousand men, of whom less than two hundred belonged to the town; for Berne, except in moments of peril, was chary of the burghers' blood, while it held in firm subjection the mountaineers and rural population of the canton. About five hundred men from

* Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. walden would have preferred to
— We shall not go so far as to assert, take the Burgundian side in the
with a native historian, that Unter- war.

Freyburg and Solothurn were added to this force. Freyburg, a stranger to the treaty with Austria and opposed to the war, not only as causeless in itself and dishonorable from the seductions which had brought it about,* but also as calculated to lead to embroilments with Savoy, had made a final effort to preserve at least its own neutrality. It had sent a deputation to Berne, to entreat that it might be excused from sending its troops into the field.¹⁰ But Berne, having just triumphed in a long negotiation through a constant self-restraint and the softest cajolements, was now flushed and impatient. With a dependent ally it stood upon secure ground, and it answered with a curt and formal summons to Freyburg to comply with the treaty-obligations on which the two states relied for mutual support.¹¹

The line of march lay through Arberg to the

* Ante, vol. ii. p. 538. — Zellweger (s. 49, note), who always endeavors to discredit the testimony of Valerius Anshelm, rejects his account of Freyburg's opposition to the French alliance, both as improbable in itself and as unsupported by documentary proof. He had not, however, searched for such proof in the proper quarter. The statements of the chronicler are substantiated by abundant documentary evidence. "Freyburg war vast ungern in den französischen Bund getreten, an Bern darum einen Tag beschrieben, erklärten Wippenen und Basel [die Boten] wie ihre Obern keine Lant hatten. Gaden-Gelden von einem Fürsten zu empfangen dar ihre Knechte auf-

wiegen und die Herrschaft vielleicht zwingen mochte mit dem Herzog von Burgund zu brechen." Girard *MSS.* (Stadt-bibliothek, Bern), a collection consisting of extracts and notes from the archives of Freyburg.

¹⁰ "Les desprier qu'ilz nos vollassent entrelassier de tirer avec leur contre le duc de Bourgogne." Ibid., from the Rathsmannal of Freyburg, *MS.*

¹¹ Ibid. — "Darumb so manen wir uwer brüderlichen Lieben, in Krafft die offnen Briefs, . . . Inhalt uwers und unsers geschwornen Burgrechtens, das ir uns uwer treffentliche Hilf und Rutand tund, . . . als wir . . . und ir uns schuldig und pflichtig and." Schilling, s. 136.

southern shore of the Lake of Bienne, where the little town of Erlach sits gracefully on the jutting slopes of a promontory. Already the entangled relations which this war must disconnect or cut through had begun to present themselves. Erlach was a fief of Savoy, and the property of William prince of Orange, a vassal of Burgundy, but also an adopted citizen of Berne. He had appointed as his lieutenant Rudolph von Erlach, whose name, so famous in the early Swiss annals, had been originally derived from the place where its present bearer held command. There was the less reason for treating this as hostile territory, that the prince of Orange, owing to family divisions, was far from being well-affected towards his sovereign. Berne had however decided that a place so near its own borders ought not to remain in doubtful hands; and Rudolph, less faithful to his trust than to his countrymen, agreed without demur to retain his position under their authority.

At Bienne there was a halt and a joyful welcome. Nominally subject to the bishop of Basel, but practically independent, Bienne was devotedly attached to Berne, with which it had been in alliance for more than a century. Though not admitted to the honor of a place in the French treaty, it had labored so earnestly in the cause that Berne had recommended it to the special bounty of the king.¹² Its position

¹² "Der erbern Statt Biel nit zu vergessen, damit si von dem kung auch gnädlichen bedacht werd, angesehen das si in disen sachen sich gar trüwlich vnd dienstlichen erzögt haben." Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 517.

at the foot of the Jura enabled it to render other services besides those of negotiation. Its citizens had patrolled the mountain passes, gone as spies into the enemy's camps, and taken part in marauding expeditions, bringing back valuable information and agreeable reports of the profit that might be made.¹² A party of them now joined the troops of Berne, who, on resuming their march, struck into a romantic gorge, unlike anything in Alpine scenery, and combining many characteristic beauties of the Jura — deep and narrow, yet without gloom; lined not with continuous walls, the vast foundations of cloud-enveloped Alps, but with broken crags and pinnacles of the most varied and startling forms; with side-glances into sunny and fertile vales, and reaches of forest, where the bright warm green of the beech bursts forth in streaks amid the sombre foliage of the fir; below, the bounding Suze takes many an upward leap, sporting with the boulders in its bed and filling the whole ravine with its laugh.

At Sonceboz they turned to the right, crossing the watershed between the Val Saint-Imier and the plain of Tavannes, and descending into the latter through the Pierre-Pertuis, with its Roman inscription overhead, and in the rock beneath a cavern from which the Birs darts forth into the sunlight. Thirty years before, when the French dauphin, now king, was leading a horde of brigands to devastate the homes of his present allies, the waters of that stream had

¹² Bleich, *Geschichte der Stadt Biel*, B. II. s. 284-289. — A valuable work, based on the registers of the canton.

run red with Swiss blood. Gladdened, doubtless, by this reminiscence of national valor, the troops pursued their way through villages and meadows along the banks of the Birs, and plunged into the grand defile of the Münsterthal, where the tossed precipices, as if struggling for disenthralment, seem to share in the hurry of the boiling torrent below and the flying clouds above. Emerging on an elevated plain girt by low hills and marked by a quiet and pensive grace, they quitted the Birs and the main road at Delsberg, and winding around the base of Mont Terrible, descended to Pruntrut, a favorite residence of the bishops of Basel. From here their course lay across an angle of the great Alsatian plain, until they reached the spur connecting the Jura with the Vosges. Ascending through dense woods, they arrived on the evening of the 5th of November in the neighborhood of Héricourt, where a castle, from which the Burgundian bands were wont to sally, was now occupied by a small garrison under Stephen von Hagenbach.

Their route had been that of many a summer tourist. But the season was no longer summer. The drenching rains of autumn had produced much discomfort and spoiled the roads. Long halts had been necessary; and the wagons being still far behind, there were no tents or shelter of any kind, and no store of provisions. At nightfall a sharp frost set in. Lying chilled and hungry on the dank leaves, the men were nevertheless full of merriment, while

awaiting the arrival of their comrades, of whom only a small company had yet come up.¹²

The others were, however, close at hand. They had rendezvoused at Basel, which was also the gathering-place of the troops from the Rhine towns, and which had been for some days in a fever of excitement. It cannot be too strongly noted, that the allied towns of Alsace were engaging in this contest with very different feelings from the Swiss. If any motive other than those we have traced had influenced the latter, it was their innate love of battle, a physical delight in the struggle and the tumult, which made them careless of all risks and cruel without passion. Although in the field their superior ardor would be conspicuous, the enemy was still with them an object neither of hatred nor of fear.

But the people of the Rhineland had continually before their eyes the spectacle of the duke of Burgundy coming at the head of his forces to avenge his murdered lieutenant, to recover his purloined rights, and to build up a dominion on the ruins of states and cities. Such apprehensions were natural and sound; the intense rancor produced by them was not less natural, though highly morbid. That inflamed imagination which had depicted Peter von Hagenbach as a demon incarnate now exercised its art upon Hagenbach's master. It was reported and believed that whoever ventured to offer him counsel

¹² Letter of Scharnachtal to Berne, in the Girard MSS. — Schilling, s. 137, 138.

was instantly run through the body; that his heart-broken wife, spurned from his feet while pleading against his mad designs, had died of grief—twenty-seven years before that event occurred in the ordinary course of nature; that, when he had no other object on which to wreak his fury, the tyrant amused himself with lopping off the limbs of cradled infants.¹⁵ Every rumor from Neuss occasioned an access of exultation or despair. At one moment “the fiend” had set his foot upon the neck of prostrate Europe; at another, “the hound” had been scourged back to his kennel.

In this quarter, therefore, dissensions had given place to unity. Nor was the league the less strong that it included those who were pursuing the most opposite aims. The towns thought only of securing their municipal independence; while Austria hoped by its leadership to acquire a firmer status of authority. The bishop of Basel, an acute politician, saw an opportunity for the extension of his own territory; while the bishop of Strasburg, an old friend of the robber-knights and a recipient of blackmail until forced by Hagenbach to dispense with these unlawful gains, expected the return of the good old times of disorder and rapine.¹⁶ It was a sufficient bond that all were conscious of a common peril, and that all looked to Swiss assistance as their

¹⁵ Knebel, *1ste Abth.* c. 94, 152, et al.—No similar ebullitions are to be found in the contemporary Swiss chronicles, who, with the ex-

ception of Schilling, almost always speak of Charles with respect.

¹⁶ Mone, *Neimchronik über Peter von Hagenbach*, Einleitung.

only safeguard. As the Alpine warriors poured through Basel, the citizens threw open their doors, and sought to fraternize with their guests, whose robust forms, swinging gait, and air of swaggering confidence found favor in all eyes.¹⁷

On the 7th of November eighteen thousand men were assembled in front of the little fortress of Héricourt. Of this number eight thousand were from the Swiss cantons and the Helvetian states in immediate alliance with them. None were absent save those of Unterwalden and Appenzell, neither of which, as Berne resentfully noticed, had sent out a single man.¹⁸ Strasburg and Basel had furnished the artillery — pieces chiefly of an unwieldy size, and capable at the most of being loaded and discharged once an hour. The civic militia wore the colors of their different towns, some white and blue, some red and green — a variety of shades and combinations. Four hundred Austrian cavalry were led by William Herter, of Tübingen, an experienced soldier, formerly in the Burgundian service, who, in deference to his master's rank and position in the league, was invested with the chief command. But instead of the red cross of Austria, which might have revived unpleasant memories, the white cross, the emblem of the Swiss Confederacy, was adopted by the whole army — a politic compliment to those who had modestly but firmly resisted all attempts to raise them to the rank of "principals" in the war.¹⁹

¹⁷ Knebel, 1ste Abth. a. 81.

¹⁸ Deutch Missiven-Buch C, 331, 348, MS. (Archives of Berne.)

¹⁹ "Dann mengerlei gegen inen erdacht und gebrucht ward, das man sy gern zu Houpthechern des

For several days the cannon pounded away, with small effect upon the walls. The Swiss soldiers, unused to waiting, demanded a change in the programme: they wished to storm the works first and leave the Strasburgers to batter them afterwards. The natives of the Oberland and other high regions were especially impatient. They could not so well endure the cold as those who, coming from a milder climate, were habitually less sheltered,²⁰ and they were anxious to get back to their dark Alpine valleys before winter should have sealed them up. "For God's sake," they cried, "send us forward to the assault! We had rather be killed outright than lie here freezing." But their leaders replied that they were there to do work for Austria, and must conform themselves to Austrian methods.²¹

Scharnachthal, indeed, proposed that the Swiss, or a portion of them, should go off on a separate expedition. He wished, like the council of Berne, to get rid of the restrictions under which the war had been proclaimed. But the other chiefs declared themselves limited by their instructions to the policy and plan laid down by the diet, and he dared not press them, lest he should endanger the unanimity so important at this stage of the movement.²²

Kriegs gemacht hette, wana das sy solliche mit grosser Vernunft allwegen furskament, und verantwort." Schilling, s. 134.

²⁰ Rodt, B. I. s. 314.

²¹ "Der Krieg wer der Herrschaft, der Willen und Gefallen volt man auch darinne erwarten." Schilling, s. 139.

²² "So haben unser Eidgenossen das nit wellen gestalten und gemeint dem abschied zu Veldkirch und zu letzten so Lutzern gemacht nachzukomen. . . . Do haben wir si nit wolen unwillig machen." Scharnachthal to Berne, Girard MSS.

The approach of a hostile army put an end to all complaints and difficulties. The governor of Franche-Comté, Henri de Neufchâtel, count of Blamont and lord of Héricourt, had hastily mustered the feudal levies within reach, securing in addition the services of a large body of recruits from Lombardy, then passing through the province to the siege of Neusa. These together gave him a force of about eight thousand cavalry and four thousand foot.²⁵ Not inclined to offer battle to superior numbers, he occupied a village a few leagues from Héricourt and intrenched his camp, intending to draw off the besiegers by a demonstration, hold them at bay in front of his works, and in the mean time throw reinforcements and provisions into the castle.

Such devices were common in mediæval warfare, and generally, as in the present instance, insured a defeat. No sooner had the fires with which the Burgundians were clearing a place for their camp given warning to the allies, than they sent their scouts to reconnoitre while arranging their plan of operations. The conclusion adopted was in accordance with the simple but effective principles of Swiss tactics. It was agreed to leave a small body of the Alsatian militia in charge of the siege, and to fall upon the enemy wherever he might be found. Word was brought that the outposts had been attacked. It was early in the morning of the 14th of Novem-

²⁵ Some of the chroniclers rate this force at 20,000, while Godet, who had probably good means of knowing, makes it only 5000. In the text we have followed a letter from the council of Berne to the king.

ber. The men were hearing mass and at the same time eating breakfast. Drums were beat; the priests shut their books; the soldiers snatched their weapons. The troops of Zurich, being nearest, marched in the van. Those of Berne, posted on the opposite side of a stream, had a long détour to make.

Between the two armies was a range of heights covered with woods and traversed by watercourses. The Swiss, unacquainted with the ways, were guided by a faint cannonade, opened by the enemy, and replied to, after a time, by a few field-pieces which Herter had succeeded in moving to the front. Emerging on a plain, surrounded by woods, they saw before them the glittering harness of the Burgundian cavalry,²² drawn up in battle array, and prepared for the preliminary skirmishing by which Blumont's design was to be carried out. But skirmishing had no place in the Swiss modes of combat. While the troops were reforming their ranks and saying their preparatory prayer, the corps of Berne, fiery youths not yet broken to the yoke of discipline, came up on the left, and, without waiting for any word of command, started forward to the attack. The others followed instantly. A regular front was formed, but no further dispositions were possible.

Nor were any necessary. Those moving *chevaux-de-frise*, that resolute tread and confident aspect, those deep, firm cries — "Saint Vincent and Berne!"

²² "Sachens vor dem Walde, Glitzern im Harnsch gut." *Héricourt-Lied*, Schilling, s. 148.

"Saint Urs for Solothurn!" — produced their invariable effect upon men confronted for the first time with the appalling apparition. The Burgundians, without waiting to meet it, broke and fled.²⁰ Some squadrons of horse, feudal nobles and their retainers, wheeled repeatedly with the purpose of securing the retreat of the foot; and a body of foot, eight hundred peasants of the lordship of Faucogney, made a stand for the honor of their prince, to whom they owed their recent enfranchisement from serfdom. But such as stood, stood only to be slaughtered, and they who threw away their arms and knelt for mercy shared the same fate. To give quarter in the heat of combat was opposed to every maxim of Swiss discipline. There could be no conceivable motive for it but the wish to obtain the ransom-money, and while two men were securing a captive, or wrangling over their claims to him, each might have slain a dozen. It was therefore forbidden to make prisoners, on the same principle on which it was forbidden to quit the foe in search of plunder.

For the better part of a league the pursuit was kept up without relaxation, and at every step the spears and halberds drank fresh blood. But butchery at the best is heavy work, and the unusual eagerness of the Swiss had abridged their powers of endurance. While they wiped their sweating brows and bloody weapons, the Austrian cavaliers, who had hitherto hung back, came creeping up along the flanks.

²⁰ "Die burgundischen fluchen zu stund, e, sy an einandren kampend." Edlibach, i. 144.

They were exhorted to push on and finish the work. "Will you stand by us?" they asked. "Stand by you! ay, and lift you into your saddles if you tumble off!" was the somewhat contemptuous reply. So encouraged they started forward, but, less furious or less punctilious than the Swiss, soon fell to making prisoners.

A rich booty was found in the camp—horses, arms, silk trappings, a quantity of silver, and what at the moment was most acceptable of all, a supply of provisions ready cooked and of full-bodied Burgundian wine, such as rarely found its way down Swiss throats. That of the choicest flavor was secured by Scharnachthal for his colleagues at home. In the village numbers of the panting fugitives had hid themselves in cellars and lofts. To save the trouble of hunting them out, the buildings were set on fire, and, while the flames crackled, the soldiers quenched their thirst and plunged into a mad carouse. It was necessary to stave in the remaining casks before their leaders could get them back to camp.

Sixteen hundred and seventeen dead bodies were counted the next day on the field; and the ashes of several hundred more lay undistinguishable among the heaps left by the consumed cottages. The victors had not lost a man.²⁶ Amid their rejoicings the Swiss remembered somewhat ruefully the large number among whom the booty must be shared.²⁷ They

²⁶ "Ein gross sach und nitt an besunder gottlich gnad vollbracht." Berne to the king, Deutsch Misiven-Buch C, 334, *MS.*—All the

official reports agree on this point. ²⁷ Scharnachthal to Berne, Girard *MSS.*

were suspected by their allies of an intention to monopolize the whole.²⁸ To avoid dissension, it was collected for removal to Basel, where commissioners would meet to make an appraisal and settle the distribution. In like manner the prisoners, of whom there were seventy or upwards, would be valued according to their respective ability to redeem themselves. Scharnachthal expressed his strong regret that they had not all been "hewn down;"²⁹ and the council of Berne were equally indignant, especially on learning that "they were not all rich."³⁰ Basel, on the contrary, found an ample satisfaction in disposing of those who were poor. Eighteen Lombards, worth neither more nor less than the armor of which they had been stripped, were charged with heresy, sacrilege, sodomy, or whatever else it was convenient to allege against them,³¹ and were burned to death with as much of rite and ceremony as belongs to all the forms of human sacrifice, pagan or Christian.³²

²⁸ "Die schweizer hatten sie bereits unter sich allein vertheilt," writes Knebel (1ste Abth. s. 89), who, here as elsewhere, is a better authority for the rumor than for the fact.

²⁹ "Es wäre besser gewesen man hätte sie allen niedergehauen." Scharnachthal to Berne, Girard MSS.

³⁰ "Ir sind bi. xxi, [an overstatement] und sitt all rich, wir wollten es were anders mitt inen gehandelt." Berne to Diesbach, Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 348, MS.

³¹ "Concubitores masculorum, et

mulierum vulvas consuantes . . . , violatores ecclesiarum, . . . effusores crismatis olei," &c., &c., &c. Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 107.

³² The Swiss diet received the announcement of this proceeding with calm indifference (*Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. n. 523). But Schilling writes of it with the unction of a Dominican: "Das doch nit allein Gott dem almechtigen, und unserm Christenlichen Glauben loblich, sunder auch aller Müsschen Ehre was, und ein Urkunde, das sy semlicher Ketzaria fiend sind."

After the victory the siege was resumed; but its progress was as slow as before. The walls, enormously thick, might be chipped away for weeks or months without being perforated; and permission to storm was still refused as likely to result in a heavy and useless loss of life. It was known that the besieged would surrender on terms, but the besiegers were loath to grant them any. At length the severity of the weather, the impatience of the troops, and a sickness which broke out amongst them, made it necessary to agree to a capitulation. The garrison, two hundred and fifty in number, after being paraded over the battle-field, were reluctantly dismissed; the castle was turned over to the Austrians; and the army scattered as quickly as it had assembled.³³

"Let your schultheiss give an account of all this to the king; it will make to our honor," were the words with which Scharnachthal concluded his report.³⁴ The council, without needing the suggestion, wrote immediately not only to Diesbach, but at greater length to Louis himself. Informing him that the moment the alliance was settled, and in conform-

³³ In this account of the siege and battle of Héricourt, we have followed chiefly the reports of Scharnachthal, and other leaders, in the Girard MSS., Bläsch, and Knebel; letters of Berne in the Deutsch Museum-Buch C, MS.; a letter in the Archives of Saint-Gall (Stifts-Archiv); and a manuscript chronicle in the Bibliothèque Cantonale

Vaudaise—Cronica von dem Ursprung und alten Geschichten der Stadt Zürich, written in 1519, and apparently compiled from official

³⁴ "Lasset doch durch euren Schultheissen dies alles dem konig kund machen, es reicht uns zu Ehren." Girard MSS.

ity therewith, the troops had taken their departure in sight of his envoys, with whom this and other matters had been concerted,³⁵ they proceeded to give that full narration which he would naturally expect, and which it was their duty to supply.³⁶ No report was sent to the emperor; nor did Frederick, when he heard of the expedition, affect to consider it as undertaken at his desire or as tending to his advantage. But by Louis it was accepted as faithful service, an earnest of the zeal with which his cause had been embraced. He gave a liberal guerdon to the bearer of the news,³⁷ and sent back a special messenger with a long letter full of thanks and praises.³⁸ His satisfaction was complete. True, his enemy had received no wound that would leave a permanent scar; the immediate benefit to himself was as little as to the emperor. But blood had been spilled — Burgundian blood, by Swiss spears; and what fruit that would bear none knew better than he, who knew so well the temper of the two parties.

It might be feared that he was too completely, too easily, satisfied. He seemed in some danger of considering any further exertions superfluous. That on his side there had been no symptom of a warlike movement, that instead of the simultaneous attack which he had promised, he had been entering into new negotiations with Charles, was precisely what

³⁵ "Mit den wir das und ander
luter beschlossen." Deutsch Mis-
siven-Buch C. 346. *MS.*

³⁶ *Ibid.* 334. *MS.*

³⁷ Berne to Strasburg, &c. *Ibid.*
352. *MS.*

³⁸ *Ibid.* 349. *MS.*

might have been anticipated. But his slackness in sending the expected pensions could proceed only from that careless security which was apt to overtake him when all seemed to be going prosperously.

If so, his confidence was premature. Hardly had the Swiss taken the leap when they began to ask themselves what they had gained by it and where it would land them. They were too familiar with victory to be dazzled by their exploit. The soldiers had not received their stipulated wages, for Sigismund too was waiting for his pension. The booty was still undivided. So far, the only result of this short campaign was the sickness which the men had brought home with them, and which they were spreading among their neighbors.³⁹ And meantime the king had not stirred. His auxiliaries were to carry on the war alone, and apparently at their own expense!

Berne became uneasy. The council wrote to Diesbach, inquiring why nothing had been attempted by any of the king's people, and conjuring him to use his utmost ability and the greatest possible despatch in securing the objects of his mission. He would himself understand how much they depended upon him in the present position of this burdensome business,⁴⁰ in which, as was too evident, Berne had a deeper interest than any other member of the Confederacy.⁴¹

³⁹ Berne to Diesbach, *Ibid.* 348. MS. an uch mer dann vil is gelegen." *Ibid.* 331. MS.

⁴⁰ "Dann ir wol verstan nach gestalt disser swärer louff das unne" ⁴¹ "Mercken doch das unnsre statt mer dann jemand anders ge-

Addressing themselves directly to Louis, they earnestly begged that he would display the same activity which had been shown by them. "Inasmuch," they said, "as our expedition was undertaken for your majesty's especial honor, it is right that on your part also there should be an earnest and effective attack."⁴² They besought him to finish the business as soon as possible with their *schultheiss*, "a principal promoter of this thing,"⁴³ and expressed their confidence — therein revealing their want of confidence — that the latter would meet with fair dealing.⁴⁴

No replies being received, the anxiety grew deeper. As the matter now hung, Berne stood committed for the good faith of both parties. It had pledged itself to the other cantons for the fulfilment of the royal promises, and it had sent off the treaty sealed only by itself, but with an assurance that it was the act of the whole Confederacy and would be ratified by every member. What would happen if, through the remissness of Louis and the apathy of the Swiss, Berne were left to meet alone the rebound of the ball which it had set in motion? The council continued their letters at short intervals. They informed Diesbach that his silence had brought them into great embarrassment. All

halten werde." Ibid. ubi supra.

⁴² "Dann nach dem wir solchs uwer k. m. zu besunder ore understanden haben, so ist ouch billich das uff ir sit ouch treffenlich kreflig angriff bestochen." Ibid. 334. MS.

⁴³ "Ein besunder fürdrer disses ding." Ibid. ubi supra. MS.

⁴⁴ "Und wol verrotechen das ihm dheim untrow begegne." Ibid. ubi supra. MS.

sorts of rumors were circulating about the king — for example, that he had concluded a peace with the enemy — which, though believing them to be groundless, they had no means of contradicting.⁴⁶ In his letter of congratulations he had told them that he had given orders to the Sire de Craon, his lieutenant in Champagne, “to be helpful to them in all ways;” but such language was too vague to give them any comfort.⁴⁷ They had written to Craon, telling him that, “having entered into the war at the king’s urgent desire,” they expected active support.⁴⁸ As they reflected on the possible consequences of their precipitate action, they were seized with a trepidation. “The duke of Burgundy,” they wrote, “has still a force in Franche-Comté. His business at Neuss will soon be ended, when he will draw together all his power and march in this direction, letting us perceive by his acts that the injury done him has gone to his heart.⁴⁹ If, therefore, there be any bad faith shown towards us, which we will not suffer ourselves to think, it will bring upon us troubles and burdens from which may God protect us.”⁵⁰ At present

⁴⁶ “Dann allerley worten under unsern eidgnossen von des konigs wegen gebraucht werden, das er mit dem hertzen von Burgund solle ein friden gemacht haben, darumb wir keinen grund können vernemen, das uns doch ganz unruhig macht.” Ibid. 351. *MS.*

⁴⁷ Ibid. 348. *MS.*

⁴⁸ “Als wir solich krieg besunder in anstechen des kunigs haben understanden, also begeren wir ouch

an ouch,” &c. Berne to Craon, Ibid. 347. *MS.*

⁴⁹ “Sin sachen vor Neuss werden sich bald enden, so wil er mit gantzer macht heruff und sich in solicher mass erzoegen das merklich gesehen das im der getün schad zu hertzen gang.” Ibid. 348. *MS.*

⁵⁰ “Sollt zu darinn untraw der wir uns doch zu denckung nit versehen, gebrucht were, ward allerley beswürnus und irrung davor

there was nothing so necessary as Diesbach's immediate return. This would silence "the great talk" throughout the Confederacy. Let him take precautions on his journey and come attended by a guard. Geneva and other places through which he must pass were full of Lombards on their way into Burgundy, and neither the government nor the populace could be looked upon as friendly.⁶⁰

The closing piece of advice was not without grounds. Diesbach so far acted upon it as to assume a disguise. But in Geneva, where, from peculiar motives, a strong hostile feeling existed, he was recognized, hustled by a mob, and obliged to run for his life — an indignity which neither he nor Berne was likely to forget. He reached home about the 1st of January. No money had been sent by him, but it was to follow immediately in charge of an embassy. He had brought the treaty, duly ratified, although the king had still some amendments to suggest, which, however, he would leave to be settled verbally.⁶¹ He and all France rejoiced over the victory. He had himself taken some castles, and had no thought of making a peace, or at all events he had concluded none.⁶² He had assented to a conference, but it was merely idle words to blind the

unns gott behut bringen." Ibid. ubi supra. *MS.*

⁶⁰ Ibid. ubi supra. *MS.*

⁶¹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 522.

⁶² "Und ganz keinen friden mit dem hertzen von Burgund gemacht

noch beschlossen und sie noch nit im willen das zu thun." Berne to Strasburg, &c., Deutsch Meissen-Buch C, 352. *MS.* — The words in *Italia* are struck out, an indication of doubt, as their insertion had been of the desire for assurance.

enemy as to his intentions. His communications with the schultheiss had been most satisfactory; he was fully resolved to adhere to his engagements, and in very truth there was nothing to be perceived in him but graciousness and entire good faith.⁵³ Having delivered this cheering report, Diesbach, at the desire of the council, proceeded to Lucerne, to collect the ratifications of the cantons.

But the troubles of Berne were not yet over. Week after week went by without the arrival of the much desired gold. The agitation in the Confederacy increased. Nor was it only against the mutterings of suspicion or the cries of impatience that Berne had to contend. An active enemy was in the field. A hand not unpractised in political manœuvring, a female hand, small and soft, but nimble withal, had taken hold of the knot so ingeniously tied by Louis. The king's sister was trying to undo her brother's work.

History is seldom quite just to historical women. It treats their feminine characteristics, which in politics must be expected to display themselves with quite as much vigor as in other spheres of activity, simply as defects; and it is apt also to forget that the embarrassments which beset a woman are greater than those of a man, who generally receives far less help in creating his. No prince in Europe had a more difficult game to play than Yolande of Sa-

⁵³ "Und als wir verstan, so können wir in rechter warheit anders mit erkennen dann mœglich guad und gantz getruwen willen." Ibid. ubi supra. *MS.*

voy. For neighbors, all of them eager to assist and protect her, she had Louis of France, Charles of Burgundy, the duke of Milan, and Berne. At home, as her supporters in the regency, of which they would readily have relieved her, she had her husband's four brothers, the counts of Bresse, Romont, and Geneva, and the bishop of Geneva. Such was her position. Her policy is not less easily indicated. Its simple object was to preserve in security and independence the heritage of her son.

Hence, though a foreigner, she was patriotic; though a Frenchwoman and the king's sister, she had no leanings towards France. She was a good mother and an equitable ruler. Her children received the most careful education, and her internal administration was economical and popular.⁵⁴

She was not the less, in quickness of intellect and addiction to intrigue, the "true sister" of Louis the Eleventh.⁵⁵ She knew how to plot and to coquet—yet like a woman, never with long calculations, or precautions against opposite contingencies. Her brother watched her sprightly motions with fraternal sympathy. His interest increased as he perceived that she was going beyond her depth. He trembled for her when he saw her establishing an intimacy with Galeas Sforza.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ See the *Chroniques de Yolande de France*, edited by M. Léon Menabrea for the Royal Academy of Savoy; and *Cibario, Istituzioni della Monarchia di Savoia*, p. 114 et seq.

⁵⁵ "Elle estoit tres seige et vraye

sœur du Roy" Commines, tom. ii. p. 19.

⁵⁶ "Sua sora e una femina, e non intende l'arte del Duca di Milano." *Dépêches des Ambassadeurs Milanais*, tom. i. p. 89.

But Yolande had the courage of her sex, proceeding from an indistinct appreciation of danger and from boundless faith in a strong upholding arm. From obvious motives, and with a dexterous turn, she had eluded the protection of Louis and thrown herself on that of Burgundy. She felt herself safe with Charles, who had no designs against her, and who did not treat her as a blind tool. One advantage which she derived from the change was its neutralizing effect upon the internal factions. It brought over to her side the count of Romont and the bishop of Geneva, who were devoted to Burgundy; and it drove the headstrong Philip of Bresse, who carried with him the other brother, to desert his own party and ruin himself with his natural adherents by going over to his ancient enemy, the king. Besides this immediate gain, there was a brilliant hope. She could indulge the dream that her young Philibert would in time be pitched upon as the most suitable partner for the Burgundian heiress.

Having chosen her side, Yolande remained true to it when threatening combinations were beginning to be formed. This is the capital fault of her life, condemned as such by all historians. Her apologist is obliged to invent a fact, that he may excuse so extraordinary a deviation from the rules of sound policy.⁶⁷ As the prospect thickened, her partisan-

⁶⁷ The author of the *Chroniques* had obtained from Charles a signed promise to give his daughter in marriage to the young duke. de Yolande asserts, but in a manner which betrays his own want of knowledge on the point, that she

ship became more active. Woman-like, she volunteered her help — such help as a woman might properly render. She conceived that she would be doing an essential service to Charles, as well as to herself, by winning over the duke of Milan, the hereditary friend of Louis.

Several years before Sforza, after vainly manoeuvring to exclude Savoy from a general peace of the Italian states, had marched an army to its frontiers. Venice, never partial to displays of personal ambition in the peninsula, had immediately marched its own army to the frontiers of Milan. Thus brought to a standstill, the duke invoked the interposition of France, on the grounds that his movement against Savoy had been provoked by its opposition to the king, and that the insolent Venetians were the natural enemies of all princes.⁸⁸ But Louis, who understood Italian politics too well to meddle with them, replied simply that he should leave his interests beyond the Alps to the sole care of his ally.⁸⁹

Since then the combinations had altered. Milan and Venice were joined in a league; Sforza and Yolande were carrying on a confidential intercourse. The policy of Sforza was not deep, for it consisted merely in deceit. But, though ineffective for great purposes, it enabled him to move with ease and safety among the pitfalls of diplomacy. He listened attentively to Yolande while she painted the advan-

⁸⁸ *Instructio domini A. Spinule* *Herzoge von Mailand, Notizenblatt, ad Franconum Regem; Briefe und* 1856, s. 36, 37.
Actenstücke zur Geschichte der

⁸⁹ Spinuli's report, *Ibid.* s. 82.

tages of a union with Burgundy. He saw for himself that he derived none from his union with France. He would only be following the example of all the other Italian governments.⁶⁰ He could break the treaty or hold to it at his convenience. As soon as it was formed, he could despatch a secret message to Louis, with assurances of continued friendship and exhortations to renew the war against Charles, and to press it vigorously while the opportunity was so good.⁶¹ Nor need it prevent him from fanning the flame in Switzerland,⁶² where any commotion that did not threaten to cross the Alps was always welcome. Meanwhile he could keep an embassy at the court of Burgundy, which would take the measure of this far-blazing meteor and calculate its course. Science would profit by the observations.

Sforza gave his consent. Yolande pressed the matter not less vehemently upon Charles,⁶³ whose personal aversion was overbalanced, not merely by the gratification of detaching from Louis an old and close ally, but by the fresh facilities he would obtain for his enlistments in Italy. A defensive league was accordingly formed, the two parties to assist each other in case of necessity with a certain number of lances or a certain amount of money. Ambassadors fully empowered met at Montecallerio, where the treaty was signed on the 30th of January, 1475.

⁶⁰ See the remark of Commynes (tom. ii. p. 14) as to the motives of Sforza.

⁶¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 27.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 32.

⁶³ See the preamble of Charles's ratification of this treaty, Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 360.

Immediately afterwards a Milanese envoy, Giovanni Pietro Panigarola, crossed the mountains at the risk of his life in the depth of the severest winter which had been known for twenty-five years,⁶⁴ traversed a long line of country swarming with loose parties of soldiery and brigands, and made his way to the camp before Neuss, whither many feet besides his were now wending, and on which the eyes of all Europe were intently fixed.

This triumph of her diplomacy gave Yolande fresh spirits for a more arduous affair, one in which her own interests were more deeply involved. The friendship between Savoy and Berne was of ancient date. While the Bear was a mere cub, it had owed much to the benignity of its princely neighbor; and since its maturity, it had made ample acknowledgment of the debt,⁶⁵ which in its own ursine fashion it was about to repay. So strong was the trust placed in its good will that the count of Romont, when about to assume the post of lieutenant-general in the Netherlands, had appeared before the council and requested permission to leave the Pays de Vaud during his absence under the protection of Berne. The council accepted the charge.

This was in the spring of 1474. A few months later, when Berne, confident of the final success of the French intrigue, was preparing to give effect to

⁶⁴ Panigarola to the duke of Milan, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 47.

⁶⁵ "Divi quondam Sebardiæ inclutissimi duces, qui rem nostram pub-

licam haud segniore studio continuis incrementis auerunt." Berne to the regent of Savoy, May 27, 1474. *Lateinisches Museum-Buch A*, 289 b. *MS.*

the scheme at the instant of its adoption by the diet, it began a quarrel with Yolande about the passage through Savoy of the Italian bands enlisted for the Burgundian service. The regent defended her conduct on the ground that there was no war between her allies, that a similar privilege had been often extended to Berne itself,⁵⁵ and that she intended to preserve a strict neutrality, giving no offence to any party. She would do everything to retain the friendship of the Swiss, and she asked to be allowed to mediate between them and Burgundy if any differences had arisen.⁵⁷

Had she made the concession required, it would have formed only a step to larger demands. With a true strategical instinct, Berne had already fixed upon the Savoyard territory on this side the Alps as the pivot both of its communications with France and of its operations against Burgundy. With this view it entered into a secret correspondence with Philip of Bresse,⁵⁸ whose unscrupulous character, enmity to Yolande, and present dependence for his very subsistence on the bounty of the king,⁶⁰ made him a ready and fitting agent in a design of this kind. A month before war had been declared against Burgundy, Berne sent a small party to surprise the castle of Sainte-Croix in the district of Grandson, while the count of Bresse, with a hundred and fifty

⁵⁵ Letter of Yolande to the count of Gruyères, Menabréa, appendix.

⁵⁷ *Eugenossische Abschiede*, B. II. n. 498.

⁵⁸ The letters "Domino Philip-

po," which are numerous, are in the *Latinsches Missiven-Buch*.

⁶⁰ His own acknowledgment to this effect, in the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 98.

French lances, made a simultaneous attack on the town of Annecy. Both attempts failed, in part through the vigilance of the bishop of Geneva, who, in reporting them to Yolande, informed her that his brother had made futile endeavors to obtain his adhesion to the plot.⁷⁰

After war had been declared, Yolande, with the consent of Charles, but probably with no expectation on his part of any good result, renewed her offers of mediation. The diet answered coldly that the matter concerned the Empire and the house of Austria; if the opposite party chose to make propositions to the Swiss, he might do so, but not through the intervention of others.⁷¹ The complaint about the Lombards was pressed with greater vehemency. "These troops," replied Yolande, "are not to be used against the Swiss."⁷² "They are to be used," retorted Berne, "against the Empire, of which both you and we are members."⁷³ This was putting the question on a different ground from that of treaty-obligations, and Yolande had an obvious rejoinder. If her dispute lay with the Empire, she would settle it with the emperor and the electoral princes.⁷⁴ But Berne was not disposed for argument. It declined further correspondence, sent what it termed "a last warning,"⁷⁵ and obtained a vote of the diet that the Lombards,

⁷⁰ Guichenon, *Hist. de Savoie*, tom. ii. p. 424. — Menabréa, appendix.

⁷¹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 523.

⁷² Menabréa, appendix.

⁷³ Deutsch Meissner-Buch C, 324, 402. *MS.*

⁷⁴ Ibid. 372. *MS.*

⁷⁵ Ibid. 324, 331, *MS.* — Schilling, s. 215, 216.

on their march through the Valais, should be pounced upon and destroyed.⁷⁶

What restrained Berne from the immediate fulfilment of its threats, from pouring its troops into the neutral territory it desired to occupy, was not so much the suspended state of the French treaty as a necessary regard for the peculiar and delicate position of Freyburg. That state had, for its own convenience, voluntarily accepted the feudal sovereignty of Savoy. The vassalage was purely nominal, but it involved at least some compliance with the laws and usages of an intimate relationship. Forced into the war against Burgundy, Freyburg struggled longer, yet under the disadvantages of its own clear foresight of the natural consequences of that war, against a rupture with Savoy. It resisted the proposal of Berne for a joint seizure of several places important from their geographical position. It entreated forbearance in consideration of the regent's difficult situation, and it appointed envoys of its own to assist hers in obtaining equitable terms.⁷⁷ On the other hand, both for its own security and because it knew all the engines that were being used and the powerlessness of Yolande to withstand their concentrated pressure, Freyburg urged upon her the necessity of yielding, and concurred with Berne in some of its menacing words and compulsory measures. It wished, however, nothing more than to compel her to the maintenance of an absolute neutrality, forget-

⁷⁶ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 523, 526.

⁷⁷ Girard MSS. — Deutsch Missionen-Buch C, 383. MS.

ting that it had been unable to preserve its own neutrality, and that for Savoy this would be equally impossible.

Yolande was in a dilemma. To refuse a passage to the Lombards would be to break the alliance which she looked upon as her strongest safeguard against France. Yet she was fully alive to the importance of maintaining her friendly relations with the Swiss. She resolved to spare no efforts for attaining a solution of the difficulty. She accepted, though with a natural distrust, the good offices of Freyburg. She deputed the conduct of the affair to the count of Gruyères, marshal of Savoy, whose estates bordered on Berne, whose people had allied themselves with that canton, and who had himself proposed to turn back the Lombards. She even consented—and her consent, we acknowledge, admits of no explanation save the fact of her being a woman—that Philip of Bresse should have a share in the negotiation.⁷⁸

Before such mediators Berne had no need to conceal the real nature and full extent of its design. The count of Bresse had gone for the express purpose of stimulating mischief. The count of Gruyères, though he wished for peace, had resolved, in any event, not to endanger his estates by taking part against Berne. The principal demands were these: the regent in her own name and that of her son to declare immediate war against Burgundy; all the places, roads, and passes of Savoy, and especially of

⁷⁸ Rodt, *Die Grafen von Greysen*, s. 318 et al.

the Pays de Vaud, to be opened to the Swiss armies; the count of Romont to be immediately recalled; twelve thousand florins, in two instalments, to be paid as an indemnity for the insult to Diesbach, and three important towns—Morat, Yverdon, and another—to be given up as security until the final discharge. These terms were to be taken as an ultimatum, and fifteen days were allowed for a definitive answer.⁷⁹

Now, then, Yolande had been explicitly informed of her intended fate—to be dragged at the chariot wheel of Louis, in the midst of his Swiss myrmidons. She met these “strange and dishonorable requests”⁸⁰ with a passionate refusal. Two considerations inspired her with the hope of making a successful resistance. The Milanese treaty had just been signed: she trusted that the “triple alliance,” which she called upon Sforza to announce, would intimidate Berne.⁸¹ Her second and surer card lay in the internal divisions of the Confederacy, which had become a matter of notoriety abroad, and of which she had already prepared to take advantage.

She did not propose to separate her interests from those of Charles. How was it possible, when she was bidden to do so only that she might sacrifice her interests to those of Louis? In an appeal to the

⁷⁹ Jean Dupont to the duchess of Savoy, Jan. 28, 1475, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 14–18. — Summons from Berne to the duchess, *Latéinisches Musiven-Buch A*, 324. *MS.*

⁸⁰ “Stranee et deshonestes recheutes facts pei Bernesi.” *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 19.

⁸¹ *Ibid.* pp. 20, 33, et al.

seven cantons she treated the threats against herself and the attacks upon her ally as proceeding from a common source. Berne, from motives of its own, had bred this confusion. Would the Confederates consent to be thus driven along by private ambition and cupidity? Their forefathers had never declared war except from public motives, with sufficient cause, and after ripe deliberation. For herself, she would spare no pains or cost to restore quiet, but she would resist the dictation of those whose only object was to stir up strife.⁸²

Agents were sent to disseminate these and similar remonstrances, and by practising with influential persons as well as with the people generally, to foment suspicions in regard to France and a jealousy of Berne.⁸³ Nor were these manoeuvres altogether fruitless. Even the diet, with Diesbach as its presiding genius and with Unterwalden unrepresented, felt the pressure from without and modified its previous action. It was resolved that no state should commence a war against Savoy without the knowledge and consent of at least a majority of the cantons. It was further voted — perhaps with as little intention as there was obviously little power to give effect to the vote — that the pensions which private individuals were commonly believed to be receiving from foreign governments had an injurious tendency, and should be given up. These resolutions were balanced by another, which might have been

⁸² Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 372 ⁸³ Schilling, s. 217, 218.
et seq. *MS.*

anticipated, that any canton receiving a communication of whatever nature from the regent of Savoy should bring it before the whole Confederacy.⁸⁴ Outside the diet the opposition took a more decided form. The count of Gruyères, who hitherto had done his best to frighten the regent into submission, now wrote that he believed an accommodation to be possible.⁸⁵ A Milanese envoy, sent partly in compliance with Yolande's request, gave more precise intelligence. The really hostile feeling, he reported, was confined to Berne. Five cantons were decidedly inclined to a pacification, both from a wide-spread doubt of the sincerity of France and from a belief that, if any profit should result from the war, Berne would appropriate to itself the lion's share.⁸⁶

Berne, meanwhile, watched this counter-agitation with a sullen rage. The "burdensome business," the load which it was urging up a steep hill, showed, as it neared the top, an increasing tendency to roll back. O for a bar to put beneath it and prevent it at least from crushing its fatigued supporters! As a temporary encouragement, a circular was addressed to the Confederates, entreating them to believe, whatever reports to the contrary might be spread, that the king had no purpose to endanger the alliance by any unnecessary delay. It was a great sum which he had to provide.⁸⁷ On its reception Berne

⁸⁴ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 528.

⁸⁵ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 60.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p. 51.

⁸⁷ "Darumb im euch geburt die sinnen mit so merklichen gelt zu furstecken." *Deutsches Misalven-Buch C*, 369. *MS.*

would assemble all the parties concerned and make an immediate and equitable division. This would restore confidence if any dissatisfaction had arisen.⁸⁸ Meanwhile let the treaty, which had been drawn exactly as agreed upon, be ratified and sent to Berne, which would take care not to part with it until the envoys arrived.

But it was vain for the head workmen to call upon the laggards while the engineer himself remained inactive. The gold! the gold! That alone could furnish the required impetus; without that, all the long labor would come to nought. Again the council took up the pen, and disclosed their trouble to the king. The delays on both sides weighed upon their hearts.⁸⁹ They implored him, whatever his affairs, which they doubted not were theirs also, to send the envoys and money with the greatest expedition. "This will strengthen the hearts of our Confederates to go forward on the road in which we have led them, keep alive the practice against the duke of Burgundy, and stifle the attempts that are being made to bring them back into his friendship."⁹⁰ We on our part spend all our daily industry in striv-

⁸⁸ "Das wolle auch den awern ob jemand an solchen verzug unwillen heit trawerlich lutern." Ibid. ubi supra. *MS.*

⁸⁹ "Die lengerungen beideteil len . . . unser gemitt verkambret."

⁹⁰ "Das selb mag zu der utung wider den hertzog von Burgunn vast nutzen, und das hertz unnrer Eydgnoasen, die dann in mangel

weg in frundschaft desselben hertzogen zusiechen understanden werden [qui variis coloribus in amicitiam ejusdem ducis reduci temptantur], in den weg den wir angerangen haben märkentlichen stercken." Deutsch Musiven-Buch C, 271. *MS.* — Lateinisches Missiven-Buch A, 336 b. *MS.*

ing to render our subjects and our allies more amenable to your royal majesty."⁸¹

While this letter was on its way the royal envoys had reached Lyons. They hesitated to come forward, on account of the insecurity of the route.⁸² Here was one mischievous result of the respite granted to Savoy, which, according to Berne, had become a mere thoroughfare for troops, embassies, messengers of all kinds, passing between Burgundy and Italy. The prince of Tarento, with a numerous escort, was going to the camp at Neuss.⁸³ The Great Bastard, with a not less numerous escort, was going to Milan and Venice. All this, as the council truly said, would never have been allowed, if Berne had had its way.⁸⁴ Luckily recourse could be had to a helper near at hand. Letters were sent to Philip of Bresse, begging him for the king's honor and advantage, and for the furtherance of his own favor with Berne, to provide for the safe passage of the envoys.⁸⁵ Message after message was despatched to acquaint them with the precautions taken and to hasten their steps. They were told that the injury occasioned by their delay had been great. Their coming was of extreme importance for the king's interests, and for baffling those who were making continual efforts to reunite the duke of Burgundy and the Swiss.⁸⁶ It would

⁸¹ "Dann wir allen floss täglich daran keren da durch uwer kunglichen maiestät unsere Eydgnoesen und wir genämer mögen sin." Deutsch Missiven-Buch, ubi supra. MS.

⁸² Ibid. 378. MS.

⁸³ Ibid. 374. MS.

⁸⁴ Berne to Lucerne, Ibid. 383. MS.

⁸⁵ Ibid. 374. 378. MS.

⁸⁶ "Das ist ein sach die des kungs nutz vast höchst und die uffsitz der so mitt täglichen besuch-

uphold the languishing spirit of the Confederates, and bring into effectual operation the agreements negotiated by the ambassadors themselves.⁹⁷ The council had labored with all their power to strengthen the friendship. They had done, it was true, only what their duty to his majesty bound them to do, and what, with the help of God, they should steadily continue to do.⁹⁸

Berne now appointed a day for the assembling of the cantons. Let all the deputies be sent with full powers. "It will be for our common advantage, for, as we understand, they are bringing the money with them."

Alas! it was necessary to strike out the closing phrase, and substitute the words, "The money lies at Lyons."⁹⁹ The envoys, the sire de Craon and Gratian Favre, who reached Berne on the 24th of February and took up their lodging at the house of Nicholas von Diesbach,¹⁰⁰ had not cared to intrust their valuable freight to the escort of Philip of Bresse. This fresh cause for anxiety was turned, however, to good account. The diet, revived by

ungen zwischen den hertzogen von Burgund und die hern der Eydgnossen understän, absteht." Ibid. 377. *MS.*

⁹⁷ "Das alle ding zwischen uns maiestät uns und unsser Eydgnossen, die in uch nitt gehandelt, zu fürderlichen end gebracht werden, und dadurch die gemitt unsserer Eydgnossen uffenthalt." Ibid. 375. *MS.*

⁹⁸ "Und ist auch das nicht un-

billich, dann wir bekennen uns des pflichtig, und wollen auch solche allzeit tun mit hilf gotts." Ibid. ubi supra. *MS.*

⁹⁹ "Dann als wir verstand so bringent si das gelt auch mit inen — So ligt das gelt zu Lyon." Berne to Lucerne, Ibid. 378. *MS.* The italicized words are struck out.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 384. *MS.* — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 62.

the news, was induced to take upon itself the responsibility of the transmission, Berne being authorized to conduct the arrangements, and warning given to the Savoyard officials to see that no obstructions were offered.¹⁰¹

The storm had been weathered; the danger was over. Or was there still a leak to be overcome? Berne had informed the envoys that they would find the treaty fully ratified. But it still lay at Lucerne, in a very doubtful condition. Three seals at least were still lacking; and such was the disposition manifested by some of the cantons which had taken the final step that an alarm arose lest they might endeavor to draw back. This at least Berne was determined not to suffer. The council wrote to Lucerne on whose cooperation they could securely count, thanking it for its true-hearted furtherance of a matter in which they were so deeply implicated,¹⁰² and beseeching it in the most earnest terms, by its brotherly love, and as it valued their honor and that of the Confederacy, to keep the treaty in its own hands, not to yield to any demand or solicitation for its production, nor under any pretext to allow the seals to be removed or meddled with.¹⁰³ In the arguments employed to overrule the dissentient voices, we have found not a single allusion to the war as a thing which at all concerned the national interests

¹⁰¹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 528.

¹⁰² "Dann unns auch vor andern gar vil daran gelegen." Deutsch Missionen-Buch C, 404. MS.

¹⁰³ "So begeren wir an uwer brüderlich lieb gar mitt besunder hochem fliss und ernst, so trawerlich wir jenen vermogen, ir wollen in bedencken uwer und unserer al-

or which had any other foundation than the bargain with France. Two points alone were dwelt upon — the profitable nature of the transaction and the faith already pledged for its completion. Berne assumed a tone better suited to its purpose than that of reason, writing in a strain of mingled supplication and reproach. "We have given to the king our bond and seal for our Confederates, after being fully empowered by their vote. If any of them shall now fail to redeem the pledge, they will inflict a wound upon our honor — a thing we have never deserved from any of them. We shall believe better of them than that they will leave us to sustain so heavy a load, especially when so many, and as we learn the majority, have already affixed their seals." ¹⁰⁴

Such adjurations — backed by the advent of the gold — might move the hardest breast. The diet again took the matter in hand. Unterwalden was invoked to abandon its opposition. Lucerne and Zurich were instructed to work upon Glarus and Zug and induce them to consent without regard to Unterwalden. Final answers must be given in by the night of Thursday after Easter, the 30th of March. If any cantons then held out, a new draft should be prepared, omitting the names of the recusants.¹⁰⁵

But Berne could not bear the thought that there

ler eren und zuzugens, solich versie-
gelt eynung hinderuch behalten, und
die gantz niemand off mannung oder
ersuch wie tech die sin mocht, hinus
geben, auch dbeins wegs zu gestat-
ten das die angehant insiegell
wider geendert und abgestellt, un-

der mitt gefliemem ernst daran sin,
damitt unnaere brief und ere ge-
schurmt were." Deutsch Missionen-
Buch C, 404. *MS.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* 404. 405. *MS.*

¹⁰⁵ Eidgenössische Abschiede, E.
II. s. 531.

should be a single recusant. Elaborate letters were prepared. They were sent by a deputation instructed as to each particular of the verbal explanations and rejoinders with which every scruple was to be turned and every argument driven home. The concurrence of Lucerne was invited in this crowning effort to bend the stubborn spirit of Unterwalden. Let the people of that canton call to mind Berne's great and long-continued friendship, which, by God's grace, had been to them not unprofitable. Never had there been a serious dissension between the two states; never had one of them done any injury to the other. And now the seal, the faith, the honor of Berne, given with the knowledge and consent of its Confederates, and with a confident reliance upon their intentions, lay impawned and imperilled until Unterwalden should consent to their redemption.¹⁰⁸ This was not a time for disunion among the Confederates, when princes and states were joining together in leagues. It was a mistake to suppose that the treaty bound them to persevere in the war against Burgundy. They were simply obliged, in concluding a peace, to stipulate for the king's admission if he should wish to be included. On this point the

¹⁰⁸ "Allen uwer flis und ernst daran keren damitt solich vereinigung die wir doch nit anders dann mitt aller unnsrer Eydgnoossen wuas und wilken uffgenomen haben, an furer bewegung von unnssem lieben Eydgnoossen von Underwalden vergeltt usgericht were, dadurch

wir dann unnsrer glaubentrieff, eigel und ere, die wir uff unnssem lieber Eydgnoossen gut vertrauen verpflichtet haben, behalten mogen." Berne to Amman Huntzli of Unterwalden, Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 410. MS.

royal envoys had been consulted, and Berne, if required, would guaranty by its own bond this construction of the clause in question. Did the case concern Unterwalden, my lords of Berne would spare no cost or labor in its service. Compliance would insure their lively gratitude, of which future generations should taste the fruits.¹⁰⁷

If, after so long a resistance, the authorities of Sarnen and Stanz were at last overborne by the torrent of entreaty, we blame them not. Temptations to which others had yielded had produced as little effect upon them as the noonday sun on the eternal crust of Titlis. They had withstood not only the blandishments of Berne, but the natural longings of a population condemned to a perpetual struggle for a bare subsistence and excited by the approaches of a golden tide which its rulers were endeavoring to dam out. We blame them not for the concession, but honor them for the motive—that sentiment of fraternal unity which had bound the Swiss people into a nation. Yet the unworthy advantage taken of this sentiment brought its appropriate curse in subsequent divisions and estrangements, which threatened more than once the existence of the Confederacy.

Having demeaned themselves thus humbly in their correspondence with the plebeian elders of Unterwalden, my lords of Berne now took their revenge in the harsh and bullying tone which they assumed towards Savoy. From the moment of the

¹⁰⁷ Letters and Instructions, *Ibid.* 405–414. *MS.*

arrival of the French envoys Yolande's chances had sunk as rapidly as those of her opponents had risen. She had brought her appeal before the diet, who replied that they had at present too many affairs on hand to refer for instructions to their constituents, as was usual in such cases. With regard to the war with Burgundy, the Swiss, as they had before told her, were mere "helpers:"¹⁰⁰ if the emperor and the other parties whose call they had obeyed could be induced to entertain propositions, an application might then be made to them also, and they would give it proper consideration. As to her controversy with Berne, they could only advise her to live up to the terms of her alliance with that state, affording to the enemy no assistance or privilege of transit.¹⁰⁰

In other words the diet, while ashamed to give open encouragement to the violence of Berne, left it to pursue its course, abstaining from further intervention. The passage of the Lombards was, as the diet must well have known, not the real question at issue. Yolande's envoys at Berne reported that they had offered every possible concession, but without the least effect. Nothing would serve but an immediate declaration of war against Burgundy. "How can you expect it?" they urged. "The houses of Burgundy and Savoy are united by kinship and by ancient treaties. The war is not against you, and you have no direct interest in it. Nor do

¹⁰⁰ "Bezüglich des Krieges gegen Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. Burgund seien wir nur Helfer." 535.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. s. 536, 536.

your treaties with us justify a demand for our participation : if there be any doubt on that point, we are willing to submit it to your own Confederates and to abide by their decision." A flat refusal was returned : "Declare war and open the country to our troops, or take the consequences."¹¹⁰ It was vain to argue. "They are pushed on by the French ambassadors," said the report ; and the Milanese envoy wrote to the same effect.¹¹¹

Amongst Yolande's advisers none could suggest any means of staving off the danger except a liberal distribution of money.¹¹² But if she had proved her inferiority in negotiation, how much weaker must she be in a trial of this kind, matched, with her tiny silk purse, against players who threw on the table a canvas bag full to the brim, while they kept another, not less heavy, concealed in their robes ? It was commonly understood that the gold sent by Louis amounted to thirty thousand francs¹¹³ — equal to a million and a half at the present valuation.¹¹⁴ Ten thousand belonged to Austria, but were stopped by Berne for the promised wages of the soldiers in the Héricourt expedition — Sigismund's "intentions not being doubted," and his quittance being demanded and given.¹¹⁵ The remainder was assigned in equal portions to the eight cantons with Freyburg and Solothurn. In the royal letters authorizing this

¹¹⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 72, 73.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.* p. 79.

¹¹² *Ibid.* p. 72, 87, 88.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* p. 79.

¹¹⁴ Zellweger, n. 55.

¹¹⁵ *Deutsch Misaven-Buch C*, 416. *MS.* — *Latemisches Missiven-Buch A*, 361 a. *MS.*

disbursement, its object was stated to be "the maintenance of the Swiss in the *service* of the king in his wars and otherwise,"¹¹⁶ and the payments were made continuable "so long as they should be so engaged in his service."¹¹⁷ Berne, expressing the same idea in different language, gave a general receipt for the whole amount, as intended "to meet the expenses which the Confederates had incurred, or might incur, in doing the *pleasure* of the said king."¹¹⁸ But these twenty thousand francs were not all which the liberal Louis designed for "servants" who were so regardful of his "pleasure." Those who had borne the heat and burden of the day were engaged — as Berne had taken care to remind him — at a very different rate from the laborers for an hour.¹¹⁹ He had sent therefore another twenty thousand francs, leaving the distribution to Diesbach and Favre, by whom a schedule was drawn up, and prefaced with the statement that this was a matter "not requiring to be made public, but to be kept secret."¹²⁰ Of this sum six thou-

¹¹⁶ "Pour eux entretenir en nostre service ou faits de nos guerres et autrement." Lenglet, tom. iii, p. 378.

¹¹⁷ "Tant qu'ils s'entretiendront en nostredit service." Ibid. ubi supra. — A document of the same tenor was probably sent, with its particular pension, to each of the cantons. At least we infer as much from the fact that a copy, of which the original is now missing, in the Archives of Zurich (Corpus Fœderum Helvetio-Tigurinorum, MS.) specifies the pension of that canton only. The date, too, is May 4,

while that of the letters-patent in Lenglet is January 2.

¹¹⁸ "Pour nous aider à supporter les depens que faire et soutenir nous a convenu et conviendra pour plaire ledit roy." Lateinisches Misaven-Buch A, 361 b. MS.

¹¹⁹ "Præterea habebitis curare et promere, quod civitates et communitates Bernenses, Zurich, et Lucernenses in factis pensionibus uberius striete et fideliter provideantur." Instructions to Diesbach, Oct. 29, 1474, Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 517.

¹²⁰ "Desquels vingt mille francs,

sand francs were assigned to Berne, three thousand to Lucerne, two thousand to Zurich; to the other cantons and the two allies — nothing. Nine thousand were thus left for particular individuals, and of this residue all but the merest trifle was absorbed by citizens of Berne and Lucerne, chiefly by those of the former state. The two Diesbachs and Jost von Silinen received one thousand francs each; Scharnachthal and a brother of Silinen, four hundred; less conspicuous persons, sums ranging from two hundred down to twenty francs. All these sums were granted in the form of yearly "pensions."¹²¹ One, of three hundred and sixty francs, was designed for Adrian von Bubenberg; but it had been forgotten to ask previously whether he would accept it. Before pocketing their allowance the council of Berne repealed the regulation under which the statute against bribes was read yearly at the opening of their proceedings.¹²² For this act we cannot but commend them. When a new god is to be set over the altar, it is but decent that the liturgy be changed.

A vein had been opened and the poison injected. In time it would course through the whole system, tainting the sources of life, checking its healthy development, paralyzing the heart and the brain. "It is just one hundred years," wrote Heinrich Bullinger, of Zurich, in 1574, "since the formation of that alli-

n'est besoin faire aucune publication, mais le tenir secret." Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 379.

¹²¹ Rôle arrêté à Berne, &c. Ibid. pp. 379-381.

¹²² Rathamanual, B. XVI. MS. (Archives of Berne.)

ance which, as is now clear to all, was our undoing."¹²³ "The art of corrupting the greedy Swiss," says another of their countrymen, writing in the eighteenth century, "has been closely imitated by all the successors of Louis the Eleventh. No spot has remained uninfected; and if any place struggles to purify itself, it becomes an object of jealousy to the rest and a prey to internal distractions."¹²⁴ According to a computation made in 1715, the public and private pensions paid down to that year amounted to 1146,868,623 francs; and it was believed that during a period of less than two and a half centuries seven hundred thousand Swiss had been drafted into the service of foreign states.¹²⁵ This "trade in Swiss blood," as it was justly called, had the natural effect of keeping down the population, abridging the cultivation of the soil, and depressing the higher pursuits of science and art¹²⁶ — facts which received a peculiar verification in the sudden and rapid progress of Zurich and Berne, in all these respects, during a portion of the sixteenth century, when those cantons renounced their treaties with France.¹²⁷ That the practice had a most demoralizing influence need

¹²³ Von den Tigurinen und der Stadt Zurich Sachen, Chron. MS.

¹²⁴ Vaterländische Sammlungen, MS. (Bibliothèque Cantonale Vaudoise.) — The struggle in which the noble Zwingli lost his life offers a remarkable instance. The whole history of the Reformation in Switzerland is intimately connected with that of the pension system.

¹²⁵ "Der Handel mit Schweizerblut durch königliches Geld kostete genau berechnet von a. 1480 bis a. 1715, 700,000 Schweizer; bezogen wurden an öffentlichen und besonderen Pensionen im gedachten Zeitraum 1146,868,623 fr." Ibid. MS.

¹²⁶ Ibid. MS. — Lauffer, B. V. s. 327-329.

¹²⁷ Lauffer, ubi supra.

hardly be observed. It tainted the dealings of the government with foreign states, causing it to trample upon principles which it was bound to uphold; and it corrupted the manners of the people in a degree still traceable in spite of their many excellent qualities. How, indeed, could it be otherwise when for so long a period the country was simply a camp for the supply of foreign armies, an arena for the contests of foreign diplomacy, a market for supplying the shambles of foreign ambition? It is not we who say these things, but the Swiss themselves.¹²⁸ From its first commencement and so long as the system prevailed, every true patriot raised his voice to denounce it, scarcely any historian of repute has mentioned except to deplore it. Switzerland has at last shaken off the yoke, and rejoices in her liberation. Those who find this system perfectly legitimate, or who seek to justify its introduction, have neither had experience of its effects nor any real knowledge of its origin.

¹²⁸ The faithful and unrivalled delineator of the national manners, Albert Bitzius, has depicted these evils, under their various aspects, in a passage of surpassing earnestness.

"Was aus uns wurde, was wir heim brachten in's Vaterland, haben das die je bedacht, welche Schweitzerblut verkauften, sold für die eigene verfallene Haushaltung, Brod für die verwahrlosten Söhne auch-

ten?" Gerade dieses Reiselaufen unter obrigkeitlichem Garantie brach den achten Schweitzersinn; da wurden die Freien dressirt, bis sie knechten wurden, bis sie schmeicheln, Stellen nachjagen konnten, da wurden sie entnervt durch fremdes Geld und fremde Lasten, die Einen reich die Andern desto ärmer." See Jeremias Gotthelf's *gesammelte Schriften*, B. I. s. 232-234.

CHAPTER VI.

THE FRENCH TREATY. — WAR IN THE JURA; SECOND CAMPAIGN.

1475.

Thus the Swiss people, which had so long held princes at arm's-length, refusing to become entangled in their alliances or their disputes, had so widely departed from its traditional principles as to consent to be henceforth "maintained in the service" of a foreign monarch.

And this, we are told, was commendable on their part, or, at the least, justifiable and politic. Their independence, it is said, was threatened, and resolving to anticipate the danger they foresaw, they wisely accepted the aid that was offered in the form in which it was needed.

How far such representations accord with the facts, every reader of the preceding pages has the means of judging for himself. There had been, on the part of the Swiss, no manifestation of jealousy or hostility towards the duke of Burgundy that did not emanate from Berne. Why Berne had labored to create such

an enmity appears from its own acknowledgments. Even now its efforts to spread this feeling had been utterly fruitless. It had secured the adoption of the treaty with France, but it had not succeeded in exciting any popular hatred of Burgundy. It had prevailed over the opposition of the other cantons, in part by appealing to the same base motives which had influenced itself, in part by the employment of artifices and by working upon that spirit of unity and mutual concession which had always been a conspicuous virtue of the Swiss character. But it had long since abandoned as hopeless the attempt to excite unfounded apprehensions. Bugbears had no place in the Swiss imagination. They had none in that of Berne itself. Intimations of danger from the "triple alliance" were received by the council of that state with characteristic and befitting scorn. "A handful of Swiss," they replied, "is a match for an army. On our own soil, with our mountains behind us, we defy the world."¹

But the summons of the emperor, their sympathies as Germans, their treaty with Austria—these at least were facts. Were not these the predominating motives?

We venture to believe that no one was more astonished at the prompt obedience of the Swiss to the imperial mandate than the emperor. What share he had had in sending the summons we are unable

¹ "Che pochi di loro . . . dariano proveduti, in forma che venesse chi de le botte ad molti armati . . . se valesse li cacciariano." *Dépêches Milenaises*, tom. i. p. 51. Sono grossi col paese forte et ben

to say. The original document, still in existence, bears the date of the 27th of October—two days later than that of the letter of defiance purporting to be based upon it.² But doubtless he was gratified at learning that he had loyal subjects where before he had counted only rebels. If the Swiss were going to fight for it, there was still hope for the crazy old Empire, and he despatched the Count Hugo of Montfort to acquaint them and their allies with his preparations for relieving Neuss and to require their attendance. This seemed to them a strange message. Had his imperial majesty not heard of their expedition into Upper Burgundy, undertaken at his command, for the honor and deliverance of the German nation?³ The coming on of cold weather had prevented them from doing all they had intended; but they had effected a diversion which would prove of the greatest advantage. At present they must stay at home and keep watch. The enemy might come upon them at any time; the duke of Milan, in their rear, must be closely looked after; and the son of

² The original is in the Archives of Lucerne, with the date very plainly written — "syben und zwanzigsten tag des monats Octobers." As the imperial envoys who appeared before the diet at Feldkirch were accredited to Sigismund and the towns of the Upper Rhine, it may be inferred that the summons to the Swiss was an afterthought — not a cause, but a result, of their agreement to take part in the war.

³ "Dazu unsz dann nutz mer

dan dieselbuwer keysslich mannung die wir gehorsamklich emphanen, und die ere und rettung des heiligen Reichs, und besunder ouch unsz gar gnädigen herren Hertzog Sigmund von Oestrich und gemeiner Tutschen nation der wir ouch zubeglidet sind, bewogen haben." Berne to the Emperor, April 23, Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 438; and previous letter without date, Ib. 386. *MS.*

the king of Naples had been seen somewhere about. They trusted that the emperor would excuse them, as they were acting entirely for the good of the Empire, and not out of disobedience to their natural lord.⁴

An answer like this would by no means go down with a monarch of Frederick's experience and discernment. He scouted the notion that such expeditions as that of Héricourt would do anything for the preservation of the Rhineland.⁵ They would tend rather to draw the enemy in than to drive him out.⁶ If the parties to the league of Feldkirch cared anything for the security of the Empire, let them send him, in the proportion of their respective means, twenty thousand men. Then the war, instead of being spread and prolonged, would be narrowed down and brought to a quick conclusion, and all who had shared in it would share also in the benefits of a common peace.⁷

Surely this was sound reasoning, and peculiarly applicable if the Swiss had any personal interest at

⁴ Ibid. 438, *MS.* — Zellweger has printed this letter, but with the disfigurements too characteristic of his copies.

⁵ "Dann des bemelten herrenzuges halb werden wir bericht dass der nit anders denn uff ein strauff und verwüstung oberburgund's ein kurtz Zyt fur genommen syn, das uns denn nit fruchtbarlich noch ratsam bedunkt." Letter of the Emperor to the Council of Strasburg, in Knebel, *late Abth.*, s. 93.

⁶ "Und ir damit den Krieg vom

Hertzogen von Burgund mer uff ouch und iwere zugewanten den abtich leitent und sichend." Ibid. ubi *supra*.

⁷ Letter of the Emperor to Sigismund, Jan. 23, 1475. *MS.* (Stifts-Archiv, Sanct-Gallen.) — A similar communication, in March, to the Swiss, *Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. s. 528. — See also Warsteisen, s. 412; and two letters of Duke Albert of Saxony in Müller, *Reichstag-Theatrum*, Theil II. s. 689, 690.

stake. All Germany was going to join; the pecuniary aid of France, if that were indispensable, had been secured; and the Swiss were not a sluggish race, requiring, like the Dutch, to be coaxed or driven to the pursuit of their own policy.

It was agreed in the diet that the emperor ought not to be treated with disrespect,* that *honorable* means should be sought for *evading* compliance with his *oppressive* request.⁹ An embassy might be sent, explanations offered, a promise given to take the subject into further consideration. In this manner, it was suggested by Berne, the matter might be protracted until the occasion had passed.¹⁰ Two or three cantons, though strongly disinclined, would consent to go if the majority were so minded, and provided the emperor would pay them for their trouble. The majority voted emphatically to stay at home. It included those cantons in which, if anywhere, the German sentiment had a real existence. But there was a difference — as the Swiss at least could see — between being Germans and being imperialists. They instinctively discerned what the correspondence of the time reveals, that the Austrian emperor still looked upon them with the same eyes as ever. "Let him confirm our liberties!" said Unterwalden, and others echoed the cry; "until he

* "Es soll, damit die kaiserliche Majestät nicht verachtet werde, eine Botschaft . . . geschickt werden." Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 519.

⁹ "Damit man mit Ehren solchen

schweren Zuges, . . . überhoben wurde." Ibid. s. 526.

¹⁰ "In Hoffnung, die Sachen möchten sich inzwischen da unten verändern und der Zug unterbleiben." Ibid. s. 530.

does so, we are not bound to help or to obey him."¹¹

The case of Austria and the free towns was no doubt stronger. The Swiss had bound themselves by treaty to assist in protecting Alsace. Shortly after they had returned home the marauders were back in their old haunts.¹² As soon as the spring had opened the fire again blazed along the frontier. The principality of Montbelliard, which had been taken into the Lower League at the express request of Berne, was completely ravaged with the exception of the chief town.¹³ In the bishopric of Basel several walled places were captured, and all the villages, forty in number, between Blamont and Porrentruy, were burned in a single night. The unfortunate prelate found that he was losing, instead of gaining, territory, and declared loudly that he could do no more, for "the bag was empty."¹⁴ A conference was called, a new expedition was planned, and again the Swiss were appealed to for help. They received the application at about the same time as they received that of the emperor, and they answered it in much the same manner. They resolved to parry it with excuses.¹⁵ What was ultimately done, by whom, and

¹¹ "Wir seien den Zug zu thun nicht schuldig, da die Freieyten niemals bestatigt worden," &c. Ibid. ubi supra.

¹² Knebel, 1ste Abth., s. 90.

¹³ Duvernoy, *Ephémérides*, p. 161.

¹⁴ Blesch, B. II. s. 278. — Wursteisen, s. 444, 445.

¹⁵ "Ebenso soll man . . . trachten, sich des Zuges wegen zu entschuldigen, zu dem wir von dem Fursten von Oesterreich und von unsern Bundesgenossen von Basel und Strassburg gemahnt sind." Eidgenössische Abschiede, H. II. s. 526.

why, will appear in its proper place. At present the cantons unanimously refused to stir.

In all this we do not consider the Swiss as chargeable with duplicity, except in so far as double speaking and double acting were necessary results of the position in which they were placed. That position they themselves had accurately defined. They had entered into the war as the auxiliaries of Austria, but at the instance, and for the benefit, of France. Therefore, the real measure of their assistance must be, not the necessities of the emperor or of Sigismund, but the conditions of their agreement with Louis. Let us look, then, at the treaty, now finally ratified, and try to understand its precise meaning and import.

As we have before said, the treaty did not bind the Swiss to prosecute a war against Burgundy. It provided only that, in the event of their becoming involved in such a war, the king was to join in it, and that, if they were menaced with an attack, he should come to their assistance; unless indeed he were prevented by some immediate danger at home, in which contingency — hardly to be apprehended — he was to pay a forfeit of eighty thousand francs.

By another clause they agreed to furnish him, in time of need, with a body of troops at a stipulated rate of payment. In regard to this point — which seemed to him of great importance — he obtained from Berne engagements of a more positive and binding tenor. On the other hand, his own obligation to assist his allies in a time of peril — a point

deemed by him of minor importance — was by the same private contract with Berne rendered vaguer and less stringent.¹⁴

Without reference to any of these matters, and “so long as he should live,” the king would pay to his allies, “in testimony of his affection for them,” yearly pensions to the amount of twenty thousand francs. If this language is to be construed literally, the character of Louis has been much misapprehended; not subtlety, but softness, must have been its distinguishing trait. But, as we have seen, it was not so construed by either of the parties. Louis had made provision for the payment only “so long as the Swiss should continue in his service;” and they had acknowledged the payment as a reward for executing “his pleasure.”

What, now, was the essential force of this arrangement, and its bearing upon the war with Burgandy? By the Swiss the pensions were regarded as in the nature of what is termed by lawyers “a general retainer,” in consideration of which they had ranged themselves on the king’s side and were bound to respond to his call when his cause should come up

¹⁴ Here is the most important clause: “Nous asseurons, interprétons et déclarons que ledit Seigneur Roy ne se doit aucunement mettre en peine pour le secours de la Ligue, sinon au cas qu’il en soit par eux requis: et encore en ce cas, ne leur doit donner secours contre leurs ennemis, sinon en tant qu’ils eussent si grande puissance que lesdits Seigneurs de la Ligue

pressent et en urgente nécessité, eussent besoin nécessairement d’estre secourus, et ne pussent autrement résister à leur ennemy.” Declaration plus ample, &c. Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 371. See also the “Lettres en interpretation,” *Ibid.* p. 375; and the remarks of Herr Segesser, *Eidgenössische Abchiede*, B. II. s. 505.

for trial. Whenever he should himself take the field, engaging the main forces of the enemy, bringing the question to a decisive issue, they would perform their part, by creating diversions and by supplying him with troops. This course he had been expected to take at the very outset. "In full reliance upon his promises," they had sent out the expedition "concerted with his ambassadors." But it seemed that they had mistaken his intentions. He was not yet ready for the struggle. "When the truce had expired," so he now gave out, "he would prosecute the war with the utmost vigor."¹⁷ In this case they too would suspend operations. So long as he remained inactive they would be unemployed, though still "maintained" or retained, "in his service."¹⁸

What could be safer than such an arrangement? The Swiss were not going to bear the brunt of the conflict, to take upon themselves the risks and the charges. If ever the harassed enemy should turn upon them, Louis would interpose to secure them against harm.

But they had yet to fathom the policy of the man with whom they were dealing. They were not commonly aware that, in addition to the general retainer, he was paying a special retainer, of equal amount, of which the larger portion went to Berne, while most of the cantons received not a fraction of

¹⁷ "Dice che finite le tregue deliberava seguire la guerra et fare più perforzo che potesse per premere et fare venire alla ragione esso

Duca de Brugogna." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 27.

¹⁸ In the 16th century engagements of this kind had become common.

it. His immediate object had been gained when the Swiss consented to become auxiliaries in the war. His profounder design, that of converting them into principals, slipping out of his own engagements, throwing upon them the burdens and the dangers,¹⁹ was to be effected by the operation of those additional grants which "did not require to be made public, but to be kept secret." It was the "duty" of Berne to render the Swiss "more amenable to his majesty," to spread assurances of his "entire good faith," to "keep alive the practice against the duke of Burgundy," and to urge its Confederates forwards by "the road in which it had first led them."

For the accomplishment of this object the main resource lay in that spirit of concord and mutual helpfulness on which Berne had already drawn so freely and effectually. Let danger hover over one community and the others would fly to its support. An indirect aid would spring out of the craving for booty and the readiness for adventure which were also among the national characteristics, and which Berne had recently taken pains to foster. While snow still lay upon the passes, parties from that canton, Solothurn, and Bienne, had made several forays into the Jura, driving before them on their return immense droves of cattle and sheep.²⁰ Soon the contagion spread. The poor herdsmen of Unterwalden in particular, despite all efforts to restrain

¹⁹ See Zellweger's remarks, *Versuch*, &c., s. 53.

²⁰ Schilling, s. 163, 164.

them, rushed in crowds across the Brünig, and, guided by a wild thirst for plunder, fell upon neutral and even friendly territory. At this point the diet became alarmed, Freyburg raised an outcry, and Berne found it necessary to interpose, lest its own influence and management should be swept away in the general confusion.²¹

A more regular expedition, not openly organized by the council, but conducted by two of its members, started about the end of March. Fourteen hundred men, chiefly from Berne and Solothurn, passed through the county of Neuchâtel, committing many excesses, descended into Franche-Comté through the narrow pass of the Brenet, plundered the wealthy Abbey of Montbenoit, devastated the country round, and at last fell upon the town of Pontarlier, which they carried at the first assault. The garrison took refuge in a neighboring castle; but this too was immediately stormed, most of the defenders being put to the sword. A large amount of valuables, including money and plate, were found stored in the castle; but the captors, instead of providing for the security of their spoil, fell to quarrelling about the division and engaged in drunken frays. Meanwhile a force, considerably magnified by rumor, was approaching to cut off their retreat.²²

Here was an opportunity such as Berne had

²¹ Girard *MSS.*—Eidgenössische Abschieds, B. II. s. 527, 534, et al. —Bläsch, B. II. s. 273. Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 422-426, 429. *MS.*—Schilling, s. 164, 166.

²² Letters of the Council of Berne,

sought and labored for.²⁵ The council ordered an immediate levy of twenty-five hundred men, and sent notice to their Confederates of the alarming emergency which had accidentally arisen. It was now, they wrote, not a question of assisting the emperor, but of giving succor to their own countrymen, who stood in instant peril.²⁶ Nor had they miscalculated the effect of such a summons. Lucerne got ready eight hundred men, with wagons and other equipments. From Schwytz came a promise of proportionate aid.²⁷ Other cantons, though less prompt, showed a favorable disposition, and the diet passed a vote recommendatory of a general arming.²⁸

Elated with their success, the council despatched a letter to William von Diesbach, who had gone on a mission to France, stating what had been done, and expressing their hope that the operations to follow would be "advantageous to the king and to themselves."²⁹ Their own troops took the field without delay, Nicholas von Diesbach, whom Scharnachtal had just succeeded as *schultheiss*, assuming the command in person. Scarcely had he started when word was brought that the party at Pontarlier had beaten off the enemy, and having afterwards evac-

²⁵ "Diesbach sah wohl voraus, dass irgend ein solcher Raubzug in Gefahr kommen musste, und er wusste es, dass die Regierungen in der Schweiz ihre Eidgenossen in der Noth nicht ohne Hülfe lassen wollten noch durften," *Zetweger*, s. 66.

²⁶ *Rathsmanual*. *MS.* (*Archives of Berns.*)

²⁷ *Deutsch Misaven-Buch* C, 432. *MS.*

²⁸ *Eidgenössische Abmachungen*, B II, s. 535.

²⁹ "Wollen dann fürder in dem Veld arbeiten und handeln, das wir hoffen den kung und uns erschiessen solle." *Deutsch Misaven-Buch* C, 429. *MS.*

uated and set fire to the town, were now on their way home. Instead of rejoicing at this intelligence, the council received it as a serious calamity. Its fatal bearing on their own plans was in fact obvious. They sent off a despatch to the leaders, expressing their astonishment and disgust, and charging them on peril of their lives to remain where they were and put themselves under Diesbach's orders.²⁸ Hoping by a vigorous pull to overshoot the rock and get again into smooth water, they announced to their Confederates their purpose not to abandon the movement, but on the contrary to send still further reinforcements, on the ground that the honor of Berne had been compromised by the retreat, and must now be retrieved by a more extended enterprise.²⁹

But this was counting upon a degree of ductility which exceeded that of the Swiss nature. The preparations in progress were immediately abandoned. In spite of all the urgings of Berne's representative, the diet stubbornly refused to send troops to the relief of men who were no longer in any danger. They had not been empowered, the deputies declared, to sanction any operations for a mere military purpose. Such expeditions were a burden which the Confederates had no right to sustain, seeing that the war was one in which they were nothing more than helpers. "These and other

²⁸ "Kan uns nit guug befrömbden, das die knecht so in Ponterlus gewesen gantz abgewichen sind, den wir solichs niemer wellen vergessen. So haben wir [ihnen unser

Botschaft ungefertigt] sich zu uch zu fügen bi verlierung ir leben." The Council to N. von Diesbach, Ibid. s. 435. *MS.*

²⁹ Ibid. 432 et al. *MS.*

words of the like kind are the answer they have given us," wrote the council in extreme dudgeon to Diesbach.³⁰ "Even our brothers of Lucerne, who were all in readiness to move, and to whose fidelity we had especially appealed, explaining to them our motives for the proceeding, talk in a similar strain. They have consented, however, to call another diet for a final determination. What they will decide we know not, but see to our deep regret little chance of any good result. We would that our Confederates would bethink themselves of their obligations to us and to our forefathers, from whom in their own necessities they never failed to receive comfort and aid."³¹

The Bear was becoming surly and dangerous, as was customary with him when his milder advances had been repulsed. In a full meeting of both branches of the council it was resolved, with or without the aid of the other cantons, to go on with the enterprise, and not expose the state, by an enforced relinquishment of its plans, to ridicule and loss of influence. Two thousand fresh troops were raised; Solothurn and Bienne were called upon for their contingents; a sharp demand was addressed to the Austrian authorities in Alsace, who had taken no notice of a previous summons;³² and Freyburg

³⁰ "Besunder diewil si doch mit mer dann heiffer syen, alles mit mer worten." Ibid. 435. *MS.*

³¹ "Das uns vast hoch bekumbert, und wolten wol die ding wurden bald bedacht, und gegen uns gehandelt als unasser vordern und

wir zu trost und handthabung gemeiner Eydgnoschaft allzit haben gepflegen." Ibid. 435 et seq. *MS.*—This letter is printed in Schilling, but with omissions that materially effect the sense.

³² Ibid, ubi supra. *MS.*

received a peremptory missive, with which, after another vain attempt at remonstrance and dissuasion, it found itself obliged to comply.³³

On the 22d of April the diet again assembled at Lucerne, the deputies bringing with them full and unequivocal instructions. Lucerne itself—a sharer with Berne, though in a limited degree, in the “special retainer”—had been aroused to a proper sense of its obligations, and now declared its purpose to take part in the expedition, on the simple ground that it could not consistently with honor abandon one of its Confederates. But in this declaration it stood alone. Zurich and every other canton in succession—except Glarus, which had abstained from sending any representative—denounced in emphatic terms the course pursued by Berne, as arbitrary and full of peril to the whole Confederacy. It had been settled long ago, they said, that no place should undertake any foreign enterprise without the common consent. Nothing could be more unjust than that a single state, acting without the counsel or concurrence of the rest, should jeopardize the interests and the safety of all.³⁴ They had never expected that Berne would take it upon herself to make the Confederates principals in the war.³⁵ It was not their war, it was

³³ Girard MSS. “Bern, Luzern, und Solothurn brachen auf und Frerburg musste folgen.”

³⁴ “Uri: . . . Es scheint ihm unbillig und bekümmert es, dass ein einzelner Ort, ohne der Andern Willen und Rath, einen solchen Kriegszug vornehmen, wozu alle An-

dern Leib und Gut setzen sollten.” Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 536.

³⁵ “Zürich: . . . So hätten sie sich versehen, Bern hätte nicht so eifertig gehandelt und uns dadurch zu Hauptsächern des Krieges gemacht.”

Austria's — so at least they had always been told ; and any assistance which might be rendered by them was to be paid for under the stipulations of the treaty.³⁵ They would have gone to the rescue of their countrymen at Pontarlier. Nay, most of them were still instructed to coincide with the general wish, whatever it might be, rather than create dissension. But as it appeared that they were all opposed to the policy of Berne, it was for her to yield, and, now that her men had got off without dishonor, to countermand her reënforcements and take counsel with her Confederates.³⁷

Meanwhile Diesbach, after recovering Pontarlier, had descended towards the plains of Franche-Comté. But the well-fortified town of La Rivière, where he met with a repulse,³⁸ offered an obstruction to his further advance ; and a strong body of cavalry, which moved around him at pleasure, though without venturing an attack, made it prudent for him to retreat. Having completed the destruction of Pontarlier and burned "many beautiful villages" on his route, he retired through the Val de Travers to Neuchâtel, and there waited for a force more adequate to the campaign which he had planned with his colleagues.³⁹

It had been from the first the darling project of Berne to get command of the chief passes and fortified places of the Jura. In the case of Neuchâtel, as

³⁵ "Unterwalden: Auch wissen sie nichts anders als dass der Krieg des Fürsten von Oesterreichs sei," &c.

³⁷ Ibid. ubi supra.

³⁸ Letter of the duke of Burgundy, in Labarre, tom. i. p. 360.

³⁹ Schilling, a. 167. — Letters of Berne in the Deutsch Meisiven-Buch C. MS.

in that of Bienne, military operations were unnecessary for this object. The people of the former state, like those of the latter, had old alliances and sympathies with Berne, and their rulers had participated in the connection. The last count, John of Freyburg, had died in the service of the Swiss. The present possessor of the fief, Rodolph, margrave of Hochberg, whose claim to the succession was far from clear, counted on the alliance of Berne as his best support against the right of reversion vested in the house of Châlons.⁴⁰ Yet, as the owner of many estates in Franche-Comté, he was a vassal of Burgundy. He had held a command in the Burgundian army, and had taken an active part in the negotiations for the Austrian marriage and the schemes connected with it.⁴¹ He stood high in the confidence of Charles, and was supposed to be devotedly attached to him. His son, a godson of Philip the Good, had been educated at the court and was now serving before Neuss. Thus Rodolph's position was closely analogous to that of the constable Saint-Pol. But with less ambition than the constable, he was a more dexterous politician. On the outbreak of hostilities he had hastened to Berne and thrown himself on the generosity of the council. Representing the considerations which must prevent him from taking open part with them, he offered to put

⁴⁰ See Boyve, *Annales historiques de Neuchâtel et Valangin*, tom. ii. p. 42 et seq.; Purry, *Extraits des Chroniques ou Annales des Chanoines de Neuchâtel*, p. 19;

Gingins, *Recherches sur la Maison de Châlons*, p. 231.

⁴¹ Chmel, *Urkunden*, &c. B. I.—Schweiz. Museum.—Müller, *Reichstags Theatrum*.

himself and his subjects under their protection, leaving it to their discretion so to exercise their power as to enable him to preserve an apparent neutrality.⁴² Berne, which had as keen an appetite for protectorates as the duke of Burgundy himself, readily accepted the trust. While it fixed upon Neuchâtel as the convenient head-quarters of its intended enterprises, it promised to refrain from calling for active aid unless in a case of necessity.⁴³ It warned off the bands of freebooters from Bienne and other places which were falling upon Neuchâtel as lawful prey;⁴⁴ and it even made vain endeavors to restrain the excesses of its own troops, who, in their passage through the county, spoiled and robbed without compunction, disregarding of their ancient discipline in a war which they naturally considered one of plunder and brigandage.⁴⁵

From Neuchâtel there is a choice of two routes by which to traverse the great natural barrier between Switzerland and France. The more direct is through the long and elevated Val de Travers, which lies behind the principal ridge, and gradually contracting finds an outlet in one of the remarkable defiles so frequent in the Jura. An easier but more circuitous course leads at first along the base of the mountains and the shore of the lake, and descends into the plain fertilized by the waters of the Talent and the Orbe ;

⁴² Deutch Massiven-Buch C, 320
322. *MS.*

⁴³ *Ibid.* 327. *MS.*

⁴⁴ Basach, B. II. n. 276. — Rodt,
B. I. n. 338.

⁴⁵ Deutch Massiven-Buch C, 432,
et al. *MS.* - Eidgenössische Ab-
schiede, B. II. n. 527, 529, 534.

then ascending the valley of the Orbe — the widest as well as the most conveniently situated of all the passes — it crosses the watershed and joins the first-mentioned route in the mountain gateway of La Cluse, which offers the only passage in this part of the chain to the western slopes and the plain beyond.

On both these routes the scenery is beautiful, though very dissimilar. Highly picturesque but contracted views — wild precipices, frightful gorges, nest-like basins and grassy vales — are characteristic of the one; while the other commands a wide expanse of lakes and hills, vineyards and towns, with distant horizons of snow-clad Alps. The Val de Travers is seen perhaps to most advantage when the moonlight has lent an additional weirdness to its jagged walls and mysterious hollows. But it is in the softness of the summer evening that the traveller up the banks of the Orbe turns and lingers while the tide of golden light sweeps across the panorama, pouring its waves upon the glistening summit of Mont Blanc and the guardian peaks of the Valais.

The Val de Travers, lying wholly within the county of Neuchâtel, was already in the possession of Berne, which had garrisoned the small posts overlooking the defiles. The territory on the other route was under the sovereignty of Savoy. Here too a right of free passage or of temporary occupation would perhaps have satisfied Berne. But the regent, as we have seen, had resisted all demands of this nature; and even had her compliance been extorted, force would still have been required to carry it into effect. Most

of the towns and castles on this route belonged to the house of Châlons, and had been bequeathed by Louis the Good, prince of Orange, to his two younger sons, Louis and Hugh, both of whom were bound to the duke of Burgundy, not only by the ties of allegiance, but by those of personal affection and gratitude. His friendship for them dated from his own youth. He had then promised that whenever it should please God to give him the power, they should receive substantial proofs of the sincerity of his regard.⁴⁶ This promise, like all his promises, had been faithfully kept. He had protected them against the usurpations of their half-brother, William of Orange;⁴⁷ he had relieved them from confiscations occasioned by the rapacity of his own father;⁴⁸ and he had promoted their interests at the court of Savoy. To the elder brother in particular, Louis of Château-Guyon, who had entered his service in boyhood and had attended him in all his expeditions, Charles seems to have been more strongly attached than to any other member of his household. Letters are still extant in which he

⁴⁶ "Et quand il plura à Dieu de me donner le pouvoir, je l'y monstrey l'amour et bonne affection que j'ay à ly." Letter of the count of Charolais to Louis prince of Orange, in Clero, *Essai de l'Hist. de la Franche-Comté*, tom. ii. p. 520.

⁴⁷ The violent and unscrupulous character of this prince is established by the "Interrogatoires" printed by M. Clero. The penalties which he incurred by procuring the death of his father's intendant at Nozeroy, were remitted by Philip

the Good, perhaps at the solicitation of Berne, which interested itself very strongly in William's behalf. See Ruchat, *Mémoires pour le Siècle XV.* MS. (Stadt-Bibliothek, Berne.)

⁴⁸ In the decree of remission, to avoid any appearance of reflecting on his father's memory, Charles assigned as the grounds the long and faithful services rendered to the house of Burgundy by the deceased Louis of Orange.

speaks of the young nobleman with a tenderness which has been thought foreign to his character.⁴⁰ His affection for him, we are told, was that of an elder brother, and we shall see hereafter with what devotion it was repaid.

It was not pretended that any acts of hostility had proceeded from the places which Berne was now about to attack. Freyburg, appealed to by the regent to prevent the violation of her rights,⁴¹ sent a message to the council of Berne, declaring its intention to recall its troops and protesting against the expedition as tantamount to a war against Savoy. The council answered this communication with smooth professions and assurances. They pretended entire ignorance of Diesbach's design, but were confident he would do nothing inconsistent with honor. "It is important," they wrote to Diesbach in explanation, "that we should have the coöperation of our allies;"⁴² and they therefore left it to "his wisdom," whether or not to make any alteration of the plan. A few weeks later Freyburg accepted the pension assigned to it under the French treaty, returning a suitable acknowledgment of the "honor" conferred upon it.⁴³ Thenceforth it could have little right to offer objections to the proceedings of Berne.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ This is the remark of M. Clerc, by whom the letters, unimportant in other respects, have been printed.

⁴¹ *Dépêches Milanaïses*, tom. i. p. 117.

⁴² *Deutsch Muraven-Buch C*, 445. MS.

⁴³ Girard MSS.

⁴⁴ The *silencing* effect of the

French gold, in a case where the amount was much smaller, but where the opposition also had been proportionably weaker, is thus noticed. "Es brachte diejeingen zum Schweigen, welche vor dem mächtigen Herzog und dem arglistigen König warnen." *Bläsch*, B. II. s. 271.

Between six and seven thousand men, including a reinforcement from Basel as well as Lucerne, were now collected at Neuchâtel, from which they set out on the 26th of April, taking the road along the margin of the lake. Near its extremity, and directly in the line of march, stood the castle of Grandson, a large, square, battlemented structure, built in or before the eleventh century, and long the seat of a line of warlike barons, of whom the last and proudest, Otho of Grandson, had fallen in a judicial duel in the year 1399. The gray masonry still remains entire; but the interior has been converted into a tobacco factory, and a railway passes through the now unguarded precincts. The town, lying somewhat in the rear of the castle, was further protected by a wall. There was, however, no sufficient garrison, for there had been no timely apprehensions of an attack. At the last moment the commander, Pierre de Joigne, had called in the neighboring peasantry to aid in the defence.

The Swiss advanced with their usual careless daring. The foremost party, two hundred in number, had no sooner come up than they sprang forward and assaulted the outworks. When a dozen of them had fallen they desisted from the attempt, and, on the arrival of the main body, the leaders judged it necessary to open a siege. Basel had sent some artillery, and heavier pieces were expected from Berne. But, as at Héricourt, the cannon produced little effect, and the impatient and confident troops insisted on permission to storm. A gate in the town

wall was forced, and the assailants, pouring in, drove the panic-stricken crowd of burghers and peasants through the streets and into the lake beyond. The castle would still have been capable of a lengthened resistance. But the garrison, overcome with terror, offered to surrender if allowed a free exit with all their effects. To save time these terms were granted, though not scrupulously kept, everything of value being appropriated by the conquerors.⁴⁴ When next besieged, Grandson would have other defenders, and would be more stoutly maintained.

After several smaller strongholds had been captured and burned, the invaders pushed forward towards Orbe, a place of great importance both from its strength and position. Situated on a limestone promontory infolded by the river, it commanded a high road by which the Romans had maintained their communications with Gaul, and which had long been the most frequented route in the whole chain of the Jura. On the brow of the eminence stood a castle of great antiquity and size. Dating from the Merovingian times, it had been the scene of many an historical incident, including the famous partition of territory between the three sons of the Emperor Lothaire. Two of the smaller towers are the only fragments of this ancient edifice that now exist; but thirty years ago its ruins covered the broad esplanade, from which the eye ranges over a lovely and almost boundless view, embracing the basin of Léman with its rivers and towns and the snowy Alps

⁴⁴ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 561, 552.

both of Berne and Savoy. By the princes of the house of Châlons Orbe was justly regarded as the chief link in the chain of their possessions. They had expended immense sums in the repair and embellishment of the castle, and had recently taken precautions against the contingency, which, however, was not considered imminent, of an attack by the Swiss.⁴⁵ The garrison consisted of between three and four hundred picked men, including thirty knights and men-at-arms. Munitions of all kinds had been abundantly stored; and Nicholas de Joux, a man of a loyal and intrepid spirit, had been intrusted with the command. When summoned by the enemy, he replied that he and his companions were well provided with the means of defence, and in any event would rather die in combat than imitate the "cowards of Grandson."

The town however surrendered, thus exposing the castle on its least defensible side. To punish the burghers and prevent the enemy from reaping the full advantage of this act, the garrison threw lighted combustibles on the roofs, and eighteen houses were burned before the Swiss could extinguish the flames. An assault was immediately delivered, but repulsed with considerable loss. Among the slain was the executioner of Berne, a person of much consideration in that town, where his loss was greatly lamented.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Letter of Louis of Chateau-Guyon, in Gingins, *Hist. de la Ville d'Orbe et de son Château*.

⁴⁶ "C'estoit un des vaillans hommes de la dite armée dont

Messrs de Berne furent bien marrys." *Chronique des Chanoines de Neuchâtel*, *Schweiz. Geschichtsforcher*, B. VIII. n. 229. — See also the remarks of Sinner, *Voyage histo-*

The assailants then opened a fire, not with the hope of effecting a breach, but to drive the defenders from the outer walls. Some difficulty was found in bringing the guns to bear, and they were at last hoisted into the steeple of the principal church, which rocked with each discharge. A rush was then made, and after a long and valiant resistance, the garrison were forced to take refuge in the towers surrounding the spacious courtyard. In each of these a desperate conflict was kept up. There was no request for quarter, and no thought of granting it. Whenever the defenders, overpowered by numbers, fell alive into the enemy's hands, they were driven to the battlements and compelled to leap over. De Joux, with the last remnant of his force, still occupied the main tower. Yielding ground inch by inch, they reached a projecting balcony near the summit, and barricaded the approach. But the Swiss, mounting still higher by an interior stairway, rained down a shower of missiles which soon rendered the position untenable. Putting himself at the head of his troop, De Joux burst open the door and rushed into the midst of his foes. His head was instantly cloven with a halberd. All his companions met the same fate. After a four hours' struggle, with a loss on the side of the assailants of twelve killed and forty wounded, the capture was complete. Not a man of the garrison remained alive.⁵⁷ A hundred and twenty gory bodies lay strewn along the passages and chambers, while two

rique et littéraire de la Suisse Occidentale, (Neuchâtel, 1791.)

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⁵⁷ "Le tout par leur grand orgueil et folle-oultre audace, pen-

or three hundred mangled corpses were heaped upon the paved courtyard or on the jagged rocks at the foot of the exterior wall. So bold, so bloody were the Swiss!

The fame of this exploit spread terror amongst the neighboring population. Echallens, a Burgundian *enclave* in the Pays de Vaud, opened its gates at the summons of a small detachment. The lord of La Sarraz, an old ally of Berne and brother-in-law of Adrian von Bubenberg, came in person to solicit exemption from ravage for his castle and estates. As he was not a vassal of Burgundy, the request was complied with; and on the same ground the strong town of Les Clées, a few miles above Orbe, obtained permission to remain neutral. Leaving this place on their left, the Swiss took the steep road ascending to Jougne, which stands in a defile near the summit of the pass. The town surrendered. The garrison at first refused, but losing courage on the enemy's approach, began to scramble from the walls, leaving their commander to open a parley. But the Swiss were not to be thus defrauded of their prey. Rushing forward, they drove back the fugitives, and then aiding each other with their long spears, which they thrust into the chinks of the masonry, climbed to the top in sight of the intimidated foe. From two to three hundred men were found in the castle, and not one was spared. The officers were beheaded; the

sant mieux faire que ceux de châtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, Grandson," is the humane comment B. VIII. n. 229.
of the priestly chronicler of Neu-

others were driven to the parapets and made to spring over on to the rocks below."¹⁰

Full possession of the pass had now been secured; for Pontarlier, on the opposite descent, was already in ruins. It was not deemed advisable to advance into the plains, where bodies of cavalry, while avoiding battle, would have made it difficult to procure supplies or carry off booty. Garrisons were posted in the conquered places, and the Swiss returned home through the Pays de Vaud. In all the towns on their route — Romont, Payerne, Morat, and others — they met with hospitable entertainment. The trembling population sought to propitiate the formidable neighbors whom it no longer dared to look upon as friends or allies.¹¹

At the pressing invitation of Berne, the troops of Lucerne took their way through the former town, where they were greeted with processions and feasting and extraordinary marks of cordiality. In this demonstration Berne had a twofold purpose. It wished to bind more closely to itself the only member of the Confederacy which had stood by it during the last movement, and to intimate to the others the danger which they ran of forfeiting its friendship. Such manoeuvres had, however, no effect save that of

¹⁰ The authorities for this brief but vigorous campaign are Schilling; the *Chronique de Neuchâtel* printed in the *Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*; letters of Berne in the *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C. MS.*; letters from the camp, in Knebel, 1ste Abth. pp. 140, 142. See also Gingins, *Hist. d'Orbe*.

¹¹ "Par cy-devant avoient toujours plus esté en leur grace que nul de leurs voisins; . . . toute fois plus par doute que autrement leur furent par eulx présenté vivres et toutes choses nécessaires." *Chron. de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*, B. VIII. s. 233.

widening the breach. Finding after the recent diet, that no attention was paid to their appeals, the six cantons had privately deliberated on their own course. In answer to a somewhat brusque inquiry as to the meaning of their secret conferences, they disclaimed any intention of constituting a separate league, but at the same time declared that they had come to an agreement to remain united in their opposition to the policy of Berne.⁶⁰ They proceeded to draw up a memorial representing the perils to which the country was exposed by being forced into a deadly war on behalf of other powers.⁶¹ They also brought forward fresh proposals of mediation which they had received from the regent of Savoy.

This communication was received with an expression of sullen contempt.⁶² The hirelings of France had other interests to care for than those of the Confederacy. They were preparing their report to the king⁶³ of the operations undertaken and successfully prosecuted "for his advantage and their own." They had soared beyond the narrow notions of liberty and independence, and could endure the coldness of their Confederates while assured of the continued "graciousness" of their royal patron.

⁶⁰ "Da hunt Sy Uns verantwort: es sye war, Sy haben sich dazemal geeint, das der VI. Ort dheim on das Ander uns nachziehen solte; . . . witer habend Sy dheim Vereinigung gemacht." Rathsbuch. MS (Archives of Lucerne.)

⁶¹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 555.

⁶² "Mit me worten als dz myn Herren wol verstanden haben." Rathsbuch. MS.

⁶³ Letter of Berne enclosing report of Diesbach. Deutsch Missionen-Buch C, 400. MS.

CHAPTER VII.

ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE EMPIRE.—LEAGUE AGAINST
BURGUNDY IN OPERATION.—SIEGE OF NEUSS CONCLUDED.—
CHARLES AND THE ESTATES OF FLANDERS.

1475.

FROM the zealous agents let us turn our glance upon the principal.

"His language is ambiguous," wrote a Milanese envoy commissioned to penetrate the royal purposes. "It is however perfectly certain that, while doing all he can by promises of money and assistance to incite the Germans to war, he will not the less use every effort to maintain his own truce."¹

This policy was not only instinctive but well considered and profound. "I can have no peace in my kingdom"—thus he pondered the matter—"if I have war with the duke of Burgundy *He* can torment me on every side."² England, Aragon, Brit-

¹ C. da Bolla to the duke of Milan, Feb. 3, 1475, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 28.

² "Qui le tourmente de tous costés." Sur l'utilité de l'alliance de l'Empereur, Legrand *MSS.*

Pièces historiques, tom. xviii. (Bib. Imp., Paris)—apparently a memorandum dictated to a secretary, or else the minute of a deliberation in council.

tany, a disaffected nobility, would have no terrors but for *him*!

As he reflected on his past struggles, he fell into a plaintive, half-querulous tone, "*I* have had continual war these ten years last Lent, while the Germans are but just beginning!"² It was but reasonable that he should have a respite, which he would well employ — in preparations for the decisive hour when he might step in and sweep away the fruits.

With prophetic confidence he looked forward to an event the announcement of which would act upon him like a trumpet-call. "The duke of Burgundy," he was often heard to say, "exposes himself to all the hazards of battle. One of these days a random bolt or cannon-ball will carry off his head."³ Then —

Meanwhile, however, other contingencies, of a less agreeable nature, were to be provided for. His old dread of an English invasion was about to be realized. The preliminary arrangements had been completed; and though delays might intervene, the reality of the approaching crisis could no longer be doubted or avoided. Louis, therefore, got ready to meet it. He made a large addition to his forces, and increased the taxes to such a degree as to raise apprehensions of a popular revolt.⁴

But his activity was not confined to a single point. Whatever might be the dangers ahead, he was not

² Inconveniens qui peuvent arriver de cette alliance. Ibid. MS.

⁴ "Dicendo son M. come fa spesso volte che stando esso Duca in continui pericoli della guerra

venira uno giorno qualche serettione o spingarda che line portare il capo." Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 28.

³ Ibid. p. 29.

disposed to let slip the opportunity afforded by an interval of security. Among other matters, he found leisure for investigating the affairs of old King René, whose childless and in all respects forlorn condition excited his sympathy. Louis decided on relieving him of Anjou, and made known his intention by a sudden irruption with an overwhelming force.⁶ René, who was then residing in the province, heaved a sigh, wrote a mild remonstrance,⁷ and, having packed up his palette and brushes, betook himself to Provence. Louis discovered that he had claims also on Provence—claims of an intricate kind, requiring a deluge of citations, proofs, replications, a regular process in short,⁸ which must at least establish his right to the reversion on René's death. The heir-expectant, Charles of Maine, nephew of René, came to Paris to petition and protest. He was immediately placed under a secret but strict surveillance. "If he show any symptom of removing," wrote Louis to his police, "lay hands on him at once. Station guards within a circle of ten or twelve leagues, in case he should try to get away in disguise. If he have any of his uncle's people about him, bid them go off, and, if they refuse, send them to me or—throw them into the river."⁹

In another quarter he showed himself at this period equally vigilant and prompt. By the recent

⁶ De Troyes, p. 111.

⁷ Legrand MSS. *Pièces historiques*, tom. xiii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, and in subsequent vol-

umes. Some of the earlier pieces are printed in Lenglet.

⁹ Two letters to Bressure, first undated, second dated Feb. 21, in Legrand MSS.

marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, these two states, so long inimical to each other, had become virtually one. Aragon was the ally of Burgundy, Castile of France; but the change in their internal relations must of course affect their foreign policy. It was accordingly intimated to the French monarch that, if he wished to preserve the friendship of Castile, he would do well to surrender Roussillon to its rightful owner, Aragon; in case of a refusal the Castilian envoys were ordered to open a negotiation with Burgundy.¹⁰ Louis received this message as a friendly warning and instantly acted upon it. He removed the governor of Roussillon, whose leniency in punishing a late revolt had rendered him an object of suspicion, and appointed a more trusty successor with detailed instructions how to proceed. "Raze all fortresses not required for defence. Build a citadel at Perpignan. Drive out all the nobles who have ever fought against France, and confiscate their estates."¹¹ When he had thus tightened his grasp, he was ready to talk about a surrender.

The only question that had any perplexities for this ready-witted, fertile-minded king was, whether he should seek an alliance with the emperor for mutual assistance against Burgundy. On the one hand he feared that, without some encouragement

¹⁰ Synopsis of instructions to Don Ferrand de Pulgar, dated Feb. 8, and read to Louis at Paris, March 18. Ibid. *MS.* ¹¹ Instructions to Bouchage, March 23, printed in Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 372 et seq.

of the kind, Frederick would either never take the field at all, or would speedily come to terms with the enemy.¹² On the other hand he reflected that the emperor, old, unenterprising, poor in purse and still poorer in spirit, could not be relied upon to perform his own share of the engagement, while he would probably make troublesome demands upon his ally.¹³ "With the Swiss and their allies," reasoned Louis, "I am perfectly safe;¹⁴ their movements—instead of obliging *me* to take part in the war—will constrain the duke of Burgundy to renew the truce.¹⁵ But how can I trust to the emperor, who pays no regard to his promises and thinks nothing of leaving his allies in the lurch?"¹⁶ Here was certainly good ground for hesitation: princes who were faithless to their promises, and who left their allies in the lurch, were not desirable partners—for Louis the Eleventh. Nevertheless the counter-considerations prevailed. "If an agreement be patched up, the duke, in concert with the Bretons and the English, will return more powerful than ever." He must therefore be kept in Germany, as far from the French soil as possible. An embassy was accordingly sent, and a treaty concluded. Thirty thousand German troops would march to the relief

¹² Sur l'utilité de l'alliance de l'Empereur, Legrand MSS.

¹³ Inconvénients qui peuvent arriver de cette alliance. Ibid. MS.

¹⁴ "Le Roy ne doit cependant craindre nullement de s'allier aux Suisses et Allemands." Ibid. MS.

¹⁵ "Le Duc en craindra plus d'en rompre la trêve." Ibid. MS.

¹⁶ "Il est peu fidèle en ses promesses, et qui ne se soucie point de réparer ce que son manque de parole lui a fait perdre." Ibid. MS.

of Neuss. Thirty thousand French troops would invade Luxembourg. Joint operations were to follow until the rebellious vassal of both crowns should have been overwhelmed and crushed. Neither of the contracting parties would listen to proposals of peace without the knowledge and concurrence of the other—"on the word of an emperor; on the word of a king." What stronger pledge could be exacted? ¹⁷

Still another move, and Louis hoped that he might pause to await the issue of his combinations. His rival's back being turned, he could now make a fresh and more vigorous effort to bring over Lorraine to his side. This time he threw his line with a wider sweep than before. The allurements held out by his immediate agents, the Sire de Craon and others,¹⁸ were not the only means to which he had recourse. He called upon his Swiss friends to use their exertions, and through their intervention he brought an influence to bear more potent than his own persuasions.¹⁹ The presence in Lorraine of the Burgundian garrisons, and the passage through that province of Charles's Italian mercenaries, furnished the towns of the Rhineland, incited by Berne, with the same grounds for intimidation as Berne had itself employed in the case of Savoy. René was

¹⁷ For the instructions, treaties, ratifications, and supplementary articles reducing the number of troops, see Lenglet, tom. ii., Muller, Reichstags Theater, B. II., and Chmel, B. I.

¹⁸ "Ne faillit pas à luy promettre qu'on en feroit un grant homme." Commines, tom. i. p. 322.

¹⁹ Berne to Basel, Freitag vor Palmam, Deutsch Meissien-Buch C, 399. *MS.*

told, as Yolande had been told, that, in a conjuncture like the present, he must not expect to preserve his neutrality.³⁰ Unless he separated himself from Charles he would incur the enmity of a powerful league, embracing his liege lord the emperor and all the states and princes of Germany. On the other hand he need have no fears about renouncing his engagements with Burgundy. If in peril, he would have the support of the whole coalition, and in particular the Most Christian King would guaranty his safety.³¹ Cornered and perplexed, René consulted with his principal vassals—parties like himself to the Burgundian alliance, distrustful like himself of both the emperor and the king,³² but unable to suggest any means of escape. War being unavoidable, he who was weakest and most exposed must side with the strongest and most menacing.³³ As a further and less humiliating excuse he could allege any acts of misconduct which might appear to have been committed by the Burgundian troops. His complaints on this score and the answer they received will be noticed hereafter. Before yielding entirely to the concentrated pressure he was powerless to withstand, he endeavored to secure himself by secret covenants, of which the immediate value was,

³⁰ "S'il ne s'en départoit, ils estoient deliberez plus tost de luy faire la guerre que de souffrir ledict passage." Dialogue de Lud et Chrétiens, p. 19.

³¹ Ibid. pp. 19, 20.

³² "Qui de guerres ne s'assueroient ne au secours de l'empereur,

ny pareillement du roy." Ibid. p. 19.

³³ "Considerant qu'il n'y auoit ay de plus presta, ny plus seure . . . que celle de ses voisins, et . . . puis-qu'il falloit estre en guerre, tant par lediete alliance que pour la requeste^l de l'empereur." Ibid. ubi supra.

that they enabled the French king to announce to the Swiss that he had added the duke of Lorraine to the long list of his "servants."²²

Heedless apparently of the machinations around him, the duke of Burgundy had been all this while immersed in the labors of a single enterprise. The seasons had rolled round, and Neuss was still untaken but still besieged. Its protracted resistance was not entirely owing to the resolution of the defenders. Winter had brought them a relief, not in the expected shape of an imperial army, but in storms and floods, which had swept away the dikes and other works of the besiegers and thrown a belt of water and swamp around the beleaguered town.²³ The camp, which had hitherto been brilliant and gay, sports and pomps filling up the intervals of labor and combat, had now become a scene of dismal privations, which proved a severe tax on the spirits of the army. Imprisoned in mire and slush, with rain and snow for their jailers, the languishing cavaliers were haunted by recollections of the banquets, the balls, and the belles of Bruges.²⁴ Their leader, "a man of steel," "active as a swallow,"

²² "Der sie sin diner und in synem schirm." Girard MSS.

²³ Wierstraet. — Lamarche.

²⁴ "Pensés se nos pavillons, glacés et cergés de nége sont estuves d'Allemaigne, . . . se les pavés de nos rues où sommes enfangés jusques à genoux, est le marché de

Vallenchiennes. Où est le diner launié au son de la cloche? Elas!

où sont dames pour nous entretenir?

. . . Les drogheries, bagueries et banques de Bruges nous sont es-carnement parus." Letter of the count of Chimay to Chastellain, Haynin, tom. ii. p. 256.

insensible to cold, hunger, and fatigue, excited their wonder rather than their emulation.²⁷

Cologne had taken advantage of this turn of affairs to throw in a reënforcement of six hundred men, with a much needed supply of ammunition. When the spring opened it was necessary for Charles to begin his operations anew. Time pressed. Germany had at length begun to stir. England would soon require his coöperation. The manœuvres in Lorraine were beginning to interrupt his communications with the Burgundies and with Italy. Flanders was still deaf to his demands and supplications for aid, while Savoy was imploring aid to enable it to remain staunch to his cause. On the other hand the motives for persisting were stronger than ever. Should he triumph in the face of obstacles, the hostile combinations, it was thought, would fall of themselves. The Rhineland, unshielded by the imperial ægis, would submit to its destiny.²⁸ The Swiss, deprived of any pretext for war, would desist from their attacks and dissolve their alliance with France.²⁹

No sooner, therefore, had the floods subsided than the lines were drawn more closely than ever, and the camp resumed its former animation. It wore the appearance of a thriving and populous town, where every kind of business, professional as well as

²⁷ *Ibid.* 234 et seq.

Emperor to the Swiss, Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 328.

²⁸ "Denn sollte Niss verloren werden, . . . so were alles das, so an dem Rin ligt, hin und wurde das veld gebrochen." Message from the

²⁹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. I. p. 79 et al.

mechanical, was as regularly carried on as in the midst of peace.³⁰ Provisions flowed in with increasing abundance, two great market-places being occupied by the booths of the country-people, and the strictest justice and order enforced by the provost-marshals, who held their court beneath the convenient shelter of a lofty gallows-tree. All further attempts to send supplies or reinforcements into the town proved not only abortive but disastrous. Parties from Cologne, hovering around with this intent, were cut off and hunted down; while single messengers, endeavoring to communicate, were either captured alive or so closely tracked that they could only elude pursuit by throwing themselves into the Rhine. The bombardment too had now begun to tell. Ere long the whole of the outer wall lay in ruins. Positions were seized commanding the bastions of the two principal gates, and, while a lively fire was kept up from towers erected for the purpose, a mine was pushed forward under the inner defences. The detection of this last danger spread a panic among the besieged. For the first time there was a general sinking of courage, and many were in favor of surrendering if terms could still be obtained.³¹ But Hermann of Hesse,

³⁰ Molinet, the Mag. Chron. Belg., Fugger, and other chronicles are full of details on this matter. The Venetian ambassador wished to have a picture of the camp to take home with him, and Charles accordingly caused one to be painted. Unfortunately on the way it

fell into the hands of Sigismund of Austria. See Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 102.

³¹ "Myllich malche gemoede wart
dar bynnen dorch grotest aweywart.
Doyle hielten sich erghesen waill
zu hoeren nae der vyand tayall
ind sprach so halden vpgenard."
Wiertrant, s. 61.

who had in his pocket the imperial promise of his own advancement to the see in case of Rupert's failure to recover it,²² had fully resolved to stake his whole fate on the issue. It was discovered that a body of Italians who had charge of the mine kept careless watch. A surprise was planned, they were driven out, and the works destroyed. Still the besiegers, in spite of all attempts to dislodge them, held the ground which they had gained and made slow but steady progress. Their assaults grew bolder and more incessant, the sallies from within shorter and feebler. Although the town stood in no danger of absolute famine, the scarcity of many articles was severely felt. Of corn and wine there was sufficient to last for many months. But the last wholesome meat had been eaten on Christmas Day. Four hundred horses had since been consumed, and but five remained. The mills had been destroyed by the enemy's fire. Underground and uncooked corn, swollen in water, formed the chief article of food, and was rendered still more tasteless by the want of salt. The stoutest pined on this innutritious diet; the sick were dying fast for lack of medicines, and the stock of powder was on the point of exhaustion.²³

²² Lacomblet, *Urkundenbuch für die Geschichte des Niederrheins*, B. IV. s. 466.

²³ Report from Neuss, in Blasch, B. II. s. 278. — Letter of Ludwig von Eptingen, in Knebel, late Abth. s. 160, 161. See also Wierstrat,

and Molinet, *passim*; a letter of Panigarola, in the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 167, and Commines (who had his information from one of the garrison), tom. i. p. 335.

Such was the state of affairs at the beginning of May. The assailants calculated on forcing an entrance within fifteen days.³⁴ The inhabitants acknowledged that now, if ever, the long-promised succors must be brought.³⁵

Yet if the moment was critical for Neuss, it was also critical for Charles. His truce with France had just run out through his own refusal to prolong it. Counting on a speedy release from his present entanglement, obliged in any event to keep his engagements with England, he was neither to be diverted by the attacks of the Swiss, on the effect of which the king had so confidently counted, nor to be moved by the direct solicitations of his rival, who besought him to take his own time for the prosecution of his German projects, assuring him — all treaties to the contrary notwithstanding — that he would meet with no molestation from the French side while so engaged.³⁶ Louis, consequently, to his deep regret,³⁷ found himself compelled to bear an active part in the prosecution of his own schemes. He could not indeed

³⁴ Commynes, *ubi supra*. — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 133.

³⁵ "Sy secorso non gy fosse non poterebano piu tegners." John Inny to the duke of Milan, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 129. — "Es ist auch syt umb sy gewesen in su helffen." Letter of Ludwig von Eptingen, in Knebel, *1ste Abth.* s. 161. — "Nacire was nye verloren die stat." Wierstrass, s. 71.

³⁶ "Le Roy sollicitoit fort de Palonger, et qu'il feist à son aise en Allemagne: ce que ledict duc ne

voulut faire, pour la promesse qu'il avoit faicte aux Anglois." Commynes, tom. i. p. 313; and p. 320. — See also, for a full account of the negotiation, Molinet, tom. i. p. 110 et seq. Also, in the Legrand *MSS.* (*Pièces historiques*, tom. xviii.), a counter-proposition from Charles, very convenient for himself, yet offered only on condition that his allies should assent.

³⁷ "Pourquoy le Roy eut tres grant regret." Commynes, tom. i. p. 325.

bring himself, perhaps from the mere force of habit, to act in concert with his allies or give them the support which he had promised. But he ordered an immediate advance of all the forces which he kept constantly posted on the frontiers. One army, under the duke of Bourbon, was to invade Burgundy; Craon, the governor of Champagne, would penetrate through Lorraine into Franche-Comté; the king set out in person to take the command in Picardy.³⁸ His plan appeared to be to strike at the most assailable points, leaving to others the task of grappling with an adversary whose closer hug he instinctively avoided. He did not in fact look for any speedy or decisive result in Germany. Pride on the one side, sluggishness on the other, obstinacy on both, would there, as he supposed, lead to a long continuance of the present confusion. The event was, however, nearer than he imagined. The imperial army had assembled and was actually on the move. Herald after herald had arrived at Charles's camp with the hostile messages of the electoral princes. Now, too, the duke of Lorraine, under the immediate peril of being involved in the fate of his ally,³⁹ sent in his defiance, expelled the Burgundian garrisons, and admitted a body of French troops. Thus the league, to all appearance, was in full and triumphant operation. From the passes of the Jura, where, as we have seen, fortress after fortress was falling before the irresistible assaults of the Swiss, to the plains of Artois,

³⁸ De Troyes, pp. 115, 117.

³⁹ Dasin, tom. ii. p. 343.

where Louis had already begun to operate, every part of the Burgundian dominions was simultaneously threatened; and Charles, instead of holding a vantage-ground from which to repel attack, stood in the very centre of his gathering foes. The world, which always reasons rapidly in such cases, considered him lost. He had refused, it was said, to budge, while the way of retreat was still open; nothing now could save him from annihilation.⁴⁰

He exhibited, however, no signs of dismay. Perils which he lacked the genius to anticipate and neutralize, he had at least the boldness to confront.⁴¹ He trusted to his subjects at home, under Romont, Roussey, and his other lieutenants, to keep the French at bay till he could go himself to the rescue. Intelligence of the latest movements of the Swiss — owing to the disturbed state of the roads, which were now indeed completely closed — had not yet reached him. Having heard of their retreat from La Rivière, and judging by their usual habits as well as by what he knew of their internal discords, he felt assured that they would not long continue in the field.⁴² The imperial avalanche about to descend upon him, he awaited with a coolness exasperating to those who had looked forward to the treat they would derive from the spectacle of his terror. Frederick, he was

⁴⁰ Ibid pp 343-347. — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 127.

⁴¹ "Inter tantas curas atque angustias . . . velut impavidus."

⁴² "Constanter et perseveranter in sua obsidione persistens, imperatoris et

suorum Germanorum adventum expectabat." *Basin*, tom. ii. pp. 341, 348.

⁴³ Letter to Claude du Fay, May 10, Labarre, tom. i. p. 360.

reported to have said, had done him a great honor in calling out against him the whole power of the Empire; the house of Burgundy had never before received such a mark of distinction.⁴³ He exhorted his troops to constancy, avowing his purpose to seek, rather than avoid, an encounter.⁴⁴ To the electoral messengers he gave a courteous hearing, and replies in which he strove to vindicate his motives, while accepting the challenge which honor forbade him to decline. He had made no war on the Empire or the emperor; he too was a German prince, and in seeking to reinstate the dethroned archbishop, was not merely fulfilling the obligations of kinship and alliance, but upholding the common rights of the electors.⁴⁵ The defiance of Lorraine touched him more nearly. But it was very differently received from that which seven months before had come from the Swiss. Instead of disconcerting his schemes, it opened a new and easier way to their accomplishment. "By Saint George you bring us good tidings!" he said to the trembling emissary, and unclasping a rich mantle from his own shoulders bade him take it, with a purse of gold, for his guerdon.⁴⁶

The emperor, though much censured for the tardiness of his preparations, had at least made a timely

⁴³ Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 122.

⁴⁴ Basin, tom. i. p. 348.

⁴⁵ Müller, Reichstags Theatrum, B. II. s. 631, 635, et al.

⁴⁶ Comment le duc de Lorraine envoie defier le duc Charles, contemporary report in Legrand MSS.,

Pièces historiques, tom. xvii. — See also Remy, Discours des choses advenues en Lorraine, depuis le décès du duc Nicolas, jusques à celui du duc René (Pont-à-Mousson, 1605, 4to), p. 9.

beginning. Even before the siege was actually opened he had announced his intention to take the field in person, and had stipulated with Cologne and the other places most nearly interested for a monthly subsidy to cover his expenses.⁴⁷ In the autumn he had issued his summonses and manifestoes. A mediator had then stepped in. The king of Denmark, on his way back from a visit to Rome, had volunteered his services in preserving the peace of Christendom, and had spent three months in going backwards and forwards on this laudable mission. Under the discouragements of the winter, Charles was not indisposed to an accommodation which might enable him to withdraw without loss of reputation. But he was told that no proposition on his behalf could be entertained, that no further intimation of the imperial will would be vouchsafed, while his tent remained pitched and his banner unfurled on the sacred soil of the Empire.⁴⁸ For the duke himself this answer was sufficient. But the royal negotiator persevered until he had learned the terms it was intended to impose. To escape the penalties of his presumption, Charles must renounce and deliver up his treaties with Rupert, disclaim all right to interfere in the affairs of Germany, and refrain from any hostilities against Si-

⁴⁷ Müller, Reichstags Theatrum, B. II. s. 649.

⁴⁸ "Er mag selbs verstan all die will der Herzog zu veld ligt mit uss-gewahntem panner und gezolt, das uns nit fugt und schimpfflich were yemanda zu gunnen in den sachen

zu tedigen noch zu demselben zedel antwort zu geben. Ist er aber uns dem Rich mit sinem veld abzulechen, alsdenn wolen wir mit unsern kur-fursten und fursten zu rat werden." Letter of the emperor to Sigismund, MS. (Stifts-Archiv, Sanct-Gallen.)

gismund or Sigismund's allies, leaving his grievances, the force of which was graciously conceded, to the arbitration of the emperor.⁴⁹ Who would have expected that at this stage of his career, Frederick was about to shine forth as a second Barbarossa?

He had found it, however, no easy matter to overcome the incoherence and disjointed action of the huge machine over which he presided. Diets had been convened and postponed; troops had been levied and countermanded. The king of Hungary could not think of abandoning his alliance with Burgundy, unless his own right to the crown of Bohemia were first conceded. The duke of Juliers pleaded his proximity to the enemy's states as an excuse for his neutrality. The elector palatine boldly proclaimed that his sympathies as well as his interests lay on the opposite side.⁵⁰ Even the cities were not all of the same mind. The people of Trèves, having tasted the munificence of the Burgundian court and experienced the good effects of the Burgundian discipline, had shown ever since a strong desire to cultivate Charles's friendship. At their request he had recognized their neutrality and given orders that they should be treated with the same consideration as his proper subjects.⁵¹

Yet in spite of all such defections and delays, fifteen electoral and other princes, sixty-five counts, and four thousand nobles of lower degree had at

⁴⁹ Vergleichs Project, Muller, ⁵⁰ Letters to Claude du Fay, Jan. Reichstage Theatrum, B. II. s. 579. 3 and March 31, Labarre, tom. i.

⁵¹ Ibid. s. 591, 690, et al. — pp. 356, 358. Chmel, B. I, s. 433-436.

length collected in the neighborhood of Cologne. These with their followers constituted the cavalry, while the infantry was chiefly made up of the contingents of sixty-eight free towns. The whole army, according to the lowest computation, numbered, when it neared the scene of action, forty thousand men.⁵² For two centuries, it was reported, there had been no such gathering of the imperial vassals.⁵³ The artillery and the wagons were numerous beyond precedent. Nothing was lacking but unity and discipline. The troops of different states availed themselves of the opportunity for deciding their hereditary quarrels; and bloody brawls, which it was forbidden to speak of outside the camp,⁵⁴ were of daily occurrence. To counterbalance this defect a high state of confidence prevailed. All vaunted their determination to annihilate the invader,⁵⁵ while not the slightest doubt was entertained that a large French force was advancing to join them.⁵⁶ Among the most fiery leaders were the archbishops of Trèves and Mayence, and the

⁵² Letter of Panigarola to the duke of Milan, *Notizenblatt*, 1858, n. 161. — Conf. Müller, *Reichstags Theatrum*, B. II. s. 793, and Rodt (from a manuscript Bericht in Constance), B. I. s. 392, 394, where the figures give a total of about 50,000. By most of the chroniclers the number is set as high as 80,000. This is explained by a passage in a contemporary letter, which says the number is reckoned at 60,000 to 80,000, "undre munder, aber die erste rede was mit 80,000." Knebel, *late Abth.* s. 148. The list of

proposed levies, which included a large Swiss force, amounted to 130,000. *Chmel* B. I. s. 421–425.

⁵³ "La potentia di Alamagna che CC anni pasati non si troua così unita." Panigarola to the duke of Milan, *Notizenblatt*, n. 111.

⁵⁴ "Item dass hiefur niemand kein rumor anheb by verliering sins leben!" *Kaiserliche Verordnung*, in Knebel, *late Abth.* s. 146.

⁵⁵ *Basin*, tom. ii. pp. 339, 340.

⁵⁶ Letter of the duke of Saxony, *Mittwoch nach exaudi*, Müller, *Reichstags Theatrum*, Th. II. s. 103.

bishop of Munster,⁵⁷ — the first inflamed by the opposition of his own people, the last by some personal pique against the duke of Burgundy, whom he intended, it was said, to single out and engage in deadly combat.⁵⁸ Duke Albert of Saxony, a brave and honest gentleman, who startled his associates by giving out that he had come to fight but not to plunder,⁵⁹ carried the great standard of the Empire as the representative of his brother, the elector Ernest. The post of generalissimo devolved as of right on the margrave of Brandenburg, the veteran "Achilles of Germany" and the hero of innumerable fights, who had never shown his back to an enemy but once. This was when his wars with Nuremberg had brought him into collision with the Swiss, on which occasion, like so many of his noble contemporaries, he had fled with precipitation.⁶⁰

A detached force, consisting of the militia of Cologne, Basel, and other free cities, had already descended the right bank of the Rhine, to operate on the enemy's flank and seize the opportunity when he should be engaged with the main host of penetrating into the town. Signals were devised to inform the besieged that the hour of their deliverance was at hand. Hollow balls were thrown across the river into the meadow at the foot of the wall. Two fell short; the third, after a sharp tussle, was carried

⁵⁷ Mayer (Annals, fol. 416) speaks most irreverently of these warlike prelates, as, "satrapas interminates, asnos inter simias."

⁵⁸ Ibid. ubi supra.

⁵⁹ Sächsischer Bericht, in Müller, Reichstage Theatrum, D. II. s. 685.

⁶⁰ J. Müller, Hist. de la Conféd. Suisse, tom. vii.

off by the Burgundians. After nightfall a stealthy search being made along the bank, a ball which had dropped into the water was picked up and carried in. It contained the cheering missive, "Neuss, be of good comfort: thou art saved!"⁶¹

Meanwhile the main army proceeded down the left bank, attended by a large fleet of boats. Its progress corresponded with its composition, and resembled the coasting voyages of primitive navigators. After a short and extremely cautious advance a halt of several days was employed in preparations for a further move.⁶² At Zons, two leagues south of Neuss, it rested eleven days, awaiting wistfully but vainly the arrival of the French reinforcements. On the morning of the 24th of May it again got upon its legs, marched about two miles through a forest, and having reached an open plain, proceeded to form a new encampment at what was judged a safe distance from the enemy's lines. The ground sloped gently towards the Rhine from a sandy eminence on the left, which was partially occupied, but not intrenched. The right wing projected from the main body, *en potence*, with its back to the river, which seems to have been considered the best line of retreat. A ditch was dug, a palisade erected, and the wagons, five thousand in number, were so ranged as to form an enclosure. A covered wagon, or horse-litter, used by the infirm emperor as a travelling equipage by day and a couch by night, was wheeled

⁶¹ Wierstraet, s. 69, 70.

397 et seq.; and Müller, *Reichs-*

⁶² See the details in Rodt, B. I. s. tageTheatrum, B. II. s. 793.

into the centre. Tents and pavilions were set up. Horses were unsaddled and armor laid aside. All was in disarray and entire security, when suddenly the boom of cannon was heard, and balls came plunging through the tents and ricochetting among the wagons.⁶²

On hearing of the emperor's approach Charles had manifested great satisfaction. Within the last few days the tidings from other quarters had much increased his anxieties. Louis was meeting with less resistance, and snatching more rapid successes, than had been anticipated. The duke of Lorraine, with his French auxiliaries, had crossed the frontiers of Luxembourg and laid siege to several fortresses, one of the strongest of which, Pierrefort, had capitulated at the first summons, to Charles's extreme indignation.⁶³ To add to his embarrassments, Earl Rivers, the brother-in-law of the English monarch, had arrived to inform him that Edward, in readiness to embark, expected his assistance.⁶⁴ Thus time had become the most important element in his calculations. The capture of Neuss, were it still possible, would yield him no substantial fruit, for he would have neither leisure nor opportunity to follow it up as he had originally contemplated. He had been thrown on the defensive, and to regain the offensive

⁶² Letter of Duke Albert of Saxony, in Müller, Reichstags Theatrum, B. II. s. 704. — Letter of the duke of Burgundy to the Sire du Fay, May 27 Labarre, tom. i. p. 360, et seq. — Letter of Ludwig von Epplingen, in Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 159.

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⁶³ Letter to the Sire du Fay, governor of Luxembourg, May 10. Labarre, tom. i. p. 360.

⁶⁴ Ancienne Chronique, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 216. — Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 133.

he must extricate himself from his present position, and turn his arms in another direction. Simply to break up his camp and retire before an exulting foe, would involve danger as well as disgrace. He must first try the fortunes of battle, and conceiving that the opportunity was now presented to him, he eagerly embraced it.⁶⁶

His army, in spite of its losses during the siege, had been fully maintained at its original strength. About half of it, however, must be left in the camp and on the island, to repel any sallies of the garrison and the concerted attacks of the forces across the river. The remaining troops, twelve thousand in number, he divided into two corps. In the centre of the first he stationed the English archers, the flower of his infantry, "interlaced" with pikemen, while the wings were formed of cavalry, chiefly Italian. The squadrons of the *bandes d'ordonnance*, the élite of the horse, constituted the centre of the second corps, with archers, pikemen, and other infantry on the flanks. Reserves of cavalry were attached to each corps. The count of Chimay had the command of the vanguard, Humbercourt of the rearguard. They were directed to cross the Erft, which flowed in the rear of the camp, by a ford, which, though narrow and deep, afforded firm footing. A bridge somewhat higher up was reserved for the artillery, of which there were eighty pieces.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ "Alegro et tanto di bona Notizenblatt, s. 110.

uoglia quanto si potesse dire spe- ⁶⁷ Ibid. — Letter of Charles to
rando dar la bataglia alli inimici." the Sire du Fay, Labarre, tom. i.
Panigarola to the duke of Milan, p. 361.

Having given his orders, Charles proceeded to arm himself *cap-à-pié*, conversing at the same time in a strain of gayety with the Milanese envoy, Panigarola.⁶⁸ He then passed into a private chapel adjoining his pavilion, and after performing his devotions, mounted a fleet courser and galloped off to join his troops.

He found them drawn up in good order on the right bank of the Erst; and, in spite of their great inferiority of numbers, their bearing and discipline were such as to justify the bold purpose of their chief.⁶⁹ A survey of the enemy's position showed that his right wing, being the nearest and most exposed, had taken particular precautions against an attack. It was strongly intrenched, and all the artillery had been posted in this quarter, with the exception of a battery which had been sent across the Rhine and so planted, somewhat lower down, as to enfilade the approaches along the shore without being itself liable to capture. For these and other reasons equally sound, Charles determined to march obliquely by his own right and fall upon the enemy's left.⁷⁰ In this way his approach was made under shelter of a wood. He pushed forward a park of artillery, which, as soon as it gained the

⁶⁸ "In mia presentia si armo da capo a piede motegiando sempre con mi . . . Rideua e parius che jubilasse." Panigarola, *Notisenblatt*, s. 110, 111.

⁶⁹ "Forono circa xij^m combattenti electi et in puncto como San Geor-

gio, e certo non vidi mai gente deliberata o di morire o di tornare con victoria e andare con tanto animo como questt." *Ibid.* s. 111.

⁷⁰ *Letter of Charles, Labarre*, tom i. p. 362.

edge of the open, began to fire with good effect. The Germans lost about sixty men and a great number of horses.⁷¹ Scarcely a tent was left standing. By their own confession they were completely surprised; and it might have been possible, by an immediate and vigorous onslaught, to force their camp and throw them into hopeless disorder.

But the courtesy of feudal tactics did not sanction such rough manœuvres. It was only the Swiss who were in the habit of assaulting fortified camps. Charles's notion, which accorded with the common practice, was, by a slight display of force, to draw out the hostile army and bring on a more equal engagement. With this view he ordered forward the archers and pikemen of the vanguard under Galeotti and Sir John Middleton, while the count of Campobasso, with some squadrons of horse, stood ready to support them. Before engaging, the English soldiers, following a national custom,⁷² prostrated themselves, traced the sign of the cross upon the earth and reverently kissed it. The Burgundians crossed themselves on the breast, with their eyes directed to heaven. Charging up the sandy hill before mentioned, they drove off the force there stationed and continued the pursuit to the foot of the opposite slope. The Germans to the number of two or three thousand issued from their defences, and the assailants retreated in their turn, but rallied

⁷¹ Letter of Ludwig von Eptingen, in Knebel, *late Abth.* s. 159. — Letter of Duke Albert of Saxony, in

Müller, B. II. s. 704.

⁷² "A leur coustume." Letter of Charles, Labarre, tom. i. p. 362.

under cover of the cavalry, which, advancing with the cry of "Our Lady, Saint George, and Burgundy!" sent the imperialists flying back, and followed them to the verge of the intrenchments.

The artillery meanwhile had continued to play, and that of the Germans at length opened in reply. Being, however, badly served, it inflicted little damage, though it made a tremendous noise.⁷³ Charles, who had chosen a conspicuous position, was exposed to the hottest of the fire. His total indifference to danger, the coolness with which he continued to make his dispositions and watch the enemy's motions while the balls were flying close around him, kindled a spark of enthusiasm in a breast not much subject to such emotions. "He is short in stature, but his soul is imperial; nor did I ever see any one so courageous," wrote the ambassador Panigarola, who was observing the combat from a safer spot.⁷⁴ A second sally on the part of the Germans ended like the former one. At last they showed a disposition to accept the challenge presented to them, by unfurling the imperial standard and coming out in sufficient numbers, of horse as well as of foot, to maintain the field. The margrave of Brandenburg chanced to be absent;

⁷³ "In modo che pariva un inferno et el mondo per troni e focho douesse ruynare.... Lartigliaria grossa continuamente laurava, ... ma inutilmente e non così bene come quella di questo S. che li bresagliaua tuto il longo." Letter of Panigarola, Notizenblatt, s. 111.

⁷⁴ "Ha un animo cesareo e po de la persona, ne mai uidi così assienato como la Signoria sua, che lo springarde e bombarde la lioluano a furia a torno al caualo, e non le stimava etiam che li fosse dicto, essendo de li primi. . . . Vole uedere tuto, ne stima periculo." Ibid.

but the fiery bishop of Munster and the duke of Saxony, who had armed himself very deliberately while his tent was getting knocked about his ears,⁷⁵ led them on. The Burgundian skirmishers were driven in; and the right wing of the first corps, with the reserves of the second, which had been ordered up to support it, fell back in confusion. But the ducal guard, which next received the attack, stood firm. The disordered troops were rallied and reformed by Charles in person. Putting himself at the head of a fresh squadron, he extended his lines still farther to the right, so as completely to overlap the enemy's left.⁷⁶ He then ordered a general charge. The descending sun shone full in the faces of the Germans. The wind being also from the west, a cloud of dust rolled towards them as their foes advanced. They broke at the first shock. Seven or eight hundred of the cavalry, being cut off from the main body, fled in the direction of Cologne. Two or three thousand of the foot rushed towards the Rhine, and, in the struggle to embark, pushed each other into the stream, where many were drowned. Meanwhile the bulk of the army had taken refuge within the enclosure, where they prudently resolved to abide.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ "So genöthe die Schoose uf uns darch und neben vnd obir unser Gezelt gungen, diweil wir uns anzo-gen." Letter of Duke Albert of Saxony in Muller, Reichstags Theatrum, B. II. s. 704.

⁷⁶ "Tirames à tout ledit escadron à la droiete main de nous . . .

pour charger à nostre gauche main." Letter of Charles, Labarre, tom. i. p. 363.

⁷⁷ The authorities for this engagement are Charles's letter, May 27, Labarre, tom. i. pp. 360-364; Letter of Panigarola, June 4, Notizenblatt, 1856, n. 110-112; duke of

Finding that such was their purpose, Charles now prepared to storm the camp. He distributed the artillery so that its fire might tell upon the weakest points.⁷⁸ But before his arrangements were completed night had settled down, compelling his army to withdraw to its own quarters. He intended to renew the attempt on the following day. But when the morning came, and he had begun drawing out his forces,⁷⁹ a messenger arrived, nay, a *deus ex machinâ* descended, to harmonize the strife.

It was still common, in the 15th century, for contending princes to invoke the interposition of that power which claimed to represent the Deity and administer the divine government on earth. Louis of France, with his habitual preference for moral and indirect agencies over the coarser modes of litigation, would gladly have referred all questions to the decision of God's vicegerent, to whose benignity he had commended himself by his profound piety and by his ample concessions on all points of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.⁸⁰ When, therefore, a papal bull, promulgated in October, 1473, had enjoined upon the French king and the duke of Burgundy

Saxony's letter, Friday after Corpus Christi, Müller, Reichstags Theatrum, B. II. s. 704, 705; Letter of Ludwig von Eptingen, in Knebel, lste Abth. s. 159, 160. There are few discrepancies. Charles's account is the clearest, and not the most favorable to his own side.

⁷⁸ "A cette intention faisons réparer nostre artillerie es lieux où plus on pouvoit offendre les def-

fendeurs dudict charroy." Charles's letter, Labarre, tom. i. p. 363.

⁷⁹ "Le lendemain au matin . . . le duc assemble ses batailles, et se prépare pour marcher comme dessus." Molnet, tom. i. p. 133.

⁸⁰ There are numerous letters, overflowing with paternal affection, from Sixtus IV. to Louis XI. in the Legrand MSS.

the duty of living in concord, and denounced the pains of excommunication against whichever of them should first violate the peace, it was received by the former prince with filial deference. He ordered it to be registered by the Parliament, despite the opposition of that body on the ground that it conflicted with the liberties of the French crown,⁸¹ and he caused it to be proclaimed with sound of trumpet on the frontiers of his rival's territory. The duke, on the contrary, showed no such submissive spirit. He entered a formal protest and forwarded an appeal, couched in the strongest terms, to the Holy Father and the Sacred College. The bull, he said, though professing to be based on certain briefs of an earlier date, had been fulminated, without any express authorization, by a papal legate at the French court, in the presence of the chancellor and other officers of the crown. It recited many things that were false, and omitted many things that were pertinent and true. It pretended to decide a cause one side only having been heard, and while nominally directed against both parties, it was so framed as to be applicable to one alone.⁸² These representations, coupled with an intimation that in case of further proceedings, the cardinals in the Burgundian interest, including those of several allied states, would at once quit Rome, brought the matter to a sudden halt.⁸³

⁸¹ Hist. de Bourgogne, tom. iv. p. 415.

⁸² Sacramorus d'Arignano to the Duke of Milan, Rome, April 3,

⁸³ Acte d'appel interjeté par le Duc de Bourgogne, Lenglet, tom. iii. pp. 262-270.

1474, Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. pp. 3-5.

Among those who had objected to this measure was the emperor. His views, however, had changed with his position; and he too would fain have aroused the sleeping thunders of the Vatican, to arrest or intimidate "the disturber of Christendom," whose insolent aggressions formed the chief impediment to the immediate prosecution of a grand crusade against the Turks.⁶⁴ It was at least incumbent on the pope not to allow an agitation like the present to go on without some display of his paternal oversight and authority. One legate, empowered to bring about a general settlement of the imperial difficulties, including the affairs of Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, the Palatinate, and Cologne, had returned, after a year's absence, with the frank confession that he had failed in every part of his gigantic task.⁶⁵ His successor, the bishop of Forli, had recently received a special commission to arbitrate between the emperor and the duke of Burgundy. Having reached the imperial head-quarters about the middle of May, he had proceeded, after a brief conference, to the Burgundian camp. A pompous reception was accorded to him, and in a public audience, attended by several foreign envoys, he delivered an oration in Latin, appealing to Charles, as the most renowned and powerful of princes, the main reliance of the Apostolic See and the object of its cordial affection, not to obstruct, by any schemes

⁶⁴ This is a frequent strain with Cardinals, Müller, *Reichstage Theatrum*, B. II. s. 654.

⁶⁵ *Epistola de Negotiatione Marci*

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of personal advantage, that great design which needed only his participation to insure its happy issue. The duke chose to make his reply in the Italian language, on the plea that he had only a soldier's familiarity with the Latin.⁸⁶ His want of fluency in the former tongue,⁸⁷ as he was scholar enough to feel, would be less offensive to learned ears than any solecisms in the latter. While demurring to the high-flown compliments bestowed upon him, as ill according with the partiality recently shown to his rival, "the perjured monarch of France," he declared it to be indeed the truth that he had always acted as became a religious prince and a faithful servant of the Church. His present enterprise was itself a proof of this. Its object was the restoration of a prelate who had received the papal investiture, and it had been sanctioned, and even encouraged, by papal briefs which he was ready to produce.⁸⁸ The real assailants, the real disturbers, were the emperor and his partisans. It was to them that the legate should carry his admonitions to peace. For himself, though not disposed to make any overtures, he was prepared to listen to any just and honorable proposals.⁸⁹

With this answer, which he appeared to consider satisfactory, the legate returned to try his eloquence

⁸⁶ "Ne il latino li era familiare, salvo di soldato." Letter of Panigarola, May 16, *Notizenblatt*, s. 82.

⁸⁷ "Facendo intendere che essa lingua li era difficile a longo parlare, como e vero aliquanto incognita." *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ "Ad instantia de la Sta de n. s. il papa como per piu soi breue e stato monito e pregato, che si pono vedere, li quali hanno assai ad questo excitato." *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* s. 80-83.

on Frederick. But he found the latter still enchanted with the prospect of appearing before the world in the character of a conqueror and resolutely set against concessions or negotiations. The affair of the 24th gave a rude shock to his fantasies and restored him to his normal state.⁷⁰ His whole army indeed had been filled with consternation at the audacity of such an attack.⁷¹ The night was spent in strengthening the works, a double line of ditches flanked with bastions being carried round the camp and so extended as to include the hill, of which the importance was now appreciated.⁷² All notions of assailing the enemy, or even of again meeting him in the field, were postponed till a more favorable occasion should offer itself.⁷³ The emperor had personally incurred a great peril. His pavilion had been pierced by four cannon-balls, two of which had passed through the awning of his litter,⁷⁴ driving him to seek a refuge on a hillock near the Rhine.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ This result had been shrewdly predicted before the emperor took the field. "Aber nach minem Beduncken so wirt nit gefochten sunder jeder man sus oosten gebracht, nach alten gewonheit unsers herren des keyseris, on fruchtbarlich erschieszen des heiligen richs." Letter of a Basel envoy at Cologne, in Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 148.

⁷¹ "Nicht gemeint waren das er so dorstig were sich von Neuss zu entlossen und sich an uns in unser Wagenburg zu versuchen." . . . "Gedencken seinem Farnemen, das on allen Zweifel dorstig und vermesszen ist, so best wir mogen, fürrupauen." Letter of duke of

Saxony, Müller, Reichstage Theatrum, B. II. s. 704, 705. And see the letter of Ludwig von Eptingen, in Knebel; also Wierstraet, s. 78.

⁷² Duke of Saxony's letter, ubi supra. — "Tuta la nocte li inimici si fortificorono di bastioni fossati dopi e quanto possono, auendo uisitato di questo principe e gustato." Letter of Pamgarola, Notizenblatt, s. 111.

⁷³ "Biss wir unsern Vortail zum Streit trechen." Duke of Saxony's letter.

⁷⁴ Letter of Ludwig von Eptingen, Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 180.

⁷⁵ Letter of Pamgarola, ubi supra.

Early in the following day the bishop of Forli was sent for and charged with a message to the duke of Burgundy, expressing a willingness to enter into an arrangement and requesting a short truce for that purpose. "It did not becom princes to quarrel about the affairs of priests."⁶⁶

To this wise conclusion Charles was of course ready to assent.⁶⁷ He had pledged himself to the ambassadors of England and Brittany to bring the siege of Neuss to a speedy termination.⁶⁸ All he had wanted was the opportunity of doing so without dishonor or further loss, and this he had now gained. His attack, indecisive in a military point of view, had been productive of the moral effects of a victory. He had struck terror into a greatly superior force, which had counted on an easy triumph. No sooner was the armistice proclaimed than the Germans, in great numbers and of all ranks, flocked to the Burgundian camp. They were burning with a curiosity, of which the main object was Charles himself. They forced a passage into the private recesses of his pavilion, where they threw themselves on their knees "as if before the newly-discovered bones of a saint."⁶⁹ For three days all graver business was suspended by

⁶⁶ "Dichiarando che aposte de prati li signori non doveano essere Inimici." Ibid.

⁶⁷ "Parso ad lo p^{re} S. al per la guerra d. Franz principata, si per li Inglesi che desoendeno concederla e attendere a lacordo." Ibid.

⁶⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 134.

⁶⁹ "Ne la camerata secreta dil paviglione lo casauano e proseguivano, gittandolo a terra e adorandolo como fosse un novo sancto trovato." Letter of Panigarola, *Notizenblatt*, s. 112.

the necessity for holding a continual reception.¹⁰⁰ The company entered by one door and after paying their obeisance passed out by another. To those of noble birth the duke extended his hand, and on quitting his presence they were invited to partake of a collation. The common soldiers were regaled with wine in unlimited quantities. No one departed without a present of money, the meanest receiving a gold piece. As a further act of munificence several prisoners in the hands of the Burgundian soldiers were set at liberty, their ransoms being paid by the duke. The evening always closed with a grand entertainment which was attended by the princes and others of the high nobility, and enlivened by military music and by the sallies and antics of the court mimics and buffoons.¹⁰¹

The Burgundians, on their part, felt a natural curiosity to view the interior of a place which had defied all their efforts to force an entrance. Accordingly, for a single day the gates of Neuss were thrown open, and the troops who had so long battered at them were admitted as peaceful guests. Even in this guise, however, their presence was not altogether welcome, many fears being entertained as to the consequences. The propriety of their deportment excited a corresponding surprise. Though the streets were filled with them, no act of rapine or violence

¹⁰⁰ "Duro tre di questa cosa che quasi non si poteva attendere ad
altro." Ibid. — Panigarola com- he had to stand four or five hours
at a time.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. a. 111, 112. — Ancienne
Chronique, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 216.

occurred, and after attending mass in the church of Saint Quirinus, they quietly withdrew.¹⁰²

Meanwhile it had been found necessary to prolong the truce, not so much on account of any real difficulties in the negotiation, as to allow time for the usual amount of haggling before any demand could be conceded or retracted. On Charles's side indeed there was no dodging and no wavering. He discerned with characteristic clearness the points on which it behooved him to insist, and he adhered to them with characteristic inflexibility. He had, as he remarked in conversation with Panigarola, two objects to effect; one was to protect the interests of the ally on whose behalf he had taken up arms; the other, to break up the league between the Empire and France, and so secure himself against molestation from the former power while pursuing his designs against the latter.¹⁰³ Having, therefore, made known his terms, he left it to be clearly understood that, rather than make the least abatement in them, he stood ready to renew the contest.¹⁰⁴

Frederick, on the other hand, disputed at every step and yielded at every step. To accept, at the

¹⁰² Wierstraet, s. 81. — "Do ich hin In kommen bin, sint obe Iij Burgundesche dar inne gewesen und ist nyt mynder; die von Nüss hatten ein grawen daran, aber sie gingen suchliklich, do sy mess geborten, widder heruss." Bericht an Basel (Ludwig von Eptingen's letter), Eidgenössische Abschlade, B. II. s. 546.

¹⁰³ "Per assecurare dali Todes-

chi che erano in liga con le Re de Franza, uolo facendo guerra di la di qua non lhaveseno offesa. Item per defendere lo archivesco." Letter of June 10, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 157.

¹⁰⁴ "Credo auera effecto, sicundo li poncti et capituli a li quali si e restreto p^{re} n. o che altramente uole la guerra." Panigarola, in the *Notizenblatt*, s. 112.

head of his forces, a peace dictated by the enemy with whom, before his forces were assembled, he had refused to treat at all, was sufficiently mortifying. It was still more mortifying to be compelled to give a fresh and transcendent example of that infidelity to his promises, and that readiness to leave his allies in the lurch, for which he was already notorious. He insisted upon a respite which would at least allow him to communicate with the French king and obtain the latter's consent to a separate treaty.¹⁰⁶ It was true that he might claim to have been released from his engagements by the failure of performance on the side of his ally.¹⁰⁸ But that failure admitted perhaps of explanations or might be represented as a mere want of punctuality. On the 30th of April, when about to take the field, Louis had written to inform the emperor of his purpose, assuring him of the earnestness with which he would follow it up, and pressing for a similar activity on the side of the imperialists.¹⁰⁷ The latter were then lying inactive at Cologne. A fortnight later, when Frederick, being on the move, had despatched a notice to that effect with a summons for the promised reinforcements, Louis had sent a prompt and satisfactory reply. He was delighted with the good news. Nothing would so rejoice him as to hear of the overthrow of the rebel enemy.¹⁰⁸ In his own extreme eagerness to

¹⁰⁶ Panigara, in the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 157.

¹⁰⁸ "La quale [obligatione] pero se porria dire spirata perche nel tempo promesso non li ha mandato el succuro." *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Chmel, B. I. s. **XXXI**

¹⁰⁸ "Nichil enim sic notum joendum est sicut ipsius subiecti nostri rebellis omnimoda repulsio." Letter of Louis, May 22, *Ibid.* s. 298.

act, he had, at the instant when the truce expired, despatched his army, under the Sire de Craon, into Franche-Comté, with orders, after some necessary conquests had been achieved, to form a junction with the Swiss. This plan, however, would now be abandoned. Craon should march at once into Luxembourg, where he would arrive by the 26th, and be ready to coöperate in the grand design. The king had ended by beseeching that there might be no relaxation of effort until condign vengeance and complete subjugation should have ensued.¹⁰⁹ The appointed day was now past, and nothing had yet been heard of Craon. But three ambassadors were in the camp, sent to attend Frederick through the campaign, to buoy up his naturally despondent spirit, and in particular to tide him safely over a danger like the present.¹¹⁰ Accordingly he was plied with remonstrances, with entreaties, and with assurances of the sincerity and activity of his ally. The check he had received might be a good reason for suspending his operations until the French succors should arrive.¹¹¹ But instead of dissolving the league and letting the enemy slip from the noose, this was the very moment for arranging a division of the spoils, and sharing the possessions of the house of Burgundy between the two suzerain crowns from which they had been originally derived. During the period of

¹⁰⁹ "Rogamus igitur et iterum ac sepius hortamur vestram magestatem, ut sic artibus bellicosis procedere adversus illum rebellum subiectum nostrum curet quod pene

legitime subiecto rebeli debite subsaceat et ulcione condigna feriatur," Ibid. s. 289.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. s. 296, 298.

¹¹¹ See Pauli, B. II. s. 328.

his own excitement Frederick would doubtless have caught at the suggestion. But he had now, as we have said, returned to his normal state, which was a very sober one. If not quite a sage, he was at least an old man.¹¹² He had seen a great deal of life, and he still remembered the wise Teutonic fables taught him at his mother's knee. In reply therefore to this brilliant scheme of partition he simply recited the story of the hunters who sold the bearskin before killing their bear.¹¹³

The bishop of Forlì now proved his fitness for the task assigned to him by devising a mode of removing the emperor's scruples while saving his reputation. Both parties should lay down their arms at the command of the pope, delivered by his representative and enforced by the spiritual censures and threatenings which no secular prince might dare to disregard.¹¹⁴ This adjustment left them free to conclude an arrangement without reference to prior obligations. It was agreed that Neuss, with the adjacent country, should be surrendered into the hands of the legate, to be held by him in pledge until the questions out of which the war had arisen should have been determined. The whole subject was to be referred, in the first place, to a diet of the Empire, but finally to the arbitration of the pope. The decision was to be given within a year; and in the mean time Rupert was to have pos-

¹¹² "Combien que cest empereur ait esté toute sa vie homme de tres peu de vertu, et estoit il bien entendu, et pour le long temps qu'il a vecu, a veu beaucoup d'experi-

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ences." *Commines*, tom. I. p. 329.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* ubi supra.

¹¹⁴ *Pangarola*, in the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 157.

session of a portion of the territory of the see, including the small duchy of Westphalia, with a suitable revenue.¹¹⁵

For the fulfilment of these terms Charles had, as he privately admitted, no sufficient security.¹¹⁶ But, in case of non-fulfilment, he would be at liberty, he added, to renew the enterprise at a time when he might be better able to carry it through. He had already shown his ability, if unhampered by engagements, to cope with the whole strength of the Empire.¹¹⁷ On a future occasion his own resources, he trusted, would be still greater, while he doubted whether the German princes would again be found capable of even the same exertions as had now proved so difficult and so inadequate.¹¹⁸

It was further stipulated that the two parties should withdraw simultaneously, that the imperial army should be immediately disbanded, without even returning to Cologne, and that the peace, or rather truce, should hold good for a twelvemonth.¹¹⁹ But the treaty was especially remarkable for its omissions. Not only the French king, but the duke of Lorraine, Sigismund of Austria, the towns of Alsace, and the

¹¹⁵ Ibid. pp. 157, 159. — Letter of Panigarola, June 27, *Notizenblatt*, s. 130, 131. — Lohrer, s. 179.

¹¹⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 158.

¹¹⁷ "Hanno facto cognoscere et toccare cum mano, che non sono potenti resistere alla potentia del D. de B. et quando la Sig^{ta} sua non habia altra impresa, che non se ne faci Signori ad aos posta." Paniga-

rola, in the *Notizenblatt*, s. 131.

¹¹⁸ "Ne mai tanto esercito de Alamani le metera insieme perche sonno stati dece mese a fare questo suo sforzo, sono poveri ne del suo voleno spendere." *Dépêches Milanaises*, ubi supra.

¹¹⁹ *Notizenblatt*, ubi supra. — Letter of the Sire de la Roche to the duchess of Burgundy, Gachard, *Doc. inéd.* tom. i. p. 248.

Swiss Confederates, were all tacitly excluded.¹²⁰ Neither Sigismund nor the Swiss would have, indeed, any right to complain. They had long before been warned that, unless they complied with the emperor's requisitions, they would be left, if an arrangement were concluded, to sustain the war alone.¹²¹ This warning they had disregarded. But the towns of the Upper Rhine, from Strasburg to Schaffhausen, had furnished their contingents; and the duke of Lorraine had incurred a far greater risk after receiving the most solemn pledges for his immunity.¹²² It was apparent, therefore, that the imperial conscience had not burdened itself with any nice distinctions.

By the middle of June the treaty had been subscribed and sworn to; the legate had entered Neuss, dismissed the feeble remnant of the garrison, taken an oath of obedience from the inhabitants, and celebrated a mass of thanksgiving in the presence of rejoicing throngs. Charles, impatient to remove to a new scene of action, had nearly completed his preparations. The trenches had been levelled, the island evacuated, and the siege-artillery embarked for transportation to Gueldres.¹²³ Most of the infantry was to move off immediately. But the cavalry had taken up a new position, in the rear of the former one, and

¹²⁰ Notizenblatt and Dépêches Milanaises, ubi supra.

¹²¹ "Dan solt das nit beschehen und die sache zu tading komen, . . . solten sy dann darinn usgeschloosen werden, das mocht diner heb und ir zu merklichen unstaten kommen, und wurd dar durch der krieg gantz uff sy geladen." Letter of the

emperor to Sigismund. MS. (Stifts-Archiv, Sanct-Gallen.)

¹²² The emperor's treaty with Lorraine is in Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, Supplément.

¹²³ Panigara, in the Notizenblatt, s. 129, 130. — Wierstraat, s. 78-80.

nearer to the emperor's camp, with the purpose of watching his movements until he should have actually disbanded his forces.¹²⁴ There were in fact some grounds for apprehending treachery, if not on the part of Frederick,¹²⁵ or the electoral princes, on that of the militia of the Rhineland, who were profoundly disgusted with the result of their patriotic labors.¹²⁶ No sooner had the Burgundians quitted their old lines than the troops across the Rhine proceeded to occupy the island, and followed up this breach of faith by the seizure of several vessels laden with cannon and valuable effects, which they forthwith sent up the river towards Cologne. Charles hastened to the shore with such of his troops as were at hand. But he had no means of crossing and no artillery; and the enemy, perceiving his impotence, coolly opened a fire upon him from some pieces which they had transferred to the island. A horse was killed close beside him. He flamed with indignation; and a message from the emperor disclaiming the responsibility and promising redress could not mitigate his desire for revenge.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Bericht an Basel, Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 548. — "Parse ala excellentia tua, reteneas ancora el cavallaro uederne el fine." Panigarola, in the Notizenblatt, ubi supra.

¹²⁵ Some of his own followers, however, anticipated that, as soon as he had got rid of the Burgundians, he would endeavor to effect a junction with the French. See the Bericht in the Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 547.

¹²⁶ Ibid. ubi supra. — For expressions of a more widely-spread dissatisfaction, see Muller, Reichstage Theatrum, B. II. s. 717; and Pauli, B. II. s. 329 et seq.

¹²⁷ Panigarola, in the Notizenblatt, s. 130. — The leader of the Basel troops crows loudly over this exploit, in which he had borne a part. He adds that the captors had been offered 80,000 guilders for their spoil by merchants of Cologne.

This desire was soon to be gratified. His outposts were now in close proximity to the imperial camp. Frederick, fearful of a collision, gave orders that no one should pass beyond the intrenchments. But the ardent bishop of Munster, whose force, several thousand strong, was in the van of the right wing, did not trouble himself to enforce the regulation.¹²⁸ The troops which had come across the river were equally heedless. Squabbles and encounters ensued, and on one day in particular a continual skirmishing went on. Towards evening it assumed the proportions of a regular combat. The Burgundians, attacked suddenly by two squadrons of horse and a cloud of arquebusiers, were driven in and hotly pursued. The duke, who had been sitting in a loose robe, saw that his opportunity had come.¹²⁹ Without waiting for his armor, he sprang to horse, rallied his men, called up the supports, and formed a line of battle. Having the advantage both of numbers and position, he was able to encircle the rash assailants, cutting them off from their camp and leaving them no chance for flight except into the Rhine. The emperor had notice of their situation, but, instead of succors, sent an order for them to retire. Before it arrived their fate was decided.¹³⁰ Attacked with impetuosity and

Letter of Valentin von Neuenstein, in Knebel, *late Abth.* s. 162.

¹²⁸ Muller, *Reichstage Theatrum*, B. II. s. 716. — Bericht in Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 648. — Chronik der heil. Stadt Con. fol. 325.

¹²⁹ "Parendoli de havers quelle che cercaua." Panigarola, in the *Notizenblatt*, s. 130.

¹³⁰ "La risposta portarono fo che erant morti." Ibid.

routed at the first charge, they were driven towards the river and closely followed up. In vain they struggled to escape from the coils. Their infuriated foes, using only the sword and that with murderous effect, pressed upon them from every side. Charles, at the head of two reserve battalions, skirted the field, striking in wherever there was occasion. No prisoners were made. The cavalry, helpless when overthrown, were butchered to a man.¹³¹ Even the nobles, in spite of the efforts to rescue them of those whom their ransoms would have enriched, shared the common doom.¹³² The infantry in a disordered mass descended into the river, still followed and hemmed in. Such as were grappled had their throats cut. Those who got off into the stream served as targets for the Burgundian archers. Numbers sank while shrieking for mercy.¹³³ The twilight faded, the moon rose on the pitiless massacre,¹³⁴ which lasted an hour and a half. Charles, who had given no heed to messages from the emperor begging him for God's sake to desist and promising to maintain the peace,¹³⁵ returned to his quarters in the

¹³¹ "Foro li alamani rotti et menati per filo de spada, quanti forono, ne se feco vn presone al mondo." *Ibid.*

¹³² "Fut tout mis à mort, non-obstant que l'on cuida sauver de bien notables chevaliers et autres qui vouloient donner ij, iiij, iiij, v et vj^{es} florins." Letter of the Sire de la Roche to the duchess of Burgundy, June 20, Gachard, *Doc. Inéd.* tom. i. p. 248.

¹³³ "Forono cossi seguiti che . . . li segattano la gola et herregiauano como san Sebastian, li negorono ad grand numero ad cento et ducento la volta, che cridauno misericordia." Panigarola, *ubi supra*.

¹³⁴ "Dura juesques la lune fut levee." Circular letter of Charles, June 17, in Labarre, Gachard, and Haynin.

¹³⁵ Panigarola, *ubi supra*. — Charles, however, in his own so-

highest exultation over his sated vengeance.¹³⁶ His soldiers, who had lingered to strip and rifle their victims, followed at intervals, displaying their trophies.¹³⁷

The next morning the Germans asked and obtained permission to collect their dead. Many indeed had been carried off during the night. But enough remained scattered over the field to fill sixteen wagons each drawn by four horses. A far greater number were fished from the shallows of the river, the search being continued for three days, on one of which alone two hundred and sixty-six corpses were hauled to land.¹³⁸ In all, the slaughtered and the drowned were reckoned at over two thousand.¹³⁹

Instead of imperilling the treaty, this affair had the effect of confirming it. The legate again interposed; some stringent clauses, with fresh securities, were inserted; despite the opposition of the Rhine towns and the increased unpopularity of the emperor and the margrave, the stolen property was restored and the territory around Neuss vacated

count, speaks only of receiving a message to this effect an hour after the affair was concluded.

¹³⁶ "Tanto alegre, quanto se potesse dire, . . . dicendo essersi vindicato de la injuria." Panigarola, *ubi supra*.

¹³⁷ Most of the particulars are taken from Panigarola, who says he was an eye-witness of the greater part.

¹³⁸ "Tre giorni continui pecco-

rono corpi al longe del rheno, et tal giorno ne trovarono colvj." Ibid.

¹³⁹ Panigarola, who adds that this estimate was fully confirmed. De la Roche says, between two and three thousand. Charles says, about three thousand. Two German accounts, not by eye-witnesses, state the number at from seven hundred to a thousand. *Chronik der heil. Stadt Coln*, fol. 325, and *Annales Paderbornenses*, lib. 18.

by the German soldiery.¹⁴⁰ On the 26th of June, Charles gave a final entertainment, which was attended by the legate and the princes, and on the 27th he broke up his camp.¹⁴¹ He had consented to take his departure a day before the emperor, the order of their going seeming to him of less importance than the manner.¹⁴² His own movements were made with deliberation, and his army remained intact; while the imperial forces, partly in compliance with the treaty and partly under the pressure of financial difficulties, melted rapidly away.

He had originally intended, after sending reinforcements into Luxembourg, to march the bulk of his army into Picardy. But, for reasons which will shortly be noticed, he had modified his plans. The several corps were ordered to enter Luxembourg by different routes and concentrate at Namur. Campobasso was placed in command; while Charles himself, with only a small escort, took the road to Calais, for the purpose of meeting and conferring with his brother-in-law.

He returned to the Netherlands, after an absence

¹⁴⁰ Panigarola, *Notizenblatt*, s. 130, 131. — Basin, tom. ii. p. 355. — Muller, *Reichstage Theatrum*, Th. II. s. 717.

¹⁴¹ *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 217.

¹⁴² Panigarola, *ubi supra*. — In this instance — as in hundreds which we have left unnoticed — the mere misstatement of facts in the ordinary versions would have been of little consequence, had it not been

accompanied with inferences to match. Thus, M. de Barante tells us, "*Comme son orgueil aurait beaucoup souffert de s'en aller le premier de devant Neuss, l'Empereur, riant de cette puerile fierté, ne demanda mieux que de partir avant lui.*" As it was Charles who yielded, the "*puerile pride*," if any there were, must of course be transferred to the other side.

of eleven months, with no new conquests or increased renown, but with his honor unscathed and his power undiminished. The combinations against him had been foiled, the threatened ruin had been warded off, he was again about to become the assailant, and some who had imagined that he could be attacked with impunity were now trembling for their own safety.

He had failed, however, to achieve the original objects of his expedition. And, since it was he who had attempted, on him must rest the burden of the failure.¹⁴³ But in his own mind — not one of those that are keenly conscious of their deficiencies — he attributed his ill success to the scanty support he had received from the people of Flanders. It was therefore with a bitter feeling that he reentered that province, and the bitterness was intensified as he passed through the streets of Ghent and Bruges, a spectator of that unbounded plenty and unruffled ease amidst which his perils had been disregarded, his demands slighted, his very existence almost forgotten.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ In 1586, Neuss was captured by Alexander Farnese, with a force of ten thousand men, after a siege of sixteen days. But the town was at that time not so strong or so populous as it had been at an earlier period; instead of being supported by Cologne, it was treated as rebellious territory; the garrison, few in number and soon demoralised offered no resistance whatever to the final assault, which was followed by a hideous massacre; while such had

been the improvements in artillery in the course of a century that with thirty pieces the Spaniards were able to throw in four thousand balls and shells in nine hours — a greater number than the Burgundians, with a far more numerous artillery, had thrown in a week.

¹⁴⁴ "Plusieurs menues gens croient qu'il fust mort, et ne leur pooit-on faire accroire le contraire, à cause de sa longue demeure." Hainin, tom. ii. p. 269.

At Bruges, on the 12th of July, he convened the representatives of the Three Estates, and addressed them in a long harangue filled with passionate reproaches. He enumerated the successive instances of their non-compliance with his requests. At first he had supposed this inattention to proceed from the sluggish spirit characteristic of all their doings. But its long continuance, coupled with what had been reported to him of their secret assemblies and deliberations, convinced him that the people, those of the cities especially, cared nothing for their prince and had taken a resolution to abandon him. Had only the pioneers and laborers he had sent for come in sufficient numbers and in due season, the capture of Neuss would have been easily effected. When the forces of the Empire were gathering against him, he had called for the immediate aid of all his vassals who owed him military service; but he had received nothing but a few dribblets, and, but for the victory which he owed to God, he must have been overwhelmed. With the same supineness, and in spite of his warnings, they had allowed the French to ravage the country and capture fortresses and towns in Artois and Picardy. But he had heard that, among their other mutterings, they pretended that their contribution to the grant of five hundred thousand crowns relieved them from any further charges. This was false; whoever asserted it lied, and would lie as often as he asserted it. When that grant was made, what he had given up was all the subsidies previously voted — so that he

might be said to contribute half the amount himself. None of the other provinces claimed exemption on this ground. Moreover he had asked for laborers to be furnished at his own cost — terms on which the merest foreigner might have had them, not to speak of their natural prince. Then, too, all the expenses of his household were defrayed out of his private domain, though its revenues did not equal the taxes raised by single cities which he could mention and appropriated by those whose only care was to plunder the inhabitants. Nor had he been more chary of his person than of his property. Let them contrast their way of life with his. While they were sleeping, he kept vigil; while they were in their warm houses, he was exposed to wind and rain; and while he fasted, they were eating and drinking and taking their ease. And for what were all his labors and sacrifices but for the defence of his people? His wars even when waged abroad were necessary for intimidating his foes, compelling their respect, and thus securing his states and subjects against insult and aggression. It was vain to murmur. Peace was the gift of God. He who has lands must have war; he who has wealth must have suits. Whether such troubles were sent for his own sins or those of his subjects, it was equally their duty to give him their support.

He remembered how, at his accession, they had everywhere greeted him with professions and promises of loyalty, of fidelity, of obedience. But he had experienced precisely the reverse. Their words had

passed away in smoke, like the experiments of alchemy. For was their constant contempt of his commands obedience? Was it fidelity to abandon their prince? Was it loyalty to defend neither him nor his states? Certes, no! It was, on the contrary, giving encouragement to his enemies. It was in a manner conspiring his death. What then was their crime? Was it not treason? Yea, indeed! and treason not of the lowest degree, since it aimed at the very person of the sovereign! And what was the punishment annexed to it? Simple confiscation? No, but attainder too! Ordinary beheading? No, but quartering as well! Let them look to it! If they refused to be governed as sons, he would henceforth govern them as servants, making full use of the power vested in him by the Creator, from whom, and from no one else, he derived his authority, and at whose pleasure alone he should continue to wield it. They might plan what they pleased; he had no fears of the result, for God had given him the power and the rule, and he would not advise them to put it to the proof.¹⁴⁶ If they doubted, let them read what was said upon this point in the Bible, in the Book of

¹⁴⁶ "Puisque sesdits subjects avoient mis en non chalance estre gouverné soubs lui comme enfans soubs pere, . . . ils seroient gouvernez et viveroient dorésnavant soubs lui comme subjects sous leur seigneur. . . . Car Dieu lui en avoit bien donné la puissance et la manière, et ne conseilloit point de l'experimenter." M. Gachard cites a parallel passage from a proclamation of Napoleon to the Spaniards

in 1808. "Si tous mes efforts sont inutiles, et si vous ne répondez pas à ma confiance, il ne me restera qu'à vous traiter en provinces conquises, et à placer mon frère sur un autre trône; je mettrai alors la couronne d'Espagne sur ma tête, et je saurai la faire respecter par les méchans, car Dieu m'a donné la force et la volonté nécessaires pour surmonter tous les obstacles."

Kings, where in express words the authority of princes over their subjects was declared and defined.¹⁴⁶ Or if they imagined that his authority came from them, let them make the trial! They would find that, instead of using prayers and requests, he was able to enforce his commands and to punish disobedience.

Yet he was willing to forget the past and remit the penalties they had incurred, if their conduct in future were such as to merit his affection. He had once loved the people of Flanders, and he who loves well is slow to forget. What he at present required, as they had been informed by the letters of his chancellor, was a general levy for the purpose of expelling the French. Let the clergy at the risk of their temporalities, the nobles on peril of their lives and estates, take care that the mandates severally addressed to them were executed without fault or equivocation. Turning to the burghers, "And for you, devourers of the good towns," he concluded, "see that you yield the like obedience to all my ordinances, under forfeiture of your heads, your property, your privileges, customs, and rights. For by Saint George!" he added, with his hand on his breast, "on my side there will be no failure to execute all that I have said." Then declaring that he wanted no reply, he dismissed them with the words, "Hereupon I salute you."¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ One might demur to this interpretation of a passage (1 Samuel, ch. 8) in which the consequences of kingly rule are foretold for the purpose of deterring the Jews from desiring it.

¹⁴⁷ Gachard, Col. de Doc. Inéd., tom. i. pp. 242-243.

Having "skulls so hard and thick," the Flemish deputies were not so much startled by this speech as an audience of livelier brains might have been. Instead of consulting the Book of Kings, they referred to their ancient charters and customs for the measure of the sovereign's power; and having claimed a hearing, they presented a "Remonstrance" in writing, of which the substance was also recited by their spokesman.

In language of discreet humility they professed an extreme sorrow at finding themselves objects of the duke's displeasure. Having, however, full confidence in his wisdom, clemency, and other high and noble qualities, they ventured, notwithstanding his declaration that he wanted no reply, to offer one which they trusted would be sufficient to remove his unfavorable impressions. In answer to his allegations they claimed to have fulfilled their duty as faithful subjects. They had certainly supposed themselves relieved by former arrangements from calls for men to serve in the siege of Neuss. Nevertheless they had sent him about twenty-five hundred, counting pikemen as well as laborers, and that with as much haste as possible and at an almost insupportable charge to the province. They acknowledged his right to succors when assailed by the forces of the Empire. On the occasion of his summons a most loyal spirit had been everywhere manifested. But for certain reasons it had been thought best to convert their assistance into a grant of money; and accordingly thirty thousand crowns had been voted for the reinforcement

of his navy, which was the more necessary as a French fleet was then threatening the coast of Flanders. Moreover, before any troops could be raised, the news of his victory and of the consequent conclusion of a peace had arrived. Finally, when summoned to assist in the defence of Artois, they had after deliberation agreed to levy a force of two thousand men to serve for six weeks. The damage, however, had been too rapid to admit of any relief. Nor could they, in view of the fact that they contributed their part to the support of troops intended for the general defence, admit their liability to a particular call for the support of any province but their own. If Flanders had been invaded, as there had in fact been and still was reason to apprehend, they should have used the utmost diligence in providing for its defence.

But the gist of their reply lay, not in this feeble, flimsy, and self-contradictory justification of their past conduct, but in the intimations which they gave of what was to be expected of them in future. After reminding him that their assent was necessary to any such measures as he had proposed, and beseeching him to do nothing inconsistent with the privileges and customs which had been confirmed and respected by his noble predecessors, they declared it to be inexpedient and impracticable to comply with his present demand for a general levy of those capable of bearing arms. "Your subjects in this quarter," they said, "are for the most part merchants, traders, and mechanics. They are unskilled in war and unfitted for

it. If your letters were enforced the foreign merchants would absent themselves, the trading community would disappear, and with it the prosperity of the province, for this is founded upon commerce — *a thing incompatible with war.*"¹⁴⁸

Such an answer was not calculated to appease the duke's anger. Holding the unopened memorial in his hand, he retorted with fresh invectives and menaces, without much further allusion to the particular points of the discussion. Did they take him for a child, who was to be quieted with soft words or sweetmeats? If he indeed possessed the qualities they ascribed to him, — which was far from being the case, — so much the more were they bound to love and obey him. How was it that, while all his other provinces served him loyally, he never made the least demand upon the people of Flanders but it seemed as if he were pulling the veins out of their bodies? They were incessantly talking of their poverty. Yet it was notorious that no other country was so rich, and, as he had before said, there were single towns whose revenues exceeded those of his domain. Look at the French, who were among the poorest of nations, and yet see how they aided their sovereign and how they served him! But he would listen to no more such pretences. What they refused him was his own. How were all their taxes raised, except under the express permission given by the sovereign? Then he had the right to appropriate them and apply them to the necessities of his states. "Take back your

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. pp. 259-266.

paper!" he abruptly concluded, "and if you want an answer to it, frame one for yourselves! *Talk* what you please, but *do*—your duty!"¹⁴⁹

Despotic as this tone may appear, it was itself a proof of the limited power which Charles really possessed, and of the difficulties which he would have found in exercising the absolute power to which he pretended. Louis of France, while taxing and conscripting his subjects at his mere discretion and making short work with the disaffected whenever he could get hold of them, deemed it advisable, in his rare appeals to the nation, to disparage his own greatness and represent himself as the mere agent of the public will. But the sovereign of a free country,—of the Netherlands or of England,—chafing at the limitations which hampered his desires, had recourse to lofty assumptions, which were arrogant in proportion as they were unfounded.

It would be a mistake, therefore, to regard such an outburst of discordant sentiments as a collision between the spirit of tyranny and that of popular freedom. On Charles's part it proceeded not from a morbid longing for arbitrary rule, but from the vehement desire for resources with which to carry out his projects of conquest and of empire. And on the part of the Flemings it was simply a protest against his plans and a refusal to supply the resources. Prince and people were singularly ill-matched. Charles was not a madman, requiring to be put under close restraint. His ideas were not empty illusions, his

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 267-270.

schemes were not the weavings of insanity. They had a solid basis, ample scope for their prosecution, continual encouragement from outward circumstances. What they needed for their realization was the support of a people warlike in habit and spirit, easily kindled to enthusiasm, ready to endure the burdens, to accept the sacrifices, to surmount the rebuffs, that lie in the path of ambition. There was hardly a people in Europe that might not have been aroused to a participation in the hopes and the struggles of such a career. The Flemings were absolutely cold and unmoved. National unity had no place in their thoughts, national greatness no place in their desires. "War was incompatible with their commerce." "They were not bound to defend any province but their own." Had it rested with them alone, the French manoeuvrer would not have had long to wait for the accomplishment of his most sanguine hopes.

The vehement prince and the phlegmatic people were, we say, singularly ill-matched. And with this open exhibition of antagonism they parted forever. On the following day Charles quitted the province, never to return. The immediate issue between them was set aside by events, and no subsequent opportunity arose for the trial of their respective powers. But the effect of his parting words, and of former words which he had spoken, would remain and deepen. He himself had said that he would rather be hated than despised. That the Flemings now hated him he need not doubt. But if the time should come when, still hating, they would also despise?

CHAPTER VIII.

ENGLISH INVASION OF FRANCE.

1475.

With all his talent, it must be confessed that Louis had not a military head. Otherwise, under the circumstances described in the last chapter, instead of scattering his forces, he would have hurled them in a concentrated mass on a foe so obviously at a disadvantage. His reasons for refraining would have counted for nothing with a general, confident in his own skill and in the valor of his troops.¹

Nevertheless the course which he pursued is not to be censured, but approved. He lacked neither confidence nor skill; but he had his own methods and resources, and his game was one in which military operations played a subsidiary, though important, part. Had he made them his principal instrument, had he trusted to them entirely, he would have lost his control over events; the reins would have slipped from his grasp; his own activity

¹ See the contemporary criticism to this effect in Basin, tom. ii. pp. 347, 348



would have been suspended ; he would have seemed to himself to have become the sport of unknown chances.

Therefore he had so disposed and so employed his forces as to be still prepared for various contingencies, secure against the derangement of his general policy, free to adopt whatever expedient the need or opportunity of the moment might suggest. If Charles should sink under the blows of the Empire, Louis would have only to push forward at all points and take possession of the spoils. Should the contest, as was more probable, be indefinitely protracted, the sharp discipline administered while there were no means of retaliation would extort a renewal of the truce and throw a fresh clog upon the English invasion.² Finally, should his adversary burst from the toils, and no resort be left but the appeal to battle, the king would still have his army, unimpaired and within call, to meet this emergency.

The result of his different expeditions must now be noticed. Early in May Craon had entered Franche-Comté at the north-west corner of the province, and had penetrated as far as Charriez, burning, plundering, and making some unimportant captures. The count of Blamont, after hesitating whether to turn against the French or the Swiss, was at length relieved from doubt by the retirement of the latter. On his approach at the head of a superior force, Craon retreated across the Saone, reentered Cham-

² "Esperoit gagner le due de necessité en quoy il estoit." Com-Bourgongne à ses treva, vu la minee, tom. i. p. 326.

pagne, and turned his attention to the western frontier of Luxembourg, where he laid siege to Damvilliers and other places.²

In the invasion of Burgundy there had been a delay of several weeks. Bourbon had declined the command on the plea of ill health. The king, mistrusting his motives, summoned him to his own side, and the command devolved on the Sire de Combronde. Close upon the frontier, in the neighborhood of Guipy, the invaders were met by an equal force under the count of Roussy, son of Saint-Pol and marshal of Burgundy. A severe combat ensued; the Burgundians were defeated with a loss of two thousand men; many nobles, with Roussy himself, were made prisoners. The invaders then overspread the province, menacing Macon and other strong towns. But they were not in sufficient strength for regular sieges. The people rallied in defence of their homes. Blamont came to their assistance, and accepted from the council of Dijon the provisional appointment of marshal, which was confirmed by the duke. A levy *en masse* took place; and the French, in danger of being surrounded, fell back into the Nivernais, whence they were soon after summoned into Normandy.³

Louis's own proceedings had been characterized by his usual vigor. On the 1st of May, the day on which the truce expired, he crossed the Somme and appeared before the small fortress of Tronquoy.

² Gollut, col. 1284-1290.

³ De Troyes; Gollut; Basin; *Dépêches Milanaises*; Legrand MSS.

He had with him an overwhelming force, including a powerful artillery. In a few hours the place was carried by assault. Every soul found in it, with one exception,—that of a traitor,—was hung, and the place itself utterly destroyed. Montdidier was next summoned, leave being granted for the garrison to withdraw, with such of the inhabitants as might decline to transfer their allegiance. Surrender having been made, the works were immediately razed, and the town, in defiance of the capitulation, was pillaged and given to the flames. Roye, Corbie, Riquier, were treated in the same manner. To save time and trouble the most liberal conditions were offered, and, if they were refused, a furious bombardment soon compelled their acceptance; but in no instance were they respected by the conquerors. On all sides the smoke of devastation went up. In all directions the roads swarmed with the scattered fragments of broken households, wandering off, heedless whither, if they might but get beyond the reach of the destroyer. Many were received and sheltered at Amiens, which, though now under the royal dominion, had still some sympathy with the neighbors whose rapid changes of fortune it had so often shared. On the king's part there was no cruelty intended. He was simply in haste. Having little chance at present of making any permanent conquests, he was under the necessity of doing all the mischief possible before he should be interrupted.*

* *Commisses*, tom. i. pp. 325, 326, seq. — *Legrand MSS.* tom. xviii. and *Preuves*, tom. iii. p. 298 et

Amid the noise and confusion he was himself creating he had one ear constantly strained to catch the first rumor of the approach of the English. This extreme alertness, as on former occasions, laid him open to deception. Saint-Pol, whom his successes had filled with apprehension, since, if they went on, he would himself be enveloped, and who was consequently professing the strongest devotion to his interests, sent him word that the hostile fleet had appeared off the coast of Normandy.⁶ Instantly, with his whole army, the king rushed in that direction — to find that his own fleet, which he had sent out crowded with soldiers to harass the enemy on the passage, had caught the alarm and returned to port, where the troops had been at once disembarked.⁷

After hurrying from Harfleur to Dieppe, from Dieppe to Caudebec, and thence to other places along the coast, and finding no visible sign of the invaders, he retired in a state of uncertainty. One thing he saw plainly, that in matters pertaining to the marine his own ignorance was great and that of his naval commanders still greater.⁸ Far from hoping any longer to interfere with the descent, he

⁶ De Troyes, p. 116. — Basin, tom. ii. p. 351.

⁷ "Je vois en Normandie à grant haste, comme vous savez, cuidant trouver les Anglois prests à descendre; mais je trouve que l'armée de mer, le jour devant que je arrivasse, s'estoit retraicte et descendue en terre, et habandonné la mer." Let-

ter of Louis to Dammartin, June 30, Commines (éd. Dupont), Preuves, tom. iii. p. 301.

⁸ "Il ne l'entendoit point: ne ceulx à qui il donnoit auctorité, sur le fact de la guerre, y entendoient encores moins." Commines, tom. i. p. 336.

would not even know where to expect it—whether in Normandy or at Calais. If in the former quarter, the peril would be far more imminent. Here therefore he resolved to continue, with part of his army, fortifying, victualling, assembling the frank-archers, and taking all manner of precautions. The bulk of his troops, under the Sire de Beaujeu, admiral of France, he sent back to Picardy to complete the work he had himself begun, by laying waste the whole country, so that a hostile army, advancing from that side, would find nothing to feed upon. His instructions, so far as time allowed, were faithfully carried out. From the interior frontier to the sea-line, from the Somme eastward to the fauxbourgs of Hesdin, not a village, not a blade of corn, was left standing.⁹ In the interval between the two raids—that of the king himself and this later one—Charles's lieutenant, the count of Romont, had re-occupied the devastated region, and had even begun to retaliate on the adjoining French districts. Being too weak to keep the field in face of the royal forces, he now retired to Arras, calling in the neighboring nobles and the peasantry, as well to aid in the defence of this important city as for their own protection. The place was in fact far too strongly fortified to stand in any danger from a siege. The enemy however advanced as far as the fauxbourgs, committing endless havoc on the fair and fruitful plains, thickly studded with villages, from which not only the large commercial population of Arras itself,

⁹ Letter of Louis to Dammartin, *Ibid.* Preuves, tom. vi. pp. 501, 502.

but that of Bruges, Ghent, and Antwerp, received their chief supplies of corn.¹⁰ Intimations had been sent to Louis by a woman of rank—one of the secret agents whom he maintained in all the cities of the Netherlands—that the capture might be effected by treachery and a surprise. But the hope thus excited proved groundless. Whatever symptoms of wavering loyalty may have existed among the citizens disappeared before the spectacle of their blazing harvests and granaries. It was a sight which had never been witnessed by those of the existing generation, taught to contrast their own condition with that of their neighbors and to consider themselves the favored of Providence. They insisted that the garrison should sally to the rescue; and Romont and his fellow-nobles allowed themselves to be taunted into acquiescence. Having ranged their little band in two divisions, they made a gallant charge, which led them into an ambuscade. The vanguard was cut to pieces. Its leader, Jacques of Luxembourg, brother of Saint-Pol, was wounded and taken, with most of his companions, some of them the nearest relatives of the fair traitor who had invited the foe.¹¹

The news of this incident, which occurred on the 27th of June, reached Louis at about the same time as that of the victory achieved by his troops in Burgundy. A few days later his joy was dashed by

¹⁰ Guicciardini, *Belg. Descriptio*, tom. ii. pp. 276, 277. — De Troyes, p. 436. • pp. 117, 118. — Legrand *MSS.*

¹¹ Commynes, tom. i. p. 327, and tom. xviii. *Preuves*, tom. iii. p. 302. — Haynin,

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other intelligence. The English had landed at Calais, and the duke of Burgundy was returning from Neuss. The latter item, it is true, he received, or he affected to have received, in a shape which prognosticated, not ill, but glorious results. Charles had fallen into utter ignominy. After losing his artillery and failing to recover it, he had fled away at midnight, leaving his army broken and dispersed. The emperor, at the head of ten thousand of his troops, was about to march through Lorraine into Bar to coöperate with Craon. He had summoned the Swiss to join him, and had despatched the bishop of Munster, with twenty thousand men, into Guedres, where the people were in full revolt. Such was the account which Louis published to his people, and announced in private letters to his confidential ministers, on the authority of direct communications from the emperor to Craon and to himself.¹² Must we then attribute so lively an invention to the slow intellect of Frederick? But, whoever devised the story, there was one person at least who knew better than to believe it. Louis had been kept too fully and correctly informed by his ambassadors in the imperial camp not to understand the catastrophe which had occurred.¹³ He knew well that, not the Burgundians, but the imperialists, had dispersed; that not the emperor, but the duke, was preparing

¹² Letter of Louis to the chancellor, July 16, *Commines, Preuves*, tom. iii. pp. 204, 205. — *De Troyes*, p. 118.

¹³ If any evidence on this point

be needed, it will be found in another letter of the king's, which will be hereafter cited, written to his friends at Barne.

to march into Lorraine ; that, instead of a revolt in Gueldres fanned by a foreign invasion, what he had to anticipate was a foreign invasion of FRANCE, which might give birth to endless revolts. He saw, in a word, that the crisis of his reign had come. That had happened which he had most feared, which he had chiefly struggled to avert. A by-gone epoch seemed to have returned. After so many labors, so many successes, here were England and Burgundy still combined, treason and intrigue still busy, for the overthrow of the French monarchy.

Considered in relation to universal history, the wars of the English in France formed a sequel of that great Northern inundation the first ripples of which had cast a prophetic gloom on the spirit of the dying Charlemagne. Many shores and many islands had been washed by that wide-spread flood ; but its fullest current had set upon the northern shore of France, whence, with collected force, it had poured its waves over the island of Britain, to return upon the Continent in successive reflux tides, that threatened to swallow all the former conquests of Frank and Goth. It was still the old sea-pirates contending with the land-pirates, the ocean-power assaying to triumph over the Continent. The ancient world had witnessed similar struggles, in which the land-power had triumphed over the sea-power — the Macedonians over the Phœnicians, Rome over Carthage.

Doubtless all the races involved in the long struggle — Celt, Frank, Saxon, Norman — had gained in it a stronger discipline and a broader development. But if we look simply at the condition of France while subject to these continual immersions, it is surely a piteous spectacle — that of a nation slowly rising above the waters, slowly re-collecting its strength and resources, only to be again overwhelmed and submerged. For the grand peculiarity, in every repetition of the movement, had been the massive force with which the blow had been delivered, and the uncertain, ineffective gallantry displayed in the resistance. So it had been in the Franco-Norman invasion of England, so in all the Anglo-Norman invasions of France. And what is scarcely less remarkable, in proportion as the original impulse had diminished, the attempts had been more persistent and on a larger scale. Originally the instinct that prompted the invasion had belonged only to the Norman sovereign and the Norman nobility. But as the Norman race became merged in the Saxon, and the Saxon nature infused with the Norman spirit, the ambition of conquest became national and popular. Long after the rulers of England had lost their inclination to such enterprises, the conquest of France continued to be the favorite project of the English people.

The last invasion, in 1415, had led to the formation of an Anglo-Burgundian alliance. In 1475 it was the Anglo-Burgundian alliance that led to the invasion. But it is a gross mistake to regard it simply as the fruit of that alliance, and as undertaken

in return for the assistance afforded to Edward in the recovery of his crown. On the part of the English nation it was the prosecution of a scheme ingrafted in the ideas of the people, suspended only in times of internal disquiet, resumed as often as circumstances afforded an opportunity. On the part of Edward it had been contemplated from the moment of his restoration, partly to exalt his reputation and win the favor of his subjects, partly in revenge for the countenance given by France to Warwick and the Lancastrians and his own consequent dethronement. If the proposal came from Charles, he had abstained from basing it on the ground of his own services, or inviting coöperation in his own plans. On the contrary, it was he who was to act the part of auxiliary, giving stipulated aid to Edward in the recovery of "his duchies of Normandy and Aquitaine," as well as of "his kingdom of France," of which he still wore the title and claimed the possession as "rightful heir," though now displaced by a "usurper."¹⁴

The treaty, with its supplementary provisions, had been signed at Westminster, on the 25th, 26th, and 27th of July, 1474. It stipulated that an English army "magnificently equipped," and led by the king in person, should land in Normandy, or elsewhere, before the next 1st of July. Charles, on his part, was to uphold the pretensions of Edward and support him with his person and power, bringing into the field a force of not less than ten thousand men. In

¹⁴ Rymes, tom. xi. pp. 806-808.

recompense for such assistance, as well as "in gratitude for the many favors" which he had already rendered to his ally, he was to receive the provinces of Champagne, Bar, Brie, the Nivernais — in short, all that part of France which bordered on his present dominions; and he was to hold these conquests, as likewise the several French fiefs which he already possessed, independently of the French crown, by "a supreme right" to be thereafter acknowledged and confirmed by the States-General. During the prosecution of the war neither of the contracting parties was to treat with the enemy, or even to receive any overtures from him, without first consulting the ally and giving time for his representatives to attend; no arrangement should be entered into except by joint consent; nor was either to abandon the enterprise while the other should choose to persevere.¹⁶

The announcement of this scheme was received by the English nation with an unparalleled burst of enthusiasm. All classes united in embracing it, and Edward, whose popularity had been upon the wane, again found himself the darling of the populace. After all his triumphs it needed a career of victory in France to set the seal upon his dynasty. There were happily no meddlesome reformers to declaim against the thirst for conquest, or to preach unwelcome lessons of economy. Every grant proposed in Parliament was voted without demur. The clergy mulcted themselves in a tenth of their income, and the example was followed by both Lords and Com-

¹⁶ Rymer, tom. xi. pp. 304-314.

mons. The merchants of London and all the principal towns vied with each other in the amount of their "benevolences." Wealthy widows doubled their gifts after a squeeze of the royal hand or a kiss from the royal lips. Throughout the kingdom there was a bustle of preparation. Ordinary business was suspended, labor being diverted from its regular channels and so large a quantity of money withdrawn from circulation that, in some parts of the kingdom, corn and other commodities were unsalable at half the customary rates. Proclamations were issued directing the impressment of sailors, carters, wheelwrights, and smiths, and the seizure of ships and wagons, of powder, saltpetre, and other munitions. "Flechers" were ordered to make nothing but "shefe-arrows," and "bowiers" to make their staves into bows with all possible haste. Contracts were entered into with knights and others for the enlistment of so many archers and men-at-arms, to serve for "one whole year," during which time there should be "noon assise generall ne speciall" against the persons engaged. Among the nobles there were not a few who, besides furbishing up their arms and mustering their retainers, dived into the boxes containing their title-deeds, and drew out the worm-eaten parchments which would establish their right to the estates once held by their ancestors within the realm of France.¹⁶

So open and active a movement could not fail to

¹⁶ Molinet, tom. i p. 141. — Ry- Lingard, vol. iv. pp. 99-101. —
mer, tom. xi. pp. 817-819, et al. — Paslon Letters.

arouse the attention of neighboring governments. The king of Scots, James the Third, saw, as he thought, an opportunity for a stroke of business on his own account. He informed the French monarch that, although strongly pressed, he had refused to go shares in the enterprise. He would undertake, for the modest fee of ten thousand crowns, to frustrate the whole design. This he could effect, either by a counter-invasion of England, or through a secret treaty with Edward, who was merely urged along by popular clamor, and who could easily be persuaded to desist, if proper inducements were held out, and a promise given him of armed assistance in case an internal rebellion should follow on the rupture of his engagements with Burgundy. Louis, in reply, expressed his satisfaction at hearing that his good brother had remained faithful to the ancient treaties and long friendship between the two crowns. As to the contemplated invasion, he was quite strong enough to resist it, and, if it should take place, it would be met in a becoming manner. Still, it was not what he at present desired, as he wished to attend to the ordinary affairs of his kingdom. If therefore it should be abandoned through James's intervention, he would pay the sum demanded. He would do more: if Edward required help against his own subjects, Louis was willing to join in affording it.¹⁷ Nothing however came of these liberal proposals, the king of Scots having in the mean time concluded a peace with

¹⁷ Instructions (without date) to Alex. de Marigny, Legrand MSS. tom. xvii.

the English sovereign on conditions advantageous to both.

Among the great vassals of the French crown the excitement was far deeper and more genuine. An English invasion had been the customary signal for feudal anarchy to burst its bonds, and on this effect the invaders had always counted. In the present instance, the aid to be expected from this source might be less available than on former occasions. The most turbulent of the chiefs, such as the Armagnacs, had been crushed; some, like the duke of Bourbon, had been stroked and tamed; the greater number, made timid by chastisement, would remain quiet as long as the keeper's eye preserved its steady gaze. But there were others who were still at large. The court of Brittany, if no longer the great centre of conspiracy, still responded to every current of intrigue, and still maintained its alliance and regular communications with both Burgundy and England. It had recently become the shelter of the remnant of the Lancastrians, including the destined founder of the Tudor line, a demand for whose rendition had been rejected by the duke. But he had accompanied the refusal with assurances that no plots adverse to the house of York should be hatched under his protection, and he now claimed the right to participate in the grand scheme for the overthrow of his sovereign. A treaty was accordingly signed by which Edward promised to send a separate force to strengthen the attack on the side of Brittany. In letters which came into the hands of Louis, the counsellors of Francis

boasted that, by secret manipulations, they would do more for the cause in a single month than the arms of the other allies would be able to effect in six.¹⁸

But the feudal vassal who looked forward to the collision with the liveliest interest was he who owed allegiance on both sides — the Constable Saint-Pol. To him indeed it must prove the very crisis of his fate. Two years before he had been on the brink of shipwreck, an agreement for his destruction having formed a secret clause in the truce of 1473 between Louis and Charles. But execution had been suspended by the generosity of the king, who had again suffered himself to be appeased by apologies and promises, and had even condescended to an interview conducted with the jealous forms usual between rivals of equal rank. The constable had pleaded, as his excuse for demanding these precautions, the enmity entertained for him by Dammartin and others in the royal suite; and he had pledged himself henceforward to hold Saint-Quentin as a royal fortress, and to act in all respects as a trusty servant of the crown. His professions had been accepted; but public opinion accused him of having humiliated his sovereign, — a circumstance to which the latter was less insensible than he seemed, — while the fresh engagements he had formed must embroil him still further with his other master, the duke of Burgundy. Thus, although he had weathered one rock, the channel had grown narrower, the pilotage more intricate, than ever. And now another storm was at hand;

¹⁸ *Commines*, tom. i. p. 317.

his possessions would lie within the theatre of the impending war; his services would again be claimed by both the hostile parties. Retreat was still possible; for he had so much to offer that either side would be glad to purchase his support on terms of immunity for the past and protection for the future. But it was this consideration that prevented him from retreating and urged him forward on his perilous course. He still flattered himself with the notion of holding the balance and profiting by its oscillations. He turned, therefore, not to one side, but to all sides, throwing out fresh lines and multiplying his entanglements. Connected by marriage with the English monarch, he availed himself of private channels of communication for encouraging the enterprise and making independent offers of support. All he should expect in return would be the provinces of Champagne and Brie.¹⁹ He little suspected that, under the arrangement with Burgundy, not only Champagne and Brie, but all his own estates in Picardy, were to be transferred to Charles.²⁰ With the latter prince he was ostensibly endeavoring to renew his old relations of friendship. Throughout the siege of Neuss he had sent continual messages expressive of his devotion, and, when called upon to attest his sincerity by the surrender of Saint-Quentin, had given distinct and repeated promises of compliance. Thrice a Burgundian force, headed by his own brother, had

¹⁹ "Ne demandoit pour sa part que la comté de Brye et de Cham-

Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 457.

pagne." *Procès du Connétable*,

²⁰ Rymer, tom. xi. p. 810.

been sent to take possession; and each time it had been dismissed with an evasive answer — a display of perfidy by which he had converted an attached kinsman into an enemy. In his intercourse with the king his duplicity was even more remarkable. Well acquainted with that eager and impressible mind, he strove to keep it in perpetual agitation by incessant and conflicting reports of the enemy's designs and preparations. His position enabled him to obtain authentic accounts from the courts both of Burgundy and England, and he knew that Louis, in his anxiety for information, would listen and be disquieted even when most suspicious. But he made a profound mistake in believing that by such means he could paralyze the king's activity, become the master of his fate, and dispose of it according to circumstances and his own convenience. Hence his alarm at the sudden irruption of the royal forces into his own neighborhood, and his manoeuvre for procuring their removal. On that occasion the false information he had sent was coupled with the assurance that he would himself follow up the business in the king's absence. Accordingly he made a show of taking the field; but even had his purpose been more sincere, his timidity stood in the way of its accomplishment. On one side of him was a French force, on the other a Burgundian, each ready, at least in his apprehension, to spring upon Saint-Quentin the moment his back should be turned. Again therefore he hastened to shut himself up in this almost impregnable fortress; again he scanned the horizon and calculated the chances of the

opposing parties; again he resorted to dissimulation, plunging deeper at every step, while every moment brought the exposure nearer.²¹

As for Louis himself, he faced the danger which his imagination had so often pictured, neither with a timid nor a desperate glance, but with looks full of courage and sagacity. What it portended, and how it was to be met, he fully comprehended. Never was speculation more idle than that which has been expended on the question whether the complete success of the English monarchs in their hereditary schemes of conquest would have rendered France a province of England or England a province of France. A success adequate to either of these results was never possible for those whose very victories served only to weaken the bases of that authority which they aspired to wield. All that Edward the Third or Henry the Fifth could have effected, what for a time and in a degree they did effect, was the disruption of the monarchy and the establishment of provincial independence. And this it was still possible for Edward the Fourth, in conjunction with Charles of Burgundy, to effect. Though many an old division had been healed, no real fusion had yet ensued, and any violent shock would again cause the parts to fly asunder. The Burgundian power was itself an example of such a rupture; while it offered, under its present resolute

²¹ See, for the chief matter in this paragraph, *Commines*, liv. iii., ch. 11, liv. iv., ch. 4, et al.; *De Troyes*, p. 118; and Documents in Legrand MSS. tom. xix.

head, an engine such as had never been brought to bear in any previous attempt. On the other hand the resistance also would be of a different character from that of earlier times. There would be no pitched battles, no impetuous dashing of the French chivalry on the stakes of the English archers, no confusion, no imbecility, in the conduct of the defence. As the invaders advanced, every patch of ground in their front would be made barren, every untenable place would be levelled, every strong town would, as far as science could avail, be rendered as impregnable as Neuss.²² One clear head would revolve every plan and direct every movement, while ever on the watch to profit by the first symptom of discouragement.

According to the original design the descent should have taken place on the Norman coast, and orders had actually been issued for the vessels and troops to rendezvous at Portsdown on the 26th of May.²³ But a difference of opinion arose in the English council, some advocating Calais, others a port in Guienne, as the place of landing. The duke of Burgundy, when consulted, combated both these views in a letter remarkable among the military papers of the time for the clearness and conciseness of its reasoning. "If you land in Guienne," he wrote to Edward, "you may have, it is true, the support

²² Letter of Francesco Rovere, a secret agent of the duke of Milan at the French court, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 206. — Letter of Louis to Dammartin, *Commines*, *Preuves*, tom. iii. p. 302.

²³ Rymer, tom. xi.

of my brother of Brittany, but you will be too far off to obtain any from me; besides which, your march to Paris, where we all wish to unite, must be made by the longest line. If, on the other hand, you land at Calais, you will have my support, but not that of the Bretons; it will be impossible to subsist both our armies from the same region, and moreover there would be constant disagreements between them. My advice is, that you make your descent on the coast of Normandy, either at La Hogue or at the mouth of the Seine. It will be easy for you to seize a few places from which to begin operations. You will then have the shortest line for advancing upon Paris; and the duke of Brittany on your right, and myself on your left, will both be near enough to give you constant support. Let me know what number of vessels you will need, and when you wish them sent, and I will take care that you are provided."²⁴

In a strategical point of view this plan might be open to the objection that it contemplated an invasion by separate lines of operation. But the same objection applied with far greater force to one of Edward's plans; while to the other the objections of a different kind seem to have been valid and weighty. Edward had nevertheless decided upon Calais and Boulogne, where he could be sure of disembarking without encountering opposition and would be able, as he imagined, to lean entirely on

²⁴ Printed by Salazar, *Hist. de* more correctly by Mdle Dupont, *Bourgogne*, tom. iv. p. cccliii., and *Commines*, tom. i. p. 336, note.

his brother-in-law for assistance and supplies. Five hundred vessels adapted for the transport of cavalry had been despatched from Holland, and the embarkation began at Sandwich and other ports of Kent, on the 1st of June.²⁶ At first it proceeded very slowly, either from a want of readiness or because the weather was unfavorable. By the end of the month only four or five hundred troops were reported to have crossed.²⁷ The week that followed may be considered as the real time occupied in the passage. The king, who was the last to arrive, landed on the 4th of July,²⁸ but a few days later than the time originally set. His suite comprehended the flower of the nobility — four dukes, Clarence, Gloucester, Suffolk, and Norfolk; five earls, Arundel, Northumberland, Salisbury, Wiltshire, and Rivers; thirteen barons, among them Hastings, Stanley, Howard, and Gray; besides a hundred and fifty-six baronets and knights.²⁹ Each of the principal nobles was attended by a retinue of from six hundred to two thousand men; and the army all told numbered some twenty-four thousand.³⁰ A very small proportion, about fifteen hundred, consisted of men-at-arms. Even the archers, however, were furnished with horses, though of an inferior description, to be used merely on the march.

²⁶ Haym, tom. ii. p. 281.

²⁷ Letter of Louis to Dammartin, Commines, Preuves, tom. iii. p. 303.

²⁸ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 193.

²⁹ Lists of names in Haym, tom.

ii. p. 282 et seq., and in Molinet, tom. i. pp. 139-141.

³⁰ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 103. — Other accounts do not differ widely from this.

Among the siege-equipage was a novelty of native invention, resembling a gigantic plough, drawn by fifty horses and designed for excavating trenches. In number, in splendor of equipments and in general fitness for a campaign, no such army, it was supposed, had ever before quitted the English shores.³⁰

Edward's sister, the duchess of Burgundy, had come to welcome him at Calais, where she remained till the arrival of her husband, on the 14th.³¹ Charles made his appearance, not, as had been expected, at the head of his army, but with merely his personal escort. It was his intention to prosecute the war in concert, but not in company, with his ally. His objections to the latter course were stronger than ever now that so much of the country from which provisions were to have been drawn had been ravaged by the French. The difficulty too, which he himself had long experienced, of maintaining harmony between troops of different nations, — particularly between English troops and those of the Continent, — would be insuperable with a divided command. Besides these reasons he had others, affecting his own interests more immediately, but not without weight in reference to the common cause. Of the different arrows recently launched at him one still stuck and rankled. Luxembourg was still invaded, in one quarter by the duke of Lorraine, in another by Craon. Both had been successful, and they were

³⁰ Haymin. — Molinet. — Com-
mines. — Basin. — Dépêches Mil-
naires.

³¹ Ancienne Chronique, Lenglet,
tom. ii. p. 217.

now threatening to unite. Unless this were prevented, the whole of the Southern Netherlands would be open to attack, while the forces invading France on the side of Picardy would be liable to be taken in flank. Charles had therefore determined to make Luxembourg his base. He would sweep the French out of Lorraine, and follow them into the adjoining provinces, securing his proper conquests as he advanced. Let the English take their route through Picardy and Champagne, shaping their course for Paris, or, if they preferred, for Rheims, where Edward had expressly stipulated that his coronation should take place.²¹ In either case the two armies would be moving towards a common centre, and if necessary could readily unite. The enemy would not dare to penetrate between them, and would moreover have the Bretons on his own rear.²²

This plan, whether sound or not, was based upon principles which Charles had laid down all along as necessary to be observed. But history, treating him with the same brusqueness as usual, has decided that he had no plan — that, having already squandered his resources, he was now under the necessity of failing in his engagements. The charge may be disproved by a single consideration. The treaty had never contemplated a junction of forces. Had the English landed in Normandy, as they should have done, or in Guienne, as they had talked of *

²¹ Rymer, tom. xi. p. 814. — This stipulation had been inserted in pp. 193, 194. — Basin, tom. ii. pp. 356, 357. consequence of the grant of Champagne to the duke of Burgundy.

doing, would they have expected Charles to unite with them? It was Edward who had deviated from the original understanding in selecting Picardy as his base. No doubt he was disappointed at finding that his ally had made a corresponding change. The truth is, he already shrank from the task he had undertaken. After the long interval that had elapsed since the previous invasions, after the loss of all their old dominions on the Continent, the English could not help feeling that they were absolute strangers, with no knowledge of the country, no clew to guide, no connections, no sympathies, to invite them. The duke of Burgundy, says Commines, should have comprehended this. He should have begun the war three months in advance, preparing the way and securing a pivot for the enterprise. Then, on the arrival of the English, he should have taken charge of them, conducting them forward step by step, till they were sufficiently initiated to go alone.³⁴ A just criticism, if they were coming simply as Charles's auxiliaries. But it was not he, it was Edward, who laid claim to the French crown, who was summoning Louis to lay aside his usurped dignity, and who had boasted that, with such an army as he had raised, he could march through the centre of France, or even to the gates of Rome.³⁵

After all it does not appear that any dissatisfaction was openly expressed. Immediately after the first interviews, the course proposed by Charles was given out as that which it was intended to

³⁴ Commines, tom. i. pp. 316, 337.

³⁵ Croyland contin. p. 568.

pursue.³⁵ He reviewed the English army, and consented to lead it through his own territory to a convenient position on the frontier for opening the attack. He had already taken measures for supplying it with provisions on the march.³⁷ The route lay across a turfy plain, traversed by black and sluggish waters, but redolent of former glories achieved by the English arms. During two nights Edward pitched his tent on the battle-field of Azincourt,³⁸ and a day or two later he skirted that of Crécy. The duke meanwhile found time for flying visits to Saint-Omer, Arras, and other places off the route, whither he was called by his own affairs.³⁹ On the 5th of August the Somme was crossed a league or two below Péronne. Passing this place, the army encamped around the village of Saint-Christ, on the opposite bank of the river, and at a bend in its course midway between Péronne and Saint-Quentin. The latter town might be considered as the gate of France. Would the English find it open or shut?

The gate of France, and Saint-Pol the keeper. If this were the position to which he had aspired, he found it a most uncomfortable one. His anxieties were in truth overpowering. He had at last opened his eyes to the fact that the game was too deep for him, that what he ought to be thinking of was the

³⁵ Letter of Charles to the council of Dijon, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 167 — Letter to the duchess of Savoy, *Ibid.*, p. 163. — Basin, tom. ii. p. 367.

³⁷ Gachard, note to Barante, tom. ii. p. 470.

³⁸ Molinet, tom. i. p. 141.

³⁹ *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 217.

way of escape. Those around him saw farther. They saw that he was already lost, or that, if a chance remained, he had not the nerve to grasp it. During the last few weeks he had been abandoned by his principal servants. Some had resumed their allegiance to Burgundy; the greater number, with a truer instinct, had gone over to the king. The royal arms had opened to enclasp the constable himself. Every day had brought a fresh message, pressing invitations, ample assurances, promises of compensation for any losses he might sustain. Let him only give up Saint-Quentin into safe keeping and come himself to take his proper post by the king's side! He seemed on the point of yielding; but his recollection of the numerous enmities which his haughty spirit had never hesitated to provoke, held him back. "Would Louis swear to protect him against these?" Oh yes! the king would swear. "On the true cross of Saint-Laud?" No! there should be no further tempting of Providence in that way. "He shall have any other oath he pleases; but that I will never again take to living man."⁴⁰ It did not follow that any perfidy was intended. But Saint-Pol could regard the refusal in no other light.

Having thus decided against one side, what remained for him but to join heartily with the other? Without further delay, he despatched a messenger to Charles, who was then at Péronne. He offered explanations of his past conduct, and announced his final resolution. While events were still pending, — the

⁴⁰ *Commynes*, tom. i. pp. 341, 342.

duke at a distance, the English not yet come,—his open adhesion would have been premature, depriving him of opportunities for gathering intelligence and for serving as a medium of negotiation. Now that he could no longer be of use in this way, he was ready to take the step which circumstances demanded. In confirmation of this purpose, he sent a letter of credence, authorizing Charles to act as his representative with Edward. Whatever was promised on his behalf he would stand to. His messenger had orders to repeat this assurance in the royal presence. As a conclusive guaranty he enclosed his seal—thereby cutting himself off from all recourse to denials or subterfuges if he should ever be called to account by Louis.⁴¹

Charles was satisfied. Edward, who, without understanding the character of Saint-Pol, comprehended his position, was equally satisfied. A party of the English advanced up to the walls, expecting that the bells would ring forth a peal of welcome and that a procession would come forth with crucifix and holy water. Instead of this, they were greeted with cannon-balls, and, the gates being opened, a troop of horse sallied and drove them back. They retreated in astonishment and dismay.⁴² What did it mean? Had the very demon of intrigue taken possession of the constable? Had his promises been designed only to lure and tantalize? Not precisely so. At the last moment his heart had failed him. Louis at a distance, Louis beset by dangers, was still so terrible!

⁴¹ Commines, tom. i. pp. 343-345.

⁴² Ibid. p. 345.

It was now the second week in August. Heavy rains had set in, the precursors of a long and open autumn, though otherwise interpreted at the time. The consequent discomforts, coupled with the late rebuff, produced their usual effect upon raw troops, who need the excitement of action or the encouragement which an enterprising commander knows how to inspire. And had not the English a commander who surpassed all others in activity and enterprise? No! for this was not the same Edward whom we have seen in other fields, swift in the search, irresistible in the shock. His form, once the model of manly vigor, had become obese; his face was still handsome, but the light had gone out of it; a long abandonment to his besetting vices had unfitted him for mental exertions or arduous undertakings. We are not obliged to believe with Commynes, and with his contemporaries in general, that he had never really intended to fight — that he had merely taken advantage of the infatuation of his subjects to extract from them the money they were unwilling to grant him on other terms. More probably he had dreamed of new exploits, unconscious that his strength had departed, or believing that the battle-cry would have the same power as of old to rouse him from his lethargy. But the embers were now extinguished, retaining only that delusive warmth which consoles the cowering spirit. Self-complacent over his acquired fame, he felt no incentive even to struggle against his propensities. And his nearest companions, those who had risen by his favor, had as little desire to see him

emancipated. The old nobility may have been fired with the idea of emulating the deeds and reconquering the domains of their ancestors. But the men who were building up new fortunes, the Howards, the Stanleys, the Hastingses, had discovered that there were easier paths and surer prizes, to which no one could so well direct them as the enlightened monarch of France.

The keen eye of Louis had discerned at the first glance the halting gait and feeble purpose of his assailants. "They are of a different metal," he wrote to the veteran Dammartin, "from the English of your acquaintance. They keep close, they creep, they attempt nothing."⁴³ After completing his preparations in Normandy, he set out to take a nearer view. At Beauvais he was met by the English herald,— "Ireland" king-at-arms, attended by two pursuivants,⁴⁴ — whom he received, not with the indignation which the insulting message might well have provoked, but with that pleasure which he always derived from the opportunity of communicating with a foe. The hall of audience was crowded with curious spectators. Louis, however, baffled the scrutiny which his mobile and expressive features were ill calculated to endure, by taking the letter in his own

⁴³ *Commines, Preuves*, tom. iii. pp. 303, 306. "Garter." He has confounded this mission with a previous one mentioned by De Troyes. The mistake is not of sufficient importance to throw any doubt upon his account of the interview, for the particulars of which he is our sole authority.

⁴⁴ Letter of Francesco Rovero, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 206. — *Commines* would seem to have made a slip in stating that the herald had been sent while Edward was at Dover, as also in calling him

hand and reading it aside. Then, withdrawing to a cabinet, he sent for the herald, and engaged him in conversation. His object was not so much to elicit information as to instil certain impressions. Assuming the confidential tone of one who has been admitted into the secrets and consulted as to the prosecution of a design, he remarked upon the fact that Edward had begun this matter not of himself, but yielding to popular clamor and foreign instigation. He ought, however, to consider well the prospects of success. He would find that he had been grossly deceived. He would get no help from the duke of Burgundy, who had ruined himself at Neuss, and whose real object in inviting him was to extort better terms than those on which Louis had already offered to treat with him. Others who pretended to favor the scheme had similar ends in view. Above all it would be madness to rely upon the constable, who, in pursuit of his private aims, would cheat all parties in turn. The season, too, was already far advanced, and would be over before anything of moment could be accomplished. For these and various other reasons Edward would be better advised if he should consent to receive propositions of peace. Let him not imagine that Louis felt any enmity towards him. The encouragement formerly given to the earl of Warwick had proceeded simply from the hostile relations with Burgundy. His desire at present was to form a cordial alliance with his brother of England, which would be far more profitable to the latter than any schemes of conquest. Details on this essential

point were added, with an intimation that whoever contributed to the result would find it to his own advantage. Two hours were not ill spent in discourse of this kind.⁴⁸ The herald, a Norman by birth, had the penetration to perceive that his master could have no truer friend, no wiser counsellor, than the monarch whom he had just defied. He suggested that Louis should seize an opportunity, when the campaign had opened, to apply for a safe-conduct for an embassy. The message might be addressed to the Lord Howard or the Lord Stanley. In the mean time the way would be made smooth. Three hundred crowns and thirty ells of crimson velvet rewarded this hint, a much larger recompense being promised in case of success. Care was taken to prevent any communication with the herald before his departure; but when Louis returned to the assembly, his eyes, less reticent than his lips, proclaimed his satisfaction with the interview.⁴⁹

From Beaulvais he now proceeded to Compiègne, his favorite post of observation. He took with him four thousand lances and infantry in proportion, which he distributed among the neighboring places as far in advance as Noyon. His immediate reserves were in Normandy; but he had a force stationed in Poitou to look after the Bretons, and another in Guienne, where the English rule had left its traces among the seafaring and commercial population of

⁴⁸ "Parlo al Rey in secreto bene vero, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. due hora." Letter of Francesco Ro- p. 206.

⁴⁹ *Commines*, tom. i. pp. 338-340

the coast towns.⁴⁷ Notice of a general levy had also been given, but not yet enforced, this questionable resort being left till all others should have failed. The quiet throughout the kingdom was profound; but no one doubted, Louis least of all, that a single mischance would suffice to break the charm and set a host of malevolent spirits in commotion. His own attitude, so vigilant, so resolute, was the sole restraining power.⁴⁸ The Bretons had sent word to Edward that they must still dissimulate for a while, but that the plots they were weaving would speed all the better.⁴⁹ In truth, however, they were completely cowed. Louis had cut through the meshes. "I will have no more trickeries," he had told them; "accept my offers or leave them!"⁵⁰

By way of feeling the enemy he allowed a skirmishing party to be sent out from Noyon. It fell upon some English foragers and rode them down.⁵¹ They however carried off a prisoner—a servant of Jacques de Grassay, one of the nobles of the guard. Being the first they had made, he was set free after having been interrogated by Edward and Charles. Lords Howard and Stanley spoke to him in private, gave him each a gold noble, and bade him carry their compliments to his master. Eager to earn a second reward by delivering the message, he hastened to Compiègne and asked for an audience. Louis, whose faithful memory recalled the

⁴⁷ *Dépêches Milanaises*, ubi supra. *Preuves*, p. cccliii.

⁴⁸ See the remarks of Busin, tom. ⁴⁹ *Duclos*, tom. iii. *Preuves*.

ii. p. 362.

⁵¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i.

⁵⁰ *Hist. de Bourgogne*, tom. iv. p. 207.

fact that Grassay had a brother in the service of the duke of Brittany, felt some momentary misgivings. He took the precaution of having the man handcuffed before admitting him to his closet. But as soon as he had told his story the irons were taken off. He had left the English camp after the repulse at Saint-Quentin and when the duke of Burgundy was on the point of starting for Valenciennes.⁶² Louis pondered a moment and came to the conclusion to strike at once. The mode was still to be considered. It was his usual hour of breakfast. As he sat down to table his preoccupation betrayed itself in grimaces and gestures which, in a company less familiar with his eccentricities, might have provoked some doubts of his sanity. Presently he whispered to Commynes, who rose and retired to his own apartment, where he sent for a person with whom the king had once happened to converse, a valet belonging to one of the courtiers. He was soon found; but when told that he had been selected to carry a message into the enemy's camp at the risk of being treated as a spy, he displayed such an extreme consternation that Commynes, after long endeavoring to reassure him, reported him as destitute of the capacity for such a mission, and suggested several others as better qualified. But the positive king, who had meanwhile retired to his closet, would hear of no other. "He is my man; bring him hither!" He had noticed the smooth accent and adroit tongue of

⁶² Conf. Commynes (*ubi infra*) and the *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 217.

the born diplomatist in happy conjunction with an obscure condition. The fellow entered; a few words from the royal lips — soft but penetrating — and his form straightened, his countenance brightened, he appeared to Commynes like a different person. His instructions were given him; let him prosper and his fortune was made. A herald's coat was hastily patched up out of an old banner of arms — for the negligent Louis had with him none of the regular functionaries so conspicuous at other courts — and the equipment was completed by borrowing from an officer of the admiral an *émail* with appropriate colors. These articles having been packed in a bag, the emissary was smuggled down to a back door, where a horse stood in readiness. Two or three persons only were cognizant of the matter. Had it got abroad, it would have given birth to a thousand surmises.⁵³

On reaching the English outposts, some three or four leagues distant, the pretended herald was stopped and questioned. He persuaded his captors to conduct him to the noblemen with whom he had been ordered to communicate. His reception plainly indicated that some such arrival had been expected; and after a brief conversation and a bountiful repast, he was taken to the pavilion over which floated the standard of Saint George. Here too the difficulties of his mission had been already removed. Edward, who had just risen from table, listened benignly to a message, the same in substance as he had before

⁵³ Commynes, tom. i. pp. 348-350.

received through his own herald. A safe-conduct in blank was immediately drawn up, the neighborhood of Amiens, as convenient for both parties and yet conveniently remote from both, being named as the place of meeting. Lord Howard, — best known to English readers as the "Jockey of Norfolk" slain at Bosworth, — Morton, master of the rolls, afterwards chancellor, primate, and cardinal, with two others, were appointed commissioners on the part of Edward. Their instructions set forth, as his grounds for assenting to the proposal, the forlorn condition of his army, the "nigh approach of winter," and the small assistance he had received from his allies⁵⁴ — the set phrases, in short, which had been invented and put into his mouth by the ingenious monarch of France. The English herald returned with the emissary of Louis to complete the arrangements.⁵⁵

No time was lost. On the very next day, the 14th of August,⁵⁶ the conference began. The French embassy was headed by the Sire de Saint-Pierre, seneschal of Normandy. As had been anticipated, the English opened the proceedings with a demand for the restoration of their former possessions in France. This formal attack having been made and parried with a becoming affectation of warmth, the real business was eagerly taken in hand. Edward and his counsellors had made a calculation of the bargain they might hope to drive. A payment in hand of

⁵⁴ Rymer, vol. xii.

⁵⁵ Commines, tom. i. pp. 350-352. — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 207.

⁵⁶ Commines seldom gives dates.

These may, however, generally be determined by a careful comparison of his narrative with the particulars derived from documentary sources.

seventy-five thousand crowns, a bond with securities for an annual pension of fifty thousand during the joint lives of the two monarchs, and a contract of marriage between the dauphin and the Princess Elizabeth,—not forgetting a maintenance for the young lady until she should have reached a marriageable age,—comprised the terms on which the English would “incontinently withdraw.”⁵⁷ Blunders! Imbeciles! Raw and inexperienced in the traffic in which they were engaged, unsuspecting of the necessities and the disposition of the opposite party! They might safely have doubled their demands. Whatever haggling ensued was designed merely to keep them in the dark as to the cheapness of their concessions. “Give them whatever they ask — only not a rood of territory, rather than part with which I will put everything at stake,” was the principle on which Louis had instructed his agents. In the effusion of heart produced by their success the English envoys intimated their master’s willingness to disclose the names of the French vassals who had secretly promised him their assistance. This offer, at least one degree baser than anything to which the ministers of Louis were accustomed, was heard in silent amazement.⁵⁸

Meanwhile Edward was preparing his army for the abandonment of the enterprise, and providing himself with a justification to be used on his return home. His troops were familiarized with the notion that the project was impracticable and their situation

⁵⁷ Instructions, in Rymer, vol. xii. ⁵⁸ Commynes, tom. i. pp. 353, 355.

hopeless. Mischance and treachery had conspired against them. The summer was already over; they were unprovided for a winter campaign; the duke of Burgundy had no forces to succor them; the Bretons had made a separate peace; Saint-Pol had diverted them from their proper road, and led them dancing after a will-o'-the-wisp, till they were landed in a bog. What remained for them but to pick their way out? The captains, assembled under the pretext of a consultation, were reminded that they had received six months' pay in advance and had served only as many weeks — which made it all the clearer that any further efforts would be useless. A remonstrance to this effect was accordingly presented. This would pledge them to proclaim at home the necessity for their return, and thus conduct away that popular wrath which was wont to smite so terribly after national disappointment and disgrace.*

But would it serve also as a shield against the reproaches of a deceived and discontented ally? Charles, who had taken his departure on the 12th,[†] was now at Valenciennes, holding an assembly of the States of Hainault. His intercourse with that province was attended with none of the vexations which he experienced in Flanders. The people were indeed conspicuous for their attachment to the sovereign and their hostility to the French. During the late troubles every incursion in this direction had been vigorously repulsed. The patriotic service thus

^{*} Haynin, tom. ii. pp. 287, 288. [†] *Ancienne Chronique*, Leuglet, — Molinet, tom. i. p. 144. — *Com-* tom. ii. p. 217.
mines, tom. i. p. 385.

rendered was now heartily acknowledged by Charles, whose fresh requisitions for money and troops met with a prompt and liberal response⁶¹ A few days sufficed for the despatch of his business, when he again set out for the English camp, intending to start the operations in this quarter before going to take command of his own army.

On the evening of the 18th he arrived at Péronne, where he slept. He spent the morning of the 19th at the English head-quarters, had an interview with Edward, and returned to pass the night at Péronne.⁶² We are led to infer that it was not until the afternoon of the next day that he was enlightened as to the events which had occurred during his absence. In a written communication — perhaps, however, verbally delivered, since it bears no signature or address — he was informed that the English monarch, constrained by the representations of his army, had consented to a negotiation. But, ever grateful to his dearest brother of Burgundy, he had taken care to stipulate that the latter, if such were his pleasure, should be included in the truce. It was not without very great exertions that this concession had been obtained from the French king, who had further agreed to accept the arbitration of the king of England in his disputes with the duke of Burgundy. On both these points Charles was now requested to signify his will and pleasure.⁶³

⁶¹ Gecharé, note to Barante, tom. ii. p. 217.

ii. p. 474.

⁶² Haynin, tom. ii. pp. 288, 289.

⁶³ *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet,
vol. III. 23

Followed by a handful of attendants, he rode back with the haste which may be imagined, and entered unannounced the royal pavilion. His eye proclaimed his errand. Edward, who sat surrounded by his nobles, would fain have avoided the storm. He hastened to inquire whether his dearest brother would not prefer a private interview. Breathless and absorbed, Charles scarcely heard him. "Is it true? Have you made a peace?" he asked. The king began to repeat his protestations and excuses. He was interrupted by a flood of invective, delivered in English in order that it might be understood by all, and rendered, doubtless, more forcible and pungent by the foreign accent. He was bitterly taunted with his lack of honor and good faith. His pusillanimity was cuttingly contrasted with the heroism of former Edwards. His offers were scornfully rejected. "Negotiate for *me*! Arbitrate for *me*! Did you come here on *my* affairs? Is it *I* who have claimed the crown of France? Leave *me* to make my own truce! I will wait till you have been three months across the sea!"⁴¹

He rushed away—to Cambray, to Mons, to Namur, which he reached on the evening of the 22d,⁴² and whence he despatched orders to the towns on the frontier to suffer no intelligence from the English army to be made public until it had been communicated to himself.⁴³ By this precaution and others of

⁴¹ Commines, tom. i. pp. 361, 362.

⁴² Gachard, note to Barante, tom.

⁴³ Ardenne Chronique, Lenglet, II. p. 478.
tom. II. p. 217.

the like nature he sought to soften the bad impression which the news might produce upon his subjects at home. As to making any attempt to avert the catastrophe, to compete with Louis in the arts of seduction, the thought assuredly never crossed his mind. He had behaved like an outraged lover rather than a cool politician, throwing up his claim in disgust on the proof or acknowledgment of an intended infidelity. His burst of choler could inflict no injury on its object. It might easily have provoked a smile. Secretly, however, it had left a sting. From that day forth Edward had no stronger feeling than hatred of his brother-in-law. Among a portion of the English nobles the effect was different. Latent sentiments of shame and discontent had been roused. "The duke of Burgundy has spoken well!" was the exclamation of many who had heard him, amongst them the duke of Gloucester.*

It seemed, indeed, incredible that, after such announcements, such preparations, the expedition should return without a single achievement or a single effort. It was contrary to all experience.** At the French court, where the possible results of an encounter had been best appreciated, the wonder was proportionally strong. When the royal council was called together, some of the members expressed their belief that the English were only concocting a ruse. But the king

* Commines, tom. i. p. 362 et al. retourner à così peu bisognier en

** "On ne vit oques si grande fet de gerre." Haynin, tom. ii. p. 290.—See also Haun, tom. ii. p. 359.

set the matter in its true light, as accordant with facts and with the laws of nature. "The French winter begins in August, the duke of Burgundy has lost his army, and — my brother of England loves pleasure and ease."⁶⁶ Triumphant Louis! He had so often longed for the opportunity to make a secure peace with the English, — to come face to face with them and try whether their stern nature could not be melted, — and here and thus the opportunity had come! And how pleasant to think that it was his cousin of Burgundy who had contrived it, who had brought the wax to the flame, the acid to the alkali!

He was now in a flutter lest something should go wrong, some mischance intervene. His coffers being drained, and the time being so short, the money had to be raised by extraordinary expedients. For this purpose he had already despatched his chancellor to Paris,⁶⁷ and, in case his own presence should be needed, had followed him as far as Senlis, whence he wrote to him, under date of August 23d, in these terms: "I send you a duplicate of the letters I have just received from Monsieur de Saint-Pierre. I thank God, Our Lady, and Monseigneur Saint Martin for the good news they contain. We must have the whole sum at Amiens before Friday evening, besides what will be wanted for private gratifications to my Lord

⁶⁶ "Allégua la disposition du temps et la saison, . . . les mauvais tours que leur avoit faits le duc de Bourgogne; . . . aussi le Roy avoit bonne congnoissance de la personne du roy d'Angleterre, lequel avoit

fort ses ayses et ses plaisirs." Commines, tom. i. p. 358. — If Commines himself was partially gulled, this is only a crowning tribute to the art of his master.

⁶⁷ De Troyes, p. 110.

Howard and the others who have had a share in the arrangement. I beseech you, therefore, as you value my welfare, my honor, and that of all my kingdom, use your best diligence and let there be no fault; for, if any should occur in this present need, it would do me irreparable damage. It is also necessary to have the great seal, for they will put no confidence in any other. If, therefore, you are not coming soon, send it immediately by some good and sure hand. Do not fail in this, that there may be no pretext for a rupture of what had been already settled."⁷¹

Although he had no real cause for anxiety, it was the fact that an attempt was being made to cross his manœuvres. Rumors of the negotiation had reached the constable and filled him with alarm. Of all contingencies this was the one for which he was least prepared. Had the invaders succeeded in making an impression, he could still have united with them; had they met with a disaster, he could have joined zealously in running them down. He might thus have avoided the rocks on either hand; what he had not anticipated was a sudden fall of the tide which would leave him stranded between them. He made frantic efforts to retard it, resorting to his old practices, and addressing himself simultaneously to Charles, to Louis, and to Edward. He entreated the English monarch not to be discouraged, warned him against the allurements of the cunning foe, and advised him as to the mode of stemming his embarrass-

⁷¹ Legrand MSS. tom. xviii.— Louis still extant that have not This is one of the few letters of been printed.

ments. Let him retire towards the coast, seize a few small places, such as Eu and Valéry (which Louis, however, anticipating the suggestion, had already given orders to burn if any such movement were attempted), and, thus sheltered, await the result of new combinations. In a few weeks he would find his way open, and meanwhile, if he stood in need of money, Saint-Pol would supply him with a loan.⁷² The message sent to Louis was an offer to assist in the negotiation of a peace. It would not do to be too hasty or too sanguine. The very straits in which the English were placed might drive them to some violent remedy. It would be best to make them an offer of some unimportant places, let them settle down quietly, and by the time the season was over they would be glad of an excuse for taking their departure.

Louis availed himself of this communication to forward a side purpose of his own. He contrived a little scene in which business and pleasure were admirably blended. Among the Burgundian prisoners taken in the combat before Arras was the Sire de Contay, of a high family and personally distinguished. He had been treated with great consideration, had been allowed to go and come on his parole, and had received the promise of an easy ransom. The king in fact intended to use him as a medium for reopening negotiations with Charles as soon as the present squall should have blown over. One main feature in any future truce must be a provision for disposing

⁷² Commynes, tom. i. p. 364.

of Saint-Pol. When the constable's agent, Louis de Xainville, was admitted to an audience, a screen behind the royal seat concealed two auditors of the interview, Commynes and the Sire de Contay. Xainville, who had just before returned from a mission to the duke of Burgundy, began by stating its purpose and result. He had gone, as he pretended, to propose to Charles to abandon the English and even to coöperate in attacking them. He had very nearly succeeded. The duke was still boiling with indignation at the bad faith and cowardice of his ally. These particulars, whether believed or not, were listened to with so much interest that the envoy, charmed at the opportunity of creating a favorable impression, was induced to give a dramatic form to his narrative. He imitated Charles's voice and gestures, stamped the ground, swore by Saint George, and talked of the upstart Englishman, calling him "Blackburn," in allusion to a well-known piece of scandal. The king was delighted. Nothing, in fact, could be more genuine than his enjoyment, for he was laughing at as well as with the performer. "Louder, monsieur! louder, my good friend! I begin to grow a little deaf." The repetition thus called for was given in a higher key and with additional touches. Behind the screen, Contay was bursting with suppressed rage; while Louis, doubly amused, laughed till the tears ran down.

His good humor received a check when, the prelude having ended, the proper business of the interview came to be discussed. At the suggestion that he should allow the English to get a footing on the

French soil, his countenance blackened. It required his strongest efforts to control a burst of passion more violent and more ludicrous than that of which he had just witnessed the caricature. The double-dyed traitor! How much longer must vengeance be delayed? But let it not be put to hazard by a premature declaration! In a cold but steady voice he dismissed the envoy, promising to send an answer to "his brother" by a messenger of his own. Contay then came forward to entreat that he might be suffered to take horse at once, and carry to his master the account of this outrage. He was made the bearer of a friendly message. The royal views were explained to him. If the object were attained he should have his freedom, without ransom, and a handsome present.⁷³

During this by-play the main action had not languished. A treaty had been draughted providing for a truce of seven years, with complete freedom of intercourse and trade between the two nations. The pecuniary arrangements formed the subject of a separate instrument; while it was stipulated in a third, which took the form of a treaty of confederation, that the two sovereigns should render mutual aid against their rebellious subjects, and that, if either of them were expelled from his dominions, he should be sheltered in those of the other and aided in the recovery of his throne.⁷⁴ In other words, Edward, presaging a second exile as among the possible consequences of these proceedings, and having no longer any claim

⁷³ Communes, tom. i. pp. 356-359.

⁷⁴ Langlet, tom. iii. pp. 397-406.

to the protection of Burgundy, had secured for himself a retreat at the French court and a second restoration, under French auspices. And yet in the very instrument in which he stooped to this acknowledgment of his danger and dependence, he still adhered to the empty pretensions on which his enterprise had been founded, arrogating to himself the title of "King of France and England," and leaving to the monarch whose pensionary he had become and whose favor he was soliciting the vague designation of "the illustrious prince, Louis of France."

In order to confer some *éclat* on the arrangement and cover up its true character as much as possible, it was agreed that the sovereigns should meet at the head of their respective forces and exchange the ratifications in person.⁷⁸ Picquigny on the Somme, three leagues below Amiens, was fixed upon as the spot. A bridge was thrown across the river, and a barrier erected in the centre with a lattice-work as strong as that of a lion's cage, but sufficiently open to allow the French king at least to pass his meagre arm between the bars. He forbade the construction of the gate which it was usual to insert, not caring to give too much scope to his own impulsive spirit. On the side of the English the freedom from all distrust amounted to recklessness. From the moment when it had become known that a treaty was in progress

⁷⁸ According to the Milanese agent, Francesco Rovero, whose letter is dated August 20, the two armies were to approach each other in battle array and make a pretence

of combating—"alcun sembiante di combattere"—before the interview. *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 207.

discipline had been wholly cast aside. As the territory around the camp belonged to Saint-Pol, there was some excuse for the depredations committed by the troops. But their maltreatment of the Burgundian subjects who brought them their supplies, whether instigated by arrogance or by spite, was alike inexcusable and impolitic.⁷⁶ No order, no precautions, were observed on the march. Their leaders, Edward himself, had lost all authority over them. When they came in front of Amiens, they flocked across the bridges as if they had been disbanded in the neighborhood of their homes. Louis, who had arrived a day or two before, gave orders for receiving them hospitably. Tables were set in the streets, and the tavern-keepers were bidden to satisfy all demands without charge. So dense was the influx that the inhabitants became alarmed and the king himself felt some uneasiness. He went in person to one of the gates, and had his dinner brought to him at the porter's lodge. Yet he refused to impose any restrictions or to use his own troops for enforcing order. Edward, when informed of what was going on, sent a message requesting him to drive the rabble out. "Not for the world!" was the polite answer; "but if my brother pleases, he may send some archers of his own guard to hold the gates and determine who shall pass." This state of things lasted three or four days.⁷⁷

On the morning of the 29th Louis rode over to Picquigny escorted by some fifteen hundred troops.

⁷⁶ Molinet, tom. i. p. 148.

⁷⁷ Commynes, tom. i. pp. 363-367.

His whole army was advantageously posted along the left bank of the river, while the side on which the English made their approach presented an expanse of swamps traversed by a single causeway. Had he felt the least inclination to foul play, the opportunities were abundant. But nothing could be further from his thoughts. He stepped upon the bridge with a dozen attendants, four of them Englishmen appointed to see that the proper precautions were observed. Edward, with a like company, met him at the barrier. After cordial greetings, in which Louis declared with truth that there was no man in the world whom he had so much desired to meet, a missal and a piece of the True Cross were produced, and the bishop of Lincoln administered the oath for the observance of the treaty. Some private conversation followed, the attendants on both sides falling back. Louis was full of pleasantries. "Come and visit me at Paris; we have ladies there who will entertain you right merrily, and you shall have for your confessor Cardinal Bourbon, who knows how to lay light penances for pleasant sins." He bit his lip when he saw that the too attractive proposal had been taken seriously. Hastily turning the conversation, he proceeded to sound the present disposition of the English monarch towards his allies. In reference to the duke of Burgundy the answer was satisfactory, Edward intimating that he cared little what course was adopted. He was more scrupulous in regard to the duke of Brittany, who had a Lancastrian pretender under his wing. Apprehending the difficulty, Louis immedi-

ately dropped the subject, and after some further civilities the interview ended.⁷⁸

In addition to the payments stipulated by the treaty, presents of money, plate, rich stuffs and choice wines, were distributed among the English nobles, and pensions to the amount of sixteen thousand crowns settled on the most influential. Even Gloucester and other malcontents were induced to participate. Hostages, of whom Lord Howard was the principal, were left till the English should have recrossed the channel. Louis was growing somewhat impatient for their departure. It was irksome to him to have to restrain his mingled feelings of triumph and contempt. Sarcasms on the heroes who had been so easily mollified forced a passage through his lips, obliging him the next instant to examine every face in the motley crowd by which he was continually surrounded. His guests, on the other hand, with a simplicity unversed in the hypocrisies of politeness, were impressed with the notion that they could do him no greater favor than by prolonging their stay and making new demands on his hospitality. Howard, with the mere view of ingratiating himself, offered to persuade his master to accept the unlucky invitation to the capital. This intimation threw Louis into a cold sweat. He had to make a thousand civil speeches, while explaining that business of a pressing nature would unfortunately compel him to turn his own steps in a different direction.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ *Commines*, tom. i. pp. 368-377; tom. iii. *Preuves*, pp. 306-308. ⁷⁹ *Commines*, tom. i. pp. 360, 363, 377, 378, 380.
— *De Troyes*, p. 119.

In their return through Picardy and the Boulonnais the English paid the penalty of their former outrages on the population. Their supplies ran short, and many a straggler was found feet uppermost in the bogs.⁸⁰ Before embarking Edward received a final letter from Saint-Pol, written in the rage of despair and filled with reproaches more bitter even than those which, with better reason, had been uttered by the duke of Burgundy. In the present instance he had the means of revenge within reach. He enclosed the letter, with others of an earlier date from the same hand, to the French king.⁸¹ He sent also a message requesting that Charles should not be allowed to make a separate peace. If he should still refuse the proffered truce, let the war be continued, and the English monarch — on condition that his expenses were paid — would join in compelling submission. A rancor of this kind far exceeded the comprehension of Louis. "God forbid that they should meet," he innocently remarked; "they would soon be as good friends as ever"⁸²

So ended — in the last extremity of ineffectiveness and meanness — an expedition which was to have eclipsed all former enterprises of the like nature. Yet the end had been foreshadowed by the beginning. Of all the parties concerned two alone had been hearty and sincere — the duke of Burgundy and the English people. The latter, like the former,

⁸⁰ Molinet, tom. i. p. 148.

⁸¹ Commises, tom. i. pp. 389, 390.

⁸² De Troyes, pp. 120, 121.

felt itself deluded and aggrieved. On his return Edward was received with a roar of indignation. What was he but a charlatan, a swindler, who had promised huge results and obtained money under false pretences? He escaped, it is true, the penalties he had feared, and had no occasion to seek the asylum which he had taken care to provide. But he sank into an object of general contempt, the close of his reign was enveloped with horrors, and his dynasty was already doomed.

In one sense, however, this invasion has a greater importance than any previous one. The very baseness and ludicrousness in which it expired mark the change of times. It was as if chivalry and the Middle Ages had made their exit leaving a foul odor behind. Henceforth France might go forward on her course without the perpetual fear of being worried and turned back. Louis had got rid of his old nightmare; he had only to cultivate the connection he had so happily formed. The enormous sums which he continued to distribute for this purpose were well laid out.⁵³ Ere long the English ministers had learned to address him in strains of gratitude and devotion worthy of the council of Berne.⁵⁴ Nor was he less careful to avoid every

⁵³ See particulars in Holinshed and Rapiu.

⁵⁴ We have a specimen in a letter from Hastings (Legrand MSS. tom. xviii.), acknowledging a communication made through the grand sénéchal, and the "very great and beautiful present" which had ac-

companied it, "dont me doint grace de vous faire service comme j'ay de ce faire la vouloir de tout mon cœur ainsi que ie luy declairé plus à plain," &c. The date is Calais, June 27; year not given except, erroneously, by Legrand; but should be 1479; in the May of

occasion of arousing the susceptibilities of the English nation. Its merchants and sea-captains, putting their own construction on the provisions of the treaty, insisted on landing their cargoes at Bordeaux and elsewhere without paying the port dues or complying with any of the customary regulations; and Louis, when applied to, yielded every point with only the softest murmur of complaint.⁶⁶ So effective was this policy that before half of the seven years' truce had expired, he was enabled to make a new and closer treaty,—a treaty of peace and amity,—to continue in force during his own and Edward's lifetime and for a hundred years afterwards.⁶⁷ Triumphant Louis!

which year Saint-Priest, the senechal of Normandy, went on a mission to Calais, where Hastings was "captain."

⁶⁶ Articles presented by Sir T. Montgomery and T. Gale, with

replies of Louis, Jan. 8, 1476, *Legrand MSS.* tom. xix.

⁶⁷ Treaty concluded at London, Feb. 13, 1476, Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 560 et seq.

CHAPTER IX.

FATE OF SAINT-POL.—CONQUEST OF LORRAINE.

1475.

THE Germans on the one side, the English on the other, had retired from the lists; and, if none but Burgundy and France had remained, the sports might have ended without the unhorsing of a single knight. But here in the centre stood a youthful champion, a mere squire of arms, still expecting apparently the combat *à l'outrance*.

What business had he there — the blue-eyed, gentle-hearted René of Lorraine, who should rather have been seeking a bride to perpetuate his gifted race? Though we may easily conceive that the Burgundian alliance had been irksome to his independence, it was nevertheless in the nature of a protection, — a protection not only against others, but against Burgundy itself, — and he had regarded it as such. Nor, even if he had good reasons for casting it off, would these afford any excuse for his unprovoked attack. This, indeed, he clearly perceived; and he had accordingly alleged in his

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justification the commands of the emperor and the French king, both of whom he affected to acknowledge as his feudal superiors. Necessity was therefore the plea; a sound one, good against his instigators, good against all the world — the duke of Burgundy excepted.

Charles had replied in a public manifesto, under date of the 3d of July. In this he reminded René that, when a complaint had been preferred touching the conduct of his troops, he had given assurances that, if any wrongs had been done, he would make reparation and provide against their recurrence. A joint commission of inquiry had been instituted and the charges found to be frivolous. As to the imperial summons, it could have no validity in the case of a war not waged against the Empire; compliance had been refused by several of the princes; and at all events this plea would no longer avail, the emperor himself having now consented to a peace. Still more futile was the pretext that the French king, as the suzerain of some petty fiefs in Lorraine, had a claim to the allegiance of its prince. On the same ground the duke of Burgundy might have set up an equal or stronger claim; whereas he had never asked any assistance from René against either the Germans or the French, though he had stood ready to afford assistance whenever required. And what force or value could any such pretences have in the face of a solemn treaty, a treaty of René's own seeking, by which he had bound himself, during his whole life, to contract no engagements and commit

no act prejudicial to the interests of his ally? "We therefore summon you" — so the missive concludes — "to observe your promises and oaths, to desist from your attacks upon our states and subjects, to renounce any alliances you have formed with our enemies, and to restore to us the rights you have unlawfully abrogated; failing which, we shall treat you as a violator of your faith and honor, and, with the help of God, will let you perceive the difference between our friendship and our enmity!"¹

In a shorter letter addressed to the count of Salm, marshal of Lorraine, and the other principal nobles of the province, they were reminded of their own participation in the treaty, and warned against supporting René in his infractions of it.²

On the arrival of the Burgundian army in Luxembourg, René retreated into his own dominions. The danger he had so little apprehended was now at hand, and he must look to his means of meeting it. His own resources, the feudal levies of the province and some companies of Gascon infantry who were receiving his pay, would be of little account. He must rely upon those who had forced him into the affair, and who had so earnestly promised that no harm should befall him. The emperor had already abandoned him; but like the Swiss, though he had put the imperial mandate in the foreground, it had formed the real basis neither of his conduct nor of his confidence. His appeal to the Rhine towns met

¹ Legrand MSS. Pièces historiques, tom. xviii.

² Huguenin jeune, Pièces justificatives, p. 347 et seq.

with a hearty and immediate response. Strasburg, Basel, and the other members of the Lower League, sent him a force of six thousand men, horse and foot, under experienced leaders, with a promise of larger aid when some necessary arrangements should have been made.² But his main dependence was of course on French support. It was the influence and the guaranty of France which had decided his course; and a French army amply sufficient to protect him was still in the immediate vicinity. As soon, therefore, as Campobasso with a small detachment had crossed the frontier, notice was sent to Craon in the full expectation that he would hasten to the rescue.

It soon appeared that the French commander was acting under special instructions. His course was equivocal. He sent a private message to Campobasso, which induced the latter to suspend his movements; but he refused to join forces with the duke of Lorraine or to concert any plan for repelling the invasion.

René now became alarmed. He summoned a council of his nobles. As parties to the Burgundian treaty, most of them had a deeper interest in the issue than belonged to their position simply as vassals. An adverse result might involve not merely a change of rule, but the forfeiture of their estates. This consideration inclined them to act with prudence. Having decided that the means for a combined resistance were inadequate, they requested permission, after renewing their vows of allegiance,

² Remy, pp. 10, 11. — Chmel, B. I. s. 204. — Rodt, B. I. s. 479.

to retire to their castles and put them in a state of defence. René was thus left almost alone with his German auxiliaries. With these he garrisoned the capital and the other principal fortresses; and he then set out in person for the French court to claim the assistance to which he was so clearly entitled.*

After bowing out his English visitors, Louis had set to work to sweep away the litter occasioned by their presence and restore his establishment to its wonted order. He had to make a new disposition of his troops; to come to a fresh understanding with the dukes of Burgundy and Brittany; to pounce here and there on some luckless wight who had betrayed a lack of zeal in the recent bustle; above all, to obtain a final settlement of the long account with his faithful constable. His envoys, hangmen, and other agents had their tasks assigned them; the bulk of his army was sent into Champagne, with what precise purpose nobody could yet tell; he himself, at the head of a sufficient force, took his way towards Saint-Quentin and the borders of the Netherlands.

The constable had already fled. Warnings, scarcely needed, had come to him from different sources. His sister-in-law, the French queen, had sent him a furtive billet, bidding him lose no time if he regarded his life.⁵ His own messengers to the king had reported, on their return, that they had been bluntly questioned by the courtiers as to the amount and

* Dialogue entre Lud et Chrétien, pp. 21, 22 — Remy, p. 12.

⁵ Malinet, tom. i. p. 180.

disposition of their master's treasure. Louis himself, unable to repress the untimely jest, had sent him word, in answer to his last offer of service, that he had better come in person, a *head* like his being greatly needed. At first a wild idea of resistance had entered his mind. He would shut himself up in the castle of Ham, which he had strongly fortified with a view to some such emergency. He found, however, that, if he tried this scheme, he would have to run the risks and carry on the defence alone. Then he thought of escaping, with his servants, his ready money and portable effects, to the Rhineland, where he might purchase an estate and live in seclusion. But the dangers of the route, for one who would have to shun both French and Burgundians, were great; the chance of finding a retreat where neither of the two great princes he had offended would be able to reach him was dubious in the extreme; strongest objection of all, he would be renouncing the hopes to which a mind like his clings even in the hour of desperation. A position more desperate it would have been impossible to imagine. He had recently lost his wife, whose voice, however ineffectually, might have pleaded for him with Louis. His son and his brother, who could have pleaded more effectually with Charles, were prisoners of war. At both courts the leading men were his personal enemies. Yet between the two lay his only choice. When this had become clear to him he had no difficulty in deciding. Charles, with all his sternness, was less venomous, less deadly, than Louis. He was

also less shrewd. Surely he could be induced to forgive the immediate past in consideration of earlier services and friendship. Perhaps he might even be brought to believe that, in intention if not in act, Saint-Poi had all along remained faithful to his cause.⁶

The fugitive took the road to Namur and Luxembourg. At Binches, just within the frontier of Hainault, he waited while a message was despatched to the duke. When the answer arrived, he was desired to take up his residence at Mona.⁷ The authorities of the town received him with the outward marks of respect due to his station. A house was assigned him; wine was furnished for his table; probably he was not made aware that an officer had come from the court to arrange with the magistrates a plan of surveillance.⁸

Day and night he sent off communications to the duke⁹ — fresh promises, fresh offers, which could now, however, no longer delude, since he had lost the power to fulfil them. The possibility that the prey might escape had sharpened the eagerness of the hunter. Louis pressed nearer to the covert. His troops were massed as if with the design of bursting in. The duke of Lorraine, who for several weeks had followed him from place to place without being able to gain his attention, was now supplied with a force

⁶ Commines, tom. i. pp. 382-384, 392 et seq. — Basin, tom. ii. p. 368.

⁷ Haynin tom. ii. p. 292.

⁸ Gachard, note to Barante, tom. ii. p. 487. — We suppress dates, be-

cause unable to reconcile such as are given in the authorities with particulars which it is nevertheless impossible to reject.

⁹ Melinet, tom. i. p. 149.

of eight hundred lances, and encouraged to believe that all would go well.¹⁰

As usual, however, these military demonstrations merely covered the real object. Arrangements had already been made, through Contay and others, for a formal negotiation, which Louis, who had taken his post at Vervins, close upon the frontier of Hainault, wished to superintend in person. He invited the Burgundian embassy, headed by the Chancellor Hugonet, to a meeting. One of the English hostages, who stood at a window among a group of courtiers, beheld with surprise the splendid body of horse that formed the Burgundian escort. A light began to dawn upon his mind. "Had we supposed," he blurted out, "that the duke of Burgundy had many such troops as those, you would not have found us so ready to conclude a peace." "And were you so simple," was the malicious reply of the young Vicomte de Narbonne, son of the count of Foix, "as to doubt that he had plenty of such troops? He was only giving them an interval of rest. But in truth you had so good a mind to return that it needed only a pension from the king and a few hundred pipes of wine to get rid of you at once." "Pension!" retorted the enraged Englishman. "Do you call the money you give us a pension? No, by Saint George, it is tribute! We were told that you would jeer at us; but have a care, or you may chance to bring us back!" "— Ay! "tribute," "subsidy," "subvention;" there is

¹⁰ Dialogue entre Lud et Chrétien, p. 22. — Remy, p. 18.

¹¹ Commynes, tom. i. pp. 388-389.

nothing in a name — except the subtle influence that determines the opinions of mankind.

Louis had intended to leave the preliminary discussions to his ministers. After the first interview they reported that the Burgundians had talked in a very lofty strain, but had been met in a corresponding spirit. The king was disgusted. "Big words," he said, "do not suit the occasion; I must speak with them myself." Thenceforward all went smoothly.¹² An agreement was speedily framed, and on the 13th of September was ratified by Charles at the castle of Soleure, in Luxembourg. It was the fifth treaty between the parties within a period of ten years, and it bore upon its face the proofs of their mutual disinclination to revive the struggle. It provided for a truce of nine years, with the restoration of places recently captured, an equitable settlement of minor questions which had arisen out of the conflict, and ample precautions for averting any future collisions; — a happy and sensible arrangement, received with general rejoicings, especially by the trading classes and the population of the border lands.¹³ The allies on both sides, including on that of the king the Swiss and the duke of Lorraine, were to be admitted to the benefits of the peace, provided they should notify their desire to that effect before the 1st of January and should refrain in the interval from all acts of hostility. The constable, as a traitor to both sides, was excluded. The party in whose dominions he

¹² *Ibid.* p. 388.

¹³ *Basin*, tom. ii. p. 387. — *Collet*, col. 1296.

should take refuge was to execute justice upon him without pardon or reprieve, or, failing to do so within eight days, was, within the further space of four days, to deliver him up to the other.¹⁴ His estates in France were to go to the duke of Burgundy, who had already confiscated those which lay within his own dominions.¹⁵ Lastly, the king was to take possession of Saint-Quentin, but, after removing his artillery, was to deliver up the town with its dependent territory to Charles, the rights and immunities of the inhabitants remaining intact.¹⁶

The provisions in regard to Saint-Pol were embodied in a separate article; and there were other and more secret articles, relating chiefly to the allies. Charles, on his part, while preserving his treaties with Aragon, consented to the French occupation of Roussillon. This was a mere formal concession; he had never mooted the point; and he expressly stipulated that the facts should be made known to his ally,¹⁷ who would therefore have no just ground of complaint. On the king's side the concessions were of greater moment. The duke of Burgundy was left at liberty to prosecute his claims against Austria and Alsace, and, if the resistance he might meet with should receive the least support or countenance of any description from the Swiss, a war against them would not be construed as an infringement of the

¹⁴ Communes (tom. i. p. 391) is no doubt correct in stating that, to save trouble, the unexecuted clauses in a former treaty were embodied in the present one.

¹⁵ Gachard, note to Barante, tom. i. p. 494.

¹⁶ Lenglet, tom. iii. pp. 409-429.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 419.

treaty, nor would the king afford them help of any kind.¹⁸ There was no express mention of the duke of Lorraine; but an article of somewhat ambiguous wording was evidently meant to apply to his case. The duke of Burgundy was empowered to transport troops at all times between the Netherlands and his southern provinces by whatever route he might himself select. A provision so vague was obviously open to a very wide interpretation. There was need of an explanatory article, and one was accordingly inserted. Charles gave an assurance that the right of passage thus accorded should not be exercised in the territory of France.¹⁹ He must then intend to exercise it in that of Lorraine.

When these particulars oozed out, the king was accused of having abandoned and sacrificed his allies. Yet the secret articles did not so much modify the main treaty as explain it. The evident object of that instrument was the restoration of the *status quo*. So far as the contracting parties were concerned this was settled by express and minute stipulations. So far as the allies were concerned it was settled by implication. Even had there been no separate articles, the duke of Burgundy could scarcely have been held to have surrendered claims and advantages which he had lawfully acquired and of which he had been violently dispossessed. Louis had made the same terms for his allies as he had made for himself. They would be liable to no reprisals for anything done during the war, provided they should reëstablish the state

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 420.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 425.

of things which had existed previously to the war. This indeed it would not be easy for them to do. Nor did Louis intend or wish that they should do it. From the first he had so contrived the knot that, when he himself slipped out, it would *ipso facto* tighten around the remaining parties.

As for the duke of Lorraine, had he clearly understood his position, he would no doubt have heeded the warning of Charles to retrieve his error by a timely "repentance." But it had been necessary to the schemes of Louis that he should be encouraged in the notion of resistance. The show of support afforded to him was a step in the negotiation of the treaty. On his return to his dominions he found the situation materially changed. Early in September the Bastard of Burgundy, having returned from Italy with a body of recruits, and assumed the command in Franche-Comté, had entered Lorraine at its southern extremity, captured many places, reopened the long-impeded communications, and cut off all chance of further succors from the Rhineland.²⁰ Towards the close of the month the invasion began in earnest on the northern frontier. Briey, the first fortified town on the route, surrendered at discretion after a cannonade of three days. A fine was imposed, the houses were pillaged, and fourscore Germans found among the garrison were hung.²¹ The duke, who had been detained at Soleure by an affection of the throat,²² now took command in

²⁰ Letters of Guillaums de Rochefort to the regent of Savoy, Sept. 5

and 17, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i.

pp. 224, 242 et seq.

²¹ Bemy, p. 15.

²² Molinet, tom. i. p. 149.

person. Various small strongholds fell in quick succession. On the 25th he arrived at Pont-à-Mousson, which he entered without resistance. Here he was met by the prince of Tarento, the second son of the king of Naples, who had set out several months before at the head of a brilliant cavalcade, with the ostensible motive of seeing service in the siege of Neuss, but attracted in reality by the illusive hope of gaining the hand of the Princess Mary.²²

Charles's train was further swollen by a throng of ambassadors, including the bishop of Forlì, who had come on an errand from the emperor. The march resembled a triumphal procession. Most of the places, as he approached, sent deputations to tender their submission. Nancy, indeed, was prepared for a siege. But instead of attacking it, the Burgundians, leaving it on their left, passed southward through the plain between the Meurthe and the Moselle, until they reached the slopes of the Vosges, where they formed an intrenched camp. Having taken this precaution against a possible surprise from whatever quarter, they went on rapidly with their work. Detached corps appeared simultaneously before different places. Where a vain resistance was attempted, it drew with it the usual severities. But in most cases the proffered grace was prudently accepted. Epinal, by far the strongest and most important fortress in this quarter, the key in fact of the whole country, might have made a stout defence. The garrison included a

²² *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 218. — *Molinet*, tom. i. p. 150 et seq.

large body of Gascons, besides seven hundred Germans under Herter, the victorious commander at Héricourt. But the people generally were not ill-disposed towards the duke of Burgundy, whose troops had before garrisoned the town and enlivened its trade. The Germans, on the other hand, were regarded with aversion. René's lieutenant, the Bastard of Vaudémont, was also an object of suspicion and dislike. When the siege had lasted five days, Herter, perceiving that the place would not hold out, and aware that, in case of its capture or unconditional surrender, he and his men would be victimized, proposed a parley. A capitulation on the most favorable terms was readily granted. The foreign soldiers were allowed to depart with their arms and baggage. The inhabitants were guaranteed in possession of their property and privileges. The only condition exacted was an oath of allegiance and fidelity to the conqueror. Charles, on his entrance, confirmed these engagements, exhorted the citizens to accept his rule, and promised them full protection.*

This example was generally followed. Within ten days, the whole province, with the exception of the capital, had submitted or was prepared to submit. Leaving garrisons at all the important points, Charles again turned northwards, and on the 28th of October appeared before the walls of Nancy.

René, with his French lances, had arrived in the neighborhood while the foe was still at a distance. He had proposed to the officer in command of his

* Remy, pp. 21-25. — Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 175, 176.

escort to undertake some active operations. He was told in reply that the king had given no orders to that effect. Thus enlightened as to his true situation, he retired in despair to the castle of Joinville, resolved apparently amid the scenes of his youth to forget the turmoils and miseries of his present existence. But he was not to escape the destiny of so many of his race — desertion, exile, the life of a wandering claimant, pitied and despised, aided and repulsed, by turns. Urged by his few remaining adherents, he bade adieu to his retreat and went to make a last appeal to the justice or sympathy of his French protector.²⁵

There seemed in fact to be still a chance in his favor. Although the treaty of Soleure had been published and celebrated in the usual manner, one of its provisions, that on which all the rest might be said to hinge, was still in abeyance. On the very day after the ratification Louis had taken possession of Saint-Quentin. He declared himself ready to restore it, and to carry out all his engagements to the letter, as soon as the constable should be given up. He was conscious of the weakness he exhibited in making such huge concessions for the sake of a mere personal gratification. "My cousin of Burgundy," he remarked, "is the wiser of the two; having got the fox, he keeps the skin for himself and leaves me only the carcass."²⁶ Yet Charles showed a strange reluctance to profit by so excellent a

²⁵ Dialogue entre Lud et Chrétien, p. 23.

²⁶ Molinet, tom. i. p. 181.

bargain. He suffered week after week to pass without giving the expected order. A French ambassador arrived to quicken his decision. It began to be feared that, after securing the prize now within his grasp, he would treat his obligations as a nullity.²⁷

A similar distrust on his own side was perhaps the chief motive of his hesitation. He required a more explicit assurance that his acquisition of Lorraine would encounter no interference while in progress nor be made the pretext of a future quarrel. It was not very palatable to Louis to give an express declaration to this effect. That which he first offered was fenced about with too many "ifs" and "buts" to be accepted. At length, on the 12th of November, he signed a document which was deemed satisfactory.²⁸

Saint-Pol, meanwhile, had undergone the tortures of a slow death. His liberty had been gradually abridged, his doors were watched day and night,²⁹ every hour brought with it some fresh omen of his impending fate. He who had spun so many webs, who had raised and baffled so many hopes, now found himself enveloped in a mesh, with no power to plot or to escape. All he could do was to turn his supplicating gaze from side to side. He addressed a petition to the king. He sent a circular to Dammartin and the other members of the Order of Saint Michael, his brothers in arms, his enemies in heart.³⁰ A fortnight later, when the matter was

²⁷ Commynes, tom. i. p. 397.

ii. p. 497.

²⁸ Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 444 et seq.

²⁹ Cabinet de Louys XI. Lenglet,

³⁰ Gachard, note to Barante, tom. i. p. 247.

already concluded, he wrote to the duke of Burgundy in the following words: "My most honored and redoubted lord, as humbly and affectionately as I can I commend myself to your good grace, which is now my only recourse, seeing the necessity into which I have fallen through having thought to do you service. As your poor retainer and kinsman, I have retired into your dominions, here to live and die, ready to be employed as you may see fit, and to spend my life and fortune on your behalf. I remember, my most honored lord, the benefits and honors bestowed upon me while I abode in your house, which gives me hope that you will not now cast me into oblivion. For I know that you would be loath to sully your honor, and also I make no doubt that you will recollect the promises you made and caused to be made to me, together with the service I rendered you on the day of Montlhéry; supplicating you most humbly, in conclusion, that my pains may not have been lost, and that you will be pleased to give credence to the bearer of this letter, whom I have charged with the representation of my sorrowful affair. Written at Mons, the 14th of November. My most honored lord, your most humble and most affectionate servant, Louis."²¹

Historians have generally stated that Saint-Pol had returned to the Burgundian territory on the security of a safe-conduct. Such indeed was the common rumor at the time,²² industriously circulated

²¹ Cabinet de Louys XL., Langlet, tom. ii. pp. 247, 248.

²² Commines mentions it as a fact, though of course only on hear-

by Charles's enemies.²² But it is utterly destitute of proof such as history requires.²⁴ It was one of several accounts all equally improbable.²⁵ It may have arisen from the fact that, a few months earlier, Saint-Pol had undoubtedly received a safe-conduct for the purpose of visiting the duke at Valenciennes.²⁶ It is at variance with the circumstances of his flight. And finally it seems to us inconsistent with the terms of the letter just quoted. Had the writer had in his possession any formal guaranty, he would not have talked vaguely of "promises made and caused to be made" to him. Whether he was entitled to use even this kind of language is excessively doubtful. We find him, after he had fallen into other hands, twisting the commonplace expressions of comfort or condolence from his jailers into assurances of safety.²⁷ His position tempted him, his character inclined him, to every kind of falsehood and equivocation. An instance in point is his effrontery in ascribing his misfortunes to his efforts to serve the duke of Burgundy.

any evidence, Basin as a rumor, but with an evident belief in its truth.

²² The Swiss intriguer, Jost von Silinen, in a letter to be noticed again hereafter, goes so far beyond necessity — to say nothing of probability — as to assert that three separate letters of safe-conduct had been given and violated.

²⁴ See the remark to this effect of a most competent judge, M. Gachard, note to Barante, tom. ii. p. 494.

²⁵ According to the version generally credited in the Netherlands, the French king had both laid the

trap and decoyed the victim into it, by inducing him to undertake a public mission to the duke of Burgundy.

²⁶ See Molnet, tom. i. p. 147. — The manner in which Commynes (tom. i. p. 392) alludes to the safe-conduct, as if it had been given some time previous to the flight, tends to confirm the suspicion that two distinct events had been confounded.

²⁷ De Troyes, Lenglet, tom. i. p. 126.

It is not the less true that his rendition has left an ineffaceable stain on Charles's reputation. Had summary justice been done upon him, it could only have been regarded as the just reward of his long career of perfidy. But the very failure to deal with him in this manner, and the delay in deciding on his fate, take away the justification. He did not suffer for his crimes against the duke; the anger that hesitated might have been appeased; his blood was made a subject of barter; and such transactions, whatever be the palliation, are odious and horrible.

On the 18th of November an order came for the prisoner's removal to Valenciennes.²⁸ Thence he was escorted to Péronne, and there delivered up to a French commission headed by the admiral and the Sire de Saint-Pierre. They were willing to spare him the ignominy of a public entry into Paris; but the gate which communicated with the Bastille being found barred, it was necessary to gain admission at a distant point. Mounted on a hackney, and enveloped in a long cape which he drew over his face, he passed through the streets in sight of a populace which held him in detestation.²⁹ No time was lost in instituting a court presided over by the Chancellor Orsini. The charges were many, the

²⁸ Gachard, note to Barante, tom. ii. p. 487. — The account given by Commynes of the constable's removal to Péronne in the custody of Hugonnet and Humbercourt, with orders for his delivery on a certain day, — Charles intending to countermand the order if Nancy should fall in

the interval, and actually sending a message to that effect, which arrived three hours too late, — is inconsistent with the documentary evidence as well as with the dates.

²⁹ De Troyes, Lenglet, tom. ii. pp. 121, 122.

proofs abundant, the confessions of the accused sufficient to remove all uncertainties. On the 19th of December he was brought before the Parliament and sentenced to death.⁴⁰ He received the announcement with surprise, like a gamester who has blinded himself to the ruin on which he has wilfully rushed.

Some hours were given him for preparation, after which he was conveyed to the Hôtel de Ville. From a window of the second story he passed by a platform to the scaffold in the Place de Grève. In front rose the mighty towers of Notre Dame. Below, the square and the adjacent streets were paved with the upturned faces of a countless multitude. With his eyes directed towards the cathedral he fell upon his knees, praying, weeping, and at times kissing the crucifix held up by the attendant priest. At last the struggle ended. He rose, stood patiently while his arms were bound behind his back, and, as if to evince his newly-gained calmness, pushed forward with his foot the cushion on which he was to kneel. The headsman, who held his office by hereditary right, was a mere stripling, and had never before exercised his functions in public. But his preparatory training had been perfect, and his self-command was greater than that of the illustrious victim. Poising the heavy sword, he brought it down with such precision and force that before the eye could follow its motion the dissevered head and trunk had rolled apart upon the scaffold.⁴¹

⁴⁰ *Procès du Connétable, Lenglet*, tom. iii. pp. 452-457.

⁴¹ *De Troyes*, pp. 125, 126. — *Molinet*, tom. i. p. 164.

The head, after being dipped in water, was held up to view. No one lamented, unless it were in secret. No act in the reign of Louis the Eleventh was more generally applauded. It was not his many treasons, it was not even his haughtiness and cruelty, that had left the constable without a friend or a mourner. It was the defect from which these had proceeded, — the boundless egotism which had led him to separate himself from every party, to aspire to solitary triumphs, to seek no accomplices even in his crimes.

On the day preceding this event a scene less tragical but more closely connected with our subject had taken place at Nancy. From the moment of opening the siege Charles had pushed it with a vigor which showed that an interruption on the side of France was the main obstacle apprehended. The walls were in good condition, the inhabitants loyally disposed, the garrison, chiefly Germans, nearly three thousand strong. But the place had none of the natural advantages which had proved so important at Neuss. Hence the approaches were made without difficulty, the fauxbourgs stormed or occupied under cover of night, intrenchments thrown up and batteries erected close to the walls. Thus tightly hemmed in, the defenders had no opportunity to sally, and their fire was soon overpowered by that of the besiegers. Without speedy relief they had no chance of holding out, and the hope of relief was extinguished by a message which is said to have

reached them from René himself. They therefore offered to capitulate. There was no motive, either of policy or sentiment, for exacting harsher conditions than had been accorded at Epinal. The surrender took place on the 26th of November. On the 30th, the day of Saint Andrew, Charles made his entrance with a pomp exceeding what he had displayed on previous occasions of the like nature.⁴⁹

Few old towns have retained less of their primitive aspect than Nancy. The broad, rectangular streets, spacious squares, splendid edifices, and other architectural embellishments, which have conferred upon it the designation of "the handsomest town in France," bear the unmistakable stamp of a great but ruthless age — the age of Louis the Fourteenth. There are scanty relics of an older period, of the Gothic towers and rich façades with which the early princes, the Raouls, the Ferrys, and the Renés, had lined the narrow, irregular streets. In the 15th century it was considered simply as a fortress. Yet its site, in the midst of an extensive plain watered by rivers and bounded by distant mountains, was suggestive of future greatness, and coupled with its central position, — central both as regarded his own dominions and the European commonwealth of states, — did not fail to produce this impression on the mind of Charles the Bold.

He wore, on his entrance, his costliest robes and a coronet garnished with diamonds and pearls. Trum-

⁴⁹ Remy, *Discours des choses advenues en Lorraine*, pp. 28-30. — Chron. anon. in Calmet, tom. v.

peters and heralds preceded him, pages and nobles sumptuously attired and superbly mounted composed his train. He went directly to the Church of Saint George, where it was customary for the sovereigns to receive their investiture. At the portal he was met by the full chapter, to whom, in accordance with usage, he presented his horse with its gorgeous caparisons. The oaths were then administered and followed by the celebration of high mass. From the church he passed into the adjoining palace, a beautiful structure, then but half finished, now more than half demolished.⁴³

During his stay of six weeks his audience chamber was open to all comers. On the 18th of December he convoked the Estates, and addressed them in a speech not ill calculated to reconcile them to a change which he ascribed to the act of Providence, and depicted as an obvious advantage to the country. He spoke of its position, which had invited constant aggression; of the inability of its native princes to protect it even against the annoyances offered by such neighbors as the bishop of Metz; of his own superior power, which had held both France and the Empire at bay.⁴⁴ Under his dominion Lorraine would become the heart of a monarchy. Nancy should be

⁴³ Remy, *Discours des choses advenues en Lorraine*, p. 32. — Huguenin jeune, p. 87 et seq. — Le page, Nancy et ses environs.

⁴⁴ "N'estiez en position que d'estre à mercy de voisins que sont puissans, et n'estoient vos ducs assez

forts que conservassent la paix en vos Pays. Ny que pussent, ainsi qu'si faict, mettre à ma l'Ost Francoise et ne crandre Monsieur l'Empereur." The allusion to Metz "et son Prestre, que n'aimés pas plus que n'aime," comes in subsequently.

his capital. He would make it his ordinary residence and the seat of his courts of justice and finance. He would enlarge and embellish it at his own charges. He would confirm and extend the privileges of his new subjects. Let them repay him by a cordial obedience and affection. After the present troubles he looked forward to "a beautiful peace," when neighboring princes, ceasing to attack him, would acknowledge his preeminence and bend to his decisions. In his absence he would leave as his representative the Sire de Bièvre, whose wisdom and gentleness were well known to them, and who would have no other care than to watch over their happiness.⁴⁵

"Nor did he use this language," says a chronicler of Lorraine, "from the mere desire to conciliate or with any intention to deceive. He uttered the veritable sentiments of his mind, founded upon just and pertinent reasons."⁴⁶ In truth he had but announced, with a confidence and frankness inspired by the occasion, that plan which had so long absorbed his thoughts and shaped his policy. He could no longer be accused of chasing a phantom. His failures in Germany and France had after all resulted in a success more legitimate and more secure than he could have gained in any other quarter. True it was but another duchy, a single province, which he had added to the list of his states. But this province was the

⁴⁵ The speech, of which very inaccurate versions are given by several writers, is printed verbatim in the *Souvenirs et Monuments de la Bataille de Nancy*, published by M. Ceyon.

⁴⁶ Hemy, *Discours des choses advenues en Lorraine*, p. 34.

natural key-stone of the arch on which he aspired to build.⁴⁷ Without Lorraine, his provinces, geographically sundered, could never become a political unit, or claim the rank of a great power. With Lorraine they formed a continuous dominion, which time would not fail to strengthen and cement, and which, skilfully wielded, would balance and control the policy of surrounding states.

The world was not slow to recognize the change in his position. Already the emperor, proclaiming that he could place no reliance on the French king and that the Burgundian princes were his natural and hereditary allies,⁴⁸ had, with the assent of the electors and through the mediation of the legate, negotiated a new treaty, not only of peace but of mutual defence.⁴⁹ On the other hand, Louis of France, who had concurred in what he considered a mere temporary adjustment, was growing nervous under the possibility of its proving to be permanent. In this case his laborious schemings would have come to nought; the emancipation of his great vassal would be complete; nothing would remain for him but to acknowledge the fact and shape his future course accordingly. He hastened to prepare for either event. He arranged a new conference, and made propositions for converting the nine years' truce into a perpetual peace. But he coupled this

⁴⁷ "Car ayant ceste petite duché, il venoit de Hollande Jacques auprès de Lyon, toujours sur luy." *Communes*, tom. i. p. 397.

⁴⁸ Letter of Frederick to the elec-

tor of Saxony, Müller, *Reichstags Theatrum*, Th. II. s. 717.

⁴⁹ Treaty in Ghmel, B. I. s. 125-130.

proposal with the condition that Charles should now at last perform that act of homage, and take that oath of fidelity, to the French crown, which he had hitherto steadfastly refused. It seemed a singular moment for preferring such a demand. Yet when it was scouted, with an intimation that no new treaty was desired by the opposite party, Louis instructed his envoys not to close the discussion, but on the contrary to seize or create occasions for keeping it alive. The point might be waived without being abandoned.⁴⁰ It would serve either as a protest, if the opportunity to insist upon it should hereafter arise, or as a ground of concession, if concession should turn out to be inevitable.

As usual, too, the advantage just obtained disclosed an avenue to still greater heights. Old King René, finding that he had no chance of bequeathing his dominions in the regular order of descent, fearing moreover to be stripped of the remnant during his own lifetime, had turned his eyes upon his persecutor's rival, with whom he opened a negotiation through the regent of Savoy.⁴¹ He offered to place Provence under the protection of the duke of Burgundy and to make the latter his heir. Such an arrangement, if carried out, would set the final seal on Charles's undertakings. It would go far to realize a project which six centuries before had been agreed upon in a famous treaty between the successors of

⁴⁰ Instructions and correspondence, in *Hist. de Bourgogne*, tom. 55 et al. iv. p. cxclviij. et seq.

⁴¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p.

Charlemagne, and which, in the four centuries that have since elapsed, has been often suggested as the best security for the peace of Europe — the establishment, namely, of a "Middle Kingdom," continuous with Germany and France, neutralizing their rivalry, embracing or sheltering whatever territory could constitute a subject of struggle or debate.

If at this epoch Charles's life had been abruptly cut short, the world would surely have said that a career pregnant with great results had come to an untimely end. Happier for him had it been so. The height to which he had climbed overlooked an abyss in which all his promise, all his greatness, were to be suddenly swallowed up. The conquest of Lorraine was the chief of his successes, and the last.

CHAPTER X.

WAR IN THE JURA; MAMONT CAMPAIGN.—SWISS CONQUEST OF
THE PAYS DE VAUD.—CHARLES CROSSES THE JURA.

1475.

WE come back to Switzerland — that land to which the feet so gladly turn, where the heart once naturalized abides forever. But it is not of you, O Mountains, O Lakes, O Beauty in which are the images of all beauty, though in your presence and beneath your spell human contentions are hushed or forgotten,—it is of them, not of you, that we must speak!

When the French king, as related in a previous chapter, had found himself compelled, despite his pacific inclinations, to engage personally in the war, he had not forgotten to give notice to his Swiss auxiliaries, requiring them to follow his example and share his dangers. Seeing that they were now actually involved in hostilities, it behooved them to act with all possible vigor. If the enemy, breaking loose from Neuss, should turn his arms against

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France, Louis earnestly entreated that the Swiss, whom he esteemed as the bravest of Christians, would come to help in the defence. Should the attack, on the other hand, be directed against Lorraine, he invited his allies to provide for its security; since he had taken the duke of Lorraine under his protection, and should consider any assistance given to that prince as a service rendered to himself. Whatever might be the scene of the conflict, he would march thither in person, ready to stake fortune and life, being firmly resolved to live and die with the Confederates, whom he regarded as his dearest friends, the most loved, the most cherished, in the whole world.¹

It appeared from all this, and from much more to the same effect,² that Louis entertained so high an opinion of the Swiss as to be perfectly willing to put them in the front of the battle, to rely upon them for his own safety, and even to devolve upon them the execution of the promises he had made to his weaker allies.

Simultaneously with this message, another, scarcely less flattering, came from a different quarter. By their repeated refusals to join either in the grand crusade for the salvation of the Empire or in the minor expeditions projected by their Alsatian neigh-

¹ "Er wol ouch sin lip und gut darzu setzen und in eigner person daran ziehen und bi den H. den Eidgenossen als seinen allerliebsten frunden die er fur die tuersten aller welt achte leben und sterben."

Handlung des Künigs von Frankreich mit den Eidgenossen, Girard MSS.

² "Mit vil me fruntlichen trefflichen Worten." Ibid.

bors, the Swiss had brought themselves into general disrepute with the German people. "They yield no obedience to the emperor," it was said; "they draw pay from France, from Austria, from all their allies, and render no assistance in return."³ Sigismund had addressed a long complaint on the subject to the French king. He acknowledged that, as the servant and pensionary of Louis, he was bound to give constant annoyance to Burgundy, and that he had authorized his ambassadors to promise as much. But this was on the assurance that he would have the support of the Swiss. He had, however, called upon them in vain. On his own account, as well as on that of the king, he would gladly undertake some operations; but he could do nothing without the Swiss, and the Swiss would do nothing without pay. For himself he had no more money to bestow upon them; and he must therefore be excused from any further exertions, unless Louis would furnish him with the means.⁴

A contribution for the same object was demanded of the Austrian subjects in Alsace and in the bishopric of Constance. Those of the former region, being exposed to the dangers of invasion, offered to take the matter into consideration. But the more remote communities, which, without having any direct interest in the war, had simply joined in it at the summons of their feudal superiors, raised an indignant outcry. "Let the Swiss do as we do!" was their

³ Knebel, *late Abth.* s. 164, 216.

⁴ Chmel, *B. I.* s. 285-287.

reply. "We risk our own lives; we defray our own expenses. We will not, in addition, pay others for fighting, whose duties and obligations are the same as ours."⁵

Basel, Strasburg, and other members of the Lower League were greatly disturbed by this state of affairs. It was indispensable to them that the alliance which had emboldened them to begin the war should be firmly maintained—that all the parties to it should appear to be embarked in a common cause. They sent therefore a fresh appeal, coupled with an offer of ten thousand florins.⁶ They asked for at least some token, however faint, of interest and activity. Let the Swiss, it was suggested, send a thousand men, if no more, to the imperial army, as a proof that they acknowledged the emperor's authority.⁷

A diet empowered to decide upon this application assembled at Lucerne on the 7th of June. The subject was brought forward by Berne. Heretofore this canton had been foremost in opposing propositions like the present. After using the imperial summons and the Austrian alliance as engines for impelling the Confederacy into the war, it had striven, as we have seen, to turn the power thus called into play in a wholly different direction, and use it for the accomplishment of plans more consonant with the real motives of the instigators. But all its arts and

⁵ "Wir setzen auch Leib und Gut auf Spiel; . . . die Schweizer . . . sollen Pflicht und Dienst thungleich uns, . . . Ihnen etwas zu sehen, ist nicht unser Wille." Knebel, 1ste

Abth. s. 154.

⁶ Girard MSS.

⁷ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 536.

endeavors had signally failed; and, by its wilful and independent course, Berne had lost much of its influence with its Confederates, increased their dissatisfaction with the new and alien policy imposed upon them, and inclined them to embrace opportunities of retracing their steps. In order to prevent this result and give a new impetus to the movement, Berne now swerved round, declared itself in favor of a project it had formerly opposed, and urged a variety of reasons in its favor. The claims of the Holy Roman Empire, the "high summons" of his imperial majesty and the "great pleasure" he would feel in finding himself obeyed, the common interests of the "German nation," and the probable benefits to all the parties concerned, were elaborately set forth. The French king, it was announced, had opened the campaign in person, had already captured forty-four places in Burgundy and Picardy, and had recommended that the Swiss should also take the field, assuring them that they would find their account in it.^a

Lucerne, as was to have been expected, voted with Berne; as did also Freyburg and Solothurn, whose representatives had on this occasion been admitted to seats. But here the list of the assenting voices stopped. Six cantons, headed by Zurich,—which had always maintained closer and more cordial relations with the Empire than any of the rest,—negatived the request, on the simple ground that the treaties they had entered into did not bind them to

^a Girard MSS.—Eidgenössische Abchiede, B. II. s. 544.

compliance. What they were actually bound to they would perform, but nothing more. Before the meeting closed intelligence arrived that the siege of Neuss had been raised, leaving the Burgundian army at liberty for other enterprises. Hereupon the deputies consented to refer to their constituents for fresh instructions. A week later they again met, but only to reiterate the same decision in still more emphatic terms. "The people had no wish to engage in such expeditions; they were too poor; they were not obliged to do it either by the treaty with France or by their contracts with Austria and the allied towns."⁹

It must be confessed that there was something disingenuous in this mode of treating the matter. It might be strictly true that the French treaty did not oblige the Swiss to send troops into the field. But from what motive could they suppose Louis to have selected them as objects of his liberality? On the other hand, it should be remembered that the share received by the dissentient cantons afforded no adequate compensation for the service demanded. Berne and Lucerne, which were so much more largely paid, and whose aristocratic rulers were at once the private recipients of a separate bounty and the irresponsible controllers of the public action, took naturally a more honorable view of their obligations.

Meanwhile the tidings from Neuss, received with such indifference by the Swiss, had excited in Alsace

⁹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 544, 551.

a feeling of alarm, which increased in intensity as the Burgundian army began to pour into Lorraine. The cowardice and treachery of the emperor were bitterly inveighed against. What mattered it that the enemy had relinquished his hold in one quarter, if he had been left free to make his approaches with greater ease and security in another? Conferences were held. A long memorial, filled with reproaches and appeals, was transmitted to Frederick. Succors were sent to René, who had been so basely deceived, and whose downfall would leave the Rhineland completely exposed. The cities separately began their preparations for defence. Strasburg, in particular, determined to level all its suburbs and exterior buildings, including several large and venerable monasteries, and to surround itself with a huge ditch, to be connected by a canal with the Rhine.¹⁰

The danger, however, was still remote. By way of employing the interval, and crippling as far as possible the enemy's resources, arrangements were made for a new expedition into Upper Burgundy. After so many fruitless efforts, it seemed idle to ask the coöperation of the Swiss. "If they will not join us," said Basel in a tone of solemn desperation, "let us resolve in the name of God to go forward without them!"¹¹ At the last moment, however, Basel itself began to falter;¹² and a final attempt was made to secure at

¹⁰ Chmel, B. I. s. 203-204. — Strobel, B. III. s. 342 et seq.

¹¹ Rathsbuch, ap. Ochs, B. IV. s. 290.

¹² "Es wolle uns bedünken rath-

sam und nothwendig zu seyn, die Eidsgenossen von neuem zu bitten, dass sie den Heerrug mit wollen helfen thun." Ibid. s. 291.

least a semblance of aid from those whose presence could alone inspire confidence. Strasburg despatched a message to Berne, offering pay for four hundred men, and promising its "eternal gratitude" if this small number should be sent. All that was wanted, the envoy stated, was the *name* of the Confederates, accustomed as they were to strike their enemies with terror at their mere approach and by the renown of their invincible valor." Berne not only acceded to the request, but promised an additional number at its own cost. While the levy was in progress Adrian von Bubenberg reappeared in his place in the executive council, and brought forward some proposals for a negotiation, such as the six cantons had shown a willingness to entertain. Diesbach, who was again to take command in the field, thought it advisable not to leave home without extinguishing these embers of disaffection. Resolutions were passed enjoining upon Bubenberg to absent himself from the council during the further continuance of the war, to divulge none of the secrets relative to the formation of the French treaty, and to hold no intercourse with subjects of Burgundy. His demand to be allowed to plead his own cause before the larger council, consisting of two hundred privileged burghers, was summarily rejected.¹³

On the following day, the 17th of July, Diesbach started on his expedition. Could he have foreseen the result to himself, he might have thought that the voice he had stifled was that of his better angel. He

¹³ Schilling, s. 188.

et seq. — Rodt, B. I. s. 430.

¹⁴ Valerius Anshelm, B. I. s. 118

took with him about thirteen hundred men, including a few from Freyburg and Solothurn. Five hundred from Lucerne, who had accepted the pay of Basel, joined him on his arrival at the latter place. He found the allies already on the march. Strasburg had furnished two thousand of its own people, besides some of the enormous cannon for which it was famed among its neighbors. The whole force may have amounted to ten thousand men. Count Oswald von Thierstein, landvogt of Alsace, though hardly less unpopular than Hagenbach had been, held the nominal command.¹⁵

The scene of operations was the same as in the first expedition — the ridges connecting the Jura with the Vosges and affording the easiest means of passage between the Alsatian plain and that of Franche-Comté. Scattered over the rugged surface, which is cloven by narrow vales and sparkling rivers, lay many little towns, each with its grim old castle, overlooking a route on which the tide of invasion had flowed back and forth from the earliest times. The garrisons were very inadequate to the present need, having been lately thinned off by the count of Blamont, governor of the province and himself the chief proprietor in this part of it, for the purpose of making head against the French on the opposite frontier.

Less than a fortnight sufficed for the capture of several of these places — Pont-de-Roide, L'Isle, Clermont, and half a dozen others. Massacre and sack

¹⁵ Schilling. — Strobel. — Tillier. — Knebel.

were the usual concomitants. At L'Isle on the Doubs the terrified inhabitants strove to emerge by a rearward gate while the storm was going on in front. A party of Swiss, who stood on the opposite bank, stripped off their clothes, tied their spears across their shoulders, and having swum the river, charged the fugitives and drove them back into the thick of the slaughter.¹⁶

Blamont, the principal fortress of this region, strong by position as well as art, proved a much less easy conquest. The garrison numbered only four hundred; but the castle, perched on the edge of a precipice, whence its gilded turrets flashed across the valley of the Doubs, commanded all the approaches; while the town was further protected by a massive wall and towers. After a cannonade of several days the assault was delivered on the 4th of August. Besides keeping up a shower of missiles, the defenders resorted to an expedient which had at least the merit of originality. Swarms of bees, loosely enveloped in linen cloths, were dropped on the heads of the assailants, compelling them to let go their weapons and guard their eyes. At the end of four hours, having sustained a heavy loss and failed in all their attempts, they retired in despair.¹⁷

This check, in conjunction with other circumstances, threatened to put an end to the campaign. Dissensions had already broken out among the leaders, and Thierstein, after a violent quarrel with Diesbach,

¹⁶ Schilling, s. 191 — Letter of corns. *M.S.* (Archives of Lucerne.)
Diesbach to the council of Lu- ¹⁷ Schilling, s. 197.

had withdrawn privately from the camp.¹¹ The troops generally, but especially the Swiss, hated the tediousness of siege operations, which in the present instance were rendered more irksome by the state of the weather. The August of this year seems to have been singularly unpropitious to military enterprise. On the distant plains of Picardy, it had disguised itself, as we have seen, to the English mind, as the forerunner of winter. Here, on the contrary, the extreme sultriness of the atmosphere had engendered a pestilence, such as had raged in Alsace in the summer of the preceding year, under the name of "cholera." It was noticed as a characteristic of the attacks, that they usually proved fatal within twelve hours.¹² In the case of its most distinguished victim, the disease ran a less rapid course. While before L'Isle, Diesbach had received a kick in the thigh from a refractory horse. Although his subsequent exertions were evidently injurious, he could not be induced to allow himself necessary repose. Alone he had struggled against the general depression. His own men he had encouraged with the hope of soon encountering an enemy in the open field; while he gave a promise to the others, who would not have found this prospect so consoling, to send for reinforcements from Berne. In a long letter to the council of Lucerne, written on the 31st of July, he characteristically described his relations with the other chiefs, and his parting with Thierstein, as amicable

¹¹ Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 166-168. B. II. s. 281, 282.

— Letters from the camp, in Blasch, ¹² Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 74.

in the extreme, and urged upon his countrymen, as members of the Holy Empire, to join in a crusade for the preservation of Lorraine.²⁰ Meanwhile his system had been gradually sinking, and he was now attacked by the prevailing disorder. At his own request he was transported to the episcopal residence at Pruntrut, where three days afterwards he expired, in the forty-fifth year of his age.²¹

If the world is not familiar with his career, this must be attributed to the secrecy of his actions, not to their insignificance. No Swiss statesman has ever exercised a greater influence on the destinies of his country. He guided it out of the haven where it was securely moored into the broad and stormy ocean of European history. Yet none of the glory of its subsequent exploits has been reflected back upon his name, which is remembered only in connection with the venality and the servitude he had fastened upon a free and high-spirited people. By his family and friends it seems to have been imagined that this act would itself form his title to renown. A tablet above his tomb, in the church of Saint Vincent, recorded the fact that he was the author of the French alliance and the pension system. "An inscription worthy of the deed!" exclaims an indignant chronicler of Berne, writing early in the next century; "among the Athenians his memory would have been publicly dishonored, like that of

²⁰ This is one of the very few Lucerne.

letters of Diesbach extant, and probably the last which he wrote.

It is preserved in the Archives of

²¹ Schilling, s. 200. — Tiller, l. II. s. 243.

the traitor who brought the gold of Xerxes into Greece."²²

His colleagues at home raised a loud lamentation over their loss, and received from some of their neighbors messages of condolence. At the court of Savoy, on the contrary, the event gave rise to rejoicings. It was there anticipated that Diesbach's death would involve the overthrow of his policy.²³ Had it happened somewhat earlier, such would probably have been the result. But the whole council was now penetrated with his views and animated with his zeal; the ship was in full career; and helmsmen trained under his instructions, his cousin William and Scharnachthal in particular, stood ready to supply his place. The latter had already been appointed to command the new levies, amounting to twenty-five hundred men. He waited only for the interment of his friend before taking his departure. On the way he learned that Blamont had already fallen. The pestilence, a foe more potent than even the Swiss, had effected an entrance, and carried off most of the garrison, including the commandant. Having called a parley, the townspeople accepted an offer of a free exit with their personal effects. As soon as the booty, including an immense amount of corn, had been secured, the walls were undermined, the torch was applied, and the whole place laid in ruins.²⁴

Scharnachthal, on his arrival, found the army pre-

²² Valerius Anshelm, B. I. s. 121.

²³ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 200, 203, 221.

²⁴ Schilling, s. 201-204. — Wursten, s. 445. — Knebel, 1ste Abth. s. 163. — Tillier, B. II. s. 244.

paring to disband. He succeeded by dint of persuasion in retaining a sufficient number to finish up the work which had been begun. Accordingly the remainder of the month of August and the first half of September were spent in a fresh series of captures, in which the daring and the cruelty of the victors were equally conspicuous. The country north and south of the Ougnon and the Doubs, and westward to the foot of the slopes, was thoroughly devastated. The strong castle of Grammont having been taken by storm, the survivors of the garrison, a hundred or more in number, were found kneeling around two or three priests, making their preparations for death. Without a moment's pause, the work of slaughter went on, and heads with the half-uttered confession on the lips, rolled at the feet of the priests. At length the devouring pestilence, which had followed the conquerors on their march, put an end to the campaign.²⁸

In these butcheries and ravages, Berne had borne a conspicuous part, yet simply with the view of keeping alive the war, or, in its own phrase, the "practice against Burgundy." Those which, after a short breathing-space, it set on foot in a different quarter, had a further and more particular motive.

Its attitude towards Savoy had undergone no change. It had neither retracted its demands nor carried out its threats. This forbearance, though trumpeted by the council as an example of singular generosity, had in fact proceeded from the continued

²⁸ Schilling, s. 206 et seq.—Girard MSS.

opposition of Freyburg, whose hearty adherence, in all its measures, had grown more essential to Berne in proportion as still nearer allies showed themselves jealous or cold.

Yolande, meanwhile, in daily expectation of the menaced blow, found herself in a state of pitiable helplessness. The preparations she attempted to make served only to display the inadequacy of her strength. The champion in whom she had put her trust was still far distant, and every fresh rumor of his approach was followed by fresh disappointment. Before the world she still bore herself bravely. But in private the weakness of the woman, of the mother, of the female politician whose delicate fabric of intrigue one rude touch had swept away, could not be controlled. When alone in her chamber, or with a few confidential attendants, she fell into fits of silent weeping, or gave way to bursts of passionate lament.²⁶

Without proclaiming war, Berne had the means of making the weight of its hand continually felt. It occupied the mountain passes, and seized upon Aigle and other places in the Valais, under the pretext of military necessity.²⁷ Neighbors, dependants, even subjects of Savoy, — the counts of Bresse and Gruyères, the peasantry of the Simmenthal, the bishop and people of Sion, — yielded to the ascendancy of Berne, and were made the instruments of its policy.²⁸

²⁶ *Dépêches Milanaïses*, tom. i. pp. 120, 121 et al. — *Chroniques de Yolande*, and *Menabré*, append.

²⁷ *Girard MSS.* — *Deutsch Mis-*
siven-Buch C, 544 et al. *MS.*

²⁸ *Instructions in Deutsch Mis-*
siven-Buch C, 552. *MS.* — *Dépêches*
Milanaïses, tom. i. p. 331 et seq.
— *Rodt*, *Die Grafen von Greysen*.

It carried on a long series of efforts, baffled finally by the superior cunning of Rome, to establish one of its own creatures, a certain Burkhard Störr, on the episcopal throne of Lausanne, to which the greater part of Western Helvetia, Berne itself included, owed spiritual obedience.³⁹ In another quarter its manoeuvres were more successful. The bishop of Sion, dragged along, as he frankly avowed, against his personal wishes,⁴⁰ signed, on the 10th of September, a treaty with Berne of mutual aid and defence against Savoy,⁴¹ and being thus guaranteed against the possible consequences to himself, permitted his subjects to open hostilities, gratify their own thirst for plunder, and create a preliminary diversion in favor of their instigator and ally.

There is nothing to show that Berne had originally gone into the war with any ideas of conquest. But in the progress of the war a taste for conquest had been acquired. It would not have been strange if the feeling had existed in a stronger degree than was actually the case. Berne, from its position and its institutions, might naturally have aspired to a wider range of action than the other cantons. It was the first in population and extent of territory. It could send, on an emergency, twenty thousand men into the field, Lucerne only nine thousand, the

³⁹ The details of this complex and interminable affair, of which the upshot was sufficiently amusing, are told with characteristic minuteness by Ruchat, in his manuscript *Histoire des troubles dans le diocèse de Lausanne*. (Stadt-Bibliothek,

Berne.) See also the *Conservateur Suisse*, tom. xii.

⁴⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 232.

⁴¹ *Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. 3. 560.

smaller cantons not more than three or four thousand each. The chief town, instead of lying close beneath the shelter of overhanging mountains, looked forth from its river-enfolded eminence over valley and plain, the snow-clad Alps rising on the horizon, less like the solid works of Nature than miraculous phantoms. The main street, wider than most thoroughfares at that period and running the whole length of the peninsula, was already becoming lined with stately edifices²² erected with the gold of France — the residences of men who governed the state and whose acquaintance with the affairs of nations and courts served as a spring to ambition. The places captured in the second campaign, — Grandson, Orbe, Jougne, and others, — though nominally held by the four states which had taken part in the conquest, were virtually subject to Berne alone. Besides serving as military posts, from which almost weekly forays were made into Franche-Comté, they furnished opportunities for the practice of statesmanship. Under the new rule the people were governed not so much by their native codes and customs as by a despotic will. The landvogts appointed by the government of Berne decided their lawsuits, at least in the last resort, and compelled them to labor on fortifications designed to keep out their former rulers.²³ The growing pleasure inspired by this exercise of authority is unconsciously expressed in

²² Alberti de Bonstetten *Descriptio Helvetiæ*, Mittheilungen der Antiqu. Gesellschaft in Zürich, B. III. — The author was born about 1445, and the dedication of his work to Louis XI. is dated 1481.

²³ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 553, 557 et al.

the letters of the council, which speak at first of "the conquered lands," then of "our conquered lands," and finally, as if these places had been incorporated with the canton, simply of "our lands."

But the way to these lands, almost from the walls of Berne, lay through foreign territory — territory weakly guarded, it is true, and closed in the background by the Jura. Along the summit of those ridges lay the "natural boundary" of Berne.* The basin of Léman, as an integral portion of Helvetia, was plainly destined to fall under Swiss rule. The present government, it was clear, existed only on sufferance — an anomalous tenure, by which no power can be permanently held. Yet its violent displacement must, under the actual circumstances, wear an odious aspect. It would be as if a city should make war upon its suburbs, as if the shepherd should harry his sheep. The Pays de Vaud was under the protection of Berne. In other words, Berne had pledged its honor not to attack or permit others to attack it. Then too the towns had old alliances with Berne, and had evinced their friendliness by constant good offices. The people were pacific in their habits, tranquil and industrious under the mildest rule[†] and amid the loveliest scenery of Europe.

It is true that in the more distant places, which had witnessed the subjugation of their neighbors and found cause to tremble for their own security, Berne had already come to be regarded not as the shepherd

* See the remarks of Rodt, B.L. n. 511.

† See Verdel, Hist. du Canton de Vaud, tom. I. p. 231.

but as the wolf. A pretext for hostilities was evidently sought for.³⁶ Let the once clear stream be muddied, and the blame, as well as the penalty, would be sure to fall upon the weaker party.

About the middle of October Berne began a series of letters addressed to its Confederates and allies, vaunting the magnanimity and good faith of its dealings with Savoy, and especially with the count of Romont, and denouncing the black ingratitude by which its patience had been at last exhausted. In addition to its standing griefs—the passage of the Italian recruits and the position of Romont in the Burgundian service—it cited some recent and more direct proofs of malevolence. One of its officers, sent with an escort on a tour of inspection up the valley of the Orbe, had been waylaid and maltreated by some soldiers of the garrison of Les Clées. A party of Nuremberg traders, allies of Berne, had been arrested and despoiled of their goods, while passing through the Pays de Vaud on their way to Lyons. Worst of all, according to a report which had just been received, the count of Romont had secretly returned to his dominions, and was now at Yverdun, stirring up the people against the Swiss, and concocting plans for expelling them from the conquered places.³⁷

³⁶ On this point all who have really investigated the matter are agreed. "Solche Anlässe," remarks Bleich, "waren den Bernern erwünscht um sich . . . die ganze Waadt in ihre Hände zu bringen." *Geschichte der Stadt Biel*, B. II. s. 283. And see Rodt, B. I. s. 511.

³⁷ Letters to Lucerne, to the Confederates exclusive of Lucerne, to the bishop of Sion, to Rudolph of Hochberg, to Basel, &c., *Deutsch-Missiven-Buch C*, 570-585. *MS.*—Instructions to envoys sent to the French king, Zellweger, *Beilage* xxix.—Schilling, s. 321 et seq.

On each of these points Savoy could have given a strong, perhaps a conclusive, reply.³⁰ But Berne wanted no reply. It asked, it waited, for none. On the 14th of the same month, before its complaints had even been promulgated,³¹ it declared war against the count of Romont, having first secured the adhesion of Freyburg by earnest entreaties, coupled with a promise not to invade the other dominions of Savoy.³² It also drew up, but without venturing to issue it, a similar missive in the name of the Confederacy,³³ while most of the cantons were still in complete ignorance of its intentions

³⁰ The promptness of the Savoyard authorities in punishing the violence at Les Clées is acknowledged by Schilling (s. 223), though he complains that only some of the wrong-doers, and those not the most prominent, were executed. That the arrest of the Nuremberg merchants, which led Commines (*tom. ii. p. 10*) and those who have followed him to say that the war had its origin in the seizure of "a cart-load of sheep-skins," was a perfectly legitimate act under regulations which had been sanctioned by the Swiss themselves, has been conclusively shown by M. de Gingins (*Épisodes des Guerres de Bourgogne, p. 176 et seq.*). With regard to Yverdon, it appears from the account of Etterlin (*Cronica, fol. 80 verso*) that he, with some of his command, had gone to that town to purchase wine for the garrison of Jougne, and that, owing to the excitement against his countrymen, they were forced to decamp without

effecting their object. The notion which Etterlin helped to disseminate, that the count of Romont had arrived, seems to have had as little foundation as the common statement of the Swiss chroniclers, followed by M. de Barante and other modern writers, that Romont held the post of governor of Franche-Comté, and that he had commanded the Burgundian troops at Héricourt. Rumer had confounded him with the count of Blamont.

³¹ The first letter on the subject was addressed to Lacorne, and bears date the 11th; the next—to the Confederacy—is dated "Donnerstag nach Dionysius [Oct. 12] in the night." One to the bishop of Sion was written on the next day. The others were all written subsequently to the declaration of war.

³² Schilling, s. 224. — Rodt, B. I. s. 811.

³³ *Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 576.*

and proceedings. Early in the morning of the same day — consequently before the hostile notice could have gone forth, much less have reached its destination — the first levy of troops, under command of Petermann von Wabern, a prominent member of the council, left the town by the west gate, from which the road led straight to Morat.

Precautions were taken to insure secrecy on the march. At Gümminen, twelve miles from Berne and six from Morat, the party halted till evening in the wooded gorge of the Saane, the boundary between the two states. Late at night, under a pelting rain, which favored their object, they arrived before the walls and demanded entrance. The inhabitants were overwhelmed with surprise. For a century and a half Morat had been leagued with Berne by the closest ties of alliance, and but two years ago the treaty had been for the fourth time solemnly renewed. In darkness and confusion the people, men and women, collected in the square, and debated what answer to give. If properly defended, the town, one of the strongest in the Helvetian territory, might defy an attack from any ordinary force. On one side it was protected by its lake with a palisade extending far into the water, on the others by a castle and walls which in older times had resisted the power of the Austrian emperors, and which had been recently rebuilt with a care attested by the still existing masonry. But, besides that there was no regular garrison, the lower class of the population consisted mainly of settlers from the adjacent cantons. These,

having perhaps been tampered with beforehand, clamored against the folly of resistance. The party outside, having meanwhile been joined by the Freyburg contingent, which had come by the way of Laupen, began to grow impatient. Another message was sent in, stating that the hour and weather admitted of no long parley, promising fair treatment if surrender were made, and threatening the worst in case of a refusal. A vote was immediately taken, and dread of the Swiss spears, or a desire for Swiss rule, prevailed with the majority. Yet among the more substantial citizens, loyally attached to the house of Savoy and not of German extraction, there was a deep feeling of rage and mortification. The burgo-master, Richard Rossel, dropped dead from excitement. The commandant, Humbert de Lavignier, mounted his horse, calling out, "Make way there, you who mean to surrender! God forb.d that I should deny my prince!" and as the gate was thrown open, rode forth between the ranks of the incoming foe and sped through the tempest to Avenches.*

On the next day, Sunday, while the mass-bells were sounding across the lake and along the hillsides, the invaders pursued their march. The alarm had now preceded them. Before they had passed the "lone wall and lonelier column" that attest the extent and splendor of the ancient Aventicum, the

* Engelhard, *Murtten Chronik* und Bürgerbuch, s. 51, 52. — Schilling, s. 226, 227. — *Chronique des Chanoines de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*, B. VIII. s. 237 et seq.

Roman capital of Helvetia, deputies from the little town that lies within those precincts and retains the name met them with offers of submission. Stopping only to exact a contribution of food, they pushed forward five miles farther to Payerne, the burial-place of Queen Bertha, traditional foundress of unnumbered abbeys and towns, female Alfred of the ancient Burgundian populations. This too was immediately surrendered; and here a halt was made to give time for additional troops to arrive, detachments being sent in the interval to capture some castles in the vicinity. On the 17th the march was resumed, across the breezy table-land that stretches to the Lake of Neuchâtel and dips abruptly to the shore. The lofty bank conceals the town of Estavayer, which hangs upon the steep slope — a quaint heap of ancient houses and ruined castles, containing some seventeen hundred souls. At the time of which we write the population seems to have been considerably larger; and as it consisted chiefly of weavers, whose cloth was in demand throughout the neighboring region, the place was reputed very active and flourishing. The municipal registers of the period are still extant; but six sheets, instead of containing a record of the events we are about to relate, have been left vacant. The scribe whose duty it was had not the heart to fill that ominous blank.

Three castles, and a wall with bulwarks completely surrounding the town, gave it an appearance of strength. Besides the able-bodied male inhabitants, numbering a thousand or more, there was a garrison

of three hundred militiamen from Nyon. The commandant, Claude d'Estavayer, was descended, as his name implied, from the founders of the place, and still exercised the rights of a co-seigneur in conjunction with Romont, to whom he had written, on the 16th, announcing the enemy's approach and asking for reinforcements. He added that, in any event, the shameful treason enacted at Morat would not be repeated here.⁴³ Riding through the streets, he exhorted the people to bear themselves manfully, threatening death to whoever should talk of yielding. A summons sent forward by the Swiss leaders was scornfully rejected.

But the spirit thus displayed was not of a kind to avail against Swiss valor and resolution. Some men of Payerne, well acquainted with the localities, had been brought along as guides; and under cover of a fire from the arquebusiers the works and approaches were diligently scanned. The halberdiers made a rush at one of the gates, and, hewing away some obstructions, began to smite the door with their sharp and ponderous axes. Another party, passing round unobserved through groves and gardens, gained the margin of the lake and crept along beneath the wall. Hanging from the ramparts they detected some ropes, affixed with the purpose of lowering goods, or perhaps if necessary of effecting a retreat, to vessels moored below. With the help of these a few of the Swiss climbed to the top and speedily drew up their comrades. The shout of *Stäfs gewonnen!* — "Estavayer gained!" —

⁴³ Girard MSS.

from the rearward side startled the defenders and diverted their attention from the gate. It was soon broken in; the whole army came running up and poured through the breach.

A massacre ensued, exceeding in atrocity what the world was too familiar with on such occasions. Every living thing that came in the way fell beneath halberd or sword. The houses were ransacked for fresh victims. The commandant, with a hundred and fifty of the garrison, had betaken himself to one of the castles. It was speedily stormed, and no prayer for mercy or offer of ransom was listened to. Another castle was fired, and the occupants were stifled, crushed, or burned to death. It was not the rage of vengeance or fanaticism that inspired these cruelties, but simply the lurking savagery of human nature, ever ready to burst its bounds and to exhibit its kindred with the wolf. The executioner of Berne, armed with his sword of office, was seen going from street to street, searching among the heaps of slain, and when he found a body in which life was not extinct, pulling it out and deliberately laying it in a convenient posture to chop off the head. From this employment he was at last called away to a more regular exercise of his functions. Ten or twelve soldiers, subjects of Lausanne, had been dragged from a cellar; and these he was ordered to take out upon the lake and drown. A rope was given him with which to tie them together, and a crowd of soldiers, chiefly youths, pushed out in boats to witness the sport. He performed his task so un-

skilfully that several of the victims, after being submerged, got loose and struggled to the bank. A yell of disappointment and contempt arose; and some of the spectators, whose wantonness and audacity are properly censured by the official chronicler of Berne, standing on the gunwales of the boats, impaled the bungling miscreant with their spears, and lifting his carcass aloft, tossed it off into the water.*

About thirteen hundred persons perished, most of them in the slaughter, the rest while endeavoring to escape in over-crowded boats. The survivors were nearly all women and children, who, having avoided the first fury of the massacre, were left unharmed when it had begun to subside. At night they ventured forth to collect their dead, brought them into the churches and laid them on the pavement. The dismal wailing of the poor bereaved creatures drowned the tumult without, terrifying the murderers, some of whom were fain to go among them and offer money by way of reparation or condolence. Others were already too busy with the work of plunder to spare even a moment's breath in a prayer for the souls they had sent so swiftly to their account.⁴⁵ In

* The manuscript of Schilling's work — a beautiful vellum folio preserved in the Library of Berne — contains a picture of this scene. The attitudes are ludicrously impossible. There are many other illustrations in the volume, vividly colored and not without historical value. Before being deposited among the civic treasures, the manuscript was read before the council,

in order that "nothing but the bare truth" — or rather nothing that it might be inconvenient to make public — should appear in it.

⁴⁵ Schilling was not one of this class, he is liberal with such ejaculations. Our other authority, the cold-blooded canon of Neuchâtel, contents himself with his usual reflection, that it was all owing to the madness and presumption of

accordance with the established rule, it was ordered that the booty should be collected into a common pile. But those who had been foremost or luckiest refused to disgorge, and the leaders found their private advantage in not insisting on compliance. There was far more, however, than could be removed by the soldiery, and the heavier articles became the prey of those who flocked like vultures from far and near. A whole fleet of vessels arrived from Neuchâtel and went back fully freighted. Freyburg, ambitious of succeeding to the position of Estavayer as a manufacturing town, sent a hundred wagons to carry off the looms. The sack lasted until every building was completely cleared. An intention existed of destroying the walls; but this was finally deemed too laborious an undertaking, and the surviving male inhabitants were summoned to take an oath of fidelity to the Swiss authorities. The number, including priests, that appeared, after a careful search had been instituted, fell short of twenty.⁴⁶

The story of these events, fresh from the lips of eye-witnesses and accompanied with details that have not been handed down,⁴⁷ sent a shock through the

the inhabitants in attempting to

⁴⁶ Schilling, s. 228-232.—*Chronique des Chanoines de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*, B. VIII. 243-247.—There is a tradition at Estavayer, according to which the present inhabitants of the place are descended from half a dozen young boys, who succeeded in escaping across the lake to Grandson. This

is not very probable: yet there are indications that Estavayer for a long time afterwards had little intercourse with other places. It still retains the ancient creed, while surrounded by Protestant neighbors.

⁴⁷ The contemporary Swiss chroniclers were not inclined to perpetuate the memory of this transaction. Etterlin and Edlibach are significantly silent in regard to it, while

population of the adjacent countries, whether hostile or friendly to the actors. The "bad day of Estavayer" was long remembered; and a heavy calamity that a few months later befell Berne was looked upon even there as the work of a retributive justice. When the first accounts came to hand, the council, appalled, and not unconscious of their own responsibility, wrote to the commanders in a strain more creditable than that of their customary effusions. "We learn," they said, "from a public and widespread report, that, after the capture of Estavayer, the greatest barbarities were practised by our men, violence being done even to priests, aged persons, convents, churches, and holy things; which troubles our hearts more deeply than it is possible to express, when we remember that our fathers always abstained from such deeds, punishing with the greatest severity any who were guilty of them, and thereby insured to themselves honor, safety, and success. We therefore beseech you, as you respect the principles and customs that have been handed down to us, and desire that the merciful protection of the Almighty and of the heavenly host may continue to shield us, not to suffer such inhuman cruelties as must draw upon us the vengeance of God; and, when words will not avail for restraint, that you will proceed to acts of exemplary punishment."⁴⁸ The answer has not been

Schilling of Lucerne frankly states that he is unwilling to write the particulars, adding, however, the just reflection that "such things will happen where there is no order

or fear of God." (Schweizer-Chronik, n. 72.)

⁴⁸ Deutsch Missionen-Buch C, 589. MS.

preserved; but its effect, if not its purport, may be read in the altered tone of the rejoinder. "Your letter of yesterday," wrote the council on the 24th, "has acquainted us with what took place at the capture of Estavayer in regard to churches, ecclesiastics, shrines, and so forth. We perceive that what we wrote has been taken differently from what we in the sincerity of our good will had intended. Our meaning, certainly, was not to cast any reproach upon you, whose wisdom and reverence for God we well knew, but merely to touch upon the disorderliness that might exist among the mass of the common people, not imbued with your sentiments, but conducting themselves as we have seen them on previous occasions."⁴⁸

This retreat in timidity and confusion, produced, as is evident, by a sharp and angry retort, shows how the basis of order and authority among the Swiss was getting shaken by events. From the beginning of the war there had been constant laments over the insubordination of the troops, and their reckless maltreatment of friends as well as foes. The despatches to and from the camp are filled with such complaints and with proofs of their correctness. Poor people from the rural districts, alike of subject and of alien territory, came daily to Berne to seek redress

⁴⁸ "Verstän daruo das unerr
schriften nitt also gewirkt als sie
über us unerr getruwen gemüten
gangen sind, dann unser meining
nitt ist gewiss uch die wir hochwiss
und nitt aller cristenlicher gotfercht
begaben wussten dheinswegs zu be-

laden, aber dabi zu beruren das vil-
licht ettlich ungezengt ludi, die
dann in solicher menge nitt euer
neigung sind, sunder werden als wir
ettlicher ander zit gesehen haben."

Ibid. 395. *MS.*

for the robberies and other injuries they had sustained. More than once the matter had been brought before the diet.⁶⁰ At a later period, when the mischief had risen to a head that imperilled the existence of the Confederacy, its source was better understood. So long as the Swiss were fighting for a cause, the general sentiment of the people had prompted and enforced a stringent discipline. But the present war, through the very motives which its instigators had aroused, was sapping the virtue that had ennobled the rudeness of the national character. Traditional principles had been cast aside, and it was idle for the government of Berne to appeal to memories which it had set the example of desecrating.

Before leaving Estavayer the army was further reenforced by the contingent of Solothurn. While the main force proceeded along the lake towards Yverdon, at the southern extremity, a strong detachment occupied the region between Freyburg and Lausanne, a rolling country, sprinkled with little towns whose battlements and towers still greet the eye like the illuminations of a mediæval chronicle.⁶¹ Moudon, the chief town, Rue, Romont, and others,

⁶⁰ Deutch Missiven-Buch C, 432, 807, 890, 603 et al. *MS.* — Rathsbuch. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) — Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. 2. 536.

⁶¹ There is probably no part of Europe where the remains of mediæval town fortifications are so numerous and well preserved as in the Helvetic territory. Erected in times of local division and strife,

and bearing only the dints of an extinct warfare, they have slowly and peacefully decayed through ages in which every other country has been the scene of conflicts that would have shattered them to atoms. In Belgium, bristling with the erections of Vauban and Cohorn, scarcely a relic of the kind is to be met with.

yielded on the appearance of the enemy, or despatched their deputies in advance. Meanwhile Yverdun, on receiving a summons, took time to deliberate. A column that attempted to steal across the marshes surrounding the place was scattered by the fire of the artillery. The citizens were not inclined to offer a useless resistance; but having made themselves obnoxious to Berne by open manifestations of dislike, they had little to hope from submission. Yet the bloody scenes at Estavayer, which had seemed to foreshadow their doom, proved their salvation. The Swiss commanders, notwithstanding their defiant air under the rebuke of their masters, shrank from the still deeper odium that must follow the recurrence of such enormities. They therefore consented to a surrender on the simple conditions of a change of allegiance, the disbandment of the garrison, and a contribution of provisions. The gates were to remain closed against the common soldiers, whose dissatisfaction was loudly expressed, the whole army having looked forward to the sack of Yverdun as the chief reward of their labors.⁶² Nor was the council of Berne well pleased with this exceptional leniency in a case which had been thought to call for exceptional severities. At least, they wrote, the walls should have been levelled as a punishment for the insolence they had protected.⁶³

Orbe was now made a place of arms, while the scattered castles along the slopes of the Jura, from

⁶² Schilling (who fully sympathized with this feeling), *u.* 232, 233. *MS.* ⁶³ *Deutsch Missiven-Buch C*, 492.

Sainte-Croix to La Sarraz, were stormed and burned by detached parties. A picked band of a thousand men was sent against Les Clées, five miles up the valley of the Orbe, which is here enclosed between shelving cliffs, overtopped in the background by still loftier heights. In the depth below, the river hurries through a chasm, on the edge of which stand the ruins of a castle once accounted a masterpiece of military architecture. The inner tower, or keep, could only be reached through four distinct enclosures, each strongly fortified, the gates being even more solid than the walls. A large proportion of the garrison, which numbered in all but a hundred and twenty, were persons of noble extraction. They had fired the town, and the still blazing houses prevented any approach on the side where the ascent was easiest. It was necessary to mount by the precipitous face of the rock, exposed to the missiles showered from above. The foremost of the assailants tumbled back, and others wavered. But shouts from the rear urged them on, reminding them that the first assault was always the most likely to succeed. Arquebusiers were posted to keep down the fire from the loopholes, and, the summit having been gained, the work of boring through the outermost wall, with picks and other implements, went on with less annoyance. When a breach had been effected the garrison retreated to the next enclosure. Several hours elapsed before the last wall was pierced, and the defenders, after losing more than half their number, including the commandant, took refuge in the keep.

They now offered to surrender on condition that their lives should be spared; but the proposition was rejected with disdain. While the majority of the Swiss, wearied with their exertions, dispersed in search of plunder and refreshments, others, more amenable to the appeals of their officers, collected timber, straw, and other materials, which they heaped at the foot of the tower, intending to try the effect of fire in smoking out or smothering the occupants. Again the latter called a parley. They no longer asked for life, but proffered the last petition of the Catholic soldier and knight — time for confession and death by the sword. But this too was refused. The Swiss were resolved upon killing both body and soul.

They were obliged, however, to forego this exquisite gratification. A voice from the interior, in their own dialect, informed them that two of their countrymen were prisoners within and would be the first victims if their purpose were carried out. They therefore conceded the point. Taking with them the remnant of the garrison, they returned to Orbe. A ring was formed in the courtyard of the castle, the priests were set at work, and a headsman was called for. None appearing, one of the prisoners, the servant of a nobleman among them, undertook the office on the promise of receiving his own liberty. His master, the lord of Galera, while leaning from a loophole, had had his head pierced by the shaft of an arquebuse. The missile was still sticking in the wound. "Yet he stood up manfully in the ring,"

wrote the captains of Berne with a strange pride in the endurance of their victim.⁵⁴

After five had suffered it grew too dark to proceed. The remainder were thrust into a close dungeon, to await their doom on the morrow. The town was filled with revellers. No one listened to the cries at first extorted, finally stifled, by the putrid atmosphere of the den in which the prisoners were immured. In the morning, when the door was opened, it was found that nineteen had perished by suffocation; and the faces of the survivors were scarcely less haggard than those of the corpses. Somewhat disturbed by this spectacle, the Swiss leaders, after executing five more, all of them noblemen, decided upon sparing the common men, excusing themselves, in their report, on the ground that these poor wretches had, after all, only obeyed the commands of their superiors.⁵⁵

Meanwhile Lucerne had sent out a force, and the diet, yielding to the repeated and urgent representations of Berne, had issued a general call to arms.⁵⁶ Zurich obeyed the summons; the other cantons, without sending their contingents, allowed their men to volunteer. So rapid had been the successes that the council half regretted having called for aid, which was seen to be little needed.⁵⁷ The declared object

⁵⁴ "Dem war ein pyll durch das haupt geschossen und ist denoch manlich am Ring gestanden." Teuchdische Sammlung. *MS.* (Stifts-Bibliothek, Sanct-Gallen.)

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* *MS.* — The council in reply graciously express their appro-

bation. Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 596. *MS.*

⁵⁶ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 564.

⁵⁷ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 601, 606. *MS.*

had been already accomplished. Wabern, however, under instructions from home, now proposed to march against Geneva and exact satisfaction for the outrage to his late colleague, Nicholas von Diesbach.

The hostile feeling at Geneva had, as we have before remarked, a special origin. The fairs of that place had formerly been much frequented by foreign merchants, whose most convenient route lay through French territory. But owing to a restriction on the right of transit imposed with this precise object by Louis the Eleventh, the trade of Geneva had, within the last dozen years, been diverted to Lyons. Savoy had retaliated by a similar prohibition, with an exception, however, in favor of the Swiss, who would not have endured its operation. They were expected, also, to use their good offices for the restoration of free intercourse; and a representation on the subject had, in fact, formed part of the business intrusted to Diesbach on the occasion of his first mission to the French court. The failure of the negotiation was attributed to the lukewarmness of the envoy, who, it was soon discovered, had returned in the capacity of an agent of Louis, devoted to the promotion of his policy and interests. Hence the insult offered to him when returning from a subsequent mission — an act for which Berne had demanded the enormous indemnity of twelve thousand florins.⁶⁸

On hearing of Wabern's design, Freyburg immediately protested against it as a violation of the

⁶⁸ GaiFFE, *Matériaux pour l'histoire de Genève*, tom. I. — *Österreichische Abschiede*, B. II. s. 332 et al.

pledge under which its own concurrence and support had been obtained. Authorized by the assurances of Berne, it had sent word to the regent that the war would be confined to the territory of Romont;⁵⁵ and it therefore besought its ally to desist from a step which must compromise the honor of both. "We gave them many friendly words in reply," wrote the council to Wabern, "telling them that we had no certain knowledge of your intentions, but would write to you on the subject. They might, however, be assured that the bad feeling of Geneva towards them as well as us would be ready to break out on the first opportunity, and we besought them therefore, if any remedial measure were undertaken, not to separate themselves from us and our Confederates, since it was not a thing that at all concerned the house of Savoy."⁵⁶ Reading the truth through these equivocations, Freyburg peremptorily recalled its troops. This, as the council wrote to Wabern, troubled them not a little.⁵⁷ Seeing how much was involved, it behooved him to act with the greatest prudence, averting any misconduct or mischance which might expose them to fresh obloquy and scandal.⁵⁸ He was not, however, to imagine that

⁵⁵ Girard *MSS.*

⁵⁶ "Ihnen ist gar freundlich geantwortet, wir wuss eigentlich uwer furnemen nitt, und wollen uch darumb traulich schriben; . . . und haben ihnen in unsser schrift brüderlich geraten ob ettwas deshalb gegen die von Jenff furgenommen wurd, sich von unssern Eidgnossen und

uns nitt zu sundern, dann es das hus Safoy nute berur, mit mer worten unsser schribens." Deutsch Missiven-Buch C. 607. *MS.*

⁵⁷ "Das uns nu nitt wenig betriibt."

⁵⁸ "Irrung und misbell die uns geschrey und bekrenkung bringen moecht zu verkommen."

they had any thought of letting the insolence of Geneva go unpunished; "and we recommend you," they concluded, "above all things, not to forget the twelve thousand florins."⁴⁰

Capturing and burning the places on the route, the army proceeded to the shores of Lake Léman. It was the first time in history that the Swiss had come in sight of those waters in hostile array. They entered Morges without resistance, a force of three or four thousand men which had been collected there retreating before them with precipitation. Geneva, destitute of fortifications, and full of wealth, both domestic and foreign, including a great ecclesiastical treasure, was in a state of panic. Deputies were hastily sent to purchase, if possible, immunity from the impending horrors. The cautions of the council had prepared Wabern and his associates to listen to proposals of the kind. They began by demanding a hundred thousand florins, but accepted finally an offer of twenty-six thousand crowns, payable within the year in two instalments, and secured by the delivery of hostages. Freyburg, in spite of its own renunciation, was made a sharer in the transaction, being everywhere named in the treaty as the partner of Berne.⁴¹ There was also a liberal distribution of gratuities among the leaders; while the private soldiers, who had again been disappointed of their prey and whose claims to compensation were

⁴⁰ "Und so vil an uns legt so bedunckt uns das ir vor allen dingen die zwolf tausend guldin nit verges-

sen." Ibid. MS.

⁴¹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 567. — Schilling, s. 243, 244.

ignored,²⁸ took their revenge by thoroughly pillaging Morges in contravention of the terms of surrender.

There was now no further reason for prolonging the campaign ; but another old score, not unlike that of Geneva, could be conveniently wiped out on the homeward march. Lausanne had incurred the animosity of Berne by its contemptuous rejection of Störr as a candidate for the see, and by refusing even to recognize his appointment as vicar-general, artfully conferred by Rome as a means of getting the nomination into its own hands. In the course of the controversy many threats had been uttered, of which the chapter had hitherto eluded the execution. An additional pretext was now found in the fact that Lausanne had granted an asylum to the fugitives from the adjoining country. Returning by the margin of the lake, the army began to ascend the slopes of the Jorat. While many of the citizens fled with their property to the opposite shore, the authorities came out to seek a composition. Besides being mulcted in nearly the same sum as Geneva, they were compelled to acknowledge the Swiss as their future sovereigns — a humiliation the more bitter that the city, with its environs, though geographically a part of the Pays de Vaud, had under the rule of Savoy enjoyed a practical independence. In consequence of this submission the army remained outside, while the leaders, ascending to the regal site which is crowned by the cathedral, gave thanks at the shrine

²⁸ Schilling, s. 244.

of "Our Lady of Lausanne" for their uninterrupted successes.⁶⁵

The troops of Berne reached home on the 2d of November. In three weeks they had captured seventeen fortified towns and twenty-seven castles.⁶⁷ They had encountered no resistance except what had sprung from a sense of honor or a feeling of despair. Such forces as the government of Savoy had been able to muster had been sent against the people of Sion, whose depredations in the Valais had preceded the more deadly attack and insured its success. The service thus rendered was promptly repaid. Driven back under the walls of Sion, the allies of Berne were on the point of being crushed, when the opportune arrival of three thousand men from the Oberland changed defeat into victory, and the routed enemy escaped across the Saint-Bernard, leaving the whole of the province to be overrun and annexed.⁶⁸ After this blow the dominion of Savoy north of the Alps might be considered at an end. Where it still lingered its plight was that of the wounded left on the battle-field amid swarms of marauders. Already the peasantry of the Simmenthal, the nearest and the most alert, had crossed the Plan de Jaman, and, descending on a region which the flaming swords of

⁶⁵ *Chronique des Chanoines de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*, B. VIII. s. 259. In the bill of expenses paid by Lausanne were included the sums expended by Störz in his journeys to Rome and

for "over a thousand letters written on his behalf by the chancellor of Berne." Ruchat, *Hist. MS.*

⁶⁷ List in Schilling, s. 246.

⁶⁸ Schilling. — Edlibach. — Rodt. — *Deutsch Meissen-Buch C. MS.*

angels should have guarded from devastation, had pillaged and burned Vevay, Montreux, and the neighboring villages, and massacred numbers of the inhabitants.⁶⁶

Thus Berne had gained the end at which it had so long been aiming. Originally, indeed, it had sought to obtain control of the Pays de Vaud merely as a means of facilitating its intercourse with France and its attacks upon Burgundy. Now it held full possession by the right of conquest. According to former practice, it should have shared the acquisition with its two chief assistants, Freyburg and Solothurn. But the latter was unceremoniously set aside, and its inquiries on the subject drew forth nothing but a curt rebuff.⁷⁰ Freyburg, on the contrary, without claiming to participate, was studiously put forward as a co-equal in power and a co-agent in every measure. Joint garrisons, officered by Berne, were distributed among the principal strongholds. A joint commission consisting of two members of the council of Berne, Scharnachthal, and Wabern, convened the Estates of the province, and set before them its new status, under which all its privileges were declared to have been voided, so that taxes would henceforth be levied, judicial decisions revised, unqualified obedience exacted,

⁶⁶ Schilling. — Stettler. — Boyve, *Annales de Neuchâtel*.

⁷⁰ "Ir haben . . . begert zu wissen die ordnung durch uns mit unsern mitburgern von friburg jets der eroberten landen halb furgenommen. Die uns etwas seltsam bedunckt,

angesehen das urer Lieb wohl wuns was darinn durch uns gehandelt ist. . . . So haben si und wir in gemeinem irn und unsern namen unser erobert landschaft besetzt, damit die in ordnung gehalten." Deutsch Misiven-Buch C, 656. *MS.*

by the conquerors. Finally, the seat of government having been transferred to Lausanne, Rodolph von Erlach, now likewise a member of the council of Berne, went thither, attended by deputies from Freyburg, to exercise the functions of a vicegerent in the name of both states.⁷¹

It remained to be seen whether Berne would be able to maintain itself in a position where, if stronger than before, it was also more vulnerable. That position had been seized with a view to the continuance of offensive movements. But the time was at hand when Berne must prepare to stand on the defensive. Its own gain would be counterbalanced by the fall of Lorraine. The minor pieces being swept from the board, Burgundy and the Swiss would come within range and be forced to try conclusions.

This had been already foreseen by one who had much to lose, nothing to gain, by the collision. Rodolph of Hochberg, as a vassal of one power, an ally of the other, and the ruler of territory subject to neither but exposed to the incursions of both, perceived that in the new phase which the conflict was about to assume, he would no longer be permitted to stand neutral, and that his county of Neuchâtel might not improbably be the scene of the struggle. Unlike Saint-Pol, who, in the same situation and at a similar crisis, had madly invited the storm, Rodolph conceived the hope and addressed himself to the task of bringing about a reconciliation. He knew that

⁷¹ Girard *MSS.* — Rodt, B. L. a. 555 et seq.

throughout the two Burgundies there was a great longing for peace. The people, unable to comprehend the fury with which they had been assailed, imagined that they could charm it away with deprecatory words. In the preceding spring, Pierre de Joigne, the former commandant of Grandson, acting as the representative of influential persons, had tried to open a negotiation, and with consummate simplicity had addressed his inquiries to Diesbach. It was a sufficient answer that he did not appear to be furnished with any authority to treat.⁷² The present conjuncture seemed more favorable. France as well as the Empire had made peace, and the Swiss, standing alone, were menaced with a danger which they had never expected to encounter. Having obtained from the council of Dijon, not indeed formal powers, which the authorities there were incompetent to grant, but letters which might serve as vouchers of a readiness to negotiate, Rodolph came to Berne, towards the close of October, and laid the matter before the council. So many of the principal members were then absent with the army and on embassies, that the remainder were reluctant to take upon themselves the responsibility of giving any reply. It seemed to them, they wrote to their colleagues in the camp, "a dark water," "especially as they were ignorant of the king's designs, and knew not but some movement on his side, by embarrassing the enemy's progress in Lorraine, might be at the bottom of it." Moreover nothing was said of Austria

⁷² Girard MSS.

and their other allies, whom it would be dishonorable and impossible for them to desert. They had therefore answered briefly and indefinitely, objecting to the documents produced as not duly attested or otherwise sufficient, but leaving the margrave at liberty to feel his way further if so inclined.⁷³

It is easy to account for this dubiety and hesitation. If allowed to dictate the terms, Berne would have found a peace not inconvenient. It must in any case desist for the present from further enterprises and look to its own security. To what extent it might count upon the support of its Confederates was less clear than it would have wished. On the other hand, a negotiation would in all probability lead to nothing, and might even add to the risks and uncertainties. If, indeed, the enemy should refuse to include the members of the Lower League, it would be safe to take issue with him on that point. Every canton, Unterwalden itself, would admit the necessity of standing by engagements once formed. But if Berne's desire to retain its own conquests should appear to be the obstacle, it might perhaps be left to defend them at its own risk.

About a week later the margrave returned with ampler credentials and a proposal for a preliminary meeting of envoys, at his own castle, to arrange a truce. As the duke himself must have assented to this, Rodolph's sanguine representations seemed not without ground. Yet in furnishing the required safe-conduct, the council started a fresh difficulty. They

⁷³ Deutsch Missionen-Buch C, 615. MS.

were much concerned about the fate of the German garrison now shut up in Nancy. The emperor, they understood, had issued his "high mandate" to princes, nobles, and towns, to see that no evil befell these subjects of the Empire, whose lives were threatened by the besiegers. Under these circumstances little fruit, they said, could be expected from the conference.⁷⁴

It took place, however, on the 26th of November. Wabern and the chancellor of Berne were present on the part of the Swiss; on that of Burgundy, Besançon Philibert, the duke's secretary, with two members of his council.⁷⁵ They agreed upon a truce till the 1st of January, to be extended three months from that date if all the parties should previously acquiesce. But who were to be reckoned as parties? Berne insisted on including, not only Austria and the Alsatian towns, but the duke of Lorraine; Wabern was instructed to assent to no arrangement that did not extend to all the allies, "be they who or where they would."⁷⁶ The Burgundians yielded the point, subject to their master's approval. Practically it was one of no importance. Nancy had surrendered on that very day; René was in exile; the war in Lorraine was over.

The gratified margrave, having now a clear space for his structure, had only, as he thought, to go on and lay the foundations. He forgot apparently that

⁷⁴ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 632. MS. barre, tom. ii. p. 263.

⁷⁵ "Si syen welche oder wo si wollen." Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 641. MS.

⁷⁶ Chambrier, Description de la mairie de Neuchâtel, p. 251. — La-

he had neither plan nor materials — no terms to propose, no mode of reconciliation to suggest. The war had not arisen out of any difference or dispute. There was consequently no matter for discussion, for mediation, for compromise. If peace was to be effected, it must be, not through mutual concession, but by absolute submission on one side or the other. And which was to make this submission — the wrongdoer flushed with triumph, or the sufferer smarting under his injuries? Should Charles forego his rights and put up with insult and outrage, or the Swiss resign their conquests and make atonement for the damage they had inflicted? Above all, were both, or either, to abandon their allies? Each had a well-earned reputation for fidelity, which neither would be tempted to hazard when want of fidelity would argue a want of courage.

On the part of the Swiss, it is true, the binding force of the engagements which had been formed lay in a cord of questionable strength. For several months there had been no direct or spontaneous tidings from the French king. His last letter had borne the date of the 17th of July, when, as we have seen, he was telling his own people that the emperor had scattered the Burgundian forces and was marching onward into France. To his friends at Berne he had given a more truthful account. Frederick had shamefully deserted him. It was only what might have been expected. It was of a piece with his whole career. It was so that he had acted thirty years before, when he had inveigled France into an alliance

against the Swiss, and then sought to incite the latter against the former. His present treachery, much as it deserved exposure, must be kept secret as long as possible, lest it might breed discouragement among the allies.⁷⁷ From the same good motive doubtless, when Louis himself, two months later, signed a treaty with Burgundy, he had refrained from making any communication to the Swiss. Berne had sent to him repeatedly, begging him in particular to provide for the prompt payment of the half year's pensions, which would be due on the 26th of October. Having failed to secure his attention, the council now wrote to Jost von Silinen, who next to Diesbach had borne the most active part in the formation of the treaty, and who, in addition to other rewards, had received from Louis the post of coadjutor of the diocese of Grenoble. They informed him of the truce, adding that they could have had it prolonged at their own pleasure by consenting to the overthrow of the duke of Lorraine. But they had refused to abandon the good prince, and they wondered that the king should have concluded a treaty without providing for his security. But the matter of chief importance now was the ten thousand francs and the other sums of which Silinen knew. They had already gone to much expense in messages and writings about the matter, and trusted that he would use his endeavors to procure payment without further delay. "It is full time," they said, "to put an end to the variances among our Con-

⁷⁷ Rodt (B. II. n. 406), who cites the original "on parchment," but without mentioning its present place of deposit.

federates, which we have this long time been staying off" The money would be a remedy for all. "It will inspire belief, a dutiful disposition, and a willingness to please."⁷⁸ William von Diesbach would write to him more explicitly.

Lucerne wrote to him more explicitly and more emphatically, reminding him that it was through his influence that his native canton had become a party to the alliance, and intimating doubts whether it would turn out to have been a wise proceeding. The king apparently despised the Confederates and was preparing to drop them. It was said that he was unable to cope with his difficulties at home, that the princes and factions were too strong for him to control. Besides he was old, his heir a mere child; his allies had nothing to depend upon in case of his death. They had made two campaigns without the least coöperation from him, and therefore thought themselves entitled to the eighty thousand francs stipulated to be paid in certain contingencies. — This, it must be confessed, was a preposterous demand; and doubtless much of the language used proceeded from pique rather than a serious distrust. The Swiss had grown so accustomed to the flatteries of Louis that his long silence and neglect, arising from his absorption in domestic affairs, wounded their vanity.

Silinen, who had taken up his permanent abode in France, could hardly be expected to feel the same warm personal concern in these bygone matters as

⁷⁸ "Es ist warlich nit irrungen in allem gutem erschiessen, und vi unsern Eydgnossen, die wir langzit giouben gevalen und dienstliche uffenthalten haben, zu verkommen. . . . neigung us im heberen." Deutsch Wo solich gelt kom, es werd zu Missiven-Buch C, 561, 648. *MS.*

when his rotund face⁷⁸ had sweated over the labor. But he had before him the prospect of a still higher elevation, and he knew that the interests of his patron were even more deeply involved than those of his countrymen. Once more therefore he put his shoulder to the wheel and lifted it out of the rut. Having roused the king from his perilous obliviousness, he proceeded to allay the suspicions and stimulate the zeal of the Confederates. He desired the council of Lucerne to entertain no doubts of his own continued devotion to them, and to command his services at all times. He was now forwarding, as he had already written to Berne, the ten thousand francs, as well as what belonged to the three cantons separately. With respect to their application for eighty thousand francs, he did not clearly understand the grounds, not having by him a copy of the treaty. But the king would fulfil all that he had promised. Were there any reason to doubt it, Silinen, their fellow-townsmen, whose ancestors had ever been true to them and who meant himself to continue so till death, would, they might be assured, have given them a warning. They had told him that they had entered into this thing in reliance upon him. It was his confident hope that they would never have reason to repent it. God was his witness that he had acted for their interest, and he firmly believed that it would be to their advantage forever. For he saw no sign of any such dangers as they seemed to apprehend.

⁷⁸ There is a portrait of him at Lucerne. The physiognomy indicates sensuality rather than shrewdness.

The king was at the height of his power and in the full vigor of his faculties. He was even now causing to be executed many great lords concerned in treasonable practices. That he despised the Confederates, or had any thought of deserting them, Silinen could never believe. As to his permitting Lorraine to be overrun, and not interfering till it was too late, this must not be attributed to dilatoriness or bad faith. There might be reasons for it; René had perhaps had something to do with the English invasion. But the duke of Burgundy had no reason to be confident. He had not so great a force as was pretended; the king of England and he were bitter enemies, so that he could derive no help from that quarter; and he had lost his reputation by his shameful betrayal of the constable. The king, it was true, had made a peace with him, but not with any thought of forsaking the Swiss. In danger as in victory he would stand by them, and never suffer any harm to befall them. Let them therefore be full of courage; great blows might be projected, but they would come to nothing.⁸⁰

A few weeks later he wrote again, in a still more reassuring strain, from Lyons, whither he had gone to see about the transmission of the pensions. He could now give them positive proofs of the king's good faith, of his resolution not to abandon them, of his purpose to do all that he had said. Silinen had received a letter from him, in which he announced that he

⁸⁰ Printed by Lütolf, in the *Geschichtsfreund*, B. XV. — The originals of this and some other letters of Silinen are in the Archives of Lucerne.

was shortly coming to Lyons. Report said that he would bring with him fifteen hundred lances. He had declared publicly that if the duke of Burgundy should make war upon the Confederates, he would go to their help, and risk his life and power in their defence. The Burgundian envoys had told him that the Swiss would gladly make peace if he would consent. But he had answered that he could not believe it, and that for his own part he would never deviate from his engagements with them so long as they remained steadfast. He had now sent the president of Toulouse and two others, the same that had treated with them before, to meet their envoys at Lyons and confer with them about certain secret matters. Let them beware of the margrave and of all who were seeking to shake their confidence in the king. The duke of Burgundy, after giving the constable three separate safe-conducts, had delivered him up to die; on him therefore they could place no reliance. They could trust to the king, and to the king alone.⁸¹

The warnings at the close of this persuasive letter were uncalled for. The negotiation had already fallen through. On learning from Silnen that the expected sums, amounting to twenty-one thousand francs, had been deposited to their credit at Lyons, the council of Berne had written to him in reply, enclosing a receipt, thanking him for his exertions, and giving him to understand that they would stick to their bargain. "We shall expect nothing but favor from our most gracious lord the king, and will faithfully and in all

⁸¹ Lütolf, *Beilage*, No. 4, *ubi supra*.

things show ourselves trusty servants."⁸² They wrote at the same time to Bartholemy Huber, their deputy to a diet which had been summoned to meet at Zurich, on the 26th of December, for the express purpose of learning the result of the negotiation with Burgundy and deciding upon the steps to be taken in consequence. The council had not yet received the particulars, but enough, they said, was known to render it certain that no good was to be looked for. The margrave, whose fidelity and good intentions could not be questioned, had just sent a secret message to the effect that the archbishop of Besançon was preparing to receive the duke of Burgundy as his guest at the beginning of the new year. All their information from other sources pointed in the same direction. Lorraine was completely subdued; the count of Romont was expected to enter the Pays de Vaud in the course of the next month. Huber was to tell all this to the Confederates and to urge upon them the necessity for immediate preparations. The Austrian prince should also be exhorted to show a bold face and be ready to take the field in person with his whole power. This would exhibit his interest as a principal in the war and could not fail to have a good effect. The diet had been already told that the ten thousand francs were at Lyons. Berne was now actively employed in getting them through, and if the roads were unobstructed, as the count of

⁸² "Wir wollen uns auch zu unserm aller gnädigsten Herrn dem Kung anders nit dann aller gnaden versprechen, und uns in allen ding-

en als getruw diener uffrechtlichen erzöugen." Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 872. MS.

Bresse had certified, no delay would take place in the distribution.²²

In subsequent letters some details were given from the margrave's report. He had deputed the business to Simon de Cleron, a Burgundian subject of noble birth, formerly a member of his own household and still his confidential agent. The duke had answered that, before consenting to a peace, he must have restitution. What was comprised in this demand Berne was unable to say. His whole demeanor had shown that he was full of resentment, and he had intimated that he did not regard the persons who had set the negotiation on foot as having any view to his honor.²³

Although we have no better authority for this transaction than the interested statements of the council of Berne, we need not withhold our belief.²⁴ It is hard to see how else, as an honest man, Charles

²² *Deutsch Meissven-Buch* C, 465. MS.

²³ Letters to Basel, Zurich, and Sigismund, *Deutsch Meissven-Buch* C, 674, 676, 678. MS.

²⁴ The chroniclers differ widely in their statements on this matter, some, like Commynes, asserting that the Swiss offered to give up all their alliances, that with France included, and to supply the duke of Burgundy with soldiers; while others, like Knebel, pretend that Charles tried to buy off the Swiss, making them enormous offers if they would desert their allies. The absurdity of both these stories would be apparent even if they were less amply contradicted by authentic evidence. The account of the council of Berne

is so far confirmed that, in the case of Alsace, in which the elector palatine had offered his mediation, Charles gave a very similar reply. He would make no peace, he said, without a previous restitution, since he had never forfeited his rights through anything done or intended either by himself or his subordinates. His assailants had not been so much as mentioned in the peace made with the emperor, and this for no other reason than because Frederick himself well knew the injustice and groundlessness of their proceedings. Strobel (from a manuscript at Strasburg), B. III. n. 342. The letter is dated Nancy, Dec. 2.

could have borne himself, what other reply he could have given. The proposition made by those who, though bound to him by allegiance, were plainly devoted to the enemy, amounted simply to this: that he should abstain from making war upon the Swiss — that he should seek no redress for his own wrongs, leave his states and subjects unprotected, sacrifice the allies whose constancy to him had cost them so dear. In his darkest hour, when beset by the forces of the Empire and harassed by those of France and Lorraine, he would have scouted the suggestion. But there had been no one to offer it then.

Now that the league had been cut in twain, the struggle limited to a single corner, and a vantage ground secured, he had only to brace himself up for the final throw. It was not a war of conquest he was about to undertake. "I am going," he said, "to deliver and avenge my own subjects and those of Savoy, harassed, injured, and oppressed by the Swiss and their allies."³⁶ In what quarter should he open the attack? Personal considerations pointed to Alsace, where his private quarrel was to be fought, his own dominion restored. There, too, he could strike with least risk and manœuvre with most freedom. The preparations made to encounter him indicated panic rather than a spirit of cool resolution; and the Swiss, when requested to join in concerting measures of defence, had given the cold response, that this was a matter with which they had no concern; they

³⁶ Letter to the magistrates of l'Acad. de Dijon, 1851 p. 181. Dijon, Jan. 29, 1476, Mem. de

would do what they had promised, neither less nor more.⁸⁷ But strong as were the inducements, others, more powerful, forced Charles in a different direction. Honor forbade any further delay in going to the rescue of Savoy. His own cause must be postponed to that of his allies. Romont and the regent were besieging him with supplications.⁸⁸ The Pays de Vaud was groaning under the oppressor. Orbe, Les Clées, Estavayer, cried for vengeance.

In anticipation of this design, Berne had already begun drawing in its forces. Jougne, as commanding the main pass across the Jura, had been deemed of primary importance.⁸⁹ But it was too remote from succor to be tenable in the hands of the Swiss, and the garrison, not relishing their exposed position nor emulous of a Thermopylean fame, had clamored for their recall.⁹⁰ This evacuation had involved that of the valley of the Orbe. As a further consequence, the inhabitants of other places grew impatient to throw off the yoke, and concerted schemes for ridding themselves of the Swiss garrisons. They communicated secretly with the lord of La Sarraz, who was hovering about the mountain defiles and rallying his plundered tenantry. Romont himself, with a few Burgundian troops, came across to aid in the attempt. In the night of the 12th of January the Swiss soldiers

⁸⁷ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 565.

⁸⁸ "Mi a dicto . . . essere intestato da Madama di Savoya et Monsignor de Romont . . . di andarli a soccorrere." Panigra to the duke

of Milan, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 262.

⁸⁹ "Daß es was ein schlüssel des gantzen landes." Etterlin, fol. 83.

⁹⁰ Schilling, s. 240.

at Yverdun were summoned to the walls to repel a sudden onslaught, and were set upon at the same time by the citizens, armed with knives and bludgeons. Broken into small bands they kept up the contest till dawn, and then fought their way back into the castle, which they barricaded securely. The noise of the tumult reached Grandson, three miles off, and roused the garrison. The commandant, Brandolf von Stein, after posting his men, went towards the town wall to reconnoitre. On the way he fell into the hands of a party who had been privately admitted by a postern that opened into a convent adjoining the works. Disconcerted in their hope of surprising the castle, his captors, by way of extorting a surrender, put a rope about his neck, and placing him in front of the gate, threatened to hang him unless it were opened. He himself called out to his men to remain firm, and a defiance was accordingly returned. An assault being out of the question, the party, after doing some damage to the outworks, went off with their prisoner.

Swift messengers carried the alarm to the neighboring places and to Berne. The small garrison of Payerne marched on the instant to the relief of their brethren at Yverdun. A more competent force, collected by the alarm-bell, set out under Wabern, in the forenoon of Sunday, the 14th, while the council were despatching calls for immediate aid to Lucerne, Freyburg, and Solothurn. Reënforcements flocked from all these quarters, but before any of them had reached the scene of action the danger was over.

After a single ineffectual attack upon the castle, the captors of Yverdun, fearing to be surrounded in their turn, had evacuated the town. The inhabitants, well knowing what their own fate would be if they remained behind, snatched up what was most needful or least burdensome, and migrated to Orbe. Three persons only, partisans of the Swiss, awaited the arrival of Wabern, whose men united joyfully with the garrison in sacking the deserted houses.²¹

Had the attempt succeeded at one point, a general rising would have followed. The people of Romont, fearing to be punished for the mere intention, followed the example of those of Yverdun and abandoned their homes in a body. But the revolt, though nipped in the bud, had revealed the difficulty of holding the country against an invading army backed by a disaffected population. Lucerne advised that Yverdun should be abandoned, or that at all events the town should be burned, and the castle alone maintained. But Berne could not, at the present moment, make another retrogressive step without incurring a great disaster. Notwithstanding the assurances of the count of Bresse, the road by which the French money was coming was evidently insecure. Romont was even reported to be on the lookout for the all-important prize. It was supposed to be now at Geneva, which, taking advantage of the sudden change in the aspect of affairs, was putting off the payment of its own debts, and might

²¹ Schilling. — Etterlin. — Chronique des Chanceliers de Neuchâtel. — Dépêches Milanaises. — Letters in the Deutsch Missiven-Buch C. M.S.

he tempted, by any sign of weakness on the part of Berne, to connive in the seizure. A loss of this kind, as the council wrote to Wabern, would work them a double mischief. It would damage their reputation and influence abroad, and frustrate their hopes of securing unanimity at home.²² So critical did the circumstances appear that many members of the larger council were called in to assist in the deliberations. Wabern was ordered, instead of retiring, to strengthen the garrison at Yverdun, and then to advance as far as Morges, or farther at his own discretion. A mere demonstration would doubtless be sufficient for the object. "We do not intend," wrote his colleagues, "that you should do any damage to the country, and we trust that you have your men under better control than before. Those of Freyburg, thank God, are of a different stamp from the rest, more orderly and obedient"²³ — a striking testimony to the evil spirit which Berne itself had let loose, and which its more conscientious ally had foreseen and resisted.

Charles meanwhile had completed his arrangements for the expedition which he trusted was to give the finishing blow to the combinations of his enemies. Conscious of the magnitude of the task, he had bestowed more than ordinary attention on

²² "Also nu uns an disen dingen nasser eren gimpffe und ander sechenhalb vil ligt." . . . "Solich untrawe und gespots, so uns deshalb erwachsen möcht, euch den unwillen under uns selb zu verkommen."

Bern in das Veld, Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 694, 705. *MS.*

²³ "Die von gota gnaden in andrer gehotens dann die übrigen sind." Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 706. *MS.*

the details of preparation. "Against the Swiss," he remarked, "it will not do to march unprovided."²² During Christmas week he was so incessantly employed that, far from taking any part in its festivities, he gave himself scarcely time to eat one meal a day.²³ Besides collecting material and reviewing his receipts and expenditures, he reorganized his army in such a manner as to render the infantry a more distinct and serviceable force, and to bring the Italian bands somewhat more directly under his own control. After posting the necessary garrisons he would be able to take the field with at least twenty-five thousand troops. Of these he had already detached four hundred lances,—about thirty-five hundred combatants,—sending them round by way of Geneva, to join the levies of the country in securing the passes and seizing such points as would be hazardous to his flanks if left in the enemy's possession. The remainder, with the artillery, were to march in two bodies by parallel roads, and effect their junction before crossing the mountains by the most convenient route.

As a precaution against unfavorable contingencies, whether a reverse to his own arms or a movement on the side of France, he had given orders for calling out the feudal levies of the two Burgundies under the command of his half-brother Anthony. But while

²² "Mi a dicto la 5^{ma} Scoa che . . . contra li Svizzeri Alamani non bisogna andare dispreveduto." Panigarola to the duke of Milan, Dé-

pêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 266.

²³ "Apena a mangiato una volta el di." Ibid. p. 262.

meaning, as he intimated, to leave nothing to chance," he thought it probable that propositions to which he could listen would yet be tendered; and at all events he might doubt whether Berne, his real antagonist, would succeed in rousing the enthusiasm and rallying the numbers necessary for a protracted resistance. That the war had been unpopular from the first, that the majority of the cantons had offered throughout a steady if passive opposition to it, were facts well known to him from the accounts sent from Savoy. It was now reported — and, as we have seen from internal sources, not without foundation — that the uneasiness and discontent were more general than ever, the impending attack being commonly talked of among the people as a calamity brought upon them by private ambition.* Let their military prestige be shaken, their career of victory cut short, let them begin to feel the evils they had so long inflicted with impunity, and neither the gold of France nor the wheedlings of Berne would keep them united. Hitherto their prowess had not been fairly tested. The foe, intimidated by their rampant self-confidence, had always shrunk from their hug. They should now, if Charles's spirit could animate his followers, find themselves locked in a grip as close and unflinching as their own. Before setting out he assembled his captains, gave them his directions, and ex-

* "Andara como dice in modo potera guadagnare et non perdere." *Ibid.* ubi supra.

" "Li populari dano imputazione

alli majorengli che sono stati causa di metterli in questa guerra." Petrasanta to the duke of Milan, *Dé-pêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 293.

horted them to do their duty. "Let every one," he said, "be ready for action and filled with a fervent courage. The Swiss, according to their habit, will not fail to meet and offer us battle on their frontiers. It is necessary that we should break them in the first encounter. If they meet with a repulse, however slight, they will be confounded and lost."⁹⁸

At the head of one division of his army, numbering about eleven thousand men, he left Nancy on the 11th of January. He staid a week at Neufchâteau, an important fortress within a bow-shot of the French frontier, and while here granted a furlough to the count of Campobasso, who deemed this a seasonable moment for performing a vow at the shrine of Saint James of Compostella — or for keeping a more private appointment with a correspondent in France. On the 22d the duke arrived at Besançon, where he remained till the 6th of February, waiting for cannon and stores, and transacting such business as had been reserved for a time of leisure.⁹⁹ It was now that he ratified his treaty of alliance with the emperor, including a supplementary article by which he consented to defer for six months the assertion of his claims against Sigismund, Frederick undertaking in the interval to bring about a satisfactory arrangement.¹⁰⁰ Verbally he made a more important concession. He gave a promise to the legate, confirmed a

⁹⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 266.

⁹⁹ *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 219. — Letters of Berne to Basel and Zurich (on information

furnished by the margrave of Hochberg), *Deutsch Meissern-Buch C*, 703, 714. *MS.*

¹⁰⁰ Chmel, *H. L. s.* 133, 134.

few months afterwards in writing, that his daughter should become the wife of Maximilian. It was a promise never revoked, and coupled with no conditions. It had doubtless sprung from a decision of his judgment, enlightened by recent experience, moderated by success as well as by failure. By the acquisition of Lorraine he had united his states. By his breach with England he had lost the last hope of further aggrandizement on the side of France. His power, from both these causes, was becoming essentially a German power. As the greatest of the German powers it would form the proper basis of the imperial dominion. What he had once demanded as the price of a union with the house of Austria would, without any express stipulations, follow as the natural result. Or even if Charles should not be preferred to Maximilian as Frederick's immediate successor, it was clear that to Maximilian alone could Charles's daughter and her heritage be safely intrusted.

Such, at this moment pregnant with his fate, were his views of the future, views with which his actual undertaking had no connection. He as little dreamed at present as he had ever done of scaling the Alps in pursuit of a fantastic glory. It was not he who had kindled the fire, and his object still was simply to stamp it out. He was in quest, not of adventure, but of security. He talked, not of conquest or of fame, but only of extorting by reprisals the peace which others had broken, and which he had labored to preserve.

From Besançon he proceeded to La Rivière, near

the foot of the pass leading up to the Val de Travers and the valley of the Orbe. Hitherto Berne, having little intelligence beyond that of his actual movements, had been in doubt as to his precise intentions. At first it had been supposed that he would direct his course towards Alsace and begin operations with the capture of Montbelliard. No steps had been taken for disputing his passage, the members of the Lower League, while talking much of concerted action, having confined themselves to measures of individual security.¹⁰¹ They were reproached for this negligence by the council of Berne, which warned them that the duke of Burgundy would "hasten after a different fashion," and, if the resistance of the Swiss were overcome, would make short work with the rest of his enemies.¹⁰² Subsequently it had been reported that he was heading for Geneva,¹⁰³ the detachment which he had sent thither being taken for his advanced guard. Wabern, consequently, lost no time in retracing his steps. He had secured the French gold, and had extorted from Geneva a pittance of two thousand florins in broken silver and in coins of a dozen different countries and denominations.¹⁰⁴ But while there was a general movement to the rear, the question where the line of defence should be drawn was still undetermined. Berne would fain have contested the advance at every step, holding Yverdun and Grandson as twin

¹⁰¹ Letter of the bishop of Basel, in Bläsch, B. II. n. 284, 285.

¹⁰² Ibid. 714. MS.

¹⁰³ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B.

¹⁰⁴ Deutsch Meiszen-Buch C, II. n. 578. 708. MS.

outposts, Romont and Payerne as an interior line, Morat as a bulwark in front of its own gates. But this plan would be feasible only if its Confederates should exhibit an ardor like its own, and the diet had not even issued a call to arms when the enemy's design began to be developed by his more rapid approach. Some vacillation and one grievous mistake resulted from the previous suspense followed by the sudden necessity for acting. Munitions were on the point of being forwarded to Yverdon, when orders were despatched to the garrison to burn both town and castle and remove the cannon to Grandson, sending also, if possible, a detachment to Payerne.¹⁰⁶ But Grandson was no nearer nor less exposed than Yverdon. It commanded, indeed, the road to Neuchâtel, and, if the invaders should turn in that direction, would serve to delay their advance. On this chance the council had decided on holding it. But they had formed the decision hastily, without counting the risk or having time to throw in supplies. They consoled themselves afterwards with the reflection that the garrison, if straitened, would be able to make their escape or receive succors by water.

They now, however, fully expected that, without turning to the right or left, Charles would march directly against Berne.¹⁰⁷ To impede his progress, to keep him at a distance till the Confederate forces should have assembled, was therefore the point on which their deliberations centred. But on this point

¹⁰⁶ *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C*, 739. *MS.*

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¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 734 et al. *MS.*

also there was a loss of time, arising not from tardiness, but from uncertainty. The more distant the danger the slower would be the movements of the Confederates. Yet if ground were yielded, damage might ensue which no subsequent haste would repair. Freyburg, for its own security, demanded that Romont and the adjacent places, being of the same importance to itself as Morat was to Berne, should be strongly garrisoned. The count of Gruyères, who, despite the menaces of Berne and the friendly persuasions of Freyburg, hesitated to take the definitive step now demanded of him and exchange his fealty to Savoy for an oath of fidelity to the Swiss, stood in equal danger, and must either be protected or given up. A conference on these matters was held at Freyburg on the 9th. Rudolph von Erlach, called thither to give his opinion, was in favor of holding the country as far as Lausanne, sending out a thousand men to serve as a nucleus of resistance at any point that might be menaced, arming such of the people as seemed well disposed, and despatching reënforcements wherever they might be specially needed.¹⁰⁷ But even had this advice been sound, it was already too late to act upon it. The Burgundian detachment at Geneva, having been joined by a force under Romont and the brothers De Gingins, — the lords of La Sarraz and Châtelar, — had pushed forward with the greatest expedition. On the 8th of February they were at Aubonne, a place near Morges belonging to the count of Gruyères. Lausanne gave them instant

¹⁰⁷ Girard MSS. — Rodt, Dis Grafen von Greyen.

admission. On the 11th the town of Romont was occupied in force by Pietro di Legnana, one of Charles's Italian captains. Neighboring places were simultaneously secured. The frontier of Freyburg was crossed, and the flames of burning villages were visible from the town.¹⁰⁸ Payerne also was threatened, and the inhabitants, who on slight grounds had been considered friendly to their conquerors, were in such excitement that many of them stole out or flung themselves from the walls by night, and went off to join the invaders.¹⁰⁹

Thus, in a few days and without a struggle, nearly the whole of the territory ravished from Savoy had been perforce relinquished. The tide had ebbed as suddenly as it had risen, and through every creek and inlet a counter-flood was setting in. Even the Valais was reinvaded by the defeated Savoyards, and Sion could neither expect succor from Berne nor repay, in the time of need, that which it had before received.

Meanwhile the Burgundian army — some twenty thousand men, with many siege guns, two or three hundred lighter pieces, and a numerous train of wagons — had crossed the Jura.¹¹⁰ Four days — from the 8th to the 12th of February — were occupied in the passage, the road being arduous and the weather inclement. Charles spent the whole time at the

¹⁰⁸ Letter of the council of Berne to Lucerne, Feb. 13. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. I. pp. 275, 277, 278. — Rodt, *Die Grafen von Greyers*, s. 328.

¹⁰⁹ Girard *MS.*

¹¹⁰ *Ancienne Chronique*. — *Dépêches Milanaises*. — Schilling. — *Chroniques de Neuchâtel*.

summit of the pass, superintending the movements, watching the defile of Les Bayards, the issue from the Val de Travers, and pushing forward troops as rapidly as possible into the valley of the Orbe, in order to save from destruction places which the enemy was known to be evacuating. On the 12th he descended to Orbe and took up his quarters at the castle. On the ancient towers, which had so lately experienced the strength and witnessed the brutality of the Swiss, the standard of Burgundy was again displayed. It was greeted with acclamations by crowds of fugitives from desolated homes. However it might be regarded on other soils, here on the slopes of the Jura, here in the face of the Alps, it was an emblem of deliverance and of hope.

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

1476.

WITH what emotions the regent of Savoy received the news of her champion's arrival need hardly be told. Though it was midwinter, she prepared at once to cross the Alps, with her children and the ladies of her court, and go to meet and embrace him. Litters for the easier part of the journey and mules for the steeper places were got ready at Rivoli, and orders were sent to Geneva to fit out galleys for a triumphal procession across the lake to Lausanne.¹ The measure of her joy would have overflowed if she could have carried with her a good sum of money and a body of well-equipped troops, as her contribution to the common cause and a solid proof of her gratitude. Surely the duke of Milan, who must be equally delighted with herself, would supply her with these desiderata. Sforza, unhappily, was obliged to decline, the notice

¹ Menebréa, appendix.

being so short and the season so unsuitable.² But he would take as good care of her dominions during her absence as if they were his own,³ and a pompous embassy should attend her and convey his congratulations to their common ally. He would also have been happy to give her, as she had asked, some useful advice as to her conduct; but unfortunately he did not understand ultramontane affairs: she, having been born and brought up on that side, must be much more familiar with them, and would doubtless display the expertness of a master.⁴ Yet he might himself hope to be somewhat enlightened by the ministers he was sending, having instructed them to watch, listen, and report with the greatest minuteness, not neglecting the minor duty of making civil and non-committal speeches.⁵

His interest in the situation was in fact exceedingly keen. The struggle between Burgundy and the Swiss was to be, in his view, a struggle for the possession of Savoy — of the defenceless prey he had looked upon as his own. His attempt to snatch it at a previous period had been balked by the interposition of Venice and lack of encouragement on the part

² "Li havemo resposto . . . non era possibile prestarli, adesso havendo contrario et la celerita che Sua S^{ma} ricerca li siano mandati, et el tempo che non poteriano andare per tanta aspresa de stagione." Duke of Milan to Leonardo Botta, Feb. 9, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 273.

³ "Che po essere certa che lo ha-

veremo ad core quanto el nostro proprio." *Ibid.* ubi supra.

⁴ "Che noi non saperessimo consigliare Sua S^{ma} perche non intendemo ben la natura di quelle cose ultramontane. Ma lei per esser li nata et allevata ne e molto piu experta et maestra che noi." *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 274.

of France. Yielding gracefully to necessity, he had made an instant and complete change in his demeanor. From the brutal ravisher he had become the most respectful and assiduous of adorers. In deference to Yolande he had abandoned his former companionships and cultivated the society of her own more select circle. Was he now, as the reward of his patience and attentions, to see the prize removed forever beyond his reach? The duke of Burgundy, if the winner, would of course appropriate the whole, thus putting an extinguisher on Sforza's hopes. The success of the Swiss, on the other hand, would not necessarily lead to the same result, and might even be made conducive to his aim. They would hardly desire to extend their conquests in this direction across the Alps, and, if properly managed, might be induced to join him in a fair partition. The French king would have his own motives, or could be supplied with motives, for consenting. It would only remain to secure at least the passive acquiescence of Venice. This was to be done by appealing to that jealousy of Italian independence which was the main-spring of her policy, and which had led her to keep so close a watch on the movements of Sforza himself. If she could be brought to see a danger to Italy in the duke of Burgundy's position, she would doubtless veer from her present course, and lose sight of the headlands by which she had hitherto steered. It would be necessary, however, to move with caution, masking as far as possible the drift of his overtures. Besides the danger of premature disclosures in the

event of a Burgundian victory, Sforza well knew the deep-rooted distrust with which he was still regarded by all except the credulous Yolande. He sent by a roundabout channel a message to the Swiss, requesting that an envoy might come to him, as he had something very secret to discuss with them, and something to propose highly beneficial to both parties.⁶ In the communication which he directed his envoy at Venice to make to the senate, he showed a still greater delicacy and reserve. He informed them of his late transactions with the regent of Savoy, because he did not wish them to be ignorant of any of his affairs, and also because he was anxious to learn their opinion as to the propriety of Yolande's proceedings. For his own part, he must confess, he thought her demented.⁷ Her states were about to become a scene of tumult and conflagration, and though she might retain her titular authority, the country would really pass under a foreign rule. He had not attempted to dissuade her, since he had seen it would be useless and he did not wish to have his views reported to the duke of Burgundy; but it was in the vain hope of deterring her from her purpose that he had refused her requests for money and men. The ambassadors he was sending with her were merely a corps of observation, and in case of a meeting which was talked of between the duke of Burgundy and the French king, they had orders to hold

⁶ "Wol er etws heimliche an sy bringen . . . dz sich zwischen Inen und Im wol erchiessen, dann er den Eidgnossen tun wol, dz Inen lib sig." Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 276.
⁷ "Pera se sia dementicata." Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 273.

no communication with his majesty, beyond the commonplaces of official courtesy. As for the rumor of an intended interview between himself and the king of Naples, it was utterly false.¹

Between the Venetian government and that of Milan there was an absolute contrast. Bloody, voluptuous, false in every impulse and volition, Sforza was a tyrant after the popular idea of that character. In policy, as in his amours, he saw no object but the gratification of an appetite, no means but seduction and treachery. Public interest he was incapable of comprehending; coalitions for mutual service or a common good were useful only as instruments of deception. This total want of principle and of all enlarged views made him, in spite of his astuteness and his selfishness, the proper tool of a superior cunning, and he had recognized his natural chief in Louis the Eleventh. The latter, in his place, might have made himself the master of Italy; Sforza was only qualified to become its betrayer. Although the assassin's dagger was ere long to cut short his career, he was already paving the road by which the heir of his policy was to introduce the successor of Louis into the Peninsula.²

Venice, from its position as well as from its constitution, was inspired by a very different spirit. Engaged single-handed in a perpetual struggle with the Moslem, secretly detested by the petty despotisms

¹ Ibid. ubi supra, and p. 284.

² See some remarks on this point

in Romanin, *Storia documentata di Venezia*, tom. iv. p. 385.

that had sprung up around it, exposed to a still greater danger in the event of their coalescence or their subjugation by a foreign power, the republic had learned that its preservation depended on the practice of a guarded and enlightened statesmanship. Hence, while in some respects the most isolated of states, Venice was a post from which the characters and designs of nations and their rulers were surveyed and calculated with a keenness and a systematic accuracy of which there has been no similar example. The rivalry between France and Burgundy had engaged from the outset the attention of the senate. They saw that it would lead to many changes and involve the destinies of many states. Rejecting the superficial view, they discerned the greater danger, not in the undisguised ambition of Charles, but in the stealthy activity of Louis. Something was even to be hoped from the more adventurous spirit of the former in behalf of that cause — the cause of Christendom and of Venice — to which his father alone among the princes of the West had afforded substantial aid. Without therefore departing from their neutrality they had given such tokens of their preference as to draw upon them the enmity of the French king and expose their commerce to the depredations of his cruisers.¹⁰ Their envoys to the duke of Burgundy had been instructed to show the warmest sympathy in his fortunes, to congratulate him "vehemently" on every success, and to treat him

¹⁰ Quod scriptum fuit Ill^{mo} Dom^o (1476). MS. (Archivio generale Ducis Burgundie, die xiii. Februarii de Frari, Venetia.)

in all respects as their "greatest and closest ally."¹¹ They had received his own ambassadors with extraordinary magnificence, had aided him in his enlistments in Italy, labored to effect his reconciliation with Austria, and even proposed a treaty for mutual pecuniary assistance.¹² Above all they had kept him constantly informed of the manoeuvres of Sforza in reference both to France and to Savoy.¹³ Charles, on first receiving overtures from the duke of Milan, had deferred taking any action until he had privately consulted those who would be best able to penetrate the motives. In reply the senate had expressed their amazement at Sforza's boundless dissimulation, and at his audacity in thus approaching so great and so clear-sighted a prince. If they could suppose him sincere their wonder would be still greater. That he was bound to France by the most intimate ties, that all his schemes, hopes, and confidence reposed on that alliance, had been long and ostentatiously manifested.¹⁴ Yet they did not advise that his proposals

¹¹ "Vehementer certe letati sumus, nec secus omni prospera fortuna sua atque nostra gaudemus. . . . Quod nostrum gaudium declarabitis et augebitis. . . . et que erant verba ornatiores et amabiliora tanto gratius et acceptius nobis erit. Et hoc idem faciat de omni alio successo Celsitudinis prefate quod postea accideret. . . . Ut intelligat non solum amari a nobis sed etiam coli et conservari ut precipuum et omnium amicorum et confederatorum nostrorum maximum et charissimum." Quod scriptum fuit oratoribus, De-

liberazioni segrete del Senato, lib. xxiii., xxvi. *MS.* (Archives of Venice.)

¹² Quod scriptum fuit die xvi. Marcii, 1472, xx. Aprilis, 1475, vi. Maii, 1475, xxv. Julii, 1475, *Deliberazioni segrete*, lib. xxv., xxvii. *MS.* (Archives of Venice.)

¹³ This is the leading subject of most of the letters extant. Those of 1472-1474 should be compared with Sforza's own reports of the same transactions to the French king.

¹⁴ "Magna profecto et difficilis

should be declined. On the contrary they suggested that he should be invited to enter as a third party into their own league with Burgundy. This would offer a security for the peace of Italy, of which the duke of Milan himself had been the prime disturber.¹⁵ Practically the suggestion was carried out by a triple alliance embracing Venice, Florence, and Milan, an engagement entered into by Sforza with the same readiness, and in the same spirit, with which he had entered into the alliance with Burgundy and Savoy.

His present communication was listened to by the senate without the least misconception of its tendency. They contented themselves with replying that, while the excitable temperament of Yolande boded ill for the quiet and security of her dominions, they could not undertake to judge of the importance of her present journey. In private conversation with some of the principal senators, the envoy had a better opportunity of learning their sentiments. They spoke of the duke of Burgundy as too active and enterprising. On no account would they see him

ad credendum res videtur quod dux Mediolani qui in regia Francorum Majestate tantum presidii tantum ornamentum et spei collocavit, tantum semper facit de regia amicitia et affinitate ostentationem et tot res vera cum rege habet obligationes, velit nunc illam deserere, et illustrissimo domino duci tam amplis tamque liberalibus conditionibus quas offert adherere et conjungi. Quod autem dux ipse audeat cum tanto principe simulare hoc etiam mirabile nobis videtur, cum preser-

tim pro comperto habere possit difficile illi future verba dare et fallere. Celatadinis ipsius domini ducis cujus singularis sapientia omnibus Christianis principalibus manifesta est." *Alia littera die xvi. Martii, 1472, Deliberationi secreta, lib. xxv. MS. (Archives of Venice.)*

" "Quod infirmus et invalidus potest reputari ob animorum suspensionem et ambiguitatem et diffidentiam inter Italie potentatus procedentem a motibus prefati ducis." *Ibid. MS.*

established on the Italian frontier. But they added, with a significance that showed their perception of the trap which had been baited for them, that they feared still more the encroachments of the French king, whom they qualified with the epithets of "restless" and "malignant."¹⁸

Venice therefore, it appeared, did not intend to be made the victim of its own fears or a catspaw of Milan and of France. It could discern the signs of a hurricane in the distance without driving on the sunken rocks where others had cast themselves away. There was no Diesbach among its rulers, and had there been, his head would have paid the forfeit of his treasonable intrigues.

But neither, in fact, had the Swiss been betrayed by mere false lights and misleading cries. They too had been conscious that their true course lay in the observance of a cool and watchful neutrality. Or, if it were indeed true that the war had been undertaken from motives of policy, it was surely a wretched policy, and the mistake must now have been apparent. Far from preventing aggression, they had simply furnished the opportunity and the justification. What had they gained by not waiting till they were attacked? Their danger could never have been greater than it now was. True they were perfectly well able to defend themselves; and so they would always have been. The duke of Burgundy was no weaker, they were no stronger, — certainly not more

¹⁸ "El quale baptizano per inquieto et maligno." *Dépêches Mises*, tom. I. p. 261.

united,—for the acts by which they had driven him into becoming their assailant.

It was still a question indeed, and a very doubtful one, whether Berne had not deprived itself of that necessary assistance on which, in a different case, it could have securely depended. If a report brought to Charles was correct,—and besides its intrinsic probability, we find that on every point he was supplied with more exact information of the proceedings of the Swiss than they were able to obtain of his,—the people of Zurich and the smaller cantons talked openly of leaving the authors of the war to extricate themselves as they could.¹⁷ There had been a meeting of the diet at Lucerne on the 9th of February. Wabern brought before it the information received by his colleagues and their conjectures as to the enemy's design. It was certain, they said, that he was now on his way into Savoy, and, though his plans were unknown, they presumed that, after joining his forces with those of the regent, he would march directly against Berne. They therefore requested that the Confederate forces should be called out at once, in readiness to move at their summons. The French money had arrived, and an application had been made for the further sum of eighty thousand francs. The king had also sent to desire a consultation with his allies at Lyons.¹⁸

Instead of assenting to the proposition, the diet

¹⁷ "Dicendo anno facto questa guerra senza loro participatione, che loro si defendano." *Ibid.* p. 301.

¹⁸ *Deutsch Meisslen-Buch C.722-724. MS.*

decided to refer it to their constituents, and to reassemble with instructions on the 19th, when deputies should also be sent to Berne to receive the pensions.¹⁹ In any case the postponement would have been far from agreeable to the council; but the tidings, true and false, that now came pouring in, threw them into a state of agitation. They therefore endeavored to cut short the deliberations by vehement appeals. In a circular dated on the 10th, "in haate," they stated their purpose to take the field with their own forces and those of Freyburg and Solothurn on the 16th. "The duke of Burgundy," they said, "as we have this moment learned from a sure source, has crossed the mountains, and is close upon our borders. All Savoy, as we perceive, is about to unite with him. The matter concerns our lives and possessions, and there is no room for delay. We therefore most earnestly summon and exhort you by your brotherly love to repair at once with all your forces to our town, for the rescue of our lands and lives, in like manner as our fathers and yours were accustomed to stand by one another faithfully, and as we and you are mutually bound to do."²⁰

On the next day they addressed a still more urgent letter to Lucerne, requesting that it might be communicated to the other cantons. "We have just received sure intelligence," they wrote, "that the duke of Burgundy dines to-day at Lausanne. The whole of the Pays de Vaud, except Yverdon, Grandson,

¹⁹ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B.
II. n. 578

²⁰ Deutsch Meissiren-Buch C, 726.
MS.

Payerne, and Morat, has fallen into his hands; and there is no doubt that, without making the least pause, he will move straight against us. We fear, therefore, that our intended setting out on Friday next will be too late, and that speedier measures, for which we are preparing, must be taken. Seeing, then, the greatness of the need, and how it increases from hour to hour, we conjure you by your brotherly love, on which we confidently rely and which we shall never cease to deserve, to hasten with all possible despatch to our defence."²¹

A repetition of these appeals, with a yet stronger representation of the peril, followed on the 12th. The enemy's forces, horse and foot, Burgundians, Lombards, and Germans, with artillery great and small, were steadily advancing. The people of the Pays de Vaud were entirely on their side, and subjects of Berne had been obliged to fly for their lives. Payerne and Morat were now the only obstacles in the way, and the former town was already besieged.²²

Rising by a steady climax, the excitement reached its height on the 13th. The news brought to Berne came in a heap which the council had no means of sifting. Knowing themselves to be the proper objects of vengeance, they had taken for granted that Charles would choose the nearest route to their own gates. This impression had been confirmed by his occupation of the Pays de Vaud, and by the taunts and boasts of the embittered and inflamed population. Hence the approach of the detachment under Ro-

²¹ *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) ²² *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

mont and his associates had been mistaken for that of the whole Burgundian army, or rather of a host which existed only in imagination. Again addressing themselves to Lucerne, as the nearest, ablest, and most deeply bound of their allies, the council wrote, under date of "Tuesday before Saint Valentine's, at noon, in haste," that the duke of Burgundy in person was besieging Payerne at the head of sixty thousand men, and that he intended to press forward in the same direction, attacking one canton after another, first Berne, then Lucerne, and the rest in succession. "Wherefore," they continued, "out of the depth of our hearts we call upon, exhort, and entreat you, as the dearest of our co-citizens, to come with all your power and without any stop, for the deliverance of our hereditary as well as of our acquired lands; sending also, at our cost, instant notice to our other Confederates, that they too may not dally, as you and they desire the preservation of us as the border people, and value your and all our lives, goods, honor, wives and children, towns, lands, and people; not allowing yourselves to think otherwise than that this is a real and pressing need, your help wherein we shall be ready to recompense in all future time, without sparing life or property for you and yours."²²

"Das wir uch als unnsere liebsten Mitbrüder us grund unnsere Hertzen vermanen bitten und anrufen das ir in al. verziehen zu unns mit gantzer macht siechen zu rettung unnsere erplichen und zugebrachten länden, und auch das ander unnsere Eydgnoos in verzug

in unnsere kotten verkanden sich auch nit zu eimen so heb uch und inen sy unnsere als der anstösser und darnach uwer und unnsere aller lib gut ere wib und kind statt land und lutt zu behalten, und lassen uch kein ander beduncken an dann das es rechte not tut, Das wollen

Strange to say, this torrent of supplication failed to set the mass in motion, or even to meet with any corresponding outflow of comfort and assurance. We cannot suppose that the other cantons entertained a deliberate thought of leaving Berne to its fate. But it was natural that, when extraordinary exertions were demanded, they should recollect, not only the original needlessness of the war, the arts by which it had been started, and the evils which it had engendered, but also how their own remonstrances against the openly aggressive character which Berne had persisted in giving to it had been slighted and contemned. Was it so certain even now that they had not been summoned with the mere object of securing conquests made without their participation and against their advice? The cry of "Wolf!" had been heard before, and its tone in the present instance betrayed a suspicious eagerness to create an ebullition. And in fact Berne itself was made aware on the 14th that it had greatly exaggerated the danger. The duke of Burgundy, it appeared, instead of being at Payerne, had but just arrived at Orbe. But while their fears were thus in some measure allayed, the mortification of the council at the passiveness and silence of their Confederates was on this account only the deeper. In a letter to Lucerne dated on the last-mentioned day, they complained that their repeated appeals, made with so much confidence, should have been treated with indifference, and have drawn forth

wir zu ewigen sitten umb uch und guts verdienen." MS. (Archives of all die uern ungespart libe und Lucerne.)

no reply either in writing or by message. They resented the supposition, which they instinctively felt to be entertained, that they would have written so strongly without sufficient cause.²⁴ Their Confederates might be assured that the Burgundian prince was personally in the land, and that his aim was nothing else than the perpetual subjugation of them all.

Still persuaded of the correctness of their conclusions, and seeing no prospect of a prompt and general support, the council now decided on a further retrograde movement. They called in the garrison of Payerne, which had reported the impossibility, if attacked, of holding out without assistance,²⁵ and determined to make their stand at Morat. Here they massed their own levies and invited their allies to rendezvous. Scharnachthal was placed in command, a deputation from the council being sent to assist — or embarrass — him with advice. He might hope to derive more valuable aid from the experience of his lieutenant, Hans von Hallwyl, a gray-haired soldier of fortune, who had served under Podiebrad in the Hussite wars, as well as in Hungary and elsewhere.²⁶ In the Pontarlier expedition the veteran had instructed Diesbach how to protect his columns from cavalry, on the march across an open country, by a moving fence-work of wagons. On the present occasion he seems to have suggested the formation

²⁴ "Und getruwen nit das unser schriften oder beger us so gar hochem vertruwen beschreiben vntervanklich gesehet oder so vnotdurfft gekert werd, Dann in zwiffel wir wölten gar ungern umer

Brüderlich lieb so vil zu schriben es wäre dann gründtlich an im selbe war." *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

²⁵ Girard *MSS.*

²⁶ Schilling, s. 272.

of a signal corps. A line of posts was extended across the strip of land between the lakes of Morat and Neuchâtel. As an immediate result word was received and transmitted to Berne, on the 18th, that the duke of Burgundy, instead of taking the direction in which he was expected, had laid siege to Grandson.²⁷

Had his real aim been the overthrow of the Helvetic Confederacy and the subjugation of the country, Charles would probably have acted as his enemies had anticipated. Berne, in that case, would have been the true objective point, and the road by Payerne and Morat the line of operations. But having come with a different object, it was not his purpose to strike at once at the heart of the Confederacy, leaving its members no choice but to combat for their independence and existence. He has been correctly described as doubting the determination of the Swiss; but this was not because he undervalued their courage, but because he believed them to be paralyzed by their divisions and the notorious aversion of so many of them to a war undertaken from no sufficient motive. Either they would renounce, at his approach, a contest in which they were "mere helpers," or, fighting with lack of numbers and of zeal, they would sustain a defeat that would insure the desired result. He had heard on his passage over the Jura that they had not yet decided on their course, and were about to hold a diet for the purpose at Lucerne.²⁸ It was his policy, therefore, to menace

²⁷ *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C*, 742, 746. *MS.*

²⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 276.

rather than attack — not to shorten the crisis, but to protract it. The road to Neuchâtel was that on which he would be least liable to meet them in force, while the place itself, when reached, would form a new and convenient base, if further demonstrations should be necessary. His object in occupying also the other route had been, not to open his own way to Berne, but to hold that line against irruptions from Berne,²⁹ which would have endangered his flank and rear during his contemplated movement.

The order for the evacuation of Yverdon had not been despatched a moment too soon. The Burgundian vanguard had already enclosed it on the land side when the garrison were prepared for their retreat, which they effected in the night by means of boats, after setting fire to the town. Their accession with guns and ammunition was thought a material addition to the strength of Grandson, although even with this reinforcement the number of its defenders scarcely exceeded five hundred, and there was no proper store of provisions.³⁰ The place was immediately invested. It lies, as already mentioned, close to the lake, at the foot of an inclined plane, which stretches along the shore and which forms the broad and gently sloping base of the line of mountains in the background. It is therefore, of course, commanded from the higher ground immediately in the rear, to which the ascent is somewhat sudden. And this ground was the more easily occupied that it is

²⁹ Ibid. p. 266.

³⁰ Ibid. — Schilling. — Deutsch
Münster-Buch C. MS.

flattened and expanded into the form of a plateau, widening fan-like towards the north and east, where it is skirted by the Arno, a stream of inconsiderable breadth, but flowing in a deep bed, which in the early spring is filled with a dark volume of half-melted snow from the crevices of the mountains. There was consequently ample space for the formation of a camp to cover the siege. The road to Neuchâtel, by which a relieving army might be expected to advance, traverses the plateau, and crosses the Arno about two miles beyond Grandson. Both sides of it were therefore occupied by the Burgundians, whose outposts extended to the Arno, while the camp itself was protected in front by ditches, as well as by the usual breastwork of wagons. Their right was covered by the lake. On their left were the mountains, pathless, wooded, seamed with deep fissures, making it all but impossible for the position to be turned.

In the midst of the most tempestuous weather the duke left Orbe, on the 19th, and proceeded to the camp.²¹ An unsuccessful attempt to carry the place by a *coup-de-main* had been made the day before, when, according to a letter of the council of Berne, the assailants had lost a hundred men, the garrison only two.²² Without waiting for a breach, the duke ordered a general assault on the 21st. The defenders were too few for the circuit of the walls. An entrance having been effected, they were chased back into the

²¹ "Ali 10 di questo ucel in campo a dicto Grandson con cattivissimo tempo quanto si poteva dire," Dé-

pêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 287.

²² Deutsch Meissiven-Buch C, 755. MS.

castle, losing about fifty in their flight. Their task would now be more perilous, but better proportioned to their strength. The height and solidity of the walls made it useless to try an assault before a breach had been opened. A battery was immediately planted, though the heaviest pieces had not yet arrived. Measures were also adopted to prevent the garrison from escaping by the lake.²²

At the meeting of the diet, on the 19th, it had been voted that the troops of each canton should assemble on the 23d, and report to the council of Lucerne, who were empowered, when this had been done, to call another meeting, for the purpose of determining what proportion should take the field, or "how otherwise to proceed."²³ The proposal to send an embassy to Lyons was necessarily rejected, the route being now closed against the Swiss. On the chance, however, of finding a mode of conveyance, a letter was drawn up by the council of Berne, in which they formally summoned Louis to come to their aid, expressing their full confidence that such was his intention, but hinting that, in the event of a disappointment, means might be found of diverting the enemy's vengeance into a different channel.²⁴ The bad taste of this intimation was the more palpable that Louis was known to be now on his way to Lyons, with even a larger force than had been reported. The duke of Burgundy had been warned

²² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. I. II. s. 590.
p. 287.

²³ *Deutsch Meissiven-Buch C*, 752,

²⁴ *Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. *MS.*

of the fact, although, with his usual carelessness in such cases, he had professed to feel no alarm. He was aware that French messengers had recently passed; he doubted not that everything would be done by means of money and promises to encourage the Swiss; but he was strangely confident that the king would not openly violate the treaty and renew the war.³⁴

Nor was it from France alone, among foreign states, that Berne had a right to expect succor. Letters were sent to the imperial towns in Suabia and elsewhere, representing that the Swiss had originally taken up arms at the command of the emperor, that the duke of Burgundy was the notorious foe of the whole German nation, and that his present expedition, like that against Neuss, was designed merely as a prologue to the overthrow of the free communities and the seizure of the imperial crown.³⁵ Answers were received from some quarters; but far from promising the assistance which had been asked for, they contained no word even of sympathy or good will.³⁶ With so magnificent a cause to defend, fighting on everybody's account rather than its own, Berne was yet left to sink alone;—unless it should be helped by Zurich, Schwytz, Unterwalden, by the old and true friends on whom it had turned its back, while prosecuting its schemes of conquest and exulting in the graciousness of its French ally.

³⁴ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. et seq. *MS.*

pp. 278, 288, 302.

³⁵ Schilling, s. 277. — Rodt, E.

³⁶ *Deutsch Meissiren-Buch*, C, 728. II. s. 30, 31.

When notice was brought to Charles that the Confederates had begun to assemble, he scarcely attempted to conceal his disappointment. It was evident from his own language and that of his ministers that he had indulged to the last a strong hope of being met with pacific proposals. Had any honorable terms been offered, it was intimated that he would not have rejected them. But he would not himself take the initiative, nor, if hostilities were opened, would he be the first to recede.³⁹ He ordered immediate preparations in case of a sudden attack. Owing to the continued inclemency of the weather, great numbers of the troops, the Italians in particular, had dispersed among the neighboring villages. The captains were summoned and sternly rebuked for not maintaining better discipline, a striking example being threatened if order were not instantly restored. The men were accordingly brought back to camp and posted at their stations in readiness for battle.⁴⁰ Even now a notion was entertained that advances might perhaps have been made through the regent of Savoy, whose arrival Charles was impatiently expecting. He continued to receive reports of disunion among the Swiss, but also more explicit details of their warlike attitude. The expressions he let drop, while intended as proofs of his confidence, betrayed the depth of his chagrin. Hereafter he would turn a deaf ear to any overtures that might be made. What kept the Confederates together was the money

³⁹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 269.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p. 298.

distributed by France. But he would carry on his enterprise till he had made some of them repent of the support which they had given to the king. He would reduce them to such terms that, when he had turned his back, there would be no danger of their again raising their heads and renewing their furious attacks.⁴¹

The season was backward. The winter had been severe beyond precedent,⁴² and now, when it was breaking up, mountains and valleys lay shrouded in gloom and the tempests howled from the Jura to the Alps. In crossing the pass of Mont Cenis, Yolande had been caught in a terrific snow-storm, and there were no signs of clearing when she descended, on the evening of the 22d, to Chambéry. Her courage had been severely tried by the unaccustomed discomforts and fatigue. She owned that she looked forward with dread to resuming her journey; but since the duke had braved the same terrible weather on her account, she was resolved to do everything in her power to gratify him.⁴³ Her reception at Geneva inspired her with fresh spirits. Two thousand nobles and gentlemen, mounted and armed, had assembled to escort her, and she was welcomed by the people with every demonstration of attachment and joy.⁴⁴ Charles had at first sent his brother Anthony with a splendid train to await her arrival at Lausanne, but seeing a prospect that the services of these cavaliers

⁴¹ Panigarola to the duke of Milan. Ibid. pp. 301, 302.

⁴² Knebel, 2^e Abth. s. 1.

⁴³ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. I. p. 295.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 307.

would be presently needed, had since recalled them. He, however, despatched a messenger to Geneva, with a cordial greeting under his own hand. "You have taken so much trouble," he wrote, "in so rude a season, that, notwithstanding my singular desire to see you, I cannot bear to urge your speedier coming to Lausanne. It is, however, a thing of much importance, in order not to retard the prosecution of the war. And by my faith, were it not for the open demonstration by the enemy of an intention to fight, I would go in person to meet you. But I know well that what you chiefly desire is the certainty of our approaching victory; of which I have the less doubt that I do not imagine the enemy will show such ardor for battle as has been reported. Yet I pray you, madam, to persevere in your determination to take every precaution, which is the way to insure a good and profitable result; committing you, madam, to the pleasure of God, who have you in his holy keeping and grant your desires."⁴⁸

The first intelligence that Grandson was besieged had not created any special alarm at Berne. On the contrary it had quieted the overstrained apprehensions previously felt. The defence would no doubt be obstinate; the enemy was wasting time, which the council could profitably employ in gathering their allies from far and near. The repulse of the first attack strengthened their feeling of security. On the 22d, when it was known that the town had fallen,

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 297.

they wrote to their Confederates for aid, adding that they were more anxious about the garrison, who were chiefly from their own town, than about the castle, though this was important for the safety of Neuchâtel.⁴⁶ They also gave orders for fitting out four large vessels at Estavayer, Scharnachtal being instructed to man them, and either to reënforce or withdraw the garrison as he should find most feasible.⁴⁷ Two days passed without any farther tidings or increased alarm. The council talked of sending their forces to reoccupy Payerne, or else to raze the walls and devastate the surrounding country, but consented, by the advice of the military commanders, to suspend this movement until it was certain that Grandson would hold out.⁴⁸ On this point they appeared to feel no doubt. But on the evening of Saturday, the 24th, news arrived of a terrible import. Two of the garrison, having been lowered from the walls in the previous night, had succeeded in getting through the enemy's lines to Neuchâtel. They reported that the fire of the besiegers was incessant and destructive. The defences of the gates had been shot away, and all the bulwarks, as well as the main tower, were in ruins. A magazine had exploded and done much damage. The head of the artillery-master, whose place there was no one to fill, had been carried off by a ball. The Burgundians, good and bad, were estimated at fifty thousand. They had lined the shore in front of the castle with artillery, and were con-

⁴⁶ Deutsch Misariva-Buch C, 755.
MS.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.* 758. *MS.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* — Rodt, B. II. s. 41.

stantly on the alert, so that it would be useless to think of approaching in vessels either by day or night. Worst of all, the unground corn, which was the sole subsistence of the garrison, would last till Thursday and no longer. Beyond that time it would be impossible to hold out. Unless instant relief were sent, the men must all die.⁴⁹

The inhabitants of Berne were seized with a foreboding. The five hundred all belonged to the canton, most of them to the town itself. Every one knew them by sight or name. It was but a few weeks since they had left home, with little idea of going on a service of especial peril. Their wives and mothers were among the crowd that listened to the news. If forced to surrender there could be no doubt of what would befall them. The pitiless spirit with which the war had been waged, the massacres of captured garrisons and even of unarmed populations, above all the "bad day of Estavayer" rose into remembrance, and it was instinctively felt that, if a single hair on a single head were spared, the retaliation would fall short.

Scharnachthal had already despatched three hundred men to Neuchâtel, where the vessels ordered by the council had been collected and equipped. He wrote home that he and his companions were ready for a more determined effort, if sufficient help could be obtained from the Confederates. The council remained in session day and night, sending forth messengers every hour and in all directions. One sped

⁴⁹ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 767. MS. And printed in Schilling, 4. 279.

to Morat with fresh orders and exhortations; another to the troops of Zurich, who were already in motion, urging them to push forward; a third to Bienne, desiring that all the boats and vessels there should be sent to Neuchâtel, in readiness for a combined movement by sea and land, which might at least give fresh encouragement to the garrison.¹⁰ Wabern and one of his colleagues went to make a personal appeal to the cantons that were still holding back. The letters to the Confederates bore the unmistakable accent of genuine distress. That voice which we have heard in so many different keys, by turns imperious and oringing, sullen and declamatory, almost always loud and insincere, was now soft and pleading like a woman's or a child's. A letter written at midnight on the 24th, after reciting the facts and stating the little prospect of success from the effort now in progress, thus went on: "True, dear, brotherly friends, to lose our five hundred in the castle, and with them perhaps the other three hundred, is a sorrowful thought, and moves our hearts with daily and hourly anguish. For they are all good and worthy people, born and brought up in our town and territory, some of them with families of young children, and have always deported themselves honestly and manfully. Such is their sore need and the situation of affairs, that we see, alas! no way of freeing them from their deadly peril, unless we are able to do it with the sword. Which ours in the camp at Morat,

¹⁰ Deutch Missiven-Buch C. 765, schichtforscher, B. VIII. s. 301. 769 et seq. *MS.*—Schweiz. Ge.—Blatzsch, B. II. s. 290.

trusting to your brotherly aid, have a full willingness to undertake. We beseech you therefore in trueness of heart to despatch your contingents in as full strength and with as much speed as possible, in order that the hand of our grim foe may be unclasped, and that ours — who are also yours! — may be preserved alive. . . . True, dear Confederates, have us and ours in your faithful remembrance, which we in all times will deserve of you and yours." ⁴¹

Twelve hours later the council had received the report of the attempt to rescue the garrison by water. The four vessels, equipped with artillery and preceded by a skiff, which was to show the way, had started in the middle of the night; but owing to the drunkenness of the pilots, it was dawn before they came in sight of Grandson. This, however, made but little difference. A single glance was sufficient to show the impossibility at any hour of penetrating to the besieged or communicating with them. Strong bodies of troops lay posted along the shore; the mouths of numerous cannon could be seen pointed across the water; even a fleet of small vessels was moored in readiness to dispute the approach. Not only was the town occupied by the enemy, but huts, tents, and pavilions, seemingly innumerable, covered the plateau from the precipices to the lake. Near the shore, yet as inaccessible as if perched upon some distant peak, stood the castle, with its doomed inhabitants. They had congregated on the battlements, and were seen running about and leaping in exultation at the delusive

⁴¹ Schilling, s. 279.

prospect of deliverance. The vessels held on their way till within a bow-shot of the land. Then the artillery opened, and the enemy's boats put forth. Veering suddenly, the prows were pointed up the lake. Before sailing away the crews gave a loud cheer, beat their drums, and waved their spears, as a signal to their friends not to despair of relief. But no answer came, except the defiant shouts of the besiegers, some of whom gave chase along the shore, firing their arquebuses and brandishing their lances, until the vessels had rounded a cape and were hidden from view.⁵²

No different result had been expected at Berne. The council had written in the night that their only hope lay in the merciful protection of the Blessed Virgin.⁵³ As the heavenly powers had not intervened, they again turned to their Confederates, giving an account of the failure, and ending with cries of "Quick! Quick! Come! Come! Come!"—like the hoarse call of a panting fugitive.

And they were coming! In that hour of real extremity, at that cry of undoubted anguish, everything was forgotten but the old fraternal bond that had knit the Swiss communities together like the peaks of their Alpine chain. They were coming—their only stipulation, that there should be no besieging of towns or castles, that nothing more should be undertaken than the repulse of the invaders; in other words, that the war on the Swiss

⁵² *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C*, 769. *MS.*—Schalking, i. 277.

⁵³ *In das Veld*, *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C*, 770. *MS.*

side should be henceforth one of defence and not of aggression.

They were coming — but alas! too late; in time to revenge, but not in time to save. When the garrison of Grandson had seen the sails of their countrymen vanish in the distance, hope had become extinct in their own breasts. Instead of giving them fresh heart, that gleam of light had served only to deepen the darkness of their despair. According to reports afterwards current among the Swiss, they were completely demoralized, admitting the loose women of the camp into the interior of the castle, holding confabulations with German soldiers outside, and wrangling among themselves. Four of them are said to have deserted to the enemy, who was thus made acquainted with their desperate condition. The commander, Hans Wyler, though hitherto esteemed a man of resolute bravery, was, if the story be true, one of the first to declare against further resistance. While it is not pretended that any capitulation took place, the surrender is described as having been made on the representations of a German officer that their countrymen were making no effort for their deliverance, and that their only chance lay in committing themselves to the mercy of the duke, with whom, in return for a *douceur*, he promised to intercede for them.²⁴ Whatever may have been the foundation for

²⁴ Schilling, s. 281-283. — Schilling of Lucerne, s. 75, 77. — There are several versions of the story — all equally devoid of evidence. The earliest — which will be touched

upon hereafter — Berne, for reasons of its own, sought to suppress. Indeed, the council would appear not to have believed any of the reports. They wrote repeatedly to the camp,

these rumors, we find no confirmation of them in the most trustworthy evidence extant, which is contained in the despatches of the Milanese ambassador, Panigrola. He had written from the first that Charles was confident of taking the castle in the course of a few days, that he had guarded against the flight of the garrison, and had no intention of sparing their lives.⁶⁶ On the 29th he wrote that, having lost all chance of receiving succor by the lake, by which alone it would have been feasible, and heavier guns having been brought to bear upon them, they had sought several times, but without success, to obtain terms, and had finally surrendered at discretion on the morning of the previous day.⁶⁷ This was Ash Wednesday. Berne had been warned that they could not hold out beyond Thursday, and its own ineffective effort in the interval may well have seemed like a confession of impotence and an abandonment.

The number of the prisoners was four hundred and twelve.⁶⁸ After their arms and money had been taken

stating what they had heard, and inquiring whether any truth were contained in it; but in none of their subsequent letters, though expressing sorrow and indignation at the fate of the garrison, do they make any charge of treachery.

⁶⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 287

⁶⁷ "A questo Castello di Grandson aveva questi di troia lardigleria. Ora li aveva piantato le bombarde grosse et cominsato trare: piu volte si avevano voluto rendere vedendo non avere soccorso dal lago . . . salva le persone, tantum prefato

Sig' li ha voluto a discretion: heri matina si resono ad ea volonta." *Ibid.* p. 301. — Probably the exact truth is contained in a letter written from the Swiss army, by the Lucerne chiefs, on the 1st of March. It states that the garrison was so hard pressed that the majority insisted on surrendering at discretion, urging, besides the impossibility of holding out, the fair words used by the soldiery for the purpose of tempting them. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

⁶⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, ubi supra.

from them, they were marched up a winding street leading to the eminence behind the town. The duke sat in front of his pavilion, which, according to tradition, was pitched near a broad rock that crops out in the corner of a field and still bears the name of *La Pierre de Mauconseil*—"the stone of bad council." For it is stated by Swiss writers that a council of war was held to decide upon the treatment of the captives, opinions being divided until a swarm of people from the surrounding country threw themselves at Charles's feet and implored him to take vengeance for the ravages and slaughters at Orbe, Estavayer, and other places.⁵⁵ This account might help perhaps to excuse the cruelty that ensued; but whether it had any other origin than the guilty conscience of those who gave it currency, is a matter of uncertainty. Panigarola simply relates that the unfortunate men were paraded before the duke, who thereupon issued a sudden order for their execution.⁵⁶ They were accordingly taken in charge by the provost-marshal and his assistants, and, their arms and legs having been bound, they were strung up, without further preparation, to the trees scattered sparsely through the camp. In some instances ten or more were attached to a single branch, which, breaking beneath its load, dropped them half alive to the ground, where their convulsions were abridged and their limbs mutilated by the pikes of the soldiers. Others were taken

⁵⁵ Schilling, s. 283. — Chron. des Chanoines de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, B. VIII. s. 272.

⁵⁶ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. i. p. 301.

out on the lake and drowned. Two were spared to aid in the execution of their comrades and to receive the curses of their countrymen. About four hours were occupied in the work, the bodies being left suspended till other hands should cut them down.⁶⁰ "It is a horrible, a fearful sight, that of so many dangling corpses," wrote the Milanese ambassador. Yes, and with all the provocation, a horrible, an execrable deed! "You can imagine," he adds, "the terror it will produce in the Swiss." In the Swiss? O no, rather in those who had witnessed or shared in the act!

On the 27th the council of Berne had been able to write with comparative calmness. The whole Confederacy was in motion, and a general plan of operations had been agreed upon. Berne's original project of marching by the way of Payerne had been rejected as too hazardous, — the whole line with its strong places being occupied by hostile forces, — and also because it was now evident that the duke intended to advance by the other route.⁶¹ Instead of Morat, therefore, Neuchâtel was designated as the place of meeting, and during the next few days there was a constant influx into that town. Intelligence of this gathering, with a very accurate estimate of the numbers, was immediately transmitted to Charles. He professed to be well pleased. A battle, he said, was what he most desired; it would enable him to

⁶⁰ Ibid. ubi supra. — Blasch. — Molinet. — Schilling. — Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, tom. vi.

⁶¹ Letters in Blasch, R. II. a. 290, 291. — Etterlin, fol. 90.

end the war at a single stroke.* On the morning of the 1st of March he rode out with his body-guard on the road to Neuchâtel, for the purpose of making a reconnoissance.

The ground which he traversed was to be on the following day the scene of the wished-for encounter. Its general aspect is that of an oblong plain, sloping from the foot of the mountains to the lake, and gradually contracting in width until, at a distance of five or six miles from Grandson, it is completely closed. For there the mountain line curves suddenly towards the lake, and sends down a broad Spur, which bars the view and terminates in capes and bluffs, though generally with a winding selvage of level shore.

The principal mountain mass overlooking the plain is the Mont Aubert, which attains a height of some three thousand feet above the level of the lake. Its mound-shaped summit rises from the centre of the curve, while its broad shoulder and the ridge that connects it with Mont Chasseron fill the rest of the background. A shaggy forest of firs, beeches, and oaks covers all its slopes as well as the crest of the Spur.

The plain has an average breadth of perhaps a mile and a half. The floor is not a regular slope. It curls up in places, especially along the shore, leaving hollows in the rear, from which the lake is not always in sight. The road from Grandson, after trending back to take advantage of these hollows,—the dip being greatest where it crosses the Arno,—again

* *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 308.

turns to the right and makes for the shore, so as to wind around the foot of the Spur, or pierce it at its lowest elevation. It first touches the lake at the village of Concise, near the extremity of the plain, but is then forced to make a *détour* round a conical hill divided from the Spur by a kind of defile. In a level nook that opens out immediately beyond stands a manor-house, formerly a Carthusian convent, called *La Lance*.⁶³ From here the road continues along the margin of the lake, and clears the Spur at Vauxmarcus, a mile and a half farther on.

But there is also another road, branching off from the former at the hamlet of Onnens, a little beyond the Arno, and keeping a much straighter course across the plain. It follows the line of hollows, with a slightly descending track, until it begins to ascend the Spur, which it crosses at an elevation several hundred feet above the main road, and half a mile or more in the rear of it. This road, now scarcely used and in many places difficult to trace, is known as the *via détra*, and is thought to have been a section of a Roman highway, of which other vestiges may be found in the adjacent country.

Even where it traverses the plain, the *via détra* is a silent and lonely road at the time of year to which our narrative relates. Villages lie to the right, in the vicinity of the lake, and to the left, along the base of the mountains. But the *via détra* passes not a single habitation till it is half way up the flank of the

⁶³ The name originated in the most precious of the sacred relics belonging to the establishment — a piece of the lance with which the Saviour's side was pierced.

Spur, where there is a low, dark, ancient farm-house, known from time immemorial as the *Prise Gaula*. Meadows, cornfields, and vineyards line the way, with no enclosures, save here and there a strip of low wall built of yellow stone and overhung with ivy, whose berries the wayfaring peasant stops to press between his fingers, prognosticating from their firmness an abundant vintage. The vine-buds, however, have not yet begun to swell; the fields are brown, the woods and orchards leafless or sere; the heights are still fringed with snow; and there are no signs of awakening spring, except that the air has something of a vernal freshness, and that a lark, the first of the year, rises from the ground with jerks of flight and gushes of song, as if melody and motion proceeded from the same organs.

On the ascent of the Spur, just before reaching the *Prise Gaula*, a swell of ground, curving out from the road like a pulpit from one of the pillars of a cathedral, invites us to pause and cast a backward glance over the plain. From this point of view it has the appearance of an amphitheatre, the heights around forming an arc of a circle, while the shore line is the irregular chord. At our feet is a cross road, leading down from the *via détra* to Corcelles on the lower road, and passing a field where three obelisks of granite, called *Les Pyramides*, are supposed to commemorate the events we are about to relate, though they are more probably of a far older date.* Look-

* There are at present four pillars, the proprietor of the soil having, some years ago, erected one at his own cost, not for the purpose of

ing across the lake, we see ill-fated Estavayer and other towns; behind, a far-reaching table-land, backed by the Alps of Freyburg; with glimpses of loftier and more distant peaks, farthest yet most conspicuous the silvery pinnacles of the Dent du Midi.

After passing the farm house, the *via détra*, still ascending, plunges into the forest that covers the back of the Spur, which here, as below, is a mile and a half in breadth. On the opposite descent, the road winds back, and comes suddenly on a narrow rift or gorge, now called the *Combe de Pont Porret*, but formerly the *Combe de Ruauz*.²² It cleaves the Spur lengthwise in a nearly straight line, and forms the channel of a mountain torrent, that intersects the lower road at Vauxmarcus. The gorge may be considered as the boundary of the Spur; for, after gaining an eminence on the farther side, we have an uninterrupted view for many miles in the direction of Neuchâtel. There is here, however, no plain in sight, scarcely a spot of level ground. The outer ridge of the Jura runs parallel with the lake and springs directly from the shore. But the slopes, which are clothed with vineyards and specked with villages, cannot be called steep; and the *via détra*, now a cheerful and frequented route, zigzags down the incline and soon rejoins the lower road.

mystifying antiquaries, but with the meritorious object of converting the triangle into a square. We have no belief in the Druidical origin ascribed for these stones.

²² "Combe, creux de vallée de toutes parts entourée de montagnes

et n'ayant qu'une issue." Sainte-Beuve, *Portraits littéraires*, tom. ii. p. 345, note. — The word appears to be Celtic. In France it is confined, we believe, to the Jura; but it is used in a similar sense in Cornwall.

From this description, if intelligible, it will be apparent that, supposing two armies to advance simultaneously from Grandson and Neuchâtel, they would be hidden from each other's view till close at hand or actually engaged. The barrier between them, the Spur of the Mont Aubert, would become the object of a struggle. The party by which it was first occupied would have a great advantage of position, and could only be dislodged by a much superior force. On the Grandson side the distance would be shorter, the ascent easier, and in case of disaster the line of retreat smoother and more open. From the opposite direction the approach could be made only by one road; it would be necessary to cross the *Combe de Ruaux*; and when this had been effected, the gorge would cover the rear of the position instead of the front. On the *via détra* the bridge was narrow and overlooked by the steep banks. The passage by the lower road was much more convenient, but was commanded by the castle of Vauxmarcus, which fronts on a slope descending to the road, while the lofty rear wall, now grimed with age, rises from the edge of the gorge, here perfectly impassable.

The owner of this castle was a kinsman and vassal of the count of Neuchâtel. After the failure of his scheme of mediation, Rodolph had given fresh assurances to Berne of his resolution to remain faithful to its cause. He could not personally fight against an army in which his only son held a command. But he had encouraged the citizens of Neuchâtel to swell

the Confederate ranks, he had sent his own retainers to man the Bayards and other passes, and he had placed his castle, with its stores of wine and provisions, at the disposal of the Swiss, who were now freely availing themselves of this privilege.* Their outposts extended to Bevaix, within three miles of Vauxmarcus, which was not thought to be in any danger. But in the morning of the 1st of March Charles arrived before the gate and sent in a summons. John of Neuchâtel immediately tendered his submission, requesting mercy on his knees for the handful of country people that formed his garrison. The duke, who wished to treat Neuchâtel as friendly territory, listened graciously and dismissed the men, after questioning them as to whether they had been expecting reinforcements. He entered the building,[†] accepted refreshments, and chose from his escort a body of archers to leave as a garrison. He seems also to have examined the ground in the rear, and to have made some preparations for disputing the passage of the gorge by the *vis détra*. On a tumulus commanding the bridge are the conspicuous remains of an earthwork traditionally known as "the Burgundian Redoubt." From Vauxmarcus he pushed forward far enough to get a view of the Swiss outposts. In the evening, after his return to camp, he gave an entertainment to the new embassy

* *Chroniques de Neuchâtel*. — are still in their place, although they no longer communicate with the interior, the front of the mansion being modern.

Boyve. — *Deutsch Misaven-Buch* C. MS.

† The stairs up which he passed

from Milan, and announced his purpose to march the next morning and take up another position.⁶⁶

During this same day the Swiss forces, like one of their mountain rivers augmented by frequent rills, had been constantly accumulating. Troops from every canton and from several of the allied states had now come up. Sigismund of Austria, instead of taking the field in person, as he had been so strongly exhorted to do, had failed to send a single man. He had in fact concluded a secret truce under the auspices of the emperor. As a passive spectator he would be able to judge more coolly of the event, and decide between the relative merits of his former and present protectors. Some other members of the Lower League had been equally remiss. But Strasburg and Basel had obeyed the earliest requisition from Berne, and their soldiers, having left home about Saint Valentine's day, had been among the first to arrive. The corps of Berne had broken up from Morat on the 27th, and had since been lying at the villages between Neuchâtel and Vauxmarcus, awaiting its Confederates. It numbered over seven thousand men, without counting those of Freyburg, Solothurn, and Bienne, amounting to two thousand more. With these it made up nearly half the army, which in all somewhat exceeded nineteen thousand combatants.⁶⁷ All were infantry

⁶⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 304, 305. — *Chronique des Chanoines de Neuchâtel*, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, B. VIII. s. 273, 274.

⁶⁷ An official list, in the Archives of Lucerne, gives a total of 18,116,

embracing about 14,000 from the eight cantons, 2500 from their Helvetic allies and dependencies, the remainder from the Lower League. But there are some omissions, Neuchâtel (about 500) being the principal.

except three hundred of the Strasburgers, sixty of the Basel men, and a hundred and twenty Austrian volunteers under Hermann von Eptingen.⁷⁰ Lucerne, from which a greater effort might have been expected, had sent less than nineteen hundred, led by the *ex-schultheiss* Heinrich Hasefurter; Zurich, seventeen hundred, with Hans Waldmann, the most popular of the Confederate leaders, as nominally second but virtually first in command. Among the smaller cantons Schwytz had done by far the best; and its twelve hundred warriors — about a third of its fighting population — led by Rudolph Reding, a descendant of one of the three founders of the Confederacy, were preëminent in stature, as well as in warlike aptitude and training.⁷¹ But in truth the whole army was composed of picked men, the *élite* of the most warlike population of the time. As they strode through the streets of Neuchâtel, singing their Alpine songs, and taking "great leaps" expressive of eagerness and joy, the burghers regarded them with admiration and delight tempered by a sensation of fear. Had their ardor been less, the terrible news, which passed from rank to rank, of the fate that had befallen their countrymen, supplied a sufficient stimulant. To the first thrill of dismay succeeded a fierce desire for revenge, and by a spontaneous impulse "Grandson, Grandson!" was adopted as the battle-cry.⁷²

Late in the evening the chiefs assembled in council

⁷⁰ Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 29, 30 et al. Helveticæ.

⁷¹ Bonstetten, Beschreibung der Burgunderkriege, and ⁷² Chronique de Hugues de Pierre, Purry, Extraits, pp. 28, 29.

— according to tradition, on a plat of ground between Boudry and Colombier, where a tree called *Le Bataillard* still marks the spot. It was known that Vauxmarcus had fallen. Yet no suspicion was entertained that the enemy designed to make a forward movement, although a note containing information to that effect had been received by the margrave from John of Neuchâtel.⁷³ Its contents were either not communicated to the Swiss leaders, or were judged by them unworthy of credence. They assumed that Charles, having a strong position and fortified camp, would remain on the defensive; and the question they debated was whether to try and dislodge him by a direct attack, or endeavor to lure him from his advantage by threatening some post occupied by a detachment.⁷⁴ In their ignorance of the exact disposition of his forces, it was finally decided to storm Vauxmarcus in the morning, and after its recapture to hold another conference.⁷⁵

Throughout the night, which was cold and dark,⁷⁶ there was a continual bustle and emulous advance. The Strasburgers having deviated some distance from the route for the purpose of foraging, the Basel

⁷³ The note, with one from the margrave to the burghers of Landeron, enclosing the former, may be found in Matile, *Musée de Neuchâtel*.

⁷⁴ "Oder ob wir im fur ein statt so er ingenomen hatt siechen, da mit er uffbrech die zu entschutten." Letter of the Lucerne chiefs to the council, dated "in ein dorff-litt [probably Bevaix] ein halb mil

von famergu uff fritag zu nacht." *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* *MS.* — From Euterlin, Knebel, and other chroniclers we learn that the same ignorance of Charles's intentions existed the next morning.

⁷⁶ "Wiewol es ein vinstere kalte nacht was." Letter of Ulrich Meltinger of Basel, in Knebel, 2te Abth. a. 11.

men, who were hanging in the rear, received orders to send forward their handful of cavalry. As they passed the troops of Solothurn and of Schwytz, these in turn sprang to their feet, sounded their horns, and resumed the march they had suspended a few hours before. It was dawn when the horsemen reached the front, where they were regaled with wine provided by the villagers. The Lucerners, while hearing mass, were overtaken by the men of Schwytz, who went by with swift strides, drawing after them the more eager of their Confederates. In this way there ensued a mingling of ranks, attended with some degree of confusion. Berne, however, still held the advance. As soon as the foremost of its troops came in sight of Vauxmarcus, they made a dash at the castle, thinking to carry it by a mere display of daring. But a well-directed volley from the interior stretched a good many of them on the ground, and the whole corps was brought to a halt.⁷

While the commanders were deliberating on a method of attack, the Schwytzers came up behind, and, finding their progress obstructed, turned to the right and climbed the slopes, till they struck the *via détra* close to the *Combe de Ruaux*. Essaying to cross, they too were repulsed by an unexpected discharge of arrows, and having retreated up the high bank, they perceived that the wooded ground on the opposite side of the gorge was occupied by a body of archers. Their shouts for aid, caught up by those in

⁷ Letters in Knebel, 2te Abth. s. — Schilling, s. 285, 286.
11, 12, 16, 17. — Euerlia, fol. 90.

the rear, set the troops of Berne in motion on the same route. As soon as this was perceived, the Schwytzers made a determined rush, carried the bridge, and began to drive the enemy before them through the woods. Pushed aside from the *via détra*, their natural line of retreat, the archers, still skirmishing, descended the Spur in an oblique direction, which brought them out on the lower road, in the vicinity of *La Lance*. Their pursuers followed on the flank and rear, the greater number keeping to the *via détra*, as well as the narrowness of the way and the masses of wet snow with which it was still encumbered would permit. But no sooner had they begun to emerge from the forest on the opposite slope than they halted in sudden amazement. Below them on the plain, spread out so as seemingly to cover its length and breadth, was the whole Burgundian army, with its imposing masses of cavalry interlaced with columns of infantry, its innumerable banners and glittering equipments, the artillery in front, lines of wagons and a host of camp-followers in the rear.⁷⁶

Had Charles believed that the Swiss, after the fall of Grandson, would come to attack him in his fortified camp, he would perhaps have awaited them there. But the intention he ascribed to them was simply that of disputing his march to Neuchâtel. On their part they had fallen into the similar mistake of supposing that his occupation of Vauxmarcus had no further motive than that of obstructing their own

⁷⁶ Schilling, s. 286, 287. — Chron. forschet, B. VIII. s. 276.
de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichte.

advance upon Grandson. His real aim had however been to secure his passage across the Spur. He had been prompter than the enemy in seizing the pass, though not in sufficient force to offer more than a temporary resistance. He had counted on arriving with his army in time to complete his occupation. But though the Swiss had not foreseen the necessity for haste, their natural eagerness, unrestrained by any cumbersome discipline, had caused them to be beforehand with him.

On the Burgundian side, the troops had been marshalled with a minute and pompous precision, not perhaps unnecessary to prevent confusion in a force so variously composed. It was about eight o'clock when the march was opened,⁷⁹ amid flourishes of trumpets and clarions. The vanguard, led by the Great Bastard, took the lower road, its place being on the right when in line of battle. After reaching Concise, it was ordered to seize the hill overlooking the convent of *La Lance* and commanding the defile around the foot of the Spur. Scarcely had this post been occupied when a flight of arrows drew attention to the neighboring heights, down which, as already mentioned, the Burgundian archers were retreating before the Swiss.⁸⁰

These archers were the advanced guard⁸¹ of the second or main corps, which, commanded by the duke in person, had followed the *via détra*. It was therefore,

⁷⁹ "Essendo proibeto S^{re} con lo exercito partito al doi." Pasigarola to the duke of Milan, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 316.

⁸⁰ Ibid. — Chron. de Neuchâtel. — Hugues de Pierre. — Molinet.

⁸¹ Bullinger, Chron. *MS.*

as usual, in the centre, when he formed his order of battle. His dispositions were made without tumult or confusion.⁶² He retired his right wing from its too advanced position, still keeping it however on the lower road; while he brought up the rearguard to its customary position on the left, where it rested on the slopes of the Mont Aubert.⁶³ The artillery, a single battery of field-pieces, appears to have been posted in front of his right centre, behind a deep cut or hollow near the cross-road before mentioned, whence it could play obliquely on both the main roads.⁶⁴ Charles had failed in his original design of occupying the Spur; and his troops, not well suited to hold such a position, were still less competent to storm it. His project now was to draw the Confederates down into the plain, where he might envelop them with superior numbers and overwhelm them with his cavalry.

After debouching from the forest the Swiss, consisting chiefly of the corps of Berne, Freyburg, and Schwytz, had ranged themselves, in a compact mass, on the flank of the Spur, in front of the *Prise Gaulte* and covering the *via détra*. Their form was that of a deep line or oblong square. The standard of the white cross, encircled by some thirty banners, floated over the centre. These were environed by a solid

⁶² "Zur stund wurden die Fiend auch gerüst, und hielten in guter Ordnung." Schilling s. 267.

⁶³ "Dryen huffen — der ein an dem berg. . . der andre in der wyte in mittel, u. der dritte wider

den see." Letter in Knebel, Etc Abth. s. 16.

⁶⁴ See the article on the battle of Grandson, by M. Frédéric Dubois, (Mittheilungen der Antiq. Gesellschaft von Zurich.)

array of halberds; while the outer ranks displayed, on the three exposed sides, a dense thicket of protruding spears. The front line thrust the butts into the earth, presenting the points at an upward slant. A few hundred arquebusiers were posted on the outside, the horse and some field-pieces in the rear.⁶⁶ According to a computation of the Burgundians — which cannot have been far wide of the truth — the force by which they were thus confronted amounted to nine or ten thousand. It appeared to be marshalled by a chief on horseback, conspicuous as well by his motions as by his long beard and a tunic descending to his stirrups.⁶⁷ When the array had been completed, the troops knelt down and uttered a fervent prayer, “as long as three Paternosters and three Ave Marias.”⁶⁸ Loud derisive laughter is said to have burst from the Burgundian ranks.⁶⁹

Hardly had the Swiss regained their feet when a line of skirmishers advanced, driving in the arquebusiers, but falling back as the solid mass moved forward instinctively to repel them. It still leaned upon the slope, but the front extended to the vines

⁶⁶ Schilling, s. 287. — Letter of Panigarola, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 372. — Edlibach, s. 150.

⁶⁷ *Dépêches Milanaises*, ubi supra. — Molinet, tom. i. p. 192. — And see Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 30.

⁶⁸ Letter of Meltinger, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 14.

⁶⁹ Schilling, s. 287. — Hugues de Pierre, one of the Neuchâtel chroniclers, puts a speech into the mouth of Charles — “Par St. Georges ces canailles crient merci. Gens de

canons, feux sur ces vilains!” — which, it need hardly be said, belongs to the stock incidents of the writers of his class. Anecdotes of a different kind — such as the *mot* attributed to the duke’s jester, “Nous voilà bien hannibalisés” — originated in the fertile inventive talent of the *ana* writers of the 17th and 18th centuries. *Le Glorieux*, whose proper name was Adrianus, was employed about this period on missions for the regent of Savoy.

along the base of the incline. The artillery now opened on it. Eight or ten of the men of Schwytz fell at the first discharge. But only an angle of the square seems to have been directly exposed to the fire; and by edging a little to the right — where also the ground falls away towards a rivulet that issues from the reëntering angle of the mountain curve — it was easy for the Swiss to avoid the range.⁵⁹

Charles now made an effort to dislodge them by force. He brought up a body of cavalry on his extreme left, and launched it against their right flank, hoping to drive them from the *via détra*, and throw them in disorder aslant his own centre. The attack was led by Louis of Châteauguyon, mounted on a gray charger of renowned strength and size, and bearing on his lance-head the striped banner of his house, blue, brown, and white, with a gold cross of Saint Andrew suspended from the silk. As the squadron swept at full gallop along the base of the mountain, the Swiss leaders, perceiving that, if the charge were successful, it would split the square in twain, called upon their men to close their ranks and to hold their spears with a firm grasp. Hermann von Eptingen, who had taken charge of the horse, faced it towards the menaced side, lest the flank should be overlapped. Owing, however, to the narrowness and irregularities of the ground in this contracted corner of the plain, the assailants were obliged to wheel before delivering their charge, which then fell with

⁵⁹ Bullinger, Chron. M.S. — Rodt. — Knebel.

diminished momentum on the Swiss front. Pushing resolutely on, they strove to press back the impenetrable lines and reach the banners — until the pointed steel pierced the nostrils of the horses, making them unmanageable and dispersing them in wild flight. Châteauguyon, followed by a few, still stuck to the attack. With curb and spur he urged and lifted his steed, which vaulted over the outer rows and plunged into the mass. Twice his hand was on the banner of Schwytz, which was with difficulty rescued from his clutch. The next moment his horse, mortally wounded, reared and fell back, throwing its mailed rider helpless on the ground. His banner was snatched away by a Lucerner, and a burgher of Berne, Hans von der Grubbe, armed with a "half-lance," sprang upon the prostrate nobleman and despatched him. He was twenty-eight years of age. Eleven years before Charles had described him as fitted by nature to arrive at the highest excellence — if it should so please God⁸⁰

As many as had emulated his example shared his fate. Of the Swiss about thirty were overthrown.⁸¹ Conscious that they had narrowly escaped an irreparable disaster,⁸² they began to look anxiously for some token that their Confederates were at hand. As yet they had warded off only partial onslaughts;

⁸⁰ Letter of Charles, in Clerc, tom. ii. p. 520. — Etterlin, fol. 90 verso. — Schilling, s. 288. — Letter of Meltinger, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 13. — Edlibach. — Rodt. — Bullinger, Chron. MS.

⁸¹ Bullinger, Chron. MS.

⁸² "Do werckte der allmechtig gott — denn hette derseib huff volltruckt so weren wir gerecht gewesen." Letter of Meltinger.

the bulk of the enemy's forces were waiting for an opportunity to engage. The artillery again opened fire; the archers gave them more serious and continual annoyance, and they could not venture to spread their lines, for fear of weakening the formation on which their power of resistance depended.

Another attack was now tried, this time from the Burgundian centre. The duke arranged his columns of mingled cavalry and foot in the form of a salient angle, placing his heaviest horse, the cuirassiers of his guard, at the apex.⁸⁵ Taking the standard in his own hand, he put himself at their head.⁸⁶ Trumpets and clarions blew, and the assailants advanced, with loud shouts and at full speed, against the centre of the opposing line. The charge is described in a letter of the council of Berne as terrific.⁸⁷ Yet it made no impression on the serried ranks,⁸⁸ which maintained themselves with the solidity of a rock.⁸⁹ Charles had his horse killed under him, but was speedily remounted,⁹⁰ and his troops fell back to a more removed position than they had previously held.

⁸⁵ Letter of Meltinger. — Freyburger Chronik, ap. Rodt.

⁸⁶ "Prit son Estendard lui-mesme en sa main, et coucha sa lance en arrest contre ses Ennemis, ce qui estoit une horrible chose de son couraige à voir." Chron. de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, B. VIII. s. 277.

⁸⁷ "Grünelich." Deutsch Missionen-Buch C, 777. MS.

⁸⁸ Ibid. MS. We are not, however, perfectly sure that the word was meant to apply to this particular charge. In fact, there is some

uncertainty as to the precise order of the attacks. Although there are no striking discrepancies in the different contemporary accounts, yet, each being incomplete and sadly lacking in symmetry, we have had to piece them together by a minute process, with more labor than skill.

⁸⁹ "Tanquam petram immobiles stare." Bonstetten, Beschreibung der Burgunderkriege.

⁹⁰ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. I. p. 324. — In a letter of the council of Berne, his horse is said to have been wounded. Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 23.

Looking upon this as a retreat, the Swiss made a counter-advance. By little and little they allowed themselves to be drawn forward into the plain,⁹⁹ until their rear was entirely uncovered; and Charles, conceiving that victory was now within his grasp, prepared to secure it by a decisive blow. He threw the weight of his force upon the flanks, strengthening especially his left wing, so as to bear down upon the Swiss from the elevated ground on that side, and surround them, or drive them towards the lake.¹⁰⁰ To entice the enemy still deeper into the net, as well as to gain room for the movements of his own troops, he ordered the artillery, with its supports, mainly infantry, to retire from the front and spread out on either flank.¹⁰¹

Simultaneously with these evolutions¹⁰² the heads of the long-expected columns came in view, filing from the forest on the crest of the Spur. After reaching Vauxmarcus, which was not till the other corps had disappeared, they had lingered a long time, ignorant of what was going on, and undecided whether to encamp above the castle, as they supposed their

⁹⁹ "A poco a poco li aveva tirati fori dal monte et conducevali basso al piano." Letter of Panigarola, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 318. — "Do hielt er uns so schimpflich das er uns hinab sallet byss gantz in die wyte." Letter of Meltinger, Knebel, ubi supra.

¹⁰⁰ "Wie der Hertzog gar vill Volke hatt, hubend sich etlich an, ein Hauffen zu thun, in willen die Eydtgnossen zu umringen, und als

by einem zu erschlachen, und in sonderheit macht sich ein schöner Hauff an den Buchel und Berg, so nebed den Eydtgnossen ward, sie zu überhöhn." Bullinger, *Chron. MS.* — "Li circondava per serrarli in mezzo." Letter of Panigarola, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 311.

¹⁰¹ Letters of Panigarola, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 311, 316. Molinet, tom. i. p. 193.

¹⁰² Bullinger, *Chron. MS.*



friends to have done, or turn it and push on.¹⁰³ At last the report of cannon, followed by a message from the front, enlightened them as to the state of affairs, and led them to hasten forward by the *via détra*.¹⁰⁴ As they emerged in view of the field and caught sight of the imperilled band of their countrymen, now in the extremity of their need, they raised a mighty shout and redoubled their pace. An unclouded sun played upon their banners and polished lance-heads. The harsh horns of the forest cantons — the “steer” of Uri, the “cow” of Unterwalden — sent forth a continuous and dissonant clangor.¹⁰⁵

From the Burgundian rear, where the reserves, the wagoners and the camp-followers, were watching the combat, the two salient features visible at this moment were their own troops withdrawing from the front in seeming retreat, and the Swiss, both in the plain and on the heights beyond, — almost a continuous stream from this point of view, — pressing forward as if in pursuit. All supposed that the day was lost. The cry of *Sauve qui peut!* was raised. The wagoners cut the traces and galloped off, followed by a struggling mass. The panic caught the retiring squadrons, and extended to the whole of the

¹⁰³ Etterlin (who was in this rear corps), fol. 90 verso.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. — “Durch den Berg, und den engen Weg.” Schilling, s. 288 — M. Dubeis understands this “narrow way” as being the lower road, and the “hil.” as the “colline de la Lance.” But Schilling had used the same terms when describing the march of the foremost corps; and

the language of Etterlin — “do zugentalle Eydtgnossen angentz schnell hin nach” — implies that the same track was followed by all. The precisely opposite error in most of the modern accounts will be noticed hereafter.

¹⁰⁵ Etterlin, ubi supra. — Bullinger, Chron. MS.

infantry. In a few moments the greater part of the Burgundian army was in full flight.¹⁰⁶

At this astounding spectacle Charles remained for an instant thunderstruck. Then, putting spurs to his horse and waving his naked sword above his head, he dashed into the press, endeavoring with calls, with gestures, with blows, to arrest and turn back the terrified herd. But in such moments far abler commanders have been powerless.¹⁰⁷ The torrent only rushes the more wildly around the obstruction. The day was indeed lost. All that could now be done was to cover the retreat and give time for the fugitives to rally behind the defences of the camp.

Returning to his body-guard, he collected around it the relics of the different corps, and formed them into a rearguard. By successive charges he was able to check the pursuit and save his army from the annihilation with which it was threatened. The bulk of the Confederates followed slowly in close order, halting to receive the attacks. The cavalry, by Eptingen's command, remained prudently in the rear. A body of light troops, under Hans von Mülinen of Berne, struck out on the flanks and kept the lead in the chase. The last encounter occurred at the mill, on the bank of the Arno. Here the bridge was held until the mass of the Burgundian infantry

¹⁰⁶ Letters of Panigarola, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 311, 318.

¹⁰⁷ "Er reitt selbe mit einem blossen schwert under sin Ätt, schlug vff sy, vnd vermeint sy ze swiugen das sy nit fluchen sollte.

Aber es was alles arbeit vmb sust." Euerlin. — "Mai fo in possanza di p^a S. di far voltare homo: el quale certo con gran^{mo} animo si governo." Letter of Panigarola, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 318.

had got safely over. It was not until the Swiss, breaking through the thick bushes that lined the stream, had begun to ford it above and below, that Charles, whose own followers had dwindled to a handful, turned his horse and rode back to the camp.¹⁰⁸

He had left it in perfect order, guarded by a detachment, and protected by a powerful artillery including the siege guns, and by such of the wagons as had not been required for the transport of supplies for immediate use. It would have been easy, with even a small force properly stationed, to withstand at least the first attack of the Swiss,¹⁰⁹ who were now approaching in loose and widely-scattered bands. But the renewed efforts of Charles to rally a sufficient number for the purpose were as vain as before.¹¹⁰ The great body of the fugitives had swept along without a pause,¹¹¹ and ere long the ground was entirely deserted, except by the duke and a small company of cavaliers. Among them was Panigarola, who, after watching the combat and retiring to the camp, had resolved not to leave it until he had seen the end. Turning to him, Charles exclaimed that he had been betrayed; treason, not fear, must have led

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. — Letter of Maltinger. — Bonstetten. — Chron. de Neuchâtel. — Rodt. — Hostile eye-witnesses, as we have seen, do justice to Charles's personal valor; and the testimony of Panigarola, who had still better opportunities of observing it, is very emphatic: "Certo monstro quel di grande virtu, animo et constantia."

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Dépêches Milanaïses, tom. i. p. 317.

¹⁰⁹ "Che se li arebe potuto far male assai." Dépêches Milanaïses, tom. i. p. 312.¹¹⁰ "Facendo prima ogni prova di unire li soi di, se fosse stato possibile." Ibid. p. 313.¹¹¹ "Erano già longi due leghe." Ibid. p. 312.

to this base desertion before the troops had even come to blows, and at the moment when the enemy was certain to have been routed.¹¹² His officers and Panigarola begged him to retire, telling him there was no time to lose. But he seemed as if rooted to the spot. The Swiss were already swarming around before he could be urged away, almost by force.¹¹³

As the Confederates, panting and exhausted,¹¹⁴ came upon the scene, they too were transfixed with surprise. They found themselves in a camp such as none of them had ever before seen,¹¹⁵ filled with booty such as they had never imagined. But there was another spectacle that arrested their wandering eyes — the bodies of their countrymen swinging from the trees, some stripped to their shirts, others still clad in the familiar, homely garb of their class, their faces blackened and distorted, yet still recognizable by father or son. The troops of Berne, on first beholding that sight, were wild with grief and rage. While relatives and friends were cutting down the corpses for burial, others, running back to the field, wreaked their fury on their slain foes, and dragged them away

¹¹² "Dicendomi che dubitava essere tradito et di qualche tractato; vedendo tanta viltà ne li soi che senza esser caxati ne essere ale mane con li inimici, quali tenendoli la punta erano perduti, così tristamente fugiesono." Ibid. p. 316.

¹¹³ "Ala fine vedendo li inimici venire fino al campo, essendo quasi solo, . . . se partì dal campo con grande difficultà dicendoli alcuni capitanei et io non esser più tempo di restar." Ibid. — "Ha! ha!

fugisti tu ipse tandem!" exclaims Bonstetten.

¹¹⁴ "Nel campo nostro medesimo vidi inimici strachì et non poter più." Ibid. p. 311. — One of the Saint-Gall troops is said to have fallen dead, without a wound, in the pursuit. J. von Watt, *Chronik*. MS. (Stifts-Bibliothek, Sanct-Gallen.)

¹¹⁵ Letter of the Lucerne commanders, March 6. MS. (Archives of Lucerne.)

to gibbet them in the place of their comrades. Finding that about thirty of the fugitives, who had thrown themselves into the castle, had been allowed by the chiefs to surrender on security of their lives, the indignant soldiers of Berne rushed upon these prisoners, and massacred all of them with the exception of a nobleman, who, with the greatest difficulty, was rescued by the officers, in order that he might be exchanged for Brandolf von Stein, the former captain of the Swiss garrison.¹¹⁶

In the hope of a fuller and more adequate vengeance, a party was at once sent back to storm the castle of Vauxmarcus, still held by the Burgundians, to the number, as was reported, of six or seven hundred. It was too late to make the attack the same night; but the Swiss, having posted their guards on all sides, kept patient watch till dawn, listening to the tumult in the courtyard — the neighing of horses and clattering of arms, which betokened preparations for a desperate sally. How intense their rage and disappointment when, advancing to the attack with shouts of "Kill, kill!" they found themselves outwitted, defrauded of their prey! The garrison, after letting loose their steeds in rattling harness, had stolen noiselessly out at a postern in the rear opening into the *Combe de Ruaux*. Having waded up the torrent beyond the hostile lines, they took a path across the mountains and descended safely to Pontarlier.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Schilling. — Etterlin. — Schilling of Lucerne. — Chron. de Neuchâtel. — Bericht aus dem Lager, March 3. MS. (Stifts-Archiv, Sanct-Gallen.)

¹¹⁷ Hugues de Pierre. Chron. de Neuchâtel, Schweiz, Geschichtsforscher. — Lamarche.

On viewing the battle-ground it was found by the Swiss leaders that no great execution had been done. The enemy had fled while the combat was still at a preliminary stage, and the pursuit had been crippled by the want of cavalry and the manner in which Charles had covered the retreat. The Burgundian slain scarcely exceeded a thousand, but the bodies of several hundred more were supposed to be lying in the lake.¹¹⁸ Few men of note had fallen. On the Swiss side the loss was much smaller — less than a hundred killed, and about four hundred wounded.¹¹⁹

But the vastness of the booty defied all present attempts at calculation.¹²⁰ The three days passed on the field in the observance of chivalrous usages were fully employed in collecting and loading it for transportation.¹²¹ Berne made a vigorous effort to induce its Confederates to abandon the restrictions under which their help had been given. They were urged to reoccupy the whole of the Pays de Vaud, or at least

¹¹⁸ "Sind villicht by thussent tod beliben, doch ist ir vil ertruncken so in see geluffen, wie vil der ist mogen wir nitt wesen." Letter of Lucerne commanders. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) — The latter statement is, however, doubtful.

¹¹⁹ For the number of the killed — variously set at from thirty to two hundred — we have no certain authority. Documentary lists give the number of the wounded of each canton, except Berne, with data from which the total may be fixed with sufficient exactness. (Lists in the Eidgenössische Abschiede and the Archives of Lucerne.) The point

is worth noting; because the Swiss chroniclers are seldom willing to admit any loss whatever on their own side, and, in most cases, it is only by isolated facts that we are able to correct them.

¹²⁰ "So kostlichen ding dass ich es nicht gethat schreiben." Letter of Ulrich Mettinger, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 15.

¹²¹ "Sind da bis an den vierdecen tag gelegen mit ritterlicher übung die ding zu samen zu bringen . . . wir uns nit verwüst und verstorben ist." Letter of Lucerne commanders. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

to seize and destroy the strong places still in the enemy's hands and to lay waste the surrounding country.¹²² But no heed was given to these counsels. The troops themselves were impatient to return home with their spoil.

They were met on the way by the Margrave Rodolph, come to offer his congratulations. Far from being cordially received, he found himself exposed to insult and violence. While at Grandson the Swiss had been told that their ill-fated countrymen had surrendered under persuasions and delusive promises from Philip of Hochberg. Alarmed at the display of feeling thus excited, Rodolph applied to Berne for a guard. Two of the leading citizens were sent to protect him, and efforts were made by the council to hush up a story in which they put no belief. But finding the clamor too strong to be resisted, and foreseeing the troubles to which he would be constantly exposed so long as the suspicions engendered by his peculiar position were kept alive, he gave up his castle and government at Neuchâtel into the keeping of Berne, and repaired to his estates in Suabia, remaining there, under a kind of surveillance on the part of the Swiss, until the close of the war.¹²³

Accounts of the battle of Grandson fill but a small space in the Swiss chronicles and documents; but descriptions of the booty are given with a harrowing minuteness which we do not propose to imitate.

¹²² Deutsch Missiven-Buch C. subsequent course of Philip of Neuchâtel makes it far more probable

¹²³ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, that he was false to Charles than to the opposite side.

Tents, wagons, stores, cannon, richly-painted banners,¹²⁴ — whatever the routed army might have been expected to leave, — were captured in extraordinary profusion. But all these formed the least valuable portion of the spoil. Intending to hold his court in Savoy and to dazzle the Italian powers with his magnificence, the duke had brought with him the paraphernalia of his chapel and table, habiliments and regalia used on occasions of state. The precious articles which Philip the Good had passed his life in accumulating, and which the art of Flanders had been employed in fashioning or embellishing, had become the property of the poorest and rudest of all races. Among the costliest prizes were an immense reliquary of sculptured gold inlaid with large gems, embracing many pieces of statuary, and containing more than eighty distinct objects pertaining to the history of Christ; the sword of state, its hilt so thickly studded with diamonds, rubies, and pearls, all of great size, that there was scarcely space for a hair to be laid between them; the velvet cap from the front of which flashed the largest diamond then in Europe, set in gold, with pendent pearls; two other diamonds little inferior in value, with a great number of smaller ones, and various other jewels and precious stones; the great seal, of solid gold, weighing a pound;¹²⁵

¹²⁴ Among the banners still preserved is one, in the arsenal at Soeur, in which Charles is depicted in the act of charging at the head of his troops. The likeness is the most authentic extant, — more so than that which is in possession of the Metternich family, — and, even

as a work of art, the painting is very interesting, being finished in the style of Van Eyck.

¹²⁵ Now in the archives of Lucerne. Many documents subsequently signed by Charles mention the “absence” of his great seal.

between three and four hundred-weight of silver and silver-gilt goblets and cups; gorgeous tapestries, illuminated manuscripts,¹²⁶ dresses of silk, satin, and cloth of gold, and wagon-loads of silver coin.¹²⁷

It has been often related and readily believed that the Swiss, all unused to luxury and splendor, tossed, tore, and trampled upon this treasure with the ignorance of savages; that they mistook diamonds for glass and gold for copper, cut up tapestries and embroidered robes to patch their homespun doublets and hose, threw away priceless jewels as worthless baubles, or parted with them to foreigners for trifling sums. It is true they were ignorant in such matters; but their ignorance was of a kind which led them to put not an under but an over estimate on the value. Gilt articles were supposed at first to be of solid gold. Jewels which it was wished to dispose of were rated at prices far beyond what the world could be induced to give. No private appropriation of the smallest object was permitted in the camp; and if any took place,—as was indeed strongly suspected and as it is natural to suppose,—it could only have been done with the greatest secrecy, and with little opportunity for selling or bartering. The keenest search was

¹²⁶ The only existing specimen we have seen is a French translation of Quintus Curtius, executed by a Portuguese physician attached to Charles's person. It is in the library of Geneva. The illustrations are beautiful, and of value as exhibiting the figures and costumes of the Burgundian court in place of Alexander's. The work was a

favorite with Charles, and considering the subject and certain passages of the narrative, there was something of a coincidence in its having been captured at Grandson.

¹²⁷ Lists in the archives of Lucerne. Those printed in the Eidgenössische Abschiede, Schilling, Etterlin, and other works are incomplete and fragmentary.

instituted: every soldier was put upon his oath; the authorities continued for a long time afterwards to prosecute close inquiries.¹²⁸ Inventories were drawn up; skilled appraisers were collected; the distribution was the work of years, gave rise to civil commotions, and was attended with punctilious forms, in some cases with solemn ceremonies.¹²⁹

Nor has the history of that great spoil been suffered to fall into oblivion. Books have been written on the subject.¹³⁰ The art of the painter and engraver has commemorated the workmanship of the jeweller and embroiderer. The three great diamonds have been traced in their passage through successive hands from court to court. One now glitters in the papal tiara; another is deposited in the treasury of

¹²⁸ Numerous entries in the lists at Lucerne show the minuteness and strictness of the search. The most trifling articles of attire, a shirt, a pair of hose, &c., &c., are enumerated. Soldiers who had disposed of a knife or some similar object for a few batzen were obliged to refund the amount. Letters were written to the allied towns, whose troops had been present, demanding that every article should be given up or the sum for which it had been sold. Schlettstadt, whose small contingent had arrived too late for the battle, replied as follows to a summons of the kind: "We have questioned our men under oath; and they all say that they took nothing, sold nothing, and kept nothing, except Hanna Kleyn, who acknowledges that he took a little pen, which

he sold for one florin: the said florin he has given up, and we send it to you by this messenger, with a list containing the names of our men." *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) It does not appear that any of the allies claimed to participate.

¹²⁹ The great reliquary, which no one was rich enough to buy, was broken up and divided among the cantons, in the church at Lucerne, the distribution being made by the priests and high mass performed. For the chief facts in this paragraph, see the *Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. passim.

¹³⁰ Sansonetti, *Traité de Charles le Téméraire*; Peignot, *État de ce qui fut trouvé à Grandson*; &c., &c. — An antiquarian of Berne is at present preparing an elaborate work with illustrations.

Vienna ; the third, after returning to India, where it is supposed to have belonged originally to the Great Mogul, has been recently brought back to Europe, and now, we believe, awaits a purchaser.¹³¹ Switzerland has preserved many of the bulkier but not less interesting objects. In its churches, arsenals, and other public buildings, the Burgundian tapestries, banners, cannon, and suits of armor, still attract the attention of visitors and the study of antiquarians.

For our own part, while looking at these trophies or turning over the leaves of the time-stained lists in which they are enumerated, we have been reminded of other relics and another inventory. The "little ivory comb," the "pair of bride's gloves," the "agnus enchased with silver," the "necklace with ten little paternosters of amber," picked up among the ashes of Dinant and duly entered to the credit of "my lord of Burgundy"—was there no connection between those memorials of humble joy, of modest love, of ruined homes, and these remains of fallen pride and grandeur? Yes, without doubt! though it be one which history, that tracks the diamond from hand to hand, is incapable of tracing.

¹³¹ This last is, we suppose, the "Sanci" diamond, which was bought by Prince Demidoff, in 1835, for 800,000 fr. Its weight is 53½ grains.

CHAPTER II.

CAMP AT LAUSANNE. — CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN BRNE AND
THE KING. BURGUNDIAN ARMY REORGANIZED. — POSITION AND
VIEW OF FORTIFIED TOWNS.

1476.

WHAT had been the cause of the defeat of the Burgundian army? A modern military writer of pre-eminent distinction has ascribed it to a tactical error on the part of the Burgundian leader. "Charles," says Jomini, "had committed the fault of encamping with one of his wings resting on a lake, the other, ill assured, at the foot of wooded mountains. But nothing is more dangerous for an army than to have one of its wings resting on a large river without bridges, on a lake, or on the sea. The reason is obvious: the obstacle which gives an apparent security to the wing thus covered becomes, in the event of the other wing being beaten, a gulf in which the whole is swallowed up. The Swiss army, superior in good infantry, having attacked the Burgundian left from the wooded mountains on that side, the wing thus commanded and taken in flank was obliged to

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give way; and from that moment the Burgundians could save themselves only by the promptest flight."¹

Nothing can be clearer or more forcible than this reasoning. It embodies a maxim which, founded simply on observation and reflection, could hardly be violated with impunity even in an age when the grander principles of war were little studied or comprehended. Examples have already appeared in a previous part of our narrative. When the Imperialists had marched to the relief of Neuss, they encamped, it will be remembered, with their right wing resting on a large river without bridges, their left, ill secured, on the slope of an eminence. The duke of Burgundy had been quick to detect and take advantage of their error. By a circuitous and concealed march he had turned their exposed flank, seized the hill that commanded it, driven thousands of them to their boats and into the river, and the rest into their intrenchments. Subsequently, when menaced in his own position, he had in like manner flanked and enveloped the assailants, cut off their retreat, and destroyed the entire force, escape being impossible because, in his own language, "they were backed by the Rhine."²

Is it then true that on the field of Grandson he had exposed his own army to a similar reverse? Not

¹ *Lettre Stratégique du Général Jomini à M. de Pixerécourt, Lausanne, 14 oct., 1833.* (Printed for private circulation, but also, we believe, published among the works of the dramatic author to whom it was addressed. We are indebted

for the communication of this letter to Colonel Lecomte, the biographer of Jomini.)

² "A cause du Rhin qu'ils avoient adossé." Letter to the Sire du Fay, Labarre, tom. i. p. 366. See ante, pp. 107, 110, 125.

from obliviousness at least, since it appears that he had counted in this instance also on obtaining a victory by precisely the same manœuvre. All the accounts of eye-witnesses on both sides speak of efforts on his part to flank the Swiss; none of them speak of any effort on the part of the Swiss to flank the Burgundians. The criticism, unimpeachable in theory, is founded on a common but totally erroneous notion of the facts — a notion derived from a misapprehension of the authorities coupled with a misconception of the localities.* The traveller, skirting the battle-field of Grandson, sees in imagination the Swiss descending the wooded mountains in the background and falling on their surprised enemies. But before the Swiss could descend the mountain, they must first have ascended it. This would imply on their part a previous knowledge of the enemy's intention, of

* The words "Berg," "anger Weg," and others of the like import, have been naturally misapplied by writers who knew nothing of the *via détro* and its course across the Spur. But when we are told by M. de Barents and others that the Swiss reinforcements, coming down on Charles's left, were first seen by him on the heights above Bonvillars and Champigny, we need only reply that there is no mention of these names in any of the authorities, no description corresponding to the locality, no account of the truly wonderful manœuvre required for this dramatic effect. The accounts and plans of Roët and Dubois — the only writers who have brought criticism to bear upon the subject —

seem to us erroneous merely in one particular of any importance — that of making a portion of the Swiss march by the lower road, along the margin of the lake.

A parallel might be drawn between the battle of Grandson and that of Issus. The features of the ground, the relative positions of the armies, and even their composition and contrasted methods of combat, were very similar. Finally, the plan of Charles resembled that of Darius, of which Quintus Curtius says, "*constituta milubriter omni ratione potentior fortuna discussat.*" But here the parallel ceases. Darius, instead of covering the retreat, was the first to flee.

which, however, as they state themselves, they had not even a suspicion. It would suppose also a plan, whereas they tell us explicitly that none had been formed. It would have required a long *détour*, and their description of the route shows that there was no *détour*. Finally much time would have been necessary, but the corps that first encountered the Burgundian archers at the *Combe de Ruauz* had no time to spare, while those which came up later wasted the time in a long delay at Vauxmarcus.

The truth is, then, that the hostile parties, advancing from opposite directions, confronted each other. The Burgundians had the lake on their right and the mountains on their left; the Swiss had the lake on their left and the mountains on their right. But they differed in their order of battle and in their tactics. While the Swiss, in a single mass, stood on the *via détra*, opposite the Burgundian centre, towards which they gradually advanced, Charles, whose three divisions stretched across the plain, threw the weight of his force on the rising ground on his left, with the obvious and avowed design of enveloping the enemy's right. When he had succeeded in this, he felt himself secure of victory. The Swiss, "commanded and taken in flank," were, as far as manœuvring could avail, on the point of being defeated. The opportune arrival of reënforcements in their rear changed at once the aspect of affairs. The Burgundians were not outflanked. The danger to which they were exposed was that of being shattered in their weakened centre. Had they fought, this would sufficient-

ly explain why they were beaten. But it will not suffice to explain why, instead of fighting, they fled.

Their flight is, however, not difficult to explain. It proceeded from the same cause which had operated at Héricourt and on many other fields. For it was not in the vicinity of lakes or rivers alone, or where they could profit by some glaring oversight on the adverse side, that the Swiss were accustomed to assert their superiority and to see their enemies flee before them. Such, where the numbers were not utterly disproportionate, was the invariable result in their contests at that period, and down to a much later period. A phenomenon so common must have had some general cause.

The cause was twofold. The Swiss formation, a phalanx of bristling spears, was impregnable against an attack by any method or with any troops that could then be brought to bear upon it. For the purposes of defence it was perfect. Like a fort, with the additional advantage that a breach could be instantly repaired, it required to be battered to pieces by unintermitting discharges of artillery.

But this strength of resistance, and still more the strength in attack, depended of course on the moral power behind the spears. And herein lay the chief superiority of the Swiss. The substance of most armies, even the bravest, varies greatly in consistence, what is solid and sound being incorporated with much that is soft, yielding, or corrupt. In a feudal army the proportion of this latter material was always large. In a mixed army like that of Burgundy it was not

unlikely to preponderate. But a Swiss army had no such material — no stragglers, no deserters, no cowards. It was said, long afterwards, of the Swiss mercenaries in the service of France, that they constituted "the bones of the army."⁴ But an army consisting wholly of Swiss was all bone.

From the time when the peasants of the Alps had overthrown the mailed chivalry of Austria, their renown had been constantly augmenting. The secret of their audacity and success may not always have been understood,⁵ but the impression produced was not the less formidable. Their neighbors, their hereditary foes, had ceased to contend with them. It had become a settled maxim that the Swiss were invincible. When, however, the duke of Burgundy first took the field against them, the world suspended its judgment and awaited the issue. No predictions, no warnings, were uttered, to deter him from the attempt. For he also enjoyed no mean prestige. He too had

⁴ Menagiana (Paris, 1695), tom. ii. p. 206.

⁵ A Venetian envoy, Giovanni Correr, describing Savoy in 1566, says the people are unfit for war, except those who live on the Swiss border, and who thereby retain "un non so che conforme alla natura di quella nazione." But Giovanni Soranzo, in a *Relazione di Francia*, 1668, speaks of the superiority of the Swiss as resting on the two causes we have assigned in the text — the "maggior puzza," and "la disciplina militare, la quale così severamente osservano, e massime nel mantenersi serrati, e non turbare gli ordini." So the son

of Agenor conquered with him

"telum splendenti lancea ferro,
At jaculum; teloque animus præstantior
omni."

And the description of the Macedonian phalanx which Quintus Curtius puts into the mouth of the Athenian Chædemos (one cannot but wonder whether Charles of Burgundy had ever noticed it) corresponds in essential particulars. "Acies torva sane et inculta clypeis hastisque immobiles cuneos et concerta robora virorum tegit. . . . Vir viro, armis arma concerta sunt: ad nutum monentis intenti, sequi signa, ordines servare didicere."

never been worsted in the field. He had conquered the people of Liège, of Gueldres, and of Lorraine. He had struck terror into France, and had withstood the whole might of the Empire. But, in the opinion of the world, the result at Grandson settled the question.

In the opinion of the world—but not in that of Charles. In his view the question was not settled, for it had not been tried. Twenty thousand men, he said, had turned their backs on ten thousand without drawing a sword.⁶ He would not admit a defeat where there had been no battle. But he acknowledged the disgrace brought upon him by the “vileness” of his troops,⁷ and his soul burned with the desire for revenge.

From the scene of the action he had ridden first to Jougne. Finding no garrison there, he continued his flight to Nozeroy, on the hither slopes of the Jura, ten leagues from Grandson, and the site of a magnificent castle owned by Louis of Châteauguayon, whose remains were soon afterwards brought there for interment.

He was not, as his enemies believed, stunned by his misfortune.⁸ On the contrary, from the very first moment he declared his purpose to renew the strug-

⁶ “Disse . . . che 20^{te} persone a 10^{te} Svizzeri senza tirar spada uno voltato le spalle.” Panigarola to the duke of Milan, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 329.

⁷ “In rabiando che questi villani Svizzeri per la viltà de li soi abiano questo honore.” *Ibid.* p. 318.

⁸ Berns circulated a report that

on account of his misfortune he had spent two days and nights without eating, and had put to death some of his nobles, who had deceived him with reports that the Swiss were unarmed and would fall an easy prey. *Deutsche Missions-Buch C.*, 196. *MS.*—Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 20.

gle and devoted himself day and night to fresh preparations.⁹ He saw too that, as a consequence of his failure, the next attempt must be made on a larger scale. Their victory, he said, would make the Swiss more ready to fight, while the king would redouble his solicitations; he must therefore take the field in greater force than before.¹⁰ The army had scattered in all directions, the Burgundians across the Jura, the Italians through the Pays de Vaud towards Geneva and the passes of the Alps. Orders were sent to the frontier towns of Burgundy and Lorraine to apprehend all fugitives and compel them to return. Places of rendezvous were designated, and a new camp, it was announced, would be immediately formed in the neighborhood of Salins. Cannons and tents were ordered from the arsenal of Luxembourg. Fresh troops were sent for, including eight hundred lances stationed in Lorraine, which were to have been removed to Picardy. Agents were despatched to Italy to raise recruits and purchase arms and equipments. To provide money for immediate necessities, commissioners were appointed to proceed to Dijon, investigate the accounts, see what loans were outstanding and in what manner a new one could best be raised.¹¹

While he looked upon his discomfiture as a mere mishap, he perceived that, unless it were speedily repaired, the consequences might be fatal. It was

⁹ Letters of Panigarola, March 4 and 5. *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 312, 316, 317, 329.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 329.

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¹¹ *Ibid.* pp. 317, 328. — Letters in Laharrie and *Mém. de l'Arch. de Dijon*. — Instructions in Legrand MSS.

the weak point in his career that all his plans and hopes were bound up with the maintenance of a high reputation. The enemies he had overawed, the allies who had submitted to his lead and bargained for his protection, the waverers who had waited for some decisive indication, would all be affected by any symptom of weakness. What he most feared was, not that the Swiss would follow up their victory (he had foreseen that, after collecting their booty, they would return home), but that Savoy would fall away, that Milan would turn against him, that Lorraine would rise in revolt, above all that the king would now make an open attack. He saw that he must speedily recover his balance, and show the world that he had not been prostrated by the blow.¹²

On the way from Grandson he had requested Panigarola to stop at Orbe and bring with him the other members of the legation. Besides wishing to anticipate rumor by his own version of the affair, he considered that the moment had arrived for testing practically the value of his treaty with Sforza. All he demanded of the latter was to station troops for a few days on the frontier passes of Savoy, especially on the side of France. This, he observed, would be also a measure of self-defence on the part of his ally, who, if Savoy were occupied by the king, might expect to be himself attacked, with no possibility of receiving succor.¹³

Panigarola, to his own chagrin, found that his col-

¹² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 318.

¹³ *Ibid.* p. 329.

leagues had gone off at the first report of the disaster. It was in vain that he sent messages after them, begging them to come round by the way of Saint-Claude, assuring them that they would run no risk, and offering an armed escort.¹⁴ Having made their way to Geneva, they rushed into the presence of the regent, and informing her that all was lost, urged her to recross the Alps in their company and to place herself under the protection of their master. But, with all her impulsiveness, Yolande had too firm a spirit to be infected with panic, and too shrewd an intellect not to detect the snare. She replied that, if the duke of Burgundy were personally safe, all other losses might be repaired; in the worst event she would apply to her brother for protection.¹⁵

Charles could not help being touched when informed of her courage and devotion at so trying a crisis. He hastened to express his gratitude and to confirm her in those hopes which few now shared but themselves. "It has given me a singular pleasure," he wrote, "to hear of your calmness and constancy of soul; for the thought of your affliction weighed more heavily upon me than what has befallen myself. This, with the pleasure of God, shall be well and quickly remedied. Every day diminishes the inconvenience, and proves that the loss in men was much less than had been thought. Such as it is, it proceeded from a mere skirmish. The bulk of the two armies did not meet nor engage—to my great displeasure, for, had they fought, the victory would

¹⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 311, 312.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 349, 367.

have been mine without difficulty. There has been none on either side. God, I trust, reserves it for you and for me. Be pleased therefore to keep your troops assembled, for I intend to return without delay, and to demonstrate by act and by effect that the hope you have placed in me has not been vain." ¹⁵

On the same day, the 7th of March, he wrote in a similar strain to Romont, who still held unmolested possession of the territory which had been recovered from Berne. That he should continue to maintain his ground, that Savoy should show a front behind which the Burgundians might rally, was of the last importance. Charles pointed out the measures to be taken, adding many exhortations. "Use your best diligence," he wrote, "that the army of Savoy be not disbanded. Incorporate with it such of our troops as have gone in that direction. Comfort and encourage your men, and also the people of the country. Assure them that we shall not abandon them, but, whatever may befall, will return to renew the enterprise with sufficient power to insure success." ¹⁷

When he thus wrote, his design was to reënter the territory of Savoy by the pass of Saint-Claude — the most distant from the Swiss frontier — and to establish his camp in the vicinity of Geneva.¹⁸ Even this plan would not have been feasible if the Swiss had pushed forward and occupied Lausanne. In that

¹⁵ Italian translation, *ibid.* pp. 335, 336.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 336.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 336.

case he could have found no secure base of operations beyond the Jura, and would indeed have been obliged to confine himself to the defence of his own dominions. This was perfectly evident at the time.¹⁹ Nor was it, as has been imagined, from a lack of strategical insight or their inaptitude for carrying on a continuous campaign, that the victors had abstained from following up their success. Berne had strenuously urged it, and the resistance of the other cantons had not been based on military grounds. Although it had been obliged to yield, Berne was still seeking to accomplish its design by a less direct method. Pleading the insecurity of Freyburg, the council had kept troops under arms, retained some of the Alsatian contingents, and applied to their Confederates for reënforcements. Their purpose was at once evident. The town of Romont, regarded as the chief barrier of Savoy against the irruptions of the Swiss, was menaced with an attack; and Charles, to whom the danger was immediately made known, saw that he must either meet it by a counter demonstration or abandon the contest. He determined at all hazards to return at once to the Pays de Vaud by the same route he had before taken, and to make Lausanne his base. Having given notice to the regent and sent his brother in advance to select a site for the camp, he followed with such troops as he had already mustered, arriving on the ground in the neighborhood of Lausanne on the 15th.²⁰

¹⁹ Ibid. pp. 368, 369.

tom. ii. p. 219 — *Dépêches Mil-*

²⁰ *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, nauges, tom. i. pp. 341, 355.

This boldness and promptness had at least the effect of suspending the contemplated movements of Berne, and again restricting it to defensive measures.²¹ But Charles was now brought face to face with the new obstacles that had started up to baffle his hopes. His toils, perplexities, and vexations during the next three months, tried, as it had never before been tried, the persistency of his spirit and will. His treasury was empty, his troops were demoralized, his prestige was gone. It seemed as if his resources had suddenly dried up. Friends as well as enemies were against him. No one was willing to aid or to follow him in an enterprise which all regarded as impracticable.

The wonder was that his own worst fears had not been realized—that all the possible consequences of his disaster had not immediately ensued. Every one had expected that his life-long adversary would rush forward to give the coup-de-grâce. Throughout Savoy the people were in commotion. The conquest and dismemberment of the country appeared inevitable. The Swiss and the French king, it was supposed, would occupy Savoy proper, while the duke of Milan would of course take possession of Piedmont. The council of regency at Turin convoked an assembly of deputies to organize a militia, more with the hope of appeasing the public mind than of any other practical result. They wished the Milanese ambassador, Francesco Petrasanta, to be present at the meeting and give assurances of the honorable and friendly

²¹ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 804, 806. *MS.*

intentions of his master. As a means of propitiating that prince, they acknowledged the error of Yolande in not having been guided by his counsel, instead of linking her fortunes with those of Burgundy.²²

It was no fault of Sforza if the result had not tallied with the popular anticipations. On hearing of the event, he had, with less prudence than usual, given open and premature expression to his satisfaction. He announced it to the other courts of Italy as the best guaranty of Italian independence.²³ Confident that his own opportunity had come, he despatched an envoy to the French king, with whom, for fear of giving umbrage to Burgundy and Venice, he had long ceased to hold any open intercourse. He represented the importance of immediate action. If the opportunity were let slip, it might never return. He would do his own part, besides aiding the king with money.²⁴

Louis was therefore master of the situation. Let him give the signal, and the work would be finished. For any slackness shown by the Swiss he would have only himself to blame. His active coopération would enable Berne to overcome the reluctance of its confederates, or, failing in that, to dispense with their assistance.

After the first moment of elation produced by the victory,—elation proportioned to the previous peril and anxiety,—the council of Berne remembered with

²² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. pp. 353, 354. mines (who, however, confounds this occasion with a later one), tom.

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 359, 374. ii. p. 14.

²⁴ *Ibid.* tom. ii. p. 20.—Com-

indignation that the ally who had promised to ward off the danger had not even shared in it. They wrote in deep dudgcon both to Louis himself and to Jost von Silinen. "We need not remind you," they said to the latter, "how we entered into this burdensome war for the especial honor of his royal majesty,"²⁰ and have so labored therein as to bring upon ourselves great damage and continual trouble." They had never expected, they went on to say, that they and their confederates were to be exposed to attack. By four several messengers they had summoned the king to assail and keep back the enemy. But they had not even had the comfort of receiving an answer, and were obliged to conclude that the whole weight was to be thrown upon their shoulders. Once more, however, in the presence of renewed danger, they were calling upon him for aid and deliverance, and they trusted that Silinen would use his exertions for the fulfilment of their just expectations.²¹

In a letter to Louis they went so far as to intimate a suspicion that he had secretly incited the enemy. They pretended that two royal captains, by name Salazar and Malorcía, with a band of cavalry and artillery, had been among the Burgundian forces. They complained also of his ambiguous conduct in regard to Savoy, at whose instigation the attack had been made. It had, in fact, not suited the policy of Louis that the Swiss should overrun the territory of his nephew and upset his sister's government.

²⁰ "Wir zwifeln nitt ir wissen men sind." wie wir dann der könighchen majestat zu ere in dia swer krieg kom-
²¹ Deutch Missiven-Buch C, 609. MS.

That was not the task for which he had engaged them; it was one which, if desirable, he could execute for himself. But it would have the inconvenience of bringing him into even closer relations than he wished with the friends whom he most loved and cherished, perhaps of admitting both them and the duke of Milan as partners. The dismemberment, or even the annexation, of Savoy would not harmonize so well with his projects as its nominal independence under a government inspired and directed by himself. If Yolande should prove incorrigible, she might, at a proper time, be supplanted by Philip of Bresse, who was kept in reserve for the occasion, while restrained from any present attempt at conspiracy and revolution. When, therefore, Berne had first begun to threaten Savoy, the king had allowed it to be publicly understood that, while he did not object to his sister's receiving a certain degree of chastisement for her imprudence, his honor would not allow him to see her and her children despoiled of their rights and possessions.¹⁷

On now learning the gross construction put upon his proceedings, and the unhappy distrust to which it had given rise, he was naturally somewhat hurt. He despatched an embassy to Berne, with copious instructions, and a private note addressed to his "illustrious and dearest friends by the grace of God invincible."¹⁸ He showed the utter groundlessness of

¹⁷ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. I. p. 46. *meis amicis nostris carissimis dei gratia inviolabilissima.*"

¹⁸ *"Illustrissimis et preclarissimis."*
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their suspicions in every particular, in none more clearly and convincingly than his supposed dilatoriness in coming to their relief. At the moment they had first given him notice that the duke of Burgundy was about to march against them, he had got to horse and set out to join them, making no delay upon the road, until he had reached the land of Dauphiny, on the borders of Savoy, where he had stopped to assemble his forces. Before he could continue his advance he had been met by the news of the great victory gained by the Confederates, which had given him such joy as it was impossible to exceed, and than which he could wish for nothing better in his whole life. His greatest desire at present was to draw nearer to them, trampling down all obstructions to a free and constant intercourse, so that there might be a complete understanding and concert of action on all points. For he had no thought of permitting the duke of Burgundy to do them any damage, but was resolved to live and die with them. Neither would he suffer that any ill feeling should arise out of the partition of Savoy. This was a matter to be settled by conference and agreement. Although the princes of Savoy were his kinsmen, he would see them exterminated rather than they should prove a source of division between him and his friends.²⁸ In a few calm and confidential sentences he disposed of the wild accusation that he had secretly aided the enemy. Of the two persons mentioned, Salazar, it was true,

²⁸ "So lies er ir zerstörung es suo liden."
beschehen denn solchen sparren

had been recalled from the post where he was formerly stationed, which was not, however, as the Swiss supposed, near their frontier, but far, far off, quite at the other side of France, nine miles beyond the town of Bituriensis in the direction of Aquitaine; but this was at the time, which they would no doubt recollect, of the English affair, and Salazar was now serving with his troop under the Sire de Craon, in Bar. As to Malorcía, he had fallen ill at Lyons in the year '72, and had since died there. So that the thing, as they could see, was clearly impossible, for Nature certainly would not permit a dead man to rise up and fight against them.³⁰ He was, however, much obliged to them for having brought the story to his ears. He had inquired into it, and they were to understand that it was an invention of the duke of Burgundy, who had always been given to the manufacture of falsehoods, winning more by his tongue than he had ever done by his sword.³¹

Louis, we perceive, was not yet cured of his propensity to laugh in the faces of his gulls. Nor was he in the present instance running any serious risk. My lords of Berne had little real right to complain. In their hearts they had known all along that his promises of military aid were a sham. They had consented to secret glosses and reservations expressly

³⁰ "Dann die natur nit ertragt, ein toten zu erston und wider sich zu ziehen."

³¹ "Ir sollen aber wissen dass das gantz von Burgund von dem ersten tag bis lets falsch erfunden

sich gebrucht hatt und mer gewint mit der zungen dann dem swert."

German translation, circulated by the council of Berne, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 35-37.

intended to make that part of the contract a nullity; and they had stifled all the doubts expressed by their Confederates with reiterated assurances of his sincerity and good faith. It was too late now to disentangle the skein. They could not expose the deception without proclaiming their own connivance. The only course was to smother their feelings and keep up the farce. Accordingly they sent copies of the royal message to their Confederates, affecting to consider the explanations as satisfactory, emphasizing the expressions of gratitude, pointing to the strong desire expressed for a closer union and concert of action, and suggesting that steps should be taken for bringing about this desirable consummation.²¹ In their reply to the king they assumed a similar tone, but not without betraying the faintness of their hopes — their internal consciousness that all appeals were useless. "Nothing," they wrote, "could give us greater joy than your majesty's offer to live and die with us. Especially as our treaty contains something in relation to this our enemy, whom from the first we made our enemy by our hostile declarations and attacks, in order to please your royal majesty."²² Having so often informed him of the danger to which they were exposed, it was needless, they said, to dwell any

²¹ "Darian uwer Brüderlich lieb mag verstan des kungs begird uns in zu nachern. Des willens wir wol wo ander uwer und unnsere zugewandten in glichem willen weren, Als wir uns auch zu inen allen und besunder uwer Brüderlich truw zu vor an versprochen." Berne to Lu-

cerne. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) — See also a letter in Stettler, B. I. s. 251.

²² "An den wir von anfang uwer k. m. zu gefallen mit unnsere vinkundung und angriffen gezogen haben."

further upon that point. What they wished him more particularly to consider was the situation of Savoy. They had always honored the house of Savoy, and could not without pity behold it falling to ruin. The duke of Burgundy looked, no doubt, to annex the country to his own dominions. Did his majesty desire to see that result? If not, it surely behooved him to interpose at once. "The enemy," they concluded, "now lies between us. We on our side are ready to attack him manfully; all that is wanting is that your majesty should do the same on yours."²⁴

By a complicated hypocrisy,—the natural growth of the situation,—each of the two parties to the correspondence had adopted a language that belonged more properly to the other. Louis, who desired the preservation of the house of Savoy, talked of permitting its annihilation; Berne, which was aiming at its destruction, affected to regard it with sympathy. But Savoy was a secondary question. On the main point, the overthrow of the duke of Burgundy, the parties were accordant and sincere. Why then did Louis, invited, urged, expected on all hands to take the decisive step, still hold back? Could it be that the world was mistaken as to his feelings, had misapprehended the great aim of his life? Not so; it understood his sentiments, but it was not deep enough to divine his calculations. If he should make any present demonstration,—it was thus that he revolved the matter,—Charles would be compelled to desist from his undertaking and to throw himself

²⁴ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 835. *MS.*

back into his own dominions. His subjects, however averse to his foreign expeditions, were still loyally attached to him and would rally round his person.³⁵ What would follow, therefore, would be simply a renewal of the old struggle with all its uncertainties and risks. From the Swiss, in that case, nothing more could be expected than the subsidiary aid for which they had originally bargained. After having been forced into the position of principals, they would sink back into that of auxiliaries. No, the present was not the opportunity for which the king had been waiting. He would see the issue of a second and more decisive encounter. When his adversary had been slain or broken in spirit, when his means had been dissipated, when his states were in distraction and terror, then would be the time for the master spirit to glide upon the scene.

Instead therefore of coinciding, the views of Louis and of his allies were in truth divergent. The Swiss were merely anxious to shake off an assailant, troublesome from his tenacity if not dangerous by his strength. The king, on the contrary, seeing matters at the exact point to which he had labored at bringing them, thought of anything rather than of interposing.

He was not, however, blind to the risk that might ensue from his continued inaction. What if the Swiss, in their wrath at his treachery and desertion, should even now reconcile themselves with Burgundy, both parties confessing the causelessness of the

³⁵ Commines, tom. ii. pp. 13, 14, 37.

embroilment and combining to take vengeance on its author?³⁶ To guard against this was the task of the hour, requiring all his skill and address. He must double, or talk of doubling, the pensions; he must ply the Swiss with messages stuffed with promises and flatteries, he must keep them in a state of prolonged expectancy, until the moment of collision was at hand and it was too late for them to draw back. So assiduously and ably was this policy carried out, with the aid of Silinen and others, that, in spite of adverse rumors and the strongest inward misgivings, the council of Berne resumed its old office of echoing and confirming his assurances.³⁷

The duke of Burgundy alone comprehended the wiles of his rival — guided, not by any corresponding subtlety of intellect, but by the still surer instinct of antipathy. When pressed by his ministers to seek the long-talked-of interview with the king, and assure himself, before reëmbarking in the struggle, that there would be no infraction of the truce, he treated the suggestion as puerile and tending only to delay.³⁸ “The king,” he argued, “has already broken the treaty³⁹ by the aid and encouragement he has given to the Swiss. He is even under an express engagement to go to their assistance with an army. He will proceed, nevertheless, with his customary craft

³⁶ Communes, tom. ii. p. 12.

³⁷ Letters in the *Deutsch Misdiven-Buch C*, and in the Archives of Lucerne. — See also Communes (who gives the general spirit of the royal policy correctly enough, though

he is erroneous and confused in details), tom. ii. p. 23.

³⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 3 et al.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 135.

and malignity. There will be no lack of solicitations, of persuasions, of promises. But he will not stir until he is sure of his own advantage.⁴⁰ It is for me to profit by his hesitation, and not wait to have two enemies on my hands.⁴¹ If I beat the Swiss, I shall have beaten both.⁴² The king will then know what he has to expect; he will fly as if he had been routed, and shut himself up in Paris."⁴³

Meanwhile it was a matter of doubt whether all the efforts of Charles to organize a new expedition would not prove abortive. He had pitched his camp on the Plan du Loup, a plateau of the Jorat, a mile or two out of Lausanne, on the road to Berne. Men, money, cannon, equipments, all that was indispensable for military operations, were wanting, and flowed in slowly and in dribblets. Even with the help of the regent, who had come to reside at Lausanne, it was impossible to obtain any adequate supplies of food. The surrounding country, already impoverished by the exactions of the Swiss, was fast becoming a desert. Scarcely had the new-sown corn appeared above the ground when it was mown down for forage. A famished population besieged the portable edifice occupied by the duke, who did what he could for

⁴⁰ "El re di Franza abia promiso loro rompere la guerra, . . . crede per sollicitudine, persuasione et promesse non manchi, lmo si tene piu che certo, pero per non subacere ala malignita sua, perche non si movera si non vede suo vantaggio." Ibid. pp. 217, 218.

⁴¹ "Delibera Anre qui piu presto potra, avendo ad fare con una po-

tentia sola, che aspettare avere a fare con doe." Ibid. p. 218.

⁴² "Fare in un tracto parecchi boni colpi." Ibid. p. 218.

⁴³ Ibid. ubi supra. — The passages cited are from conversations with Panigarola. They exhibit Charles's ideas, and were doubtless of the same general tenor as his discussions with his own ministers.

their relief, though with the effect of diminishing the means and provoking the clamors of his troops. Under such circumstances the rigorous discipline he had so long enforced ceased to be practicable. In fact the Italian bands were in a state of unruliness amounting to a chronic mutiny. Their captains had received their dues down to the time of the battle of Grandson, but, besides requiring an advance of pay, they expected compensation for the losses they had then sustained. Charles, though he intended as soon as possible to satisfy their demands, made no attempt to soothe them in the interval. On the contrary, he seldom addressed them except as "cowards," and "traitors," who had deserted him in the moment of necessity. Their consequent ill-temper and lack of zeal had the worst effect upon the soldiery; while the complaints and denunciations which they poured into the ears of the Neapolitan ambassador and others of their countrymen helped to spread the belief that Charles was rushing like a madman on his own destruction.⁴⁴

Matters were brought to a crisis by an open tumult, which threatened to break up the camp in a scene of carnage. A guard of English archers had been posted over a convent, to protect it against depredations. Some Italians having attempted to break in, a fray occurred in which lives were lost on both sides. It was ordered that the culprits should

⁴⁴ *Dépêches Milanaises*, *passim*. — *Episodes de la Guerre de Bourgogne*. — Contemporary account in *Le grand MSS.* tom. xviii. — Gingins,

be flogged through the camp and then executed. Upon their arrest the whole of their countrymen rushed together in arms and began an attack upon the English troops. Blood had already been spilled when the duke arrived on the spot. Instead of dispersing at his command, the mutineers pointed their weapons at him. For two hours his life was in constant peril. His guard and all the loyal portion of his followers mustered behind him in battle-array, waiting for the signal to charge. At length, however, he succeeded in quelling the riot without a conflict. The mass of the Italians retired sullenly to their quarters. One of the ringleaders, a nobleman holding a command under Troilus, was seized and hanged on the next day in presence of the whole army.⁴⁵

All such scenes were enacted under the eye of a watchful though hampered enemy. Berne had organized a system of espionage; and though its agents were occasionally caught and strung up, the rewards were sufficiently high to insure an abundance of information more or less correct.⁴⁶ Waldmann, who commanded the troops at Freyburg, offered to fall upon the Burgundian camp. He would undertake, he wrote, to clear the whole country of the wretches, even if their number—which had been quadrupled by rumor—amounted to seventy or eighty thousand.⁴⁷ But no order to this effect could

* *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 84, 85, 91. Reports sent to Berne, Kuebel, 2te Abth. n. 48-50.

⁴⁶ Girard MSS.—*Deutsch Mis-*

siven Buch C. MS.

⁴⁷ Rodt (who adds the comment, "scheinbare Fäblersi"), B. II. s.

162.

be obtained from the diet, and Berne was too prudent to assume both the responsibility and the risk. Operations were therefore limited to acts of menace and annoyance. Some feeble assaults were made on the town of Romont; but the works were found too strong to be carried without a siege, and the garrison was reenforced by Charles. Fresh irruptions were made from the Simmenthal; Chillon was menaced, Châtelar was burned to the ground, and the invaders advanced against Vevay, but fell back before a detachment from the camp. A counter-expedition sent out by Charles crossed the Jaman, but finding the bridges over the Saane removed, returned without effecting any thing.⁴⁶

In the Valais hostilities took place on a somewhat larger scale. Previous to the battle of Grandson, the troops of Savoy had recovered possession of the banks of the Rhone from Villeneuve to Martigny. But these conquests had again been lost, Berne having sent reinforcements to Sion, and urged that the war should be vigorously prosecuted. Yolande and her advisers, fearing that the incursions in this quarter, if unchecked, would jeopardize the communications across the Alps, had entreated the duke of Milan to guard the passes. Receiving only civil evasions in reply, they planned an enterprise in which the duke of Burgundy promised his cooperation. It was agreed that two or three thousand troops should be sent from Turin across the Saint-Bernard, and be joined by an equal or stronger body of Burgundians proceeding up

⁴⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. *passim*. — Schilling. — Knebel.

the valley of the Rhone. Such an operation required for its success a greater nicety of combination than might have been feasible with good generalship. The Burgundians, entangled among the marshes of the Rhone, were still at a day's march from the designated point of junction, when the Piedmontese, who had descended into the plain without meeting any obstacle or observing any precautions, were surprised and routed. They fled back over the pass, leaving the ascent as far as the hospice strewn with corpses; while the Burgundians, more wary or more fortunate, escaped with but slight molestation in the opposite direction.⁴⁹

Such failures, coupled with the general outlook of affairs, could not but have a depressing effect on the mind of the regent. She had begun to perceive that her hopes of triumph and revenge were doomed to be disappointed — that her perils had in truth been immensely increased by the presence of that aid on which she had built her expectations of safety. But how was she now to extricate herself? Her honor, her fears, her lingering hopes combined to deter her from open defection. She sent a message to her brother; but Commynes, who seems to have had charge of the affair, failed to extract any frank declarations, and ascribed to ambiguities of character a vacillation which had its real source in her embarrassments and her scruples⁵⁰. With the privity, though without the participation, of Charles, she tried

⁴⁹ Letters in Knebel. — Schilling.
— *Dépêches Milanaises*.

⁵⁰ Commynes, tom. ii. pp. 13, 12.

to open a negotiation with Freyburg — an attempt quickly frustrated by the vigilance of Berne.⁴¹ She also addressed an appeal to the emperor, setting forth in a tone of feminine earnestness the injuries she had suffered from the Swiss and her claims to protection as an unoffending subject of the Empire.⁴²

Frederick was by no means indifferent to a crisis in which his personal interests were to some extent involved. For these he was not slack in providing. He sent an envoy to Lausanne, to obtain, before it should be too late, a written ratification of the contract of marriage between Mary and Maximilian. It was arranged that the ceremony should take place at Cologne, on the 10th of November following.⁴³ For the present the agreement was still kept secret. It was in fact a testamentary disposition on the part of Charles. Should he perish, he would at least have left a guardian for his daughter, some bar to the rapacity of his rival. This point secured, the emperor was not unwilling to issue one of his "high mandates," for preventing the catastrophe which he might hope would now do him no harm. Proclamation was made of the peace he had concluded, and warning given to the Swiss and their allies that they were no longer fighting under his sanction. Unless they laid down their arms and made reparation to Savoy, they might expect to be put under the ban of the Empire.⁴⁴

Far from endeavoring to dissuade the duke from

⁴¹ *Deutsch-Missiven-Buch C. MS.*
— *Dépêches Milanaises.* — Hisey,
Hist. du Comté de Gruyère, tom. ii.

⁴² Chmel, E. I.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii.

the further prosecution of his enterprise, Frederick promised his own cooperation, with that of Sigismund and other princes, in some dimly-defined future. This, indeed, was what Charles had a right to expect. Was he not playing precisely that part which the house of Austria had so earnestly besought him to undertake? As its champion, though in his own despite, he was entitled to the warmest encouragement. Hässler, the imperial envoy, having made some allusion to endeavors of the French monarchs in former times to seduce the Swiss from their allegiance to the Empire, Charles remarked that this was just what the present king was doing; that in fact the whole aim of his policy was to aggrandize France by the absorption of imperial fiefs; and he instanced the course which Louis was even now pursuing in regard to Provence. The envoy replied that the best precaution in that case would be for the emperor to bestow Provence upon some other prince, on the duke of Burgundy himself for example—an intimation so agreeable, that Charles, who had been dictating a letter to the pope, ordered his secretary to add a postscript recommending Hässler for a cardinal's hat.⁵⁵

While his perplexities were at their height, the duke, for the first time in his life, was attacked by a serious illness. It had come on gradually, an excessive paleness and feverish turns being the earliest symptoms noticed. After a while, his stomach rejected food, he was unable to sleep, and a swelling of the legs led to apprehensions of dropsy. By the

⁵⁵ *Notizenblatt*, 1858, s. 160, 170.

physicians the malady was attributed to the fatigues he had undergone, his exposure to a humid atmosphere, and his habit of drinking in the morning a bowl of warm barley water under the notion of expelling noxious vapors.⁶⁶ They insisted on his taking wine and changing his hard couch for a feather bed, and, when he had become too weak to rise, induced him to let himself be removed to lodgings in Lausanne.⁶⁷ Yolande's physician watched by his couch day and night; but Angelo Catto, whose skill in divination as well as in medicine, was to bring him soon afterwards into close relations with Louis of France, had the chief charge of the patient, or at least received the chief credit of saving his life.⁶⁸ The Burgundian ministers took advantage of their master's condition to extort his consent to their sending the Sire de Contay on a futile mission to the king. On more important points his resolution was not to be shaken. Before he had fully recovered he was again abroad, urging forward the preparations, and exhibit-

⁶⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 60, 105 et al.—Some writers, with more zeal than knowledge, have discovered that drunkenness was the cause of this illness. The spies of Berne, who ascribed it—as in fact Charles himself did—to trouble and melancholy, furnished their masters with gratifying details of his condition, describing him as having fits of delirium and raving, as seeing the Evil One at his bedside, &c. (*Deutsches Missiven-Buch* C. 892. *MS.*) There is an illustration in Schilling, exhibiting a scene

of this kind; the portrait there given of Charles is apparently the original of one which disgraces the Museum in the Ducal Palace at Dijon, and which we suspect to be the same as was formerly kept at Morat, whence it is now missing. We have seen a copy at Berne.

⁶⁷ According to a tradition he occupied a house still standing in the Rue du Bourg.

⁶⁸ Commines (who, however, confounds this real illness with an imaginary one after the battle of Morat).

ing a greater impatience than ever to enter on another campaign. On the 9th of May he held a review of his troops, in presence of the regent and the foreign ambassadors. Though still very pale and incapable of wearing his armor, he spent five hours in the saddle, directing all the manœuvres in person, riding from troop to troop, noting every fault, and occasionally using his bâton to enforce his rebukes.¹⁰

Exclusive of garrisons and other detachments, the force he had succeeded in collecting hardly amounted to twenty thousand men. The condition of Lorraine had kept back the expected succors from that quarter; and though in Italy thousands of disbanded mercenaries had offered themselves for enlistment, their exorbitant demands, coupled with an evident disrelish for hard fighting, had soon put a stop to recruiting. From the Netherlands twelve hundred pikemen had arrived, and more, it was said, were to follow. The artillery comprised some half dozen siege guns, as many mortars, and a considerable number of field-pieces. There was still a great deficiency of tents, arms, and accoutrements, and a general absence of that splendor which had formerly characterized the Burgundian armies. In points of training the defects were equally manifest and of still greater moment. To remedy these Charles gave orders for a more careful and continual drilling in companies. He also decided, in a council of his principal captains, on some new regulations, adopted partly from necessity, partly to meet the requirements of mountain

¹⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 133-145.

warfare. In the conveyance of the lighter baggage, mules and pack-horses were to be substituted for wagons. Several thousand archers were dismounted, with the object as well of improving their aim as of reducing the expense. The bulk of the infantry were to be furnished with pikes, the simplest of weapons, which were ordered, however, of an extraordinary length, in the hope of competing with the Swiss spears.⁶⁰ Other changes of a more radical nature formed the subject of an ordinance, remarkable, among the similar documents of the period, for an approximation in some of its features to modern systems of military organization.

In place of the time-honored three divisions, the army was broken up into eight battalions and a reserve, embracing respectively troops of all arms. Five hundred pikemen, six hundred archers, and two hundred lances — sixteen hundred cavalry — were assigned to each battalion, except the first and second, which were very much stronger than the others, the first having a double proportion of infantry, while the second was mainly composed of the heavy squadrons and mounted archers of the ducal guard. When drawn up, two battalions were to form a double line of battle, with the pikes in the centre, archers and horse on both flanks. On the march each battalion

⁶⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. *passim*. — In letters of the council of Berne it is stated that the new pikes were even longer than the Swiss. Berne also warned its allies that it was not the arquebuses, but

the spears, that the enemy feared. *Deutsch Missiven-Buch C. MS.* — According to Diodorus, Darius, after his defeat at Issus, caused his army to be supplied with long spears in imitation of the Macedonians.

would form a separate corps, with the cavalry in front. The artillery, pack animals, and wagons, under escort, were to move on the flank and in the rear of the column, in a prescribed order, to be modified according to the nature of the country and the proximity of the enemy. Scouts were to be constantly sent out, to gather intelligence and guard against a surprise. Minute directions were given for avoiding confusion or delay in encamping and distributing rations.

Besides the company commanders there was a superior officer over each battalion, and a chief, or general of brigade, over each double battalion. The highest commands were assigned to the duke of Attri, the count of Marle, the prince of Tarento, and the count of Romont. The Great Bastard, under the title of "marshal of the camp," was to exercise the office both of quartermaster-general and chief of the staff.

In respect to such equipments as were still lacking, it was ordered that they should be of the simplest description consistent with utility, neither time nor money being lavished for mere pomp or display. A rigid enforcement of discipline was enjoined upon the officers. Soldiers who left their ranks or strayed from their quarters were to be put under arrest and reported for punishment. In friendly territory no act of pillage or violence was to be overlooked; even in the enemy's territory women and ecclesiastics were to be strictly respected. Offenders in these particulars were to suffer death, their commanders being

held responsible for the due enforcement of the penalty under forfeit of their own lives. Vice of all kinds was to be discountenanced. A diet of bread and water was prescribed for those who made use of profane or blasphemous language. Women of loose lives were not to be allowed to follow the march; and, by way of subduing the inflamed desires of the soldiers, their officers were to make them drink copiously of cold water.⁴¹

That he might have better facilities for tightening the reins he had thus imposed, the duke determined on transferring his camp, for the short remaining interval of preparation, to a somewhat greater distance from Lausanne. A suitable position was found near the village of Morrens, in the district of Echallens, and the troops proceeded to the ground during the last week of May. On the 27th Charles paid a farewell visit to the regent, holding a long conversation with her in private. It was arranged between them that Yolande should go and await the result at Gex, on the road from Geneva to the pass of Saint-Claude, by which, in case of disaster and danger, she would be able, in a few hours, to take refuge on Burgundian soil.⁴²

As the critical moment drew near, the interest of the spectators increased, leading to more decided efforts to prevent the apprehended catastrophe. It was felt that the consequences would not be limited to the parties engaged. The career of Charles, sub-

⁴¹ *Dépêches Milanaïses*, tom. ii. pp. 158-174.

⁴² *Ibid.* pp. 195-197.

versive and aggrandizing as it was, had yet something conservative in its tendencies and influence. Those who stood in dread of the encroachments of the French king, and those who desired to limit the growth of the Austrian and imperial power, were alike accustomed to look upon the house of Burgundy as their natural bulwark. That it was even more than this, that it was a bulwark of France against the Empire and of the Empire against France, was not yet perceived. Yet this too came to be perceived — when too late.

Among the advisers of Yolande — as in Yolande's own breast — there was a divided sentiment. Some were still devoted to the Burgundian interests and hopeful of a Burgundian triumph. Others, having lost all faith in Charles, were thrown upon the opposite horn of the dilemma, and fancied that relief might be obtained from the intervention and good offices of Milan. The bishop of Turin, who was the leader of this party, drew up and transmitted to Sforza a paper entreating that prince to exert his influence against the prosecution of a design which could only end in the ruin of the house of Savoy. The representations on the subject would come with more effect if made through a special envoy, a man well versed in military affairs. Ostensibly the mission might be one of congratulation to the duke of Burgundy on his recovered health. By a natural transition he could then be advised to have a more careful regard for his own person, and not to expose himself to fresh fatigues and dangers. He should be

told that the duke of Milan desired not less earnestly than himself the overthrow of the Swiss, and, if he were to follow simply his own inclinations, would be ready to join in attacking them, nor desist till they were utterly destroyed. They were in truth a pack of rabid wolves, menacing to the existence of princes and of the whole order of nobility. But this was itself a reason for abstaining from an encounter with them, for not leading against them an army like the Burgundian, full of high-born men, the loss of the least of whom would be poorly compensated by the slaughter of a host of them. And what advantage would follow from a victory? No profit; for full possession of their country would not add five thousand ducats to the revenues of the conqueror. No renown; on the contrary, he who was the most glorious and powerful prince in the whole world would only sully his dignity by a contest with such wretches. But if he should be defeated by them,—which God avert!—his honor would be lost, and he would be exposed to incalculable evils. Let him then be content with the glory he had acquired by his victories over France. By making a truce with the Swiss, he would preserve his reputation undiminished, and he would frustrate the hopes and purposes of the French king.⁶²

Sforza was not indisposed to act on these suggestions. His own views had of late materially changed. His exultation over the event at Grandson had been greatly damped by the cool reception given to his

⁶² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 201-204.

overtures by Louis, and by the intimation that the latter had his own plans and was biding his own time. It had begun to dawn upon him that the victories of the Swiss, which were clearing away all obstacles to the ambition and dominion of the king, might fail to afford those opportunities of which he himself had been dreaming. He was beginning, therefore, to feel a real solicitude about the fate of his ally, and had recently sent him a hint of a plot against his life, to be put in practice during the ensuing campaign. Charles had listened attentively, but replied that he believed the rumor to be a mere invention intended to keep him from moving; but even if it were true, he preferred death to dishonor.* After such an answer any further dissuasions could be of little use; yet Sforza, while he did not choose to compromise himself more deeply by sending a special embassy, instructed Panigarola to make the representations contained in the memorial which had been sent him.

No person could have been better qualified for the delicate task. Besides being thoroughly versed in his profession and perfectly acquainted with Charles's character, Panigarola seems not to have been without a feeling of regard for one with whom he had been in daily intercourse while fortune was still at the flood and since it had begun to ebb. Two months ago, when nothing had been visible but shallows and rocks, he had ventured to hint at the propriety of adopting a temporizing course. The duke had re-

* Panigarola to Sforza, May 14, *Notizenblatt*, 1856, n. 179.

plied that the general state of his affairs, and especially his changed relations with England, made it necessary that he should finish up the business in hand without delay, so as to be able to return to Flanders. To an inquiry whether the Swiss had manifested any disposition to negotiate, he had answered in the negative. Nor, he added, would he have listened to any overtures. He should count the man an enemy, ay, if it were his dearest friend, who should now talk to him of peace. He had made a solemn vow to recover his reputation or to die in battle.⁵⁵

On the present occasion he listened more patiently and responded with comparative calmness, though with the same unwavering resolution, entering at some length into the motives of his conduct. The provocation and offence, he said, had come from the Swiss. He could not sit down under the infamy of having been defeated by a nation of brutes, and exposed to the continual repetition of their attacks. For their practice would be the same as before. Instigated by the king, — perhaps in conjunction with the king, — they would go on assailing him, now here, now there, until by degrees he should be ruined.⁵⁶ Moreover he was determined to recover his rights in Alsace. He would never consent that anything that was lawfully his should be wrested from him without

⁵⁵ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 16, 18.

⁵⁶ "Non essere deliberata vivere al mondo con questa infamia di essere stata rotta di questi populi bestiali, ne vedersej perdere il suo a palmo a palmo, come aris a questo

modo. Perche ora persuasi dal Re di Franza ora con la Mesta Sua si levarano et mo in un canto mo in altro li farano guerra e dannificano como anno facto et fanno de continuo."

resistance. No, if the imperial crown were offered to him as the price of dishonor, he would renounce it rather than submit!

"I know well," he continued, "that I am risking position — life — all. But I will trust in God and my just cause."⁶⁷ If there was much to lose, there was much also to gain. Victory would restore his credit, liberate him from danger, give security to his states, establish his authority in Savoy, and cover the king with confusion. His army was now in such numbers as to give him confidence, and he would move with the caution which his friends had recommended.

Finding that he could bear to look at the opposite chances, Panigarola, while assenting to the probability of victory, again recounted the consequences of defeat. The safety, not only of the duke of Burgundy, but of all his allies, was at stake. Savoy would be utterly ruined; the peril would extend to Milan. Sforza had lately intimated that he was not indisposed to co-operate in an enterprise against France; and Charles had spoken of sending a messenger to learn how far he could rely upon this talk and whether any arrangement were feasible. While he had shown himself loath to ask for any assistance against the Swiss, he considered a war with France as a thing only to be undertaken by several powers in concert. Panigarola now urged that he should wait to hear the result. Perhaps the answer might be such as to lead him to

⁶⁷ "Cognoscere bene li mette il servito et assicurarsi di costoro, ... stato, la vita et tuto a periculo. et sperare in nostro Sig^{ro} et in la Ma questo fa per liberarsi di questa justitia."

change his plans. He replied that he would willingly wait; and he desired that his cordial thanks should be given to the duke of Milan for the interest shown in his welfare. But nothing would induce him to abandon his undertaking. His honor, he said, was at stake; and in fine he would try the cast, and get rid of the vexations, disgusts, and melancholy which had engendered his illness.⁶⁶ If he were victorious, he should be able to live, as alone he desired to live, in reputation and renown. If defeated, he hoped to die honorably on the field of battle; for were he so unfortunate as to survive, rather than continue to live he would throw himself into a well. His honor lost, he would lose his life, nor stay longer in the world amidst confusions and disputes.⁶⁷ Further argument only inflamed him, and Panigarola wisely desisted. Some allusion having been made to the emperor and his endeavors to put a stop to the war, "The Swiss," said Charles, "will not obey him, and in that they are right; for if I would have consented to join, he and the electoral princes would long ago have undertaken a crusade against them."⁷⁰

That his demeanor in this conversation should have been regarded as proof of an intense obstinacy, was no doubt natural. Yet it was surely not the obstinacy

⁶⁶ "Ideo per usure di questi affari, despiaceri et melanconia che li generano queste eoe infirmita deliberava metterli tuto ad un tracto."

⁶⁷ "Si perde . . . intende perdere la vita, no più stare al mondo, e qui per confutations et argumenti."—

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The final words may, perhaps, belong to the sentence that follows, of which the sense, owing to a hiatus, is somewhat obscure.

⁷⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 215–219.

of a blind, distempered, or illogical mind. A wise statesman, a prudent general, would have acted simply on a cool calculation of the chances. But the motives by which Charles was carried away compel a degree of sympathy for the man. There are, it is true, persons who cannot sympathize with princes. This is because their servile instincts make them look at the accidents, not at the essentials, of humanity.

A remonstrance similar in substance, but expressed with a bluntness altogether foreign to the tone of Italian diplomacy, was addressed to Charles, about the same time, by the king of Hungary. Its sincerity was unquestionable, for in the policy of Corvinus there was no crookedness or ambiguity. His whole career was one of steady and successful resistance to Austrian domination. This principle formed the basis of his alliance with Burgundy; and he saw with indignation a power which, in his view, had been raised up as a barrier to imperial encroachments, quitting its proper sphere and dashing itself to pieces on a remote and immovable rock. In his ignorance of its origin, he not unnaturally fancied that a course so injurious to his own interests must have had the same origin as his more immediate troubles — that his cunning enemy had laid the trap and his ally had gone blindly into it. So warmly did he feel about the matter that, in addition to more than one protest through his own and the Burgundian ambassadors, he sent a private letter to Charles, in the following outspoken though rhetorical strain:—

“Illustrious prince: We cannot sufficiently wonder

that you should have been so glaringly deceived, and that, after having once already tasted the fruits of seduction in so great a loss and disgrace, you should still let yourself be drawn into a labyrinth, from which you will either never escape or escape only with damage and shame. From your own case, and from ours, and from that of our allies, you might have comprehended the craft of that man, who is always planning to tie a bell, as the saying is, round the neck of those whom he fears, so that they may never be able to move their heads without a premonitory sound. What could be more burdensome or more perilous for you, what safer or more agreeable to him, than your waging a war on that unconquered and unconquerable people? He knew that, in the chances of war, they might overthrow you; he had no fears that you would overthrow them. For how are those to be vanquished who are protected on every side by the nature of their country? How are those to be vanquished who, although they may seem to be rejected by the Empire, would at once, in case of need, have the whole Empire to back them? For can you suppose that *he* would be pleased at seeing the men exterminated whose subjugation would leave him defenceless, would entail, in fact, his own subjugation? Without risk to himself he has precipitated you into an abyss, and tied you where you are exposed to the loss of your possessions and your life. His sole object is to rid himself of one whom he has good reason to fear. We speak from experience, and not without grief, for we regard your fortune, whether good or evil, as com-

mon to us both. Wherefore we exhort you to pause before falling into heavier losses and greater dangers. Be assured that, should fortune smile upon your attacks upon that people, you will have the whole Empire against you. In the opposite contingency, — which God avert! — it will be turned into a common tale, how so great a prince was overcome by rustics, whom there would have been little or no honor in conquering, to be conquered by whom was an eternal disgrace.”⁷¹

This warning did not reach its destination till after the calamity it was meant to avert had already happened. Nor, had it come sooner, would it have had any effect. Even if Charles had been less immovable, the sharp truths contained in the missive were blunted by the mixture of errors. It was true that Charles had fallen into a snare; but the hand that had laid it was a far craftier one than Frederick’s. It was true — no one felt the bitter truth more keenly than Charles — that to be overthrown by the Swiss would be a perpetual disgrace. But it was not true that no honor was to be gained by defeating them. Charles’s own honor, of which they had made booty, would be redeemed. Nay, it was certain — the very arguments used to dissuade him furnish the proof — that, were he to triumph over the Swiss, he would rise to a height which he had never contemplated, and see Europe prostrate at his feet.

Yet these facts left the main argument against him without answer or means of evasion. What availed

⁷¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 126-128.

it that he had a just cause, that he could not go back without dishonor and continual peril, that victory would restore him to security, power, and renown? What availed all this, when to go forward was certain ruin, when victory was unattainable, when the Swiss were in very truth invincible?

Never had they shown themselves more conscious of their invincibility than now. Throughout the greater part of the country a mutual good understanding and a profound calmness existed. No rumors or appeals produced any excitement. To all questions as to the course they intended to pursue Zurich and the smaller cantons gave a clear and sufficient answer: "We will take no part in aggressions or invasions. So long as the duke of Burgundy remains on his own soil or on that of Savoy, so long as he offers no injury to us, we will not molest him. But if he enters our territory or that of our Confederates, we shall use our natural and lawful right of self-defence."⁷²

To more precipitate minds this attitude had the appearance of a disinclination for battle.⁷³ But it was in reality the true Swiss spirit shining forth with its old lustre. It was a return to the right path, to the ancient policy of the Confederates, from which, in an evil hour and led by Berne, they had reluctantly strayed.

But the authors of the mischief showed no such disposition to await without perturbation the course of events. Far from finding satisfaction in the thought

⁷² Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 27.

⁷³ Ibid.

that the war had assumed an appearance of rightful self-defence, they looked upon this as an intolerable grievance. They had not begun it on this principle or with this expectation. They had counted only on the rewards and the spoils. The smitten enemy was to be held fast and prevented from smiting in return.

They were now, consequently, in a state of disappointment and rage, trying at one moment to drive forward at their former pace, talking at another of undoing all their past work. In their correspondence with their Confederates they still kept up useless pleadings for bolder measures. They treated the imperial message as a perfidious attempt to deprive them of the assistance of their allies, denouncing Frederick for having left them to support alone a quarrel into which they had entered as members of the Empire, out of regard for its honor, and as a mere act of obedience.⁷⁴

A deeper and more genuine indignation was aroused by the conduct of the monarch to whom they had really rendered their service and submission. Months had slipped away; the king had exhausted his stock of delusions; the hour of action was at hand, and he made no sign. On the 30th of May, having heard of Charles's departure from Lausanne, and supposing him to be taking the field, the council began the composition of a letter to Louis, which, altered and realtered,

⁷⁴ "Dann wir haben als zuglied des heiligen Reichs us bewegender gehorsam die recht an uns genommen." . . . "Sollen billich mit hofen das jemand des heiligen Reichs dem

wir zu ere in solich recht gewachsen sind von uns mitt sunderung solt siehen." Deutsch Misaven-Buch C, 862-870.

now abridged and now expanded, was not finished till the 10th of June. It was worded as follows: —

“From many former letters, sent both through your messengers and ours, your royal majesty has had the opportunity of learning the hostile feeling of the duke of Burgundy on account of the especial vassalage and duty which we have taken upon ourselves towards you.⁷⁸ Prompted and aided by the duchess of Savoy, he has made his preparations before Lausanne, laboring day and night to strengthen himself with men and material, and leaving nothing undone to provide for the necessity. Seeing at first that the thing was bringing ruin on the house of Savoy, and was also putting a bar between you and us, so that our forces might be prevented from uniting, we long since admonished your royal majesty, in virtue of our alliance, to assail the common enemy with your whole power. But though your royal letters and messages gave us assurances to this effect, the matter is turning out to our no slight injury, and very differently from what the late praiseworthy knight Nicholas von Diesbach, whom God assoil, and still more the honorable provost of Munster, had given us to understand would happen in case such need should ever arise. It is evidently in the hope that your royal majesty will not meddle with him, that the duke has been carrying on his preparations against us; while we, on the other hand, relying confidently on your succor, have awaited its approach, intending

⁷⁸ “Von besonder dienstbarkeit haben uff uns empfangen.”
und pflicht wegen so wir gegen uch

to join it with our forces, as we had understood to be your royal majesty's strongest desire. The load is now falling heavily upon us. What in the beginning might have been effected with little labor will now prove a matter of difficulty. Since, however, the duke is about to attack our town, with the purpose, if he can, of destroying it utterly, — which God avert! — we summon, request, and beseech your royal majesty, by virtue of our treaty, as strongly and earnestly as we can and may, to march against him through Savoy, with all your power and without any delay. Take this summons to heart, and let it not again, as hitherto, die away in empty sound!⁷⁶ This is what our treaty requires; so justice demands; it was in the hope and assurance of this, confiding in it as in a solid wall, that we from the beginning plunged into this foul sink of war.⁷⁷ Think not to profit by procrastination! We hold it certain that, if the duke be successful against us, he will then turn upon your royal majesty, as the one at whose instigation we entered into this quarrel.⁷⁸ Wherefore, if your royal majesty will put forth all your strength to drive him away, — which, if earnestly undertaken, may be easily accomplished, — then will we also use all our might and best endeavors.

“But if otherwise, then will we bethink ourselves, and turn our affair into a different and more advantageous course, no longer exposing our happiness to

⁷⁶ “Und solich mahnung zu herten nimen und funder nit als bisher verhallt.”

confide in hanc guerrarum certitatem ab initio venimus.”

⁷⁷ “Quibus oen muro firmissimo

⁷⁸ “Als die durch der anrechnung wir in die vacht gewachsen sind.”

empty words and promises.⁷⁹ To prevent this is in your power, Most Christian King!⁸⁰ Out of pure trust we have attached ourselves to you, and, if we are truly dealt with, purpose to continue faithful, with the help of God, who ever preserve your royal majesty. And we desire an answer, without any putting off, by this messenger."⁸¹

When they came to read over these blunt and threatening expressions, the writers were either struck by the impropriety of their thus addressing so potent and gracious a king, or they feared that the effect might be different from what they intended. They proceeded, therefore, to change some of the more objectionable phrases. Then, finding that a sentence thus corrected had become altogether pointless, they struck it out. Finally, with three strokes of the pen they erased the whole of the last paragraph, inserting instead one of their commonplace effusions of humility, devotion, and continued confidence.⁸² By the time, however, that the letter thus amended was ready for transmission, the urgency of the situation had again suggested the necessity of making this final appeal as forcible as possible. A

⁷⁹ "Ob ab' anders so werden wir gedencken unneser sache ein andro and fruchbare weg zu furstecken, und unseer gluck nitt allen worten und verheissungen zubevelken."

⁸⁰ "Das nitt zu beschechen ist in uwer gewalt aller Cristenlichet konig."

⁸¹ Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 887 et seq. *MS.* Lateinisches Missiven-Buch C, 887 et seq. *MS.*

ven-Buch A, 458 et seq. *MS.*

⁸² The erasures and interlineations are made in such a manner that in every stroke of the pen — now strong, now faint, sometimes leaving a sentence unfinished, sometimes stopping in the middle of a word — one can read, after the lapse of four centuries, the precise emotion that impelled or checked the hand.

postscript was therefore added, in a style supposed to be adapted to the character it was designed to operate upon, a ruse being employed to arouse a sense of personal danger, and touching reminders thrown in to stimulate the blunted sense of personal honor.

"We learned an hour ago that the duke of Burgundy had burned his camp and was on the move; and supposing at first that it was against us, we immediately summoned our forces to repel his invasion and drive him off. But we understand that he is marching in the direction of your royal majesty. (!) If it be with a hostile purpose, we shall joyfully conclude that it is because you are yourself taking the field, and we shall keep you supplied with information, as desiring your safety, advantage, and success not less than our own. Should it, however, be the duke's intention to seek and conclude an arrangement with your royal majesty, so that he may the more easily fall upon and oppress us, — who came into this war at the prompting and in the service of your royal majesty,⁸² — then we beg of you to make such provision, and to take such steps, on our behalf, as shall correspond with the hope and high confidence we have placed in your royal majesty, who have so often offered to live and die with us — words which will never be erased from our memory. On our part we shall omit nothing that becomes the reputation of upright men. As in the past the manifold attempts of the duke of Burgundy to separate us

⁸² "Die durch wissen und diessen krieg komen and."
dientlicher neigung uw k. m. in

from your royal majesty have never been able to draw us into any unseemliness, so we shall maintain the same honorable persistence in the future, under the favor of God, to whom we commit your royal majesty, desiring a special and precise answer by this messenger."⁸⁴

Such a letter could not fail to inspire Louis with the liveliest satisfaction. It gave him the assurance that his labors had been crowned with success, that his victims were conscious of being hopelessly caught, that he need give himself no further trouble.

It was a mistake of the Swiss to suppose that he had of late been absolutely idle. As usual he had profited by the suspense to take up some of the loose threads hanging from the web of his vast and intricate policy. With one long outstretched arm he had seized upon the duke of Nemours, the last survivor of the Armagnac nest of intriguers, purposing, if all went well, to send him to a cage in the Bastille, and have such revelations as were wanted squeezed out of him by due process, before handing him over to the headsmen.⁸⁵ Another portion of the royal forces, under the duke of Bourbon, was just taking possession of the principality of Orange.⁸⁶ More than a year before, William of Orange, while crossing the territory of France in a time of peace, had been

⁸⁴ Deutsch-Missiven-Buch C. MS. — The date of the letter is May 30, and that of the postscript June 10, in the Lateinisches Missiven-Buch; in the Deutsch-Missiven-Buch the latter date only is given. Portions of this document are printed in

Schilling and Stettler, but without the suppressed passages or the postscript, or any mention of them.

⁸⁵ Legrand MSS. — De Troyes. — Notizenblatt.

⁸⁶ Dépêches Milanaises.

arrested as a prisoner of war. His captors had extorted a bond for forty thousand gold crowns, and the only person found willing to advance this sum was the king, who had taken in exchange a surrender of certain sovereign rights over the principality, accompanied with an act of homage.¹⁷

Provence being within easy reach, and the duke of Burgundy fully occupied, the juncture was not less favorable for a final settlement with old René, who had accordingly received a summons, so worded as to shake him into a comprehension of the necessity of prompt obedience, to appear before Louis at Lyons, and give an account of the arrangement he had been making with Charles. His seneschal attended him and avowed himself the author of the obnoxious treaty, his design, as he boldly stated, having been to save the last relic of his master's inheritance from the rapacious hands that had despoiled him of Anjou and Bar. Enchanted with this frankness, Louis treated both the old king and his minister with distinguished kindness, while obtaining their signatures to an instrument transferring Provence, at the decease of its present possessor, to the crown of France.¹⁸

Another René claimed, at this same propitious moment, a fraction of the royal interest and attention. The defeat of the Burgundians at Grandson had not, as was feared, been followed by a popular rising in Lorraine. But a small party of nobles, headed by the Bastard of Vaudémont, had succeeded, with the

¹⁷ Legrand MSS. tom. xviii. *Dépêches Milanaises.*

¹⁸ Commines. — De Troyes. —

help of Craon, in seizing a few fortresses on the French frontier. The king, however, had been no party to this violation of the truce. At all events, on receiving a complaint from Charles, he had disavowed the proceedings of his lieutenant and ordered his troops to withdraw.¹⁰ René, who had followed him to Lyons, made fresh but still useless appeals. The mere presence at the court of a suitor so little disposed to accommodate himself to the workings of the royal policy, was evidently irksome.¹¹ Disgusted with the slights which heaped up the measure of injustice he had received, René announced his purpose to go and seek help from his German allies. The idea was hailed as a happy inspiration. Whatever the result to himself, it could not fail to be agreeable to the king.¹² He was supplied with an escort and a small sum of money; and an arrangement was made with the authorities in Lorraine, by which the dethroned prince was enabled to pass unmolested through his lost duchy, on his way to procure the means of recovering it. In most of the towns on his route little notice was taken of his presence; but, as he approached the Vosges, he received from his former subjects, notwithstanding the presence of the Burgundian garrisons, open marks of respect and sym-

¹⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 72, 73, 178, et al.

¹¹ "On s'ennuyoit de luy en nostre cour." *Commynes*, tom. ii. p. 28.

¹² "Il ne pouvoit que gagner, car s'il succomboit en quelque execu-

tion de guerre, . . . il demouroit quitte de la recompense de la perte qu'il avoit fait en son service, et s'il obtenoit quelque victoire, . . . cela luy redandroit à profit." *Dialogue entre Lud et Chrétien*, p. 28.

thy. A guard of honor, spontaneously enrolled, attended him across the mountains, into Alsace, where he proposed to enlist a body of auxiliaries. In this, however, he was prevented by the emperor. From his crowned protectors René was destined to meet with nothing but rebuffs. Passing to more hospitable soil, he arrived at Lucerne in time to do battle for a cause which he hoped to identify with his own.⁸²

The ten days during which the council of Berne were concocting their letter to the king had been employed by Charles in his final preparations. His army was now perfectly equipped, and according to the Swiss spies was superior in numbers, and inferior only in artillery, to that which he had previously commanded.⁸³ Even the Italian critics admitted that a high state of discipline seemed to have been established, a great improvement having taken place since the new regulations had gone into effect.⁸⁴ How it had been done—how, under the circumstances, such a force had been raised and organized—passed their comprehension. On one point alone they still had misgivings. Their countrymen, they thought, after receiving the wages now due, would desert in great numbers. To guard against this, Charles ordered that only a first instalment should be paid

⁸² Ibid. — Remy. — *Dépêches Milanaises*. — Knebel.

⁸³ *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C*, 893. *MS.*

⁸⁴ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. II.

— The Swiss spies also reported that Charles had established "excellent order." *Deutsch Missionen-Buch C*. *MS.*

before the march began. The second would be disbursed when an encampment had been formed in the vicinity of the enemy.⁶⁶ The third — But that debt would be otherwise cancelled.

Never before in modern history had an impending conflict excited so deep and wide-spread an interest. The long rivalry of Burgundy and France, with its ever-widening influence, had awakened all Europe to a perception of the multiplied results involved in the issue. The emperor hoped to gain, the king of Hungary feared to lose, by the event, whichever way it might turn. The king of England, who from sheer personal spite had been making attempts to increase the embroilments of his former ally and benefactor,⁶⁷ was sending his other brother-in-law, Earl Rivers, on a visit of inspection to the Burgundian camp. Close around the theatre of war were eyes that watched with an intenser gaze, ears that listened in a hushed suspense. Yolande, surrounded by her children, sat at Cex, her heart beating with balanced hopes and fears, her hours employed in processions, masses, and almagivings, to win over Heaven to the side of the right.⁶⁸ Sforza, who had so enmeshed himself in intrigue as hardly to know what he hoped or what he feared, thirsted for the earliest tidings, that he might shape his course accordingly, and had

⁶⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 115, 230, 233, 238, 239, 244.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* tom. i. p. 344.

⁶⁸ "Vive cum speranza di sua salvezza in questa victoria, e già-

may credo non pensa in altro, et continuamente fa fare processione, dire messe, fare elemosine." Letter of Aplane, *ibid.* tom. ii. p. 289.

stationed relays of couriers along the route from his palace door to the scene of action. No such facilities were possible for him who waited at Lyons with a sharper vision, a deeper interest, a stronger purpose, than all the rest. Nor did he need them. His keen vulture's scent would inform him when the prey was struck down and awaiting his stoop.

CHAPTER III.

MORAT.

1476.

FROM Lausanne to Berne is a journey of fifty-six English miles. After crossing the Jorat there is a choice of two roads — one through Rue, Romont, and Freyburg; the other through Moudon, Payerne, and Morat. On ordinary maps the former is represented by a straight, the latter by a circuitous, line. But that which seems the more direct is equally long and not so practicable. It traverses a high and rugged region, the base of the Freyburg Alps; while the regular route descends the valley of the Broye, which opens out into a broad and level tract as it approaches the Lake of Morat.

The cross-roads are infrequent, and the intervening ground is hilly and wooded. It would not, therefore, have been prudent in Charles, with the force at his command, to undertake active operations on both lines. He had, however, the option between them, his advance being secured by his present possession

of the country for about half the distance, including two strong places, Romont and Moudon.

As he had given no positive indications of his purpose, Berne, made wary by its miscalculations on a former occasion, did not attempt to concentrate troops in advance. The reports of the spies, and the conjectures of the council, wavered down to the last moment.¹ But, whichever line he might take, he must be kept at arm's length until the Confederates, who would be certain to wait till the danger was imminent, should have assembled to meet him. Bernc itself, if not easy to capture, would be easy to invest; and its communications severed, its leadership suspended, its voice made inaudible, the council would have been filled with misgivings as to the conduct of those who had so often held back when loudly and urgently summoned. Luckily, they had the same advantages for defence as Charles had for attack. On each route a strongly fortified town would bar the way. If he came by the upper road he would have to lay siege to Freyburg, if by the lower, to Morat.

Yet his choice was not a matter of indifference to Berne. Freyburg had a claim, readily acknowledged by the diet, to be treated as an integral part of the Confederacy. The cantons exclusive of Berne had contributed over eleven hundred men to the garrison, and had promised full succors in case of need.² But they had taken no such step, and given no such pledge, in regard to Morat. They looked upon Berne's

¹ *Deutsch Meissien-Buch* C, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

² *Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. 1. 582, 583.

occupation of that place as one of the aggressive acts which they had long discouraged, and of which they were anxious to wash their hands. When questioned on the point, they had earnestly counselled the evacuation of Morat, giving their reasons, and adding the assurance that Berne might count upon their aid in the defence of its proper territory.³

To this advice Berne had of course refused to listen. Even had it shared in the scruple, the surrender of an advantage already gained could not alter the origin or stop the prosecution of the war. At its present stage all questions must be looked at simply from a military point of view; and, thus looked at, the advantage was one which it would be the height of folly to surrender. "Morat is a bulwark of our own territory," the council urged in reply; "if it were given up, all our lands would be lost and laid waste."⁴ To this sufficient reason they added another, neither so well grounded nor so forcible, but proceeding on the natural presumption that it is easier to darken the conscience than to enlighten the intellect. Savoy, they pretended, had no real right of sovereignty over Morat, since the latter, before coming under its dominion, had been a free imperial town. In that capacity it had contracted an alliance with Berne, the main object of which was mutual protection. They could not, therefore, in honor, and without a breach of their obligations, suffer Morat to fall into the hands of the enemy. This ingenious mode of justifying their reten-

³ Ibid. ubi supra.

unser Statt verloren und gewunt."

⁴ "Dann wo das selb also verlassen so weren all unser land vor

Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 897. MS.

tion of the stolen property from its lawful possessors made less impression than might have been expected. The diet, without taking any notice of it, adhered to its own recommendation, but offered, as usual, to refer the matter to the people.⁵

Whatever might be the ultimate decision, on Berne alone would devolve the burden of holding Morat in the interval, and withstanding the first onset of the enemy if he should advance by this route. Warned by the fate of Grandson, the council resolved that there should be no remissness or oversight on their part. The preparations were begun in good season, all the resources of the canton being put in requisition. In addition to the actual garrison of four or five hundred men, a levy of fifteen hundred was ordered, to be picked man by man from the strongest and most courageous in every district, and in such a manner that, while one member of a family would be exposed to the risk of capture, a brother, father, or son would remain to be enrolled in the army of succor. The rural population, in compliance with successive mandates sternly worded, sent in abundant supplies. Bienne and Solothurn furnished small contingents. Heavier ordnance and more experienced cannoniers than could be found at home were borrowed from Strasburg. It only remained to select a commander on whose devotion, ability, and resolution full reliance might be placed.⁶

* Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. — Knebel — Rodt — Tillier. —
II. s. 583, 585, 586. Schilling.

⁶ Deutsch Meissen-Buch C. MS.

Among the persons on whom the conscription had fallen was Adrian von Bubenberg, then residing in complete retirement on his family estate. Chance having thus recalled his name to the minds of his colleagues, they immediately remembered that the qualities of which they were in search belonged pre-eminently to the man whom they had discarded and stigmatized as a partisan of the enemy.

Bubenberg was, in truth, the very reverse of a partisan. He was a patriot of the antique cast, who felt more pain when his country did than when it suffered wrong. It was because of this — because he had shown not less, but greater, loyalty than his calumniators; because, unlike them, he had prized the public welfare and the public honor higher than private interests — that he had been driven from the service of the state. For the same reason he was now recalled, and, by an overwhelming majority of voices in both branches of the council, nominated to the post of greatest danger and of greatest trust.

In the language of the vote he was "affectionately besought to overcome his feelings about the matter." It was feared apparently that he would either refuse from spleen or accept with a mortifying exultation. But Bubenberg was the last man to think of his own wrongs in connection with his country's peril. The conditions he annexed to his acceptance were dictated by a sage and single-minded regard for the common good. He saw that the only real source of danger in a war like the present lay in that decay of discipline which the war itself had occasioned. He

therefore demanded ampler powers than were usually conferred on a single Swiss leader, including that of punishing with death and of administering to the soldiers an oath of fidelity and of unlimited obedience to his orders. His stipulations were acceded to without demur, and in the latter part of April he had gone to take command.⁷

Although the earlier demonstrations of Charles, so far as they were of a menacing character, had pointed chiefly to Freyburg, he had never intended to march in this direction, unless it should be necessary for the defence of Romont. Besides that the other route, as he had found by personal inspection,⁸ was more open and practicable, he had a far stronger motive for preferring it. Its course was such as would enable him at every step to cover his communications with his own frontier—a consideration to which he showed himself keenly alive. From Moudon and Payerne, branch roads, striking off to the left, led to a junction which was also that of the routes to the main passes of the Jura. Yverdon was the centre from which these different roads all radiated, and its consequent importance as a strategical point was fully appreciated by the duke. He had reënforced the garrison, ordered the bridges across the Thièle to be put in repair and well guarded, and even caused a fleet to be collected in anticipation of an attack by the Lake of Neuchâtel.⁹ In fact, all his proceedings were

⁷ Rodt, B. II. s. 186, 187.

⁸ Deutsch Misaven-Buch C, #83—

⁹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. 887. *MS.*

p. 4.

marked by a vigilance and caution in singular contrast with the blundering rashness which is generally supposed to have characterized this part of his career. No precaution which modern generalship would prescribe seems to have been neglected. To secure his flanks, menace the enemy's communications, and divert attention from his own movements, he sent a force by the upper road to ravage the neighborhood of Freyburg and threaten the town, left detachments at Romont, Lausanne, and Vevay, and despatched the count of Romont, with a strong body of horse and some field-pieces, down the strip of land between the Lakes of Morat and Neuchâtel, with orders to cross the Broye where it connects the two lakes, strike the roads by which Berne received reënforcements and supplies, and inflict such damage as might be possible.

Having started from Estavayer, Romont, by a rapid night march, reached unobserved the left bank of the Broye. Here he dismounted his men and left his artillery, the opposite side being impracticable for horses or guns by reason of a vast morass. After fording the river, the party proceeded in the direction of Ins, a point of junction in a great network of roads traversing a fertile and populous region and connecting Berne with Neuchâtel, Bienne, and its other allies along the Jura. Day had scarcely dawned when the alarm was given, and every village steeple began to send forth its summons. The peasantry, already warned to be on the alert, flocked in, armed chiefly with their implements of labor, but followed

quickly by bodies of troops from Arberg, Erlach, and other posts. With such swarms in his front and such obstacles in his rear, Romont was probably wise in recrossing the Broye, which he did without delay and with little loss. The pursuers, on whom he opened fire, hesitated till the example of a herd of cattle, which had been terrified by the tumult, incited them to follow. Being then, however, charged by the Burgundians in a solid battalion, they were driven back in disorder.¹⁰ Meanwhile a party sent across in vessels from Neuchâtel had landed on Romont's left flank, another, from Morat, on his right. By a vigorous attack on either he might have gained a real and important success. Instead of this, he drew back from between them and allowed them to unite, profiting by his double advantage of a shorter line and greater speed only to make good his retreat.¹¹

In the afternoon of the following day, Tuesday, the 4th of June, the duke broke up his camp at Morrens, and set out upon the expedition which, in common with the world, he expected to prove decisive of his fate. His route lay through Echallens, avoiding the Jorat, and crossing at right angles the roads already mentioned as leading to Yverdon. Halts were made at the junction with these roads; scouts were sent

¹⁰ "Lors le Seigneur de Romont ayant reconstré et rangé sa bataille, torne gentilement face faisant charge et rudes saillies sur ceulx du Landeron qui les plus avancés et proches se treuvent, et tant grande et serrée

estoit sa bataille que les Allemands ne les nostres ne povoient tenir longtemps la rive delà." Hugues de Pierre, Purry, Extraits, p. 33.

¹¹ Ibid. — Chron. de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, B. VIII.

ahead to explore the wooded heights along the valley of the Broye; and no advance was made till their reports had been received and compared. The excellent order maintained on the march did much to establish the reaction of opinion which had lately set in. Old Italian captains admitted that they had never seen so large an army in an equal state of discipline; and those who had been loudest in denouncing the enterprise as an act of madness were now, as was natural, the most sanguine of a prosperous issue.¹⁸

From the 7th to the 9th the army lay encamped on the spacious plain extending westward from Payerne to Estavayer, head-quarters being at Montet, midway between these two places. Contradictory accounts having been received, the Great Bastard undertook a reconnoissance in person, and brought in word that a force estimated at six thousand was posted on the heights above Avenches, commanding the road from Payerne to Morat. It being then late in the evening of the 8th, a plan of attack was arranged for the next morning. Earl Rivers, who had arrived only the day before, and had talked of remaining through the campaign, suddenly took leave, pleading other business. His departure on the eve of an expected engagement gave rise to sarcastic comments in the camp, where doubtless there were many who would fain have followed the example.

¹⁸ "Tutti questi capitanei dicono
però servando questo ordine tanta
gente como sono, se ben li Sucerj
fossero grossissimi, la vittoria essere
nostra." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom.
ii. p. 233.

Yet the smile of contempt with which it was spoken of by Charles¹³ seems not to have been misapplied. Though distinguished above all his contemporaries by his prowess in the lists, Rivers had been long before described by his own sovereign and brother-in-law as a coward, who always found some excuse for avoiding danger.¹⁴

No opposition was encountered on the next day's march, which brought the army in front of Morat. The reported "six thousand" turned out to have been a reconnoitring party of only as many hundred, led by Bubenbergh himself, who, after taking a couple of prisoners and securing some needful articles, had again retired into the town.¹⁵ On Charles's arrival, he caused all his forces to deploy on the heights in view of the garrison¹⁶ — a common means of intimidation at the opening of a siege. The investment on the land side was immediately completed. It would be less easy to intercept the communication by water. Bubenbergh had already sent letters to the council, informing them of what was going on, but deprecating any premature or rash attempt at succor, such as had worked only injury at Grandson and might prove even more disastrous here. Let them wait calmly till

¹³ "Ei ne he riso dicendo, per paura si ne ha andato." Ibid. p. 236.

¹⁴ "The king hath said of him that whosoever he hath most to do, then the Lord Scales will surest ask leave to depart, and weeneth that it is most because of cowardice." Paston Letters (Knight's ed.), vol. i. p. 163.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 242. — Schilling, s. 324.

¹⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 242. — This has been ridiculed as empty bravado; and if it had taken place, as the critics represent, a week later, it might have passed for such. But if moral influences are to count for anything in war, surely an exhibition of force, in a case of this kind, might be expected to produce some effect — as, in fact, it did.

their allies had come to their assistance and concerted a plan of operations. They might rely upon his holding out to the last. He would never leave the place alive without their express orders.¹⁷

During the six weeks he had been in command he had made diligent preparations for defence. The works, consisting of an excellent wall, double ditch, towers, and castle, had been further strengthened by bastions and outworks; and a church and other buildings outside the walls had been razed.¹⁸ One point only had been overlooked or too long deferred — the destruction of the village of Meyriez, lying within five hundred yards of the south-western gate. An attempt to fire it was made at the enemy's approach; but after a struggle the Burgundians effected a lodgment, and captured two prisoners, who were brought before the duke. Being separately questioned, they gave correct information as to the strength of the garrison and other particulars, as well as of the uncertainty that still existed whether the Confederates would undertake the relief of a place not situated on their own soil.¹⁹

It was Charles's hope, by vigorous cannonading and assaults, to reduce the town in a few days, and continue his march upon Berne before the Swiss should have decided how to act or have time to assemble.²⁰ The idea of leaving Morat unassailed, masking it with a portion of his army while prosecuting operations

¹⁷ Stettler, B. I. s. 263. — Schilling, B. VIII. s. 417.
Eng. s. 323.

¹⁸ Engelhard, s. 54. — Girard, p. 242.
MSS. — Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher, ¹⁹ Ibid. p. 243.

with the rest, does not appear to have occurred to him. In that age, and down to a much later period, it was common to confound the resisting power of stone walls with the assailing power of the garrisons which they sheltered. It is true that the duke of Burgundy himself, in both his expeditions into France, had left fortified places in his rear. But the country was one with which he was familiar, which had few natural obstacles, and where he had counted on a host of adherents. In the present case the whole land was a fortress, which an invader could hope to penetrate only by guarded approaches. Moreover his force was hardly sufficient to warrant any division of it. To cover his communications against sallies from Morat, and probably Freyburg, would have required him to detach at least ten thousand men; and his army, though rated by the Swiss and by many historians at seventy, eighty, and even a hundred thousand, cannot possibly have exceeded forty thousand, unless we suppose it to have grown by some internal principle of accretion.²¹ Of this number about six thousand, chiefly Savoyards, were now posted on the north-east of the town, their commander, the count of Romont, being intrusted with the conduct of the siege. The second brigade, commanded by the prince of Tarento, and consisting wholly of Italians under Troylus and

²¹ Rodt (B. II. a. 224), basing his calculations on the data furnished by the reports of the Milanese envoys, thinks the total cannot have been greater than thirty-six thousand. He seems, however, to have underrated the lances of the *ordon-*

nances, and not to have allowed for accessions mentioned merely in general terms. Panigarola writes, on the 10th, "*Si cognosce questa come una gran gasta, . . . ed ogni di ingrassa.*"

Antonio di Lignana, were stationed on the south-west, along the margin of the lake, both to carry on the approaches from this side and to hold the road to Avenches. The two remaining corps and the reserve battalion, numbering probably about twenty-four thousand and comprising the household troops and Burgundian levies, would form the covering army; and in order to determine how it might best be posted and employed, the duke, attended by his staff, spent the forenoon of the 10th in exploring the environs.

To a general trained in the precepts, and an army habituated to the manoeuvres, of modern warfare, the theatre, while suggesting the need of extraordinary watchfulness, would also have presented an opportunity for brilliant combinations. It is one of the narrow sections into which the great undulating tableland of Switzerland is divided by the numerous rivers flowing northward from the Alps. The Saane on the one side, the Broye with the Lake of Morat on the other, run their parallel course from south-west to north-east, the general dip of the interjacent land being in the same direction. Across from the lake to the Saane is a distance of five or six miles. On the former sides the slopes are gradual though irregular; but the bed of the Saane lies for the most part in deep gorges. The surface has a general elevation of three or four hundred feet above the level of the lake. It is everywhere unequal, embossed with hill-tops, not much varying in height, but distinctly marked by hollows and watercourses. Much of it is covered with forests, which hide in their recesses many villages and cultivated patches.

The town of Morat stands, as already mentioned, on the margin of the lake, about three miles from the upper end and two from the lower. Four roads radiate from its gates. Two skirt the lake and the marshy tracts at the extremities, the first leading north-east to Arberg, the second south-west to Avenches and Payerne. The other two, branching off from these, trend across the hills to the Saane, the more northerly crossing it at Gümminen and leading thence to Berne, while the other, going south, meets a bend of the river, and continues up the left bank to Freyburg. There are also many cross-roads and by-ways connecting the villages with one another and circuitously with the town; and besides the bridge at Gümminen, a second, three miles higher up, leads to the village of Laupen, a spot famous in the earlier annals of Swiss triumphs and connected by direct roads with both Freyburg and Berne.

Two methods of operating, if not equally good, yet both justifiable according to circumstances, would seem to have been open to the duke of Burgundy. For offensive movements the Saane offered a screen behind which to mass his troops and prepare his attack, keeping the enemy in suspense and preventing his concentration, or holding him fast by feints and demonstrations while assailing a weak point or flanking a strong one.²² If restricted, on the other

²² This was the course pursued by the French invaders in 1798. Holding the left bank of the Saane, they cannonaded Gümminen, made a false attack on Laupen, and while thus diverting the attention of the defenders, effected a crossing at Neu-ench. Yet they were immediately repulsed, and forced back to their original position. But in the mean

land, by the necessities of the siege and the smallness of his army, to defensive measures, he would have a more difficult part to play; for in this case, of course, the advantages of the screen and of the initiative would lie with the Swiss. Yet even then there were circumstances in his favor. The road connecting the bridges of Gümminen and Laupen lies on the left bank, lined along the margin by a wood, and in the rear by heights of easy ascent. Consequently bodies of troops, defending the points of passage, could render mutual support, falling back, if compelled, to a position behind the Biberen, a shallow stream, but flowing in the same direction and in nearly as deep a bed as the Saane. Thus the Burgundians might have a double line of circumvallation, covering the besieging army and allowing it full opportunity to retire in case of disaster.²²

Charles seemed at first to comprehend the situation. His opening measures were in the conception judicious and prompt, though they failed in the execution. While preparing a camp and harrying on the siege, he pushed out bodies of troops to secure the points which would form the pivots of his subse-

time a government at Berne, worthy of the days of Diesbach, had betrayed the country and the army.

²² A long and able article in the *Helvetische Militär-Zeitschrift*, 1836, contains some instructive criticism—marred, however, by fundamental errors on points of fact. Thus Charles is assumed to have had from 70,000 to 80,000 troops, and is blamed, on this assumption, for

not having doubled his detachments. He is censured for having deferred till the 17th attempts which were actually made on the 11th and 12th. It is also taken for granted that he carried with him all his supplies, and had consequently no need to preserve his communications; but this, as we shall see on the authority of Panigara, is a mistake.

quent operations. A strong party of cavalry went northward as far as Arberg, as well to arrest intended succors from that end of the lake as to occupy the enemy's attention. On the 12th from six to eight thousand infantry marched against Gümminen and Laupen. At the former point the road, after leaving the bridge, enters a pass capable of being held against far superior numbers.²⁴ Such troops, few in number, as Berne had already sent out were posted here, and, on the first alarm, were reënforced by the peasantry of Freyburg, without whose aid they would, by their own confession, have been overpowered.²⁵ At Laupen the bridge itself lies in a kind of defile, the left bank above it and the right bank below being lofty and precipitous. The road along the river, by which the Burgundians advanced, approaches it by a sudden turn under the edge of a cliff, and hence their superior force gave them little advantage, especially as no guns or missiles seem to have been used. The defenders consisted of the neighboring villagers, those of Neueneck, headed by their priest, being conspicuous by their courage and promptitude. They sustained the contest, chiefly one of stratagem, for six hours. Messengers sent to Berne with the first notice of the danger found the citizens already under

²⁴ See the *Lebensgeschichte des Schultheissen Niklaus Friedrich von Mülinen* (Bern, 1837), which contains a striking account of the operations on the Saane in 1798.

²⁵ "Als dann die vünd gestern an die unsern zu Gümminen an den bruck mit starken macht kament,

litten die unsern grosse not, mocht inen auch nitt wol ergangen sin ob die unsern nitt manlichen auch kecklichen zugesogen weren als getruwbruder, und insunder die von Reangen waren bald do." Berne to Freyburg, Girard MSS.

arms, the banners waving and the array forming in the Kreuzgasse, in front of the council-house. Instead of marching, as had been intended, to Gümminen, the column immediately took the road to Laupen, where it arrived in the nick of time. The bridge had at length been carried, and the village and castle, occupying an angle formed by the confluence of the Sense with the Saane, were on the point of falling.²⁶ With a river in their rear and another on their flank, the Burgundians, attacked suddenly by a fresh and superior force, imagined that they had been decoyed into an ambuscade. They retreated in haste across the bridge, turning, however, on their pursuers and compelling them to withdraw in turn, with a loss of forty or fifty.²⁷

Skirmishing was kept up along the river, but the attack on the bridge was not renewed. The party sent against Arberg had also been worsted, in a sally by the garrison.²⁸ Charles, meanwhile, had found that the siege would prove a more protracted operation than he had counted upon. The fire from the walls was so powerful and so well maintained that it was not till the 14th that the Burgundians succeeded in intrenching themselves on the edge of the ditch²⁹ — the position where in that day the chief labors of the

²⁶ "Wo wir inn mitt unser offner paner und starken zuzug nitt zu hilf komen, so hetten wir sloes und statt, das unns altvarden und wir langzit harbracht und mitt vil blüt vergiessen behauptet haben, uff den tag verloren." Bern to Lucerna, June 13. *MS.* (*Archives of Lu-*

cerne.)

²⁷ *Ibid.* — Schilling, s. 330. — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 262.

²⁸ *Deutsch Mimiven-Buch C*, 904. *MS.*

²⁹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 264.

siege must begin, but where, under the modern system of fortification and attack, they may be said to end. Two bombards, with some pieces throwing stone balls, were brought to bear upon the wall on the north-eastern side, and seventy discharges were delivered in the course of twenty-four hours.²⁰ Every shot that told was followed by a burst of cheers from the battery, while the defenders remained perfectly silent for fear of drawing the fire of the arquebusiers. By Bubenberg's orders the gates were left open, that the vigilance of the garrison might be kept upon the stretch.²¹ A sally in the night of the 16th, for the purpose of overturning the guns, had no result.²² On the 18th, several towers having been shot away, and large ravages, of which the effects are still visible, made in the wall,²³ an assault was ordered. It was made at nightfall, the stormers being equipped with axes and ladders. But the defenders had made every preparation. The breach was strewn with pointed irons; retrenchments had been raised, and a flanking fire was brought to bear. After losing sixty killed and a hundred or more wounded, the assailants were withdrawn.²⁴

²⁰ Schilling, s. 331.—This is the obvious origin of a statement, to be found in most of the later narrators, that Morat resisted a bombardment from seventy pieces.

²¹ Engerhard, s. 56.

²² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 271.

²³ "So hat er den besten thurm inn fier schutz nieder geschossen, oeh ander thurm und ir murren vast zu schoosen." Letter of Hans

Waldmann to the council of Zurich. *MS.* (Archives of Zurich.)—Parts of the wall have been left unrepaired, as a memorial of the siege.

²⁴ Tschudi, *Fortsetzung*, in *Baltazar, Helvetia* (Aarau, 1828), B. IV. s. 469.—Schilling, s. 331, 332.—*Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 279, 282.—In the Swiss accounts the loss is put at 700—1000; by Molinet at 200 killed and many wounded.

The officers who had superintended the attack were called before the duke and reprimanded for their want of energy. They excused themselves by alleging that, if numbers of the best men were sacrificed in the assaults, the army would be too much weakened to meet the enemy in the field. Their ideas, derived from the Italian modes of warfare, were too methodical for the emergency, and their plans, formed with deliberation, were executed with a corresponding slowness. It was necessary, they declared, that all the ravelins and other works on one side should be levelled before a general assault was attempted. They were charged to redouble the fire and to act with great celerity. A new battery had been erected on more commanding ground; mines had been opened at several points; and Charles went frequently to inspect the works and to stimulate the activity of the men.³⁵

During the first three days of the siege all communication between the garrison and their countrymen had been suspended.³⁶ On the 14th a single messenger succeeded in getting to Berne.³⁷ To pre-

³⁵ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 258, 264, 271, 278, 282.

³⁶ Letters of Berne, June 12 and 13, in *Deutsch Meisslen-Buch C*, and Archives of Lucerne. *MS.* "Solicher mass das one macht niemant mit bottschafft noch ausse keine wege zu noch von inn komen kan noch mag." On the 13th the council wrote that they had not yet received a word of intelligence. This refutes the statements of Schilling;

Engelhard, Rodt, and other writers, that the communication by the lake was never for a moment interrupted. It appears from a letter of Panigola that the besiegers were themselves under a similar impression. But the only foundation for it would seem to have been the boasts of the garrison.

³⁷ Letter of Ludwig Seiler, June 14. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

vent any messages or succors by the lake, Charles had caused some vessels to be fitted out and filled with troops.³⁸ They were stationed so as to watch the passage between the palisades, but out of range of the guns in the wooden towers that guarded the entrance. The success therefore was only partial. In a dark night a fleet, adroitly steered from the opposite shore, succeeded in landing a number of men, furnished with panniers of earth to aid in repairing the works.³⁹ Yet a feeling of discouragement also found entrance; for no report arrived that the Confederates were gathering for the relief of the place, which otherwise, it was clear, must ultimately succumb. Although few lives had been lost, the fatigues of an incessant defence, the crumbling of the walls, the roar of the artillery, and the dull echoes of the pick, cast a gloom upon that spirit which flamed so ardently on the battle-field, but which always chafed at the irksome and protracted toils of a regular siege. In the present instance the discontent was the greater, that those on whom the duty had fallen contrasted their lot with that of their brethren, who would monopolize the excitement, the glory, and — it was to be feared — the booty. At the first indication of this feeling Bubenberg assembled both the soldiers and the disaffected townspeople, reminded the former of their oath, warned the latter of their peril, declared that whoever breathed a word or exhibited a sign of faintheartedness or treason should

³⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 247.

³⁹ *Chron. de Neuchâtel, Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*, B. VIII. s. 294.

be cut down on the spot, and wished the same fate for himself if he should ever entertain a thought of yielding.⁴⁰ He nevertheless perceived that the crisis of the siege was at hand. He wrote, therefore, to Berne that, if it were intended to save the town, there must be no delay. The works were greatly damaged, and the men were fairly worn out. Yet they and he would continue the defence while a vein pulsed in their bodies.⁴¹

If any time had been lost, Berne at least was not in fault. At the first moment it had sent notice to all its Confederates and allies from Strasburg to Sion. Letters were issued daily with circumstantial accounts, and members of the council had gone to obtain assurance that the summons would be obeyed.⁴² There was no occasion for undue emphasis or reproachful allurs. Yet the council could not refrain from observing that, if their earlier urgings had been heeded and the plans of Berne adopted, no second invasion would have taken place.⁴³

At present, however, there was no lack of zeal in any quarter. The cantons were all in a bustle of preparation. Alarm-bells were constantly pealing; signal-fires blazed on the hill-tops. The summons found the herdsmen ascending to the Alpine pastures, and recalled them to the valleys. Gathered into

⁴⁰ Schilling.—Engelhard.—Tschudi, Fortsetzung.

⁴¹ Tschudi, Fortsetzung, Helvetia, B. IV. n. 470.

⁴² Schilling — Deutsch Missiven-Buch C. MS.

⁴³ "Wo alle pundsverwandten als wir... wir waren deswütenden Blutgusser langst abkommen." Berne to Strasburg, Deutsch Missiven-Buch C, 398. MS.

groups, they heard in fancy the reverberations of the cannon battering the walls of Morat.⁴⁴ Questions as to the propriety of assisting Berne to preserve its unrighteous conquests were forgotten. Recollections of Grandson — of the fate of the garrison, of the plunder of the camp⁴⁵ — filled all minds; and there was a general determination to muster more quickly and in greater numbers than on that occasion. One place was suspected, though wrongly, of a different feeling. Zurich, dissatisfied with the distribution of the money received from Geneva, would, it was said, display its grudge by a scanty contingent. But the authorities, when made acquainted with the charge, repelled it as a stigma on Helvetian fidelity. "It is false," they said; "such a thought never entered our minds. We intend not to diminish, but to increase, our levies."⁴⁶

Lucerne, while mustering its men, had sent an agent to Berne to give a promise of their speedy

⁴⁴ At Bienne the noise of the bombardment was actually heard, throughout the 17th and 18th, raising excitement and impatience to the highest pitch. See Bläsch, B. II. s. 301.

⁴⁵ There are numerous indications of the degree in which, after Grandson, the thirst for booty grew to be a settled and primary motive for war. To trace them would lead us too far from our subject. An extract from Schilling will be sufficient to mark this influence on the present occasion. Speaking of the feeling with which the troops at Berne

and Morat had awaited the enemy's approach, he says, "Die . . . wurden damit desto mannhafter und gehertzer, dann sy meinten, er wurde aber gros Gut von Gold, Silber, und andern Dingen, mit ihm bringen, das sy ihm aber meinten an zu gewinnen." s. 323.

⁴⁶ "Von wem uch das furgeben ist der hat die unwahrheit gebrucht, und uns ist soliche in unser gedechtnis sinn und gemut nie komē Und wir wolent unsern zug meren und nit mindern." Zurich to Lucerne, June 14. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

arrival, as well as to ascertain the exact state of affairs. He wrote back on the 14th, certifying the correctness of former reports. On his journey he had found the fields and houses almost entirely deserted, — men, women, and children flocking to Berne in a state of anxiety and alarm.¹⁷ There too all was commotion and fear, especially on account of the garrison of Morat. The troops of the canton had already set out, resolved to lose every life rather than that the tragedy at Grandson should be repeated.¹⁸ None of the Confederates had yet arrived. But it was to Lucerne that the inhabitants of Berne of all classes looked with the greatest confidence and hope. Aided by their brothers of Lucerne, they would be ready, they said, to meet any attack.¹⁹

On Monday, the 17th, the council sent out an urgent missive to the forces already approaching, entreating them to lose no moment on the way. Tidings just received from the besieged showed that their situation was growing desperate. "Dearest friends and brothers," the letter concluded, "were the need not so great, we should be loath to use such pressing and burdensome solicitations. But our affairs, alas! are in a state which obliges us to load you beyond our desire. If God grant that we preserve our existence and power, we will show our eternal

" "Under wege bar uff hab ich die lantschaft zu gatter mass gantz sit gesehen und niemand da heimen, und mansbild wib und kind gantz trurig und erschrocken." ren numer zu verlassen das innen beschech als dennen vor gransson beschochen ist, a all lib und gut darum geben."

" Letter of Ludwig Seiler MS. (Archives of Lucerna.)

" "Und vermeint je mer die fr-

gratitude, to the extent of our ability, with steadfast brotherly love, never" — as heretofore — "separating ourselves from you."⁴⁰

Before this message had left the gates those to whom it was addressed had begun to enter. The first to arrive were the men of Unterwalden — the last who had consented to the war. They had been joined on the route by those of the Entlibuch Valley, too eager to wait for the banner of Lucerne. This canton, Schwytz, and Uri, followed in quick succession on the next day, and the stream continued to flow without intermission. All the allies arrived in good season. Frederick's injunctions to the contrary had been treated with scorn by the imperial towns, their answer being, that their obligations to the Swiss imposed a duty paramount to that of obeying the emperor.⁴¹ Some, who had rejected the former summons, now came without any. Others, who had then been too late, were now among the foremost. Austria was represented by five hundred cavalry under Oswald von Thierstein. Sion had sent the whole of its forces. The young count of Gruyères, whose father, the marshal of Savoy, was now dead, had put off his mourning weeds and the doubtful policy he had inherited, and chosen the side that was certain to win. But the warmest greetings were given to René of Lorraine, who, with his meagre and ill-equipped

⁴⁰ "Den furächtigen frommen Montag nach Corporis Christi, zu vewysen Houpthuten Vennern and Räten von Luzern und Schwis und underwalden so jets zu unsere statt Bern siechen." "Datum schnell

Montag nach Corporis Christi, zu vewysen." MS. (Archives of Lucerne.)

⁴¹ Knebel, 2te Abth. n. 42.

troop of three hundred mercenaries,⁵² seemed to symbolize the cause of the conquered and oppressed. As fast as they were refreshed, the successive bands pushed on to Gümminen, to join the troops of Berne, who had meanwhile crossed the Saane, taking post at Ulmütz, on the Biberen, in readiness, if the case required it, to fling themselves on the enemy and give the hard-pressed garrison a chance to fight their way out.⁵³ Charles, having learned the design, had kept his whole force under arms throughout the night of the 17th, and on the following morning had made a reconnoissance in person, posting troops on the heights to guard against a surprise.⁵⁴ But the reinforcements constantly arriving had given the Swiss leaders the assurance of a speedy and more effectual blow and determined them to wait.⁵⁵ By the evening of the 19th all the expected succors had reached the place of rendezvous or were close at hand, except those of Zurich and Appenzell.⁵⁶

Through his scouts and the spies in the service of Romont, Charles had been kept informed of the enemy's numbers and movements. He knew, and Berne was aware that he knew, that its own force, with that of its immediate allies, was no match for him.⁵⁷ Yet after his first, too feeble efforts, he had

⁵² Ibid. s. 52 et al.

⁵³ Letters of Peter Rot, commander of the Basel troops, in Knebel, 2te Abth. i. 58-60.

⁵⁴ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. ii. pp. 273, 274.

⁵⁵ "Also ist man einheleklich zu

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rate worden das man . . . erwarten will" Letter of Peter Rot, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 60.

⁵⁶ Knebel.—Schilling. — Tschudi, Fortsetzung.

⁵⁷ Dépêches Milanaises, tom. ii. p. 273. Deutsch Maaßen-Buch C,

suspended all offensive attempts, letting slip the golden opportunity to overwhelm a far inferior force, with a river in its rear. Remembering his habitual eagerness for battle, and the promptitude with which he had taken the offensive at Neuss and at Grandson, this conduct cannot but appear strange, — the more so, since it appears from a letter of his own, written on the 16th, that he had made preparations for falling on the enemy on that day;⁹³ but hearing that they meant to attack him, he had changed his plan and resolved to remain on the defensive. The truth is, that, despite his independent position and arbitrary will, he was oppressed by a sense of responsibility. He had undertaken the campaign against all men's entreaties and advice; and for any ill fortune that might befall he must expect to bear the sole blame. The notion of his extreme rashness had become universal. It was a common opinion that, if he had remained behind his intrenchments at Grandson, the Swiss would inevitably have been repulsed.⁹⁴ Aware of this criticism and of the censures on his overweening confidence, he had given repeated assurances, before setting out, that he would move with the greatest prudence, risking as little as possible, offering

904. *MS.* — "Sy hand ouch ij gefangenon die sprechend das der kertzog hab sin anschlag in sölcher mass das er wol wuss das bern solotern und friburg in nit angriffe." Letter of Ludwig Seiler. *MS.* (*Archives of Lucerne*)

⁹³ "Avons esté la nuit passé

veillant et debout en intencion de marcher à tout notre armée au devant de nos ennemis, prochains de nous à deux petites lieues." Letter to the magistrates of Dijon, *Mém. de l'Acad. de Dijon*, 1852, p. 132.

⁹⁴ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 324.

the enemy no advantage.⁶⁰ Since he had opened the siege new causes of anxiety had arisen. Vedettes and foraging parties had been cut off, and Charles was in constant fear for his communications,⁶¹ limited now, as far as Payerne, to a single road on the verge of a lake and a morass. In the distant rear a still more serious peril had occurred. No sooner had he quitted the neighborhood of Lausanne than a band from the Simmenthal, several thousand strong, had crossed the Jaman and marched against that city. They were met in front of Vevay by five hundred men under Pierre de Gingins, lord of Châtelar. An obstinate combat ended in the slaughter of the whole of the defenders, and was followed by a frightful massacre of men, women, and children. The invaders were about to continue their advance, when a summons from Freyburg recalled them to the army mustering for the relief of Morat.⁶²

The capture of this place, as preliminary to the execution of his original plan, would have freed Charles from his embarrassments. It was not without a visible vexation that he had renounced the hope and turned his whole attention to preparations for defence. In his choice of a position, apprehensions proceeding from the sources we have noticed had a preponderating influence.⁶³ The road from

⁶⁰ Ibid. tom. ii. pp. 15, 52, 216, 217, 219. — *Notizenblatt*, 1856, s. 179.

⁶¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 248, 279. "Si dubita costoro a ingegnamento torne la via di le vic-

tualle e arar li passi."

⁶² Ibid. s. 249, 258. — Schilling, s. 313. — Gingins, *Episodes*, pp. 292-293.

⁶³ "Prefato S. e stato a vedere tuti questi monti circostanti, per

Morat to Freyburg, diverging at a right angle from that to Avenches, rises through the villages of Courgevauz and Courlevon, which, with others in the vicinity, had been burned by the duke's orders. Around or in the rear of these the main Burgundian camp seems to have been pitched,⁴¹ — about two miles south of Morat, and three or more east of Avenches. In both these directions — i. e. to the north and west — the ground of course slopes downwards. Southward it alternately falls and rises; but stretching eastward, a space of tolerably level ground, as if the top of a hill had been partially sheared away, presented the only chance Charles was able to find for the deployment of troops.⁴² On the right was a ravine hollowed out by the Biberen; on the left a tangle of hollows and hills, besides the danger to an assailant of being caught between the main body and the besieging force. In front the position looked down upon a gentle slope, clear of woods for several hundred yards, beyond which the forest extended to the Saane. On the brow of the slope the Burgundians erected a palisade, called in the military language of the time a "hedge," lining their front, but with openings to allow

fertificare questo campo interno, e serar che non possano li inimici venire salvo da un canto, al quale uscire, per essere ala mano con loro, o non, sia in arbitrio di Sua Exlia." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 248.

⁴¹ The names of these villages are not given in the authorities; but the descriptions of the locality and the distances and directions mentioned

leave no doubt of the correctness of the local traditions. A kind of cavity near the Freyburg road is pointed out as the spot where the duke's pavilion stood.

⁴² "Li facto consiste in avere loco spatiose et in lo quale possi adoperare le squadre et fanti soi." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 258.

the artillery to play and the troops to sally when the foe had been repulsed.

At a superficial glance, the position may well have seemed the best that could be found. It was assailable only in front, and there at a sufficient disadvantage. But looked at in relation to purposes which it was essential to keep in view, it was faulty in a fatal degree. Were the troops engaged in the siege to be regarded as a separate corps or as the left wing of the army? In the former case, the larger portion of them were completely uncovered, liable to be overwhelmed before assistance could arrive, or, if the main army were first defeated, to be cut off from all chance of retreat. If, on the other hand, they formed a portion of the line, — which in this case extended from Courlevon on the right to Romont's position, north-east of Morat, on the left, — then the army would be fighting, in modern parlance, "front to a flank," and that with a lake in its rear.⁶⁶ The problem would have been solved if Charles had carried out an expressed intention to draw off the

⁶⁶ The sarcasm of Bonaparte, when at Morat, in 1797, on his way from Italy to Rastadt, — "*Si jamais nous livrons bataille en ces lieux, soyez persuadé que nous ne prendrons pas le lac pour retraite,*" — is treated by Von Rodt as inapplicable, inasmuch as only the besieging force was in this position. No doubt Napoleon, like Jomini, was under the impression that the whole Burgundian army lay posted along the lake at the foot of the hills, and that it was

turned by a flank attack on the right wing. Von Rodt has exposed these errors, and partly indicated their source. But he has failed to notice how hazardous the position was rendered by this distribution of the different corps; while he attributes to mere accident that decisive movement of the Swiss which, as we shall see, was really an effect of design and skill, well entitled to the designation of "*belles manœuvres*" given to it by Leconte.

greater part of the besieging force. He proposed, by constructing "bastions" in front of the gates, to enable a small body to repel any attempted sally during the battle.* But the time was insufficient for the engineers, with their sluggish methods of procedure, to execute this project; and all that was actually done was to remove most of the light artillery, leaving Romont to carry on a steady bombardment.

While awaiting the issue, the busy mind of Charles turned from its calculations of immediate triumph or disaster to schemes of an older date. The war with the Swiss he looked upon merely as an episode. Midway in his career of success he had been arrested, not by the opposition he might have expected to arouse, but by an unforeseen obstacle falling upon and blocking up his path. When this had been removed, he would be able to resume his course — provided his crafty adversary had not strewn it meanwhile with fresh impedimenta. It was important to lose no time in counteracting the manœuvres of Louis in Provence, and in securing, if possible, the adhesion and assistance of Milan. A mission having in view this double object was now intrusted to Olivier de Lamarche, with instructions for his guidance and an armed escort to secure his passage across the Alps. The worthy cavalier, who held the post of captain of the guard,

* "Mi è detto . . . intende far fare dei bastioni contra le due porte di la terra, forti quanta potrà, perassar manco gente a l'obediencia di la terra, etiam perche uscendo tro-

vino il contrasto de dieci bastioni, quali poche gente tenerano et defenderano." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. II. p. 283.

pleaded hard not to be sent away at a moment when every true knight was looking forward to the opportunity of attesting his courage and devotion. He was dismissed with the reply that the day of battle was uncertain, and that he could render better service in the negotiations intrusted to him than by any acts of prowess in the field.⁶⁶

Another and more ominous departure followed on the 21st. The king of Naples, with a policy modelled on that of Sforza, though with strongly antagonistic objects, had maintained an open alliance with Burgundy, while his secret leanings were on the side of France. He had long since made the simultaneous discovery that his son had no chance of obtaining the hand of Charles's daughter, and that the star of Louis would in the end eclipse that of his rival. If the French king could be induced, in view of innumerable advantages to himself, to discountenance and chastise the duke of Milan, Ferdinand would only await the safe return of his son to come to an open rupture with Burgundy.⁶⁷ It was not, however, till after the battle of Grandson that, under the mask of a mission of condolence to Charles, he had made arrangements

⁶⁶ Ibid. *ibi supra*.

⁶⁷ Letters to Louis from a secret agent of Ferdinand, Aug. and Oct., 1473. Legrand MSS. tom. xviii — A passage in the former of these letters shows that the world was beginning to comprehend the sagacity and good fortune of Louis, the greatness of his aims, and the imprudence of being classed among his opponents. "Je vous supplie,

sire, tres humblement qu'il vous plaise me pardonner si je ose si avant me ingerer à en escrire, car bon desir le me fait faire, et la grant joye que j'ay de la prospérité que je voy qui graces à Dieu vous vicat de toutes pars. En quoy vous aures fait le plus grant oeuvre et de la plus grant prudence et estimation que jamais prince pourroit faire."

for the prince of Tarento to withdraw from the camp, before the renewal of hostilities, and proceed to the court of France. The design had easily revealed itself to Sforza, who, in communicating on the subject with the duke of Burgundy, had advised that so important a hostage should not be allowed to leave the camp. Charles had replied that he would endeavor by persuasion, to retain him, at least for a time.⁷⁰ But he disdained to employ even persuasions at a moment when his power was about either to be shattered forever or to soar above all opposition. He dismissed the young prince with thanks for his past services and good wishes for his welfare.

A notion was prevalent in the Burgundian camp that the Swiss would make their attack on a Saturday, as a day which had proved propitious to them on former fields.⁷¹ And it so happened that an intention of fighting on Saturday, the 22d, had in fact been entertained by the Confederates, not for the reason supposed, but because the festival of the "Ten Thousand Martyrs," on which the battle of Laupen had been gained, in 1399, would fall on that day.⁷² Yet it was only through a second coincidence that the event corresponded with the expectation. Already on the 20th preparations had been made; the troops were filled with impatience, and the leaders had dis-

⁷⁰ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 218.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* pp. 280, 283.

⁷² "Versehen uns do uff samstag

der X^m Rittertag do gestritten werd
harem so wellend die hh. X^m Rit-
ter für uns bitten." Letter of Peter
Rot, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 59.

missed all notion of waiting either for additional auspices or further succors.⁷³ But on this same day a letter from Lucerne, written on the 19th, was received, stating that the troops of Zurich, four thousand strong, were to leave home on that morning, and begging that, if possible, the attack should be deferred until their arrival. They would probably be joined by those of Appenzell and Saint-Gall.⁷⁴ Waldmann, who was to command the levies of his canton, had already brought the garrison of Freyburg to the camp, whence he hurried back to Berne to meet and urge forward his men. He was taunted in the streets with the backwardness of his canton,⁷⁵ and in feverish anxiety he sent message after message, both to his colleagues in the camp, entreating them to wait, and to the oncoming forces, charging them not to linger. To miss such an opportunity for overwhelming the enemy would be an eternal disgrace. "There are three times as many of them as at Grandson," he wrote to his people; "but let no one be dismayed; with God's help we will kill them all."⁷⁶

Thus stimulated, the troops made no delay. The roads were very different from those which on the same route, as everywhere else in Switzerland, now excite the admiration and gratitude of travellers.⁷⁷ The difficulties were doubled by heavy rains, that abated at

⁷³ Ibid. s. 60.

⁷⁴ In das Veld gen Murten. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

⁷⁵ Edlibach, s. 155.

⁷⁶ "Aber erschreck nieman, wir

werden sy mit der guts hilf all erwöden." *MS.* (Archives of Zurich.)

⁷⁷ One can scarcely believe that in a country now so distinguished for the excellence of its roads, it

intervals only to recommence with greater violence. Nevertheless the zealous band accomplished their march of a hundred miles in less than three days, arriving at Berne in the afternoon of Friday, the 21st. Finding what shelter they could, they sank down to rest, thinking to recruit their exhausted strength before going into battle. But crowds of women and children, weeping and running to and fro, kept up the incessant cry, "Dear friends, go on, go on! Rest not yet! The lives of our husbands, our fathers, are in peril!" Waldmann, after writing to the camp to crave still a short delay, as the wearied troops could not possibly proceed till morning, found that the impossible must be done. A little before midnight the horns again sounded, and the sleepers started to their feet. Lights blazed in every window. No one in Berne went to bed that night. At the moment when the leading files left the gate and plunged into the darkness, the storm broke out with greater fury than ever, and had not yet subsided when, at dawn, the drenched and broken band struggled into Gürzminen. Six hundred had dropped by the way. After crossing the river, they made a brief halt for refreshment, notice being sent forward of their arrival. They entered the camp through a lane of spears, saluted with welcomes and plaudits, and with

was a common complaint, scarcely more than half a century ago, that no such thing as a decent road was to be seen. This fact, with the lack of internal improvements generally,

was attributed to the policy which, from the period of our history, had kept the attention and energies of the government absorbed by its foreign relations.

the exclamation from all sides that so strong and gallant a band had been well worth waiting for.⁷⁸

Mass was now said and breakfast served out, though many, in their restlessness, refused to eat or drink till the victory had been won. The leaders had already decided on the method of attack. At first it had seemed the more obvious plan to follow the direct road, fall upon the besieging army, and liberate the garrison. But the old landamman of Schwytz, Ulrich Kätzy, gave wiser counsel. "While we are beating Romont," he said, "the duke will have time and opportunity to escape. Let us go round by the hills against the main body; when that is routed, we shall have the rest without a stroke."⁷⁹ This suggestion of a happy instinct, equivalent to the *coup d'œil* of military genius, was appreciated and accepted by all. A reconnoitring force was sent out to find the proper road and the exact position of the enemy. For still greater surety, messengers were despatched to Ins, Erlach, and other places, desiring the people in that quarter to guard the passes and fords, in case Romont, on learning his danger, should attempt to make off round the lake.⁸⁰

Meanwhile the task of marshalling a force consisting of numerous independent bands, many of which had never before fought in the same array, presented considerable difficulty. In some cases a question was quickly settled; in others there was hesitation

⁷⁸ Edlibach, s. 155, 156. — Schilling, ubi supra.
ling, s. 335, 336. ⁸⁰ Chron. de Neuchâtel, Schweiz.

⁷⁹ Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 65. — Geschichtsforscher, B. VIII. s. 296.

or a struggle for precedence. When it was asked where Bienne should stand, "Where else but next to Berne, as of old?" was called out in reply. "Where is Lenzburg?" cried a voice; "its place is next to Zofingen." "Gone forward to wake the duke, that he may hear us coming," was the laughing answer.⁸¹ It was soon evident that consultations of this kind, amid bursts of hilarity, would end in disorder and a waste of time, and that the only proper course was to elect a supreme commander and leave all the dispositions to him. Herter, who was present in the suite of the duke of Lorraine, was chosen for the post,⁸² in preference to the unpopular Thierstein. The experienced soldier, thus raised from the lieutenancy of the smallest fraction to the leadership of the united host, proceeded to arrange it in three divisions. In the vanguard he placed the whole of the cavalry, amounting to sixteen hundred, with six thousand light troops — nimble youths, selected chiefly from the corps of Berne, Freyburg, and Schwytz. These were placed under the orders of Halwyl. To Caspar von Hertenstein, of Lucerne, was assigned the command of the rearguard, about eight thousand strong, embracing the bands of Lucerne and the Forest cantons. The artillery, under Waldmann, with whom Herter rode in company, was divided between the vanguard and the "battle," or main body, which comprised the bulk of the army. The standards in the centre were flanked by the

⁸¹ Rodt, B. II. s. 264.

⁸² Euerlin, fol. 93. — Knebel, s. 65.

halberds, while the spears in close column bristled in front and rear, ready, when deployed, to form a girdle firmly interlocked.⁵³ The three divisions numbered together from thirty-five to forty thousand men.⁵⁴

The forenoon was far advanced when the arrangements had been completed, and the march began. Yet a long halt took place in the forest, the time being chiefly consumed in making knights, a chivalrous mode of exciting emulation at the moment of going into combat. Any who had themselves received the accolade were qualified on such occasions to administer it. The honor was bestowed on three hundred or more, René of Lorraine being one, but the great majority simple burghers, many of them too obscure to make any subsequent use of it. A still more futile act was the administration of a new oath, prepared by the Swiss diet as a remedy against the failing discipline of which there had been so much complaint,

⁵³ Schilling. — Knebel — Etterlin. — Edlibach. — Calmet. — Schwyz. *Geschichtsforscher*, B. XI.

⁵⁴ Knebel says in one place, not less than thirty thousand, in another, not more than forty thousand; Hugues de Pierre, Bonstetten, J. von Walt, and the chroniclers in general, forty thousand; Commines, who, like all these, had his information, as he tells us, from some who were present, says, about thirty-four thousand. Von Rodt, who wishes to reduce the number to twenty-four thousand, has noticed only the authority last cited and rejects it on

erroneous grounds, bases his own calculations on little beyond mere conjecture, and, above all, leaves out of view the fact that all the data and descriptions we possess go to show that the army was vastly more numerous than at Graadson, many bands being present which had then been absent, and all, except perhaps those of Berne and Schwyz, in far greater force than on that occasion. The contingent of Zurich, as we have seen, had been more than doubled; and no doubt this was also the case with others.

more especially the private appropriation of booty.⁸⁵ The troops, all the while, were chafing with impatience, little suspecting that, by one of the accidents of war, the delay was destined to facilitate and insure their triumph. Before leaving the wood they knelt down, while a soldier in each band recited a prayer, his comrades joining in the Amen. As they rose to their feet, the sun, which had been invisible for several days, threw his beams upon their ranks.⁸⁶ Halwyl is said to have pointed to the glorious omen with his sword, proclaiming it as a proof that the prayer had been heard, and that the sun of victory was about to shine upon their arms.⁸⁷ We have more conclusive authority for the addresses of other chiefs, who reminded their men of the rich spoil they might expect, and promised that the state would provide for the families of those who fell.⁸⁸

In expectation of the coming attack the duke of Burgundy had led out his army at dawn, and posted it, in an order of battle previously arranged, in the arena he had selected and prepared. When the reconnoitring party was seen on the verge of the wood, some shots were fired, and all stood in readiness for an immediate struggle. But the hostile horse had instantly vanished; a long interval of unbroken stillness succeeded, until, as the morning wore

⁸⁵ Schilling. — Knebel — Letter Abth. a. 98.

of Lucerne to the Abbot of Saint-Gall. MS. (Stifts-Archiv, Sanct-Gallen.)

⁸⁷ Tschudi, Fortsetzung. — Balingier.

⁸⁸ Rathsbuch of Lucerne, ap.

⁸⁶ Etterlin, fol. 93. — Knebel, 2te Pfyffer, B. I. a. 179.

away, the opinion became general that the enemy, discouraged by the weather and the preparations for his reception, had concluded to postpone the attempt. About noon the troops, after standing to their arms for six hours in a continuous rain, were permitted to retire to the camp, leaving a double guard at the palisade. Officers and men dispersed to their quarters. Arms were laid aside; horses were ungirded and groomed; the booths of the sutlers were filled with throngs, draining the wine-casks as quickly as they were broached. Charles himself, contrary to the habits of his whole life previous to his recent illness, allowed his armor to be taken off, and was sitting at table in a loose robe when the alarm came from the front.⁸⁹

Bursting from the forest, the Confederate vanguard, horse and foot, proceeded to form. The Burgundian artillery opened fire on the instant. It played with great effect upon the cavalry. A hundred and thirty were killed, and two or three hundred grievously hurt. "I saw heads carried off," says a soldier-chronicler, "and bodies torn asunder, the upper part falling to the ground, while the lower remained in the saddle."⁹⁰ The infantry suffered little, the balls for the most part passing overhead and crashing among the trees. In loose array the men ran up the slope and strove to break through the palisade. It proved, however, too strong for their efforts; the fire became deadly, and a general wavering ensued. But

⁸⁹ Basin. — Moinet. — Dépêches
Milanaises. — Rodt.

⁹⁰ Etterlin, fol. 93 verso.

a party who had clambered round where the ground was steeper found an unguarded gap, and, breaking through, took the guns in flank.⁹¹ Then the main entrance was cleared; and the whole army, which had meanwhile deployed, came up, with the cavalry in front, and began to form on the high ground, where a commemorative chapel dedicated to Saint Urban now stands.⁹²

At the first gun Charles had sprung to horse, his armor being put on while he was giving his orders. There was no time now for the studied array in which the troops had been formed and exercised. As fast as any body of them could be got together, they were hurried forward to defend a position which before they could arrive was already lost. The first to advance were some squadrons of the ducal guard, which, encountering the enemy's cavalry, swept it off at a charge. René of Lorraine was overturned among others, and would have been crushed if Halwyl had not sprung forward and disengaged him. But against the serried ranks of spears the squadrons dashed only to shiver and recoil. Raising the shout of "Grand-son!" and still maintaining their compact order, the Confederates moved forward, and, as the ground

⁹¹ Schilling. — Bullinger. — Herges de Pierre. — It is doubtless this incident, coupled with the general direction of the Swiss march, which has given rise to the notion that the Burgundian left was turned. Such a measure could only have been executed by gaining the Freyburg road beyond the source of the Biberen — which was quite imprac-

ticable, and was certainly not attempted, as the intrenchment in this case would never have been mentioned.

⁹² The present is not the original building; the inscription designating the spot as that on which the Swiss leaders assembled after the battle to pray, is of doubtful authenticity.



began to descend, went with an increasing momentum which nothing could resist. Every column they met was hurled back upon the supports coming up behind. In front of the camp the duke had drawn up the English archers, hoping to arrest the torrent and gain time to form a line of battle. Before a bow could be bent their commander was killed by a shot from an arquebuse, and a rush like that of a hurricane whirled them away. Finding that every effort only added to the confusion, Charles gave an order to fall back, with the purpose of reforming his troops on more favorable ground. But with this order, equivalent to one of retreat, all resistance ended. To stop, to turn, to form, in such a wreck, before such a pursuit, was impossible. Flight itself was a difficult, often a hopeless, struggle. The shattered army plunged and tossed like a hamstrung horse in the fangs of a wild beast. Three miles or more of broken hill-side had to be traversed before coming to the main road at Avenches. On every bit of open ground the Confederate cavalry darted forward, overturning the fugitives and leaving them to be finished by halberd and spear. Every slope ran with blood, every hollow was heaped with corpses. It was the pride of Burgundy, the glory of chivalry, the pillar of feudal power, that was thus smitten and overthrown. Fifteen hundred cavaliers of Franche-Comté perished on that day. There was scarcely a noble house in either Burgundy but had cause to put on mourning. Many such families were henceforth extinct. Flanders and Hainault had their share of ruth for gallant sons

and stalwart sires. The count of Marle, eldest son of Saint-Pol and commander of the principal brigade, made vain offers of a countless ransom. A nobler death was that of Jacob van der Maas, of an ancient Dutch family, who carried the great standard. Facing the foe, after his circle of guards had been cut down or put to flight, he wrapped the once glorious emblem round his loyal heart, where it was afterwards found, suffused and stiffened with his blood. Among so many bodies his alone was given up to be entombed with those of his ancestors.¹⁰

Yet the cruelest carnage — as a moment's reflection will suggest — was not in this part of the field. The main army, attacked in front, was simply pushed back obliquely from the heights to the low ground at the extremity of the lake. But the besieging army, stationed along the margin of the lake, was by the same movement necessarily taken in reverse. It was, as we have seen, divided into two distinct bodies—the Savoyards on the north-east of the town, and the Italians on the south-west. The latter were posted along the Avenches road, from Morat to the village of Faoug—a distance of two miles. At the height of the battle they were attacked by a sallying party from the town, which was driven in, though with the loss of most of the pursuers.¹¹ When the rout had begun they were enveloped and cut off by a portion — apparently the

¹⁰ Schilling. — Etterlin. — Knebel. Rodt. — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 299, 300, 330, 345.
¹¹ Bullinger. — Edlbach. — Tschudi. — Hugues de Pierre. — Mohnet. — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 343.
 — Haynin. — Gollut. — Dunod. —

rearguard — of the victorious army. In such a predicament braver troops might well have ceased to struggle. The poor wretches, six thousand or more in number, threw away their arms and made pitiable attempts to hide themselves from the merciless foe. At Faoug they crept into chimneys and ovens. To smoke them out, or smother them in their holes, afforded excellent sport to the hunters. Others climbed the huge walnut-trees that lined the road, seeking concealment in the foliage. A cry of "Crows!" was immediately raised, and the arquebusiers, gathering in a circle, picked them off one by one, while calling to them to spread their pinions, or asking if there were not air enough to sustain them. But the great mass was driven into the lake, men and horses struggling together and trampling each other down, a few getting rid of their armor and swimming out till they sank from exhaustion, the rest, when they had waded up to their chins, standing in a dense crowd, their faces wild with terror, their arms thrown up, their voices sending forth screams for mercy, which were answered with derisive yells. "Ha! they are thirsty! they are learning to swim!" While the spearmen waded after them or collected boats, the arquebusiers, calling to each other to mark "the ducks," poured in their fire from the bank. For two hours the slaughter went on, nor ceased until the water over a space of miles was incarnadined with blood.²²

²² Schilling, a. 338, 339, 340. — IV. a. 473, 474. — Etterlin, fol. 92
Tschudi, Fortsetzung, Helvetia, B. verso. — Knebel, 2te Abth. a. 83. —

Of the different divisions the one that suffered least was that whose doom had been considered certain. Romont, on hearing how the day had gone, kept up a vigorous fire while preparing to retreat. When his column was formed he discharged a salvo and began his march, leaving behind only the heaviest gun. No sally was made upon his rear—an omission on the part of Bubenberg which he himself seems never to have explained, though his colleagues thought proper to put forth some lame excuses on his behalf.¹⁰ He sent information, however, to the leaders at Avenches, but merely with the effect of suspending the pursuit in that quarter. Meanwhile Romont, who had intended to make the circuit of the lake and find shelter at Estavayer, had learned from his scouts that his retreat in that direction was already cut off. Wheeling, therefore, to the right, he crossed the hills, so close in the rear of the victorious army that he was supposed to be meditating an attack. Having reached the Saane, he there diverged from the Freyburg road, and after running the gantlet between hostile villages, succeeded, with no great loss, in

The Murten-Lied in Schilling is literal in description, as well as in its cruel irony. —

"Einer doch hat der ander hin, Do er meint wol verborgen sin, Man thut sy in den Hurten; Kein grösser Not sah ich nie me, Ein grosser Schaar laß in den See, Wiewol sy nit was dörsten."

"By waten drin bis an das Kün, Dem nocht schoe man fast zu Ihn, Als ob sy Ruten weren; Man schiñt en jaen und schleg sy zu tod, Der See der wart von

Blut roht, Jemmerlich hort man sy plern."

"Car vil die Hummen uff die Bäume, Wiewol ir nieman mocht haben güm, Man schoss sy als die Kregen; Man stach mit Spiessen über ah, Ir Geißer jaen kein Hilffgab, Der Wind mocht sy nit wegen."

¹⁰ Tschudi, Fortsetzung, Helvetia, B. IV. s. 473. — The principal reason alleged was Bubenberg's vow not to leave the town without orders!

reaching the town from which he derived his title — to quit it forever a few days later.⁹⁷

The Confederates had begun their attack at two o'clock,⁹⁸ and within an hour had overcome all resistance.⁹⁹ But the sun was low when the pursuit ended; and the troops, weary with slaughter, but still fresh for spoil, retraced their steps to the camp. They found there a number of women, some of whom were killed under the supposition or pretence that they were men disguised in female attire. The others were compelled to exhibit their persons and to submit to the lust of the soldiery.¹⁰⁰ To the general surprise, there was a great abundance of provisions; but the scarcity of other booty, except arms, banners, and equipments, occasioned equal disappointment.¹⁰¹ No collection took place, the successful plunderers, in spite of their oath, savagely resisting every effort to compel them to disgorge. The prize of chief value was the duke's pavilion, or portable house, constructed of nicely-fitted blocks, and elegantly furnished. This, with its contents, the Swiss leaders generously

⁹⁷ Letters in the *Schweiz. Geschichtsforcher*, B. XL. s. 416, 417. — Schilling, s. 343. — Etterlin, fol.

⁹⁸ Letter of Peter Rot, Kusel, 21e Abth. s. 64.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* s. 66.

¹⁰⁰ Tschudi, *Fortsetzung, Helvetia*, B. IV. s. 474. — But the story is told more fully by Schilling, not in his text, but in an illustration in the original manuscript.

¹⁰¹ Letter of Hertenstein, June 24. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) —

He goes on to say, "Doch so schätzten wir die ere und überwindung der vigenden höchst dan das gut." Schilling, on the other hand, asserts that there was a great quantity of rich booty, but that the chiefs, — of whom Hertenstein was one, — having taken a large portion of it for themselves, were unwilling to have it brought into a common board for fair distribution. The diet often subsequently talked of enforcing a collection, but without effect. *Eidgenössische Abachiede*, B. II.

presented to René of Lorraine. But he had scarcely taken possession of it when it was broken open and despoiled, even his own coffers being pillaged by the marauders. He declined to prosecute a complaint, but asked to be allowed to purchase some of the captured guns, one of which bore his own arms.¹⁰²

Hertenstein, in a letter written at seven o'clock on the evening of the battle, declared himself unable as yet to form any estimate of the enemy's loss, as well on account of its greatness as of the wide extent of ground over which the slaughter had raged.¹⁰³ On Monday, the 24th, after having gone over the field in bad weather and an intolerable stench, he set down the number of the slain at ten thousand.¹⁰⁴ Most of the first accounts coincided with this, or fell somewhat below it.¹⁰⁵ But as fresh heaps were dis-

¹⁰² Tschudi, Fortsetzung. — Schilling. — Berchtold.

¹⁰³ "Haben . . . so lang bestritten damit wir im so viel leuten erschlagen und errenckt haben, dz von ir vñ wegen die sal so bald noch niemand wissen mag, bits morn sondeg, dz wir die walstatt wit erschouwen werden." *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.) — This letter is dated "zu Sungstest." No village, or even farm, so named (as we learn through an investigation kindly instituted by M. le comte de Circourt) is known to the local antiquaries, either from tradition or existing records. Our own conjectures would lead us to believe that the village of Chandamel was intended. If the point were clear, it would help to establish the exact position of the Burgundian camp.

¹⁰⁴ "Vinden ds des vigenden ob Xⁿ blißen sind . . . van ds wir die dry tage in ungewitter und grossen gestank der vigenden und doten uff der walstatt gelegen sind." *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

¹⁰⁵ *Deutsches Mosen-Buch* C.920. *MS.* — *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 329, 333, 345. — Yet twenty thousand was also a common statement. See the letter of Kagenack, the commander of the Frankfurt troops, and an Austrian report, in the *Schweiz. Geschichtsforscher*, B. XI.; also a letter of Peter Rot, in Knebel, and a Swiss report to the duke of Milan, in the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 316. Hugues de Pierre says ten thousand, adding, with one of his flashes of naïve enthusiasm, "Aulcuns disent quinze voir vingt mill, si faut-il se contenter

covered, and the bodies of the drowned, fished up for the sake of plunder, were added to the amount, rumor magnified the total as much as it had before been underrated.¹⁰⁶ After a while the authorities of Berne, fearing an outbreak of pestilence, caused deep pits to be dug and the festering corpses to be thrown in. There are reasons for believing that, by a computation then made, the number was found to exceed twenty-two thousand.¹⁰⁷

Nine years later, when Berne and Freyburg, as joint sovereigns of the territory, had decided on raising a memorial of the battle, the mouldering remains were unearthed, and deposited in a building erected for the purpose on the shore of the lake, near the village of Meyriez, with a chapel attached to it under the guardianship of a friar. During three succeeding centuries this depository was several times rebuilt, and decorated with fresh inscriptions.¹⁰⁸ But

de dix mill."—Commines, in general so loath to believe in large numbers, says the Burgundian ambassador Contay confessed in his presence to a loss of 8000 all slain; but that from other information he believed the total to be full 18,000.

¹⁰⁶ Forty thousand is the number given by several writers.

¹⁰⁷ De Troyes says, 22,700; Knebel, 22,005, actually buried; Schilling, 26,000; most of the chroniclers, 22,000. These accounts have the air of being derived, more or less directly, from official reports, and their particularity and general agreement show that they must at least have rested on some different basis from mere guesswork. The Swiss loss

was reported by the women, and by a few other prisoners, saved, secreted, and ransomed by some of the chiefs, at 1500 to 3000. But there are no data of any value.

¹⁰⁸ Among these, one, the composition of Albert von Haller, has the true patriotic glow which was characteristic of its author:—

"*Steh still Helvetier! hier liegt das kühne Heer,
Vor welchem Lüttich fiel, und Frankreichs Thron erbebt,
Nicht unser Ahnen Zahl, nicht kühnster Helden Geschick,
Die Kämpfgeschlagen den Feind, die ihren Arm belebte.
Kennt Bilder eure Macht; als liegt in eurer Brust,
O würde sie auch jetzt bei jedem Leser neu!*"

the ill-starred relics were not destined even yet to rest undisturbed. At the close of the last century, when the armies of the French republic were occupying Switzerland, a regiment consisting mainly of Burgundians, under the notion of effacing an insult to their ancestors, tore down the "bone-house" at Morat, covered the contents with earth, and planted on the mound a "tree of liberty." But the tree had no roots; the rains washed away the earth; again the remains were exposed to view, and lay bleaching in the sun for a quarter of a century. Travellers stopped to gaze, to moralize, and to pilfer; postilions and poets carried off skulls and thigh-bones; ingenious peasants scraped and polished the well-hardened material into knife-handles. At last, in 1822, the vestiges were swept together and re-sepulchred, and a simple obelisk of marble was erected, to commemorate a victory not undeserving of its fame as a military exploit, but all unworthy to be ranked with earlier triumphs, won by hands pure as well as strong, defending freedom and the right.

CHAPTER IV.

CHARLES IN ADVERSITY,--LOUIS IN PROSPERITY.—END OF
YOLANDE AND OF SPORZA.

1476.

No special anxiety had been felt by the regent of Savoy during the last few days. Her Burgundian escort and others of her suite had concealed their knowledge that a battle was impending, some, who had intended to take part in it, having remained at the court, in order not to excite an alarm.¹ At seven o'clock in the morning of Sunday, the 23d, she was roused from sleep two hours before her usual time of rising, to receive the prince of Tarento, who had travelled to Geneva in company with Olivier de Larmarche, and now came to Gex with the first report of the defeat. She refused at first to credit tidings for which she was ill prepared. But in a few hours they were confirmed by messengers sent to inquire; and in the afternoon a son of Campobasso brought the decisive intelligence that he had seen the duke of Burgundy, who would be at Gex the same evening.²

¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 287.
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² *Ibid.* pp. 293, 296.
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Charles had, therefore, not kept his vow to die upon the field of his disgrace. Surrounded by hostile bands, he had fought his way through,³ but, unable to rally any portion of his troops, had been swept along by the stream, until darkness, and shadows blacker than darkness, had settled down. There was no drawing of bridle through the night. At every cross-road the press diminished, most of the fugitives taking the routes to the nearest passes of the Jura. The duke, with the remnant of his guard, kept the road through Echallens to the Lake of Geneva, and halted in the morning at Morges. In the long hours of the dark and rapid ride his heart had silently consumed some portion of its bitterness. Before the eye of day and of the world he was able to put on a stoical demeanor. Having taken refreshments and heard his regular mass, he resumed his journey, with less than a hundred horse, and at six in the evening dismounted in the courtyard of the castle of Gex.⁴

Yolande and her household met him at the foot of the staircase. He saluted them severally in strict order of precedence — first the young duke and his brother, then the mother and the daughters, afterwards the ladies in attendance, kissing each in turn. Yolande had given up her own apartment for his use. They ascended to it, followed at a distance by the rest of the company, and talked together for some time in a low voice. He then escorted her to

³ Knobel, *2te Abth.* c. 63. —
"Passa parmi l'armée de ses ennemis." Molinet, tom. i. p. 204.

⁴ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 208, 209. — *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 220.

her son's apartment, returning alone with evident marks of great fatigue. Antonio de Aplano, the Milanese envoy at the court of Savoy, seized the opportunity to address him, offering, in the absence of Panigarola, who had gone to Orbe, to be the medium of any communication he might wish to have transmitted to Sforza. The curt reply, "It is well; it suffices," cut short the prying intermeddler. Larmache, who had come from Geneva for fresh orders, and the Sire de Givry, the commander of Yolande's Burgundian escort, were summoned, and remained for a long time closeted with their master.⁵

From the regent Aplano learned that Charles was as firmly fixed as ever in his resolution to carry on the contest to the end. What did she herself propose to do? Did she consider it safe, the envoy asked, to remain at Gex? and he suggested her immediate removal to Chambéry. That would be too near the king, she replied; if there were actual danger, which she did not anticipate, she could take refuge at Saint-Claude, on the Burgundian side of the Jura. It seemed, therefore, that she was still clinging to the alliance which had proved so fatal. Standing on the verge of the abyss, she was apparently spell-bound and unable to turn. But Aplano did not believe her. He saw that she was only temporizing. It was clear, he wrote to his master, that she had no resource but to throw herself on the protection either of France or of Milan; and her choice between the two would

⁵ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 293.

be easily decided, if she could be induced to return to Piedmont by the highly convenient route of Courmayeur and Aosta.⁶

But, desperate as was her situation, Yolande had not lost her head, or become so incapable of measuring her perils as to let herself be plunged into the most ruinous of all. To accept the offers of Sforza would be, not merely to resign her own authority, but to surrender the dominions of her son into the hand that was already opening to grasp them. With equal firmness she resisted the persuasions of Charles to accompany him in his flight — to consider their union indissoluble — to find encouragement and hope in the continuance of mutual trust and aid. It was asking too much. She had already trusted too far and hoped too long. Charles had proved his inability to defend her; she must now look to another quarter. She would cross neither the Alps nor the Jura, but simply go back to Geneva, and there, in the face of the danger, in the midst of confusion and terror, wait for deliverance from the only hand that was able to save her. She had kept up her secret intercourse with her brother; and though there had been no plain speaking or confidence between them, and her last message, sent a week before, was still unanswered,⁷ she saw clearly, after revolving the matter, that for-

⁶ "Concludo per quel puecho chio intende essergli forza mettersi totalmente in mano del Signore Re aut di Vostra Eccellenza volendo rimanere nel stato suo, quale V. S. sapientissima che la sapra prehendere,

et migliore partito farasse venendo la via da Cormagio et de Valle de Augusta." *Dépêches Milanaise*, tom. ii. p. 302.

⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 269, 302.

tune had made him the arbiter of her lot, and that her best, her only chance lay in submitting to his decree.

In the vain hope of inducing a change of purpose, the duke deferred his own departure till the moment of her setting out, in the afternoon of the 27th. Their roads lay in opposite directions; but he gave her his escort about half way to Geneva, riding beside her carriage, and bending over it while still, in a low voice, making earnest but fruitless appeals. At last he drew up, bade her farewell, and parted from her with a kiss.^a With her must vanish forever illusions that still curtained the naked, hideous reality — Savoy in the hands of the king, Provence and Italy cut off, Lorraine in revolt, the Burgundies hemmed and invaded, allies banded with enemies, nothing left but the struggle of despair! Maddened with the thought, he called Lamarche, and, in a tone which admitted of no remonstrance, ordered him to follow the party with a troop of horse, and on peril of his head to seize the regent and her sons and bring them after him to Saint-Claude. He then rode off to cross the mountains, but stopped short of Saint-Claude, where his lodgings had been prepared, passing a sleepless night at Mijou.^b

In the dusk of evening, the cortége was overtaken and surrounded when close to the gates of Geneva. Yolande was lifted from her seat and placed on horse-back behind Lamarche. Her children and two of her

^a *Chronica Latina Sabaudie*, *Monumenta hist. Patrie*, tom. i.
^b *Antienne Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 220.

ladies were disposed of in like manner, while others fled screaming to the town. The young duke was given in charge to a captain of the troop, a Piedmontese by birth, with whose connivance, and befriended by the confusion and obscurity, some of his attendants carried him off and hid him in the tall corn beside the road. Lamarche, either ignorant, as he himself pretends, of the escape, or too lukewarm to prosecute a search, hastened off with the prisoners he had secured.¹⁰ His half success was worse, in every sense, than total failure. The full odium had been incurred, while the advantages — if any there would have been — were lost. On receiving the report Charles burst into a rage, in which the flood of his pent-up passions was discharged. His luckless servant expected nothing less than death upon the spot.¹¹ Others feared that the duke would turn his drawn sword upon himself.¹² But anger, grief,

¹⁰ Lamarche. — Chron. Lat. Savaudia.

¹¹ "Fus en grand danger de sa vie." Lamarche, tom. ii. p. 418.

¹² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 326. — M. de Gingins would have us believe that Yolande was carried off with her own consent. The notion is not so absolutely absurd as it has been thought. But where is the proof? Her remark to Aplane, about going to Saint-Claude in case of necessity, is cited by M. de Gingins as having been made publicly "at the moment when Charles was preparing to return to Burgundy." This is an incorrect statement. The conversation had

occurred soon after Charles's arrival, on the 23d or 24th, while Yolande was no doubt undecided. Herr von Rodt, on the other hand, seeks to fix upon Charles the odium of having planned the abduction a long time before, representing him as having induced her to go to Gex, with the express intention, in case of his defeat, of forcing her across the Jura. But this theory is supported by still less proof. It may, in fact, be easily disproved. The idea of going to Gex, "*per emere pui in sua liberta de potere andare inanti et indietro como gli parera*," had originated with Yolande herself, immediately after the battle of Grand-

remorse, if he felt it, again subsided, leaving thick clouds tinged with a portentous glare. Panigarola, who joined him at Salins, — having previously had an interview with him at Gex,¹³ — described him as unlike himself,¹⁴ his demeanor not the same as after his former reverse. He had fits of hilarity, seemed to think nothing of his defeat,¹⁵ wished that a couple of thousand more of his household troops, who were "French at heart," had been killed, and talked wildly of the immense armies he could raise at will. He had sent Yolande, refusing to see her, to the castle of the Sire de Rochefort, his former envoy at her court, and one of his ablest and most trusted ministers. Now he drove him from his presence, accusing him of having aided her in conspiring with the king and with the Swiss.¹⁶

Such incidents, getting abroad, gave rise in some quarters to a belief that his intellect was affected. What perhaps saved him from insanity was that which the world was disposed to consider its strongest indication — namely, his inflexible purpose and continued efforts to renew the contest. Now, as after Grandson, he employed himself day and night in the labors of preparation. His first care had been to muster and send out a force to occupy Jougne, on the pass by

son, before she had seen or even communicated with Charles, and appears to have been suspended in consequence of his reassurances and promise to reënter the Pays de Vaud. See the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. i. p. 343.

¹³ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii.

p. 328.

¹⁴ "Fa bon viso, e non pare più sia quello."

¹⁵ "Rade, scorsa, et fa bona chiera altramente che l'altra volta, e pare non s'è rotto."

¹⁶ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 341, 342, 349.

which the victorious enemy might be expected to pursue. The precaution would have been vain against a Swiss army; but it was happily sufficient to save the plains of Burgundy from the ravages of the marauding bands which alone had taken that direction. La Rivière was designated as a place of arms, to receive the débris of the beaten host. All the founderies and workshops in the principal towns were kept busy, casting cannon and forging arms. Money for present exigencies was in hand, that which had been carried to Morat having neither been disbursed nor lost. In the coffers at Lille something still remained of the treasure bequeathed by Philip the Good, and a three months' subsidy from the provinces, as well as from the domain, was falling due. It was not without reason that Charles insisted on the amplitude of his resources, declaring that, if the people of all his states should put forth their strength, his only cause of fear would lie in their proud and independent spirit. With a nation, a willing and united nation, at his back, he would have no cause to despond. The time had come to test the spirit of his subjects, and he had already convoked the Estates of the two Burgundies, who met accordingly at Salins, on the 8th of July.¹⁷

This was not such an assembly as we have seen him confronting in Flanders. Even in an hour, like the present, of gloom and dishonor, though there might be sorrow and dejection in the faces before

¹⁷ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 340-342, 348-350, 360.

him, there was nothing of sullenness or aversion. The proceedings were opened by Jean de Gray, president of the parliament of Burgundy, who described the sovereign as having constantly desired to preserve his states and subjects in tranquillity, and as having expended his means and imperilled his life on their behalf. In former encounters he had been always successful. Now, at last, he had been vanquished by the Swiss, through a lack of zeal and courage in a portion of his troops. As a consequence the country was in danger, not only from the Swiss, but on the side of France and of Savoy. It was for their own protection, therefore, that he was calling upon his people for aid. What he asked of them was to furnish garrisons for the frontier towns, taking the expense upon themselves. At his own cost he would raise a fresh army, and again carry the war into the enemy's territory.

In a fervent address from his own lips Charles exhorted his hearers to provide for the security of their property, the safety of their wives and children, unless they wished them to become the spoil of the Germans and the French. It was a time for efforts and sacrifices, not for despair. History was full of instances of states and princes that had risen from defeat by sinking individual interests in the common welfare. He cited examples from Livius of the spirit displayed by the Romans in their contest with Hannibal, recounting at length the story of that memorable day when the senators, in response to the appeal of the Consul Lævinus, had poured all their

jewels and other treasures into the empty exchequer of the republic. Adducing the cases of several of the emperors, he dwelt especially on that of Octavianus, who, after being totally defeated by Sextus Pompeius, had lived to make himself and the Roman people masters of the world. As a recent illustration, fresh in the memory of the world, he recited the long struggles of King John of Aragon, — old, blind, despoiled by a pretender who had been set up by the French, yet enabled by the support of his people to triumph over his enemies and to reëstablish his dominion. So ready were the quotations, so fluent the discourse, that it seemed as if a book lay open before the speaker; and the impression he produced was visible in the faces of his auditors.¹⁸

Their assent to his demands was immediate, but the formal answer was not presented until the 12th. Although they had held themselves exempted from any further calls by their annual grant of a hundred thousand florins, yet in view of the greatness of the peril, and the representations of his highness, they were ready to undertake whatever he required of them, and to risk their possessions and their lives. They requested him to designate the places to be defended and the number of men to be apportioned to each, promising to supply whatever was wanted, and adding many assurances of their loyal and cordial affection. In return they proffered two petitions: first, that he would leave to his generals the operations in

¹⁸ "Scorrendo queste cose come uno imprimeasse bene questo suo avesse il libro avanti, pareva ad ogni intento."

the field, remembering the importance of his own life as that of the sole surviving prince of his house; secondly, that he would listen to any overtures that might be made, and restore to his subjects as soon as possible the blessings of peace. Charles, in reply, made general but warm professions of his regard for the welfare of his people, declaring his desire to be more than ever their good lord and to live and die with them. With raised spirits and restored health,²⁰ he applied himself to the task of organizing another army, confident that before the summer had passed he should find himself at the head of thirty thousand men.²¹

But how was it that he had obtained a respite? Where were the Swiss? Above all, what was the French king doing? Had Louis sunk into apathy, or — having no proper emissaries on the ground, depending for his information on mendicants, pilgrims, and the like²² — was he still ignorant of the good news? It would appear, on the contrary, that he had known of the event on the instant — by inspiration. The stragglers from the field had been met

²⁰ "Sia bene ora di la persona, et fa bona chiera."

²¹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 358-362. — Among the thousand misrepresentations of the events of Charles's career, few are more glaring than the common account of this meeting of the Estates of Burgundy. His demands are described as having been scornfully rejected, and the discussions as having ended in violent recriminations. A report started in

Alsace, and propagated by Burgundian writers who were assumed to have found authority for it in the archives of the province, has passed current among all writers on the subject.

²² "Il avoit maintes espies et messagiers par pays, la pluspart despeschez de ma main. . . . Y falloit envoyer mendians, pellerins et semblables gens." *Commines*, tom. ii. pp. 11, 12.

at Geneva, on the day after the battle, by a royal courier going openly, at full speed, with a message of congratulation and advice to the victors.²³ On the 25th, if not sooner, full details had been received at Lyons,—three or four days before the first rumor reached the ears of Sforza,²⁴ the despatches of Panigrola, containing information which he had risked his life to obtain, and which he had penned with the fidelity of an evangelist,²⁵ having been intercepted. Posterity has been the loser. Who was the gainer it is not difficult to conjecture. A Milanese agent at Lyons wrote, on the 26th, that all the particulars were known at the court, but that he himself could learn nothing, as no one would answer his questions.²⁶ By making good use of his eyes, however, he discovered that something was in progress which would be far from agreeable to Sforza. The royal forces were in motion, not on the road to Burgundy, but towards Savoy and the Alps. The calculations of the world in regard to the versatile Louis were again to be disappointed. At the risk of allowing his rival time to

²³ "Son avizato che certamente e passato un cavallero del S^{re} Re di Franza ad Alamani tutto battante, giungeva a loco domenica doppo la rotta facta el sabbato, se dicto andava per fare soprostare essi Alamani. . . . Non so que credera che questa fosse la casona, perche ala sua partita dela rotta non si poteva sapere. Vero e che la passato a loro, per la via de Genevra, verso il dicto cammino." Letter of Aplano, June 25, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 303.

²⁴ Conf. letters of J. Blanco and

Sforza, *Ibid.* pp. 307, 319.

²⁵ "Per le mie de 25 et 26 del passato avere [V. S.] el tutto inteso, che e levangelio San Joanne; perche propriis oculis vidi e foi al facto, e tanto ananzi che mi sepe costare caro e la vita." Letter of Panigrola, July 8, *Ibid.* p. 314.

²⁶ "Ego per pauca sentie; nullus enim mecum ex Gallia loquitur. . . . Animus [Regia] ad Vestram Excellentiam . . . non est talis qualem cuperam." Letter of J. Blanco, *Ibid.* p. 307.

recover from the defeat, he had to guard against a misuse of their victory by the Swiss. Instead of pursuing the beaten enemy, they were, as he had feared would happen, threatening to overrun Savoy. To prevent this had been the object of the message he had sent beforehand; and he now despatched Silinen to exercise his persuasive eloquence to the same effect, and to announce the speedy advent of a splendid embassy, comprising some of his greatest lords, and headed by his own son-in-law, the admiral of France. In the mean time, however, the admiral was marching to Chambéry, at the head of the army, with orders to seize the fortresses in the mountain regions of Savoy, bring them into subjection to the king, and not permit the troops of any other power to enter. As a further precaution, the levies of Dauphiny were called out. Leaving his various measures to be executed, Louis himself started on a visit to Our Lady of Béluard, to acknowledge the many favors lately vouchsafed, and by costly gifts insure their continuance.²²

In his absence, as if by the operation of some natural law, events began everywhere to shape themselves to his wish. The abduction of Yolande, designed as a bar against French intervention, had prepared all parties in Savoy to accept and even invite it. At Geneva the people had raged with an indignation that swallowed up their old jealousy of the king and of the Swiss. Passing bands of Burgun-

²² Ibid. ubi supra.—De Troyes. *MSS.* tom. xix.
—Letter of J. de Milani, Legrand

dians were set upon by the rabble, robbed and murdered, the tumult being fomented by the bishop, no longer a hollow supporter of Yolande, but an open aspirant for her place. As the natural guardian of the orphaned duke, he was able to assume the chief direction of affairs. An embassy was sent to the king to solicit his protection, and another to the Swiss, to arrest the invasion by offers of submission and proposals of an alliance against the treacherous Burgundian.²⁷

We left the Confederate forces on the battleground, intending, after they had completed the usual term of three days, to return home. Against this purpose the council of Berne protested in the strongest terms. It was now the time to punish Savoy for the aid it had given to the enemy.²⁸ To their own generals they pointed out that a proper sequel would be the conquest and annexation of Geneva.²⁹ In the existing state of affairs and disposition of the people, the proposal for a prosecution of the campaign met naturally with less dissent from the other cantons than on former occasions, while the minor allies were only too happy to follow the lead of Berne.³⁰ It was settled that about half the troops of each state should be disbanded, the remainder³¹ being amply sufficient for the enterprise. Those

²⁷ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. II. *Geschichtsforscher*, B. XI. pp. 325-328.

²⁸ *Deutsch Meissiven-Buch* C, 918, 918. *MS.*

²⁹ *Ibid.* 922. *MS.*

³⁰ Letter of Kagenack, *Schweiz.*

³¹ One or two of the chroniclers put the number that kept the field at 12,000; and this is the chief fact on which Von Rodt bases his estimate of the Swiss force at Morat.

of Berne and the allies marched against Moudon, the others against Lucens. Both places were sacked, and the latter was given to the flames—an act strongly censured by Berne, on the ground that Lucens, being a dependency of Lausanne, must be considered as ecclesiastical property. Meanwhile, however, marauders of its own, in conjunction with those of the Simmenthal, had pounced upon Lausanne itself, and plundered houses and altars alike, leaving but a scanty harvest for their successors, and affording just grounds of recrimination.²² Within a few days that fraternal spirit which had shone so brightly, and through which the victory had been achieved, seemed to be utterly extinct. Most of the bands withdrew from the camp, filling the country, on their return, with complaints and denunciations of Berne. The source of the rupture seems to have lain in the want of a common purpose. Berne was aiming at conquest; its Confederates had yielded simply to the temptation of spoil. Lausanne was occupied by the remnant of the army; every building, the cathedral included, was stripped bare; but the leaders were already hesitating as to their future course, when they were met by the messengers from Geneva and from the king,

But, apart from the fact that this is a very loose deduction, M. de Gingins cites an official entry from the registers of Lausanne, which gives the number of the Swiss troops that marched against the city as 24,000.

²² Schilling throws the chief obloquy of this act on the count of Gruyères. The statement is dis-

credited by M. Hisely (*Hist. du Comté de Gruyère*, tom. ii. p. 99), who opposes to it the amiable character of young Louis, as exemplified in a charming letter, which certainly overflows with *bonhomie*. We may add that the council of Berne throw all the blame on their own subjects.

at whose persuasion they consented to an armistice, leaving the terms of a final adjustment to be settled by a diet.³²

In another quarter where the royal projects might have encountered an obstacle, there had been an equal lack of energy. Sforza, as we have seen, instead of being the first, had been the last, to hear of the Burgundian defeat. He had made his preparations to profit by it. His army lined the frontier of Piedmont, and had even crossed it at one point. The people and government, cursing the alliance with Burgundy, which had brought them into this strait, were in no condition to oppose him. But his own heart failed him. Remembering his premature exultation after Grandson, he was full of doubts and fears, and, after seizing a couple of castles, waited while he despatched a message to the king, preparatory to the renewal of his old connections.³³

Thus Louis, by a concurrence of circumstances, was left perfectly free to deal with Savoy as he pleased. Not that he had any thought of open usurpation, without some better pretext than he could now set up. Experience had taught him that the moral resistance, of which in his hot youth he had made so little account, deserved to be taken into consideration. Moreover he was growing anxious to finish up the great task of his life, fearful of leaving

³² Schilling. — Gingins, *Episoden*. pp. 9, 319, 322, 342. — Olibrio, — *Deutsch Miszellen-Buch C.* — tom. i. p. 3. — Corio, *Storia di Milano*, tom. iii. p. 299.

³³ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii.

difficult questions to be dealt with by an incompetent successor.²⁵ It would answer his purpose to play the part of protector, holding the strong places, while leaving the management of internal affairs to natives of his own selection. The Estates desired the appointment of two of the principal nobles; but these were persons of a patriotic leaning, on whom, therefore, he could place no reliance. He set the useful but unruly Philip of Bresse over Piedmont, to be a thorn in the side of Sforza. The bishop of Geneva—a more pliable character, who was giving up the fortresses to the French while sending Yolande's personal effects to Lyons and elsewhere to be pawned or sold²⁶—seemed to the king the most suitable person to administer the government of Savoy, but not to have the charge of the young duke, whose person was intrusted to surer hands.²⁷

And now it remained to report these proceedings to the Swiss, as evidence of his own exertions in the common cause, and an incentive to them to complete their proper share of the work. It was to be feared that the Confederacy would prove a less manageable body than heretofore. Its recent triumphs had raised it to the zenith of its reputation. Addresses of congratulation, offers of alliance, petitions for aid, were

²⁵ "Che se fosse una volta liberato da tanta paura, como l'ha havuto de luy, non tanto per se quanto per la sua posterita, cioe per il Delphino, che veramente quando accadesse altro del Re, non e alcuno Signore in quello reame, che potesse

impedire ne torre la corona al Delphino che dicto Duca." Letter of J. Blanco, *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 287.

²⁶ *Notizenblatt*, 1836, n. 196.

²⁷ *Chronica Latina Sabaudie*.

pouring in from all sides. German communities which had refrained from earlier exhibitions of sympathy begged that no ill construction might be put upon the omission; they had rung their bells and offered up prayers for the success of the Swiss. The electors of Mayence and Trèves and the elector palatine — hitherto a stanch ally of Burgundy — sought admission into the Lower League. René of Lorraine, relying on his services at Morat, was soliciting a more intimate alliance and help in the recovery of his duchy.²⁸ It rested only with the Swiss themselves to take a position at the head of the European powers and to become the arbiter of all pending questions. But to do this they would have to emancipate themselves from the guidance of France — a proceeding which Louis proposed to avert by offering them a more equal, or at least a more prominent, share in the partnership. He would continue to hold his own position in Savoy; but he could afford to let his allies take possession of Geneva and the whole of the Léman valley.

Such openings might well have fired the ambition of Berne. But Berne had no longer the same influence, or the same power of independent action, as of old. Twice in the course of a war in which the wishes of its Confederates had been overborne and their advice contemned, it had been obliged to owe its preservation to their succor. In its hour of need it had promised that it would never again seek to separate itself from them; and they were determined

²⁸ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 599, 600, 604 et al.

that the promise should be kept. A vote was passed by the diet requesting Berne to lay all future communications from the French king, with the seals unbroken, before the eight cantons, and to send no answer except under the direction and approval, and in the name, of the whole Confederacy.³⁸ Partly in submission to the feeling thus displayed, partly because Bubenbergh had regained his position in the council, Berne relinquished for the time its usurped leadership and went with the general current, though not without a private assurance to Louis that every thing would still be managed, as heretofore, by his direction, counsel, and assistance.³⁹ Among the people at large there was but one sentiment and one aim. No thought of conquest or aggrandizement entered their minds. They remembered only the origin of the war, their own labors and losses, and the broken guaranties of France. Reparation was to be sought, not in wresting territory from the enemy, but in wringing just pecuniary compensation from their employer.

A diet called expressly to settle matters of foreign policy met at Freyburg on the 25th of July. It opened with extraordinary pomp, and remained in session several weeks. The delegations of the cantons included many of the most notable men, Berne, in particular, being represented by the four leaders of

³⁸ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. Letter to the president of Toulouse, II. a. 569. July 9, Deutsch Misaven-Buch C,

³⁹ "Durch der sîrung bystand 831. MS. und rat all sâch gehandelt wurde."

the council — Scharnachthal, Wabern, Diesbach, and Bubenberg. Deputies from the allied states were admitted to the more public sittings, places of honor being assigned to René of Lorraine and Herter. The bishop of Geneva had come, attended by his council, to make terms on behalf of Savoy. The French embassy comprised the admiral, the president of the parliament of Toulouse, the coadjutor of Grenoble, and other dignitaries, with a train of two hundred knights. Their business took precedence of all other. They announced the satisfaction of their master at the glorious victory achieved by the Confederates. Nothing in his life had ever given him equal joy. The duke of Burgundy was the common foe of the French and German nations, the great disturber of the peace of Christendom. It was now the time to run him down and finish him, giving him no rest and no opportunity to get aid from the emperor and other princes, or to complete his preparations for again assailing the Confederates. He had lately sent a humble message, calling himself "the king's poor friend," offering to do homage for all his fiefs, to give his daughter in marriage to the dauphin, and send her in the mean time to the court, on condition of receiving aid against the Swiss. Far from listening to such proposals, the king had no other desire than to strengthen and extend his league with the Confederates, and to join with them in following up the war till the enemy was utterly annihilated. He proposed that they should send out twenty thousand men, while he himself, with an equal or greater force,

would make an attack in Picardy or some other quarter, besides bringing over the king of England to help. When the work was done, the gains should be fairly divided. The barrier which had hitherto impeded their intercourse and concert of action no longer existed, the king having settled the affairs of Savoy and reestablished the authority of the duke his nephew. The better to secure their communications, he invited his allies to occupy Geneva.

On each and all of these points the Swiss were prepared with a categorical reply. They had entered into the war at the instigation and for the honor of the king.⁴¹ Often as they had been tempted, they had rejected all offers of a separate peace. Thrice they had encountered and beaten the enemy's forces, not without much cost and labor to themselves. On their own part they deemed it unnecessary to undertake anything further. They were, however, glad to learn that the king, as he had so often and so long announced, now intended to go personally into the war, which, by using his best endeavors, he would no doubt be able to bring to the desired conclusion. What they wished the envoys to commend to his attention was the amount of the pensions now in arrears and the additional eighty thousand francs for which he had made himself lable by failing to come to their assistance. If any obstructions had prevented

⁴¹ "Gemeine Eidgenossen und ihre Zugewandten sein dem König zu Ehren in diesen Krieg getreten." *honorem et impulsionem regis guerras in eum [Burgundie ducem] movimus.*
 "Domini de liga respondent, esse ob

their summonses from reaching him, this ought not to work to their disadvantage. With regard to the affairs of Savoy they declined to express any opinion, the entanglements with that state having grown out of its treaties with Berne. Neither would they occupy Geneva, but would leave the king to do so if he pleased.

When pressed in regard to the eighty thousand francs, the admiral and his colleagues replied that they had brought no instructions on this point, but being well acquainted with the sentiments of the king, they were sure that he would fulfil all his engagements. They suggested that the Swiss should send an embassy of their own to negotiate the matter. Nothing would so delight him as to have an opportunity of becoming personally acquainted with the heroes of Grandson and Morat.⁴²

Terms of peace with Savoy were dictated by the diet, the passage of the Italian recruits and other acts of assistance to Burgundy being recapitulated at great length as the grounds of the war.⁴³ No useless denial or protest was offered by the opposite party; but all the blame was laid upon the regent, and mildness entreated in consideration of the sufferings and poverty of the people. It was decided that Savoy should pay an indemnity of fifty thousand florins, the Pays de Vaud to be held by the Confederates as security. The districts of Morat and

⁴² Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. bel, 2te Abth. n. 79-81. — Stettler, II. s. 601-608. — Lateinisches Missiven-Buch A, 484 b. MS. — Kne-
⁴³ Schilling, s. 353-359.

Grandson, with some other places, were to be permanently retained, under the joint sovereignty of Berne and Freyburg. No portion of the territory was to return to the count of Romont. Geneva was to pay its separate fine, in good current money of full weight. Other debts were to be discharged; freedom of intercourse and trade was to be restored; and the treaty was to be ratified and guaranteed by the French king.⁴⁴

Among minor matters, the petition of René of Lorraine received a patient and benign hearing. There was no intention of according it; but a vote was passed commending the claims and services of the good prince to the consideration of the people.⁴⁵

The proposal to send, for the first time, an embassy to the king, embracing representatives of all the states which had executed his pleasure and earned his bounty, met with general acceptance. The chiefs, or others who had most distinguished themselves in the two great battles, were appropriately chosen by the respective cantons, Zurich sending Waldmann; Schwytz, Kätzy and Reding; Lucerne, Hertenstein and Hassfurter; Berne, Halwyl and Bubenberg; while Diesbach and Albert von Silinen were designated as the chaperons of their unfamiliar and less polished colleagues.⁴⁶ More time was required for fitting out in a becoming manner this novel expedition than had ever been consumed by the Swiss in raising and equipping

⁴⁴ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 603, 608 et seq.

⁴⁵ Ibid. s. 604.

⁴⁶ Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 215. — Schilling, s. 363.

troops for the field. In the interval the council of Berne, in disregard of the interdict laid upon their correspondence with the king, deemed it advisable to give him a preliminary warning of the demands about to be made upon him, entreating his favorable reception of them, as he valued his own interests and the maintenance of the alliance.*

The affairs of Louis were just now at a stand-still. It appeared that he had nothing to fear from the ambition of the Swiss, but also nothing to hope from their spirit of enterprise. His rival had sustained a great overthrow; but he was still alive,—his spirit as indomitable and defiant as ever. Was it then fear that kept the king inactive, and prevented him from giving the finishing stroke with his own knife? Yes; the same fear, as we learn from a close and keen observer, which had so long restrained him,—relics of an old terror, the flesh shrinking at the recollection of former scaldings; an extreme desire to have a continuous peace within his own borders, where the harmony was now so perfect; the conviction that it would be altogether better to have the job performed by other hands rather than attempt it with his own.**

* "Die wir von hertzen und höchsten begirde hatten, das nitt anders daß es bestechen und verhalten ist zu bedencken, und sich gewüss zehalten das so funderlichet das ymmer ain mag die selb unsere botschafft by uwer k. m. ain wirdt, alles das selhun das uwer k. m. und unnsere gemeynen nutz nitt wenig berurt." Deutsch Missiven-Buch D, 46. MS.

** "E opinione che la maestà del Re non debba schiffare il nouo appuntamento con luy parte per extremo desyderio di viuere pacificamente, parte per lasciarlo sbirariti con altri che con lay, del quale non e pur chel non habia qualche reliqua et paura per essere tante volte scotato de laqua calda, etc." Petrasanta to the duke of Milan, Notizenblatt, 1856, n. 184.

In truth, eager as he was, he could afford a short delay. If it should prove impossible to induce the Swiss to make a direct and final attack on the duke of Burgundy, there still remained the chance that the duke of Burgundy would make another and final attack upon the Swiss.

Unfortunately this chance was every day diminishing. The hope that had lately dawned upon Charles was but a transient lifting of the clouds before they settled down forever. Towards the end of July he proceeded to La Rivière, where his stay, with brief intermissions, lasted till the close of September. He had counted on finding in the camp eleven hundred lances, — some nine thousand cavalry, — which were known to have escaped the slaughter. Scarcely half the number had made their appearance, and such of them as had passed through Geneva in much the same plight — stripped of horses, arms, and accoutrements — as the rifled dead upon the field. Of the foot companies there was scarcely a relic. The great majority of the soldiers had made for their homes or found other hiding-places. To tempt them out, and raise the spirits of those who had assembled, it was necessary to double the pay, putting all on the same footing in this respect as the household troops. The latter force, diminished now to four hundred lances, had been stationed around the camp, to stop any further desertions. There were besides four hundred lances in Picardy, as many in Luxembourg, and eight hundred in Lorraine, forces considered as reserves —

if it were only safe to draw upon them.⁴⁹ From Italy, so long his great recruiting ground, Charles was now entirely cut off. His exhausted Burgundies had done their part towards that supreme effort of which he rightly believed his people to be capable. It remained to be seen whether the Netherlands, hitherto untouched by the war, could be roused in a commensurate degree.

Advices already received from that quarter had not been encouraging. On the first report of the disaster at Morat, the Chancellor Hugonet and the Sire de Ravenstein, who had charge of the duke's affairs in his absence, had convoked a council of the highest nobles and principal functionaries, the Duchess Margaret presiding in person. All concurred in the necessity of immediate measures to secure the frontiers against a French invasion. The Estates of Flanders had already rejected demands for the same object.⁵⁰ It was decided as the only resource to appropriate the three months' subsidy — the chief item of the ducal revenue. In excuse it was pleaded that the duke had lost his army, — the inference being that he would have no occasion for money. But, low as he had fallen, Charles was not a person who could be safely treated in this fashion. He had written back from Salins, on the 13th of July, that if any sums had been taken and were not instantly reimbursed, he would hold the chancellor and the treasurers of the exchequer responsible in their own

⁴⁹ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 369, 370.

⁵⁰ Gachard, note to Berante, tom. ii.

estates. The grant, he reminded them, had been voted expressly for the maintenance of his army in the field. He was well pleased that the garrisons should be strengthened; but this was a duty incumbent on the people. Those of Burgundy had cheerfully undertaken it, although the towns were far from being so populous and wealthy as those of the Netherlands, and the country had been constantly harassed by war. From his other provinces he expected more. His army had not been lost. He was now going to review it, preparatory to a new campaign. He required all the reinforcements possible—the lances and artillery he had left in Picardy and elsewhere, a general levy of the feudal vassals, and ten thousand men to be enlisted as part of his permanent force.⁵¹

So far as the powers and liabilities of his own officers extended, this missive proved effectual. But all efforts to induce the people to share in the burdens and the risks were unavailing. And naturally so. The war in which Charles was engaged had for its objects the preservation of his southern provinces, the retention of the links by which he had sought to unite his separated dominions, the establishment of a power secure against foreign machinations and aggressions. With such projects the burghers of Flanders had no concern. They were content with their present position—with the feudal dependence of their sovereign, with a liberty resting on provincial charters, with a prosperity founded on pursuits “in-

⁵¹ *MS.* (Bib. Imp., Béthune, 9560.)

compatible with war." As long as they turned a deaf ear to the mandates and invectives of Charles, nothing would disturb their tranquillity. They had now only to forget his existence in a life of industry and enjoyment—their busy factories, teeming warehouses, and comfortable abodes, their cabarets, bagnios, and pleasure gardens, beautified with wooden statues and perfumed with the emanations of slimy canals. Yet we wrong them. On one point that concerned their sovereign they were not so indifferent. They had always, it may be remembered, shown a punctilious respect for his person. Of this feeling they gave a proof on the present occasion. In answer to his "requests," they are said to have sent him a loyal and generous message, to the effect that, if he were surrounded by his enemies and unable to escape, they would go and deliver him.

Such, in very truth, was the predicament into which he was falling. Lorraine, his avenue of retreat,—unless he intended literally to share the fate of his Burgundian subjects,—was becoming closed. Immediately after the battle of Morat, the Bastard of Vaudémont and his comrades, again assisted by Cron, had gained possession of some castles on the western frontier. On the opposite side, René himself, leaving Herter to plead his cause with the Swiss, had unfurled his standard early in August. He had succeeded in raising a considerable force in the friendly Alsatian towns, augmented by a band of vassals on his passage across the Vosges, where he counted his strongest adherents. In the interior of the province

there was little disposition to revolt. Many of the nobles—those of French extraction—had submitted not unwillingly to a rule which had offered the best security against the insatiable claims and encroachments of the king. In the towns, the capital included, the mild and equitable administration of Bièvre had at least prevented the people from chafing under the yoke of the conqueror. On the other hand, the recent overthrow of Charles, and his apparently prostrate condition, neutralized his more active supporters, and at most of the places where René made his appearance he was welcomed as the rightful sovereign. The Burgundian garrisons gave proofs of their ability to defend themselves; but, seeing no prospect of succor, they accepted in many cases the proposals made to them, and retired with their arms and effects. In this way Epinal, Lunéville, and other important towns changed hands without any serious struggle; and by the end of the month René, with an army enlarged through the effect of these successes to twenty thousand men, was able to lay siege to Nancy.⁵²

Thus, despite the inactivity of the Swiss and of the king, Charles was again reduced to the defensive, and this while he had no sufficient means of resistance. Yet the ultimate issue must depend on the course of the only powers he had any real reason to dread. Immediate intelligence had reached him of the refusal of the Confederates to participate in a war of inva-

⁵² Chrétien. — Remy. — Calmet. — *Dépêches Milanaises*.

sion.⁵³ Nor, such being the case, did he apprehend any attack from the king. He had seen that Louis wanted, not only an opportunity, but a pretext; and one of his first steps had been to send orders to the frontier to avoid every act that could give the slightest occasion for a rupture.⁵⁴ To obtain, if possible, a more definite assurance, at least by closer observation, Contay had since gone on another mission to the court.

On hearing that the envoy was awaiting him at Tours, Louis, in his eagerness to hear of the welfare of his cousin of Burgundy,⁵⁵ had cut short his pilgrimage, and hastened back to his secular affairs.⁵⁶ His arrival at his favorite domicile was followed by an influx from various quarters — envoys from the duke of Brittany, proposing a personal visit if a safe-conduct with trustworthy signatures could be obtained; an agent from England, to collect the annual "tribute" of Edward and his nobles; another from Berne, to remind the king of the humbler claims of the Swiss; a succession of messengers from Yolande, to treat about her release and restoration; deputations from Savoy and Piedmont on the same business, and to protest at all events against the further tyranny of the count of Bresse and his brother; finally, and of

⁵³ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 381, 382.

⁵⁴ *Legrand MSS. histoire*, tom. iii.

⁵⁵ In a polite note on an unimportant matter, written at the beginning of the Morat campaign, Louis had expressed his desire to have

news from Charles immediately upon his return. *Legrand MSS.* tom. xix.

⁵⁶ "Senza hauere fornito il peregrinaggio di la diuotione sua se sera tornata qua subito chel intesa la venuta del detto M. di Conte." *Notizenblatt*, 1866, s. 182.

chief interest to us, an embassy from Milan, to conclude the fresh treaty of alliance, and to appease by detailed reports the strong inquisitiveness of the duke — and of the historian.⁸⁷

Sforza had chosen for this mission Francesco Petrasanta, his resident minister at Turin. The ground assigned for his renunciation of the Burgundian alliance was his indignation at Yolande's abduction,⁸⁸ which had conveniently occurred just after his preliminary message to the king. Petrasanta's first conferences were with the vice-chancellor and other ministers, who were drawing up the treaty. On essential points there was no disagreement. But a long and terrible struggle arose in regard to the form. Louis was no longer the modest and retiring personage of an earlier epoch, cheerfully submitting to be eclipsed by his inferiors. He insisted on sticking into the instrument phrases humiliating to Sforza, to punish him doubtless for his short-sighted desertion. The envoy, though confined to his bed by a fever, made a vigorous resistance, keeping up for days together an unintermitted discussion "*de verbo in verbum*." But the royal ministers declared that they would fling the treaty to the winds rather than abate a jot of their master's dignity. "You are not now," they said, "dealing with inferiors, like Florence and Ferrara, nor with equals, like Venice and Naples, but with my lord the king — a monarch than whom there has been none in a state of greater prosperity from

⁸⁷ Ibid. — Legrand MSS. to Apiano), Legrand MSS. tom.

⁸⁸ Instructions (given originally xix.

Charlemagne to the present day."⁸⁰ Notwithstanding this haughty announcement, Petrasanta had thoughts of going off *re infecta*, or at least of not yielding without fresh instructions. But in consultation with the Florentine envoy and other Italians, he was cautioned not to put in jeopardy the conclusion of so important a matter, remembering the suspicious temper of the king, the presence of a Burgundian envoy whose adverse schemes it was essential to frustrate, and the satisfaction with which many of the royal council would see the negotiation broken off, as well from ill will to Milan, as from a desire that their master should have more "bones to gnaw," and consequently less leisure for the freaks and gambols to which he was too much addicted.⁸¹ Sforza was in fact trembling with apprehensions lest the duke of Burgundy, if not strenuously pushed, might again, as at Neuss, cut asunder the league, burst from the toils, and call for a reckoning from his false allies. In that case the excuse pleaded by the duke of Milan would hardly serve.

Having yielded accordingly, Petrasanta had his first interview with the most prosperous monarch since Charlemagne on the morning of Saturday, the 9th of August. Personally Louis was as affable and unassuming as ever. He had removed from the

⁸⁰ "Maxime che qua non haemo a fare con inferiori come e Fiorenza et Ferram, ne con pari all S. V. come e Venetia et Napoli, ma son questo Signore Re quale pare sia in si grande prosperita quanto Re fosse

da Carlo magno in qua."

⁸¹ "Perche il Re hauesse piu cose da vedere, dubitando deessere peggio tractati, quanto sua maestà ha piu prosperi desydarii."

palace to a *barchetta*, or pleasure house, "small and not handsome," but girdled by walls. Having sent for his queen, from whose company he had abstained during his recent devotions, he had slept with her the night before. When the envoy was announced, he had only just risen, and was sitting in his doublet at an open window. He complained of feeling unwell, and asked for Pantaleone, the physician of the embassy and an old acquaintance of his own, who was called. Holding out his wrist for his pulse to be felt, he gave the doctor an account of his condition in Latin. He was much afflicted with piles, which he attributed to his labors of mind and body, his journeys, and his "cogitations on the conduct of wars,"⁶¹ — that is to say, cogitations how wars were to be conducted through the agency of a third party, — and also to the continence he had lately practised.⁶² "So that I have now," he concluded, "a certain confusion in the head, with a trembling of the heart, which causes me some uneasiness."⁶³ — Alarming symptoms indeed — in such a head, and such a heart!

After reading the letter presented from Sforza, he expressed himself more than satisfied, adding that he saw his brother did not intend any deceit, by the envoy he had sent. He then prepared himself for mass, and on his way to the chapel put his hand familiarly on the arm of his companion, talking fu-

⁶¹ "In cogitandis rationibus bel-
lorum."

⁶² "Et etiam propter abetinentiam
coitus, quia steti tanto tempore ab-

sens ab uxore mea."

⁶³ "Un certo fumosità alla testa, et fattomi venire vno tremore di core che mi dà molestia assai."

ently in French. The conversation turned first upon the Swiss, the duke of Milan having, it would seem, asked the royal advice—or commands—in regard to his future relations with that people. “Francesco,” said the king, stopping in his walk, although the priest was waiting for him at the altar, “on that matter I should not wish to give an answer on a sudden and without deliberation. Yet it would seem that my brother could not but do well to renew his league with them, for they are men to be greatly esteemed in war; and then, as often as he wishes to make war upon Venice, he can always have them at his command, at a low price, especially through my aid.” “It would be easy, he went on, to devise a good color for recovering territory which the Venetians had usurped, and “for such wars these Germans would be very good and very useful.”⁵⁴ Petrasanta, while acknowledging the good will shown in this suggestion, objected that the Venetians were now on good terms with his master, and very well disposed. “It may be so,” replied Louis, “nor do I advise any movement at present. Yet neither would I have it too long deferred; for I assure you, Francesco, and I have so written to my brother, the Venetians have never kept, and will never keep, any of their promises, unless it be for their own advantage.” Petrasanta having introduced another topic, of a more

⁵⁴ “Perche sono homini da farne gran stima in guerra. Et ogni volta che mio fratello volesse far guerra a Venetiani sempre li haueria per po-

cho predo a suo commando mediante maxima lopera mia.”

⁵⁵ “Li Alemanni seriano molto boni et molto vtile in tale guerra.”

pressing nature, — the proceedings of Philip of Bresse, which had been highly distasteful to Sforza, — the king listened patiently, but after standing silent a while, as if perplexed, said he must not keep the mass waiting any longer, and they would have a fuller discussion on the morrow.

—“And then, as often as he wishes to make war upon Venice, he can always have them at his command — at a low price — especially through my aid.” Shade of Nicholas von Diesbach, listen, and echo from thy Elysium this fresh proof of the graciousness of thy patron! Nay, lie still, heroes of Morgarten and Sempach! Wake not, challenge not the statement! Liar though he is, he has spoken the truth; yea, the truth, unless all concerned, all who know, are in a conspiracy to lie!

A week or more elapsed before a second audience of any length was granted, Louis secluding himself at first on account of his continued troubles in the head, heart, and other parts, and being afterwards, for three days, absorbed in the celebration of the fête of the Virgin, at which time no one was permitted to speak to him. Meanwhile Petrasanta employed his diplomatic instinct in ferreting among the affairs of his brother envoys, and especially in finding out the exact state of the triangular relations of Yolande, Louis, and Charles. Yolande, though a prisoner, had full opportunities for managing her own part in the affair. On the 14th of July, when Charles, as we have seen, was again hopeful and sane, he had paid her a visit, spending the night and half the next day

at Rochefort.⁶⁶ Later in the same month she had been removed to Rouvre, farther from the French frontier. Her confinement, however, was of the mildest description. Her host, the Sire de Mague, and his daughter seem to have won her esteem by their delicate attentions. No guards or spies were set over her. She went abroad at her convenience, making excursions of pleasure or devotion with only her own attendants. Visitors from home, ladies of her court, mules laden with dresses, trinkets, and money, came in perfect security — unless they happened on the way to fall into the hands of the Swiss or their allies. With the same freedom she despatched couriers to her brother, to the duke of Milan, to Geneva, Nice, and Turin.⁶⁷ What was to prevent her from going off in any direction she pleased? Chiefly, it would seem, her own uncertainty as to what direction to take. She sent word to the bishop of Geneva that she would find means to go back if assured as to her reception. Sforza was also sounded, and he, of course, made boundless professions, and was sincerely eager to have her come to Piedmont. Luckily perhaps for herself, her messenger was stopped on his return by Philip of Bresse and detained as a prisoner.⁶⁸ As to fleeing to the king, which would have been still easier, she was in mortal dread of being delivered into his hands by Charles,⁶⁹ who, according to a story which

⁶⁶ *Ancienne Chronique*, Lenglet, tom. ii. p. 220. p. 377. — *Chronica Latina Sahan-*
dis.

⁶⁷ *Menebrea*, append. — *Commines*.
— *Girard MSS*.

⁶⁸ *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. ⁶⁹ "Elle estoit en grant crainte
de tomber sous sa main." *Com-*
mines, tom. ii. p. 36.

we may trust was groundless, — and indeed it bears the stamp of a well-known hand, — made use of this threat, and at the same time disclosed her feelings to Louis, with the object of preventing them from coming to an understanding.⁷⁰ Yolande herself announced that a line from her brother would set her free at any moment; and Charles made repeated declarations that he was ready to restore her to the hands of her own chamberlains. But such communications had, of course, the effect of disinclining Louis to take any active steps. She was at her old tricks, he said, and meant to keep up her connection with Burgundy. Putting together these and various other items he had gathered, Petrasanta came to the conclusion that the negotiation would prove a protracted one; for, as he remarked, both the king and the duke desired her restoration, but each wished to be the restorer, and one had possession of her person, the other of her states.

In regard to the probable result of Contay's mission Petrasanta was more in doubt, having only external indications to judge by. At first the king had treated Contay with the greatest consideration. But as it grew clearer that Charles had sunk too much in the estimation of the world, and was too much weakened by the "bastonadings" he had received, ever again to do "any great thing," his ambassador found himself neglected, put off on slight excuses when he asked for an audience, or admitted

⁷⁰ Notizenblatt, s. 184.

only that he might be put into a state of confusion by the delicate-minded Louia. Under the mask of good-humored raillery he had to listen to "the strangest things"—jeers and sarcasms of which one tongue alone possessed the gift. When the Milanese treaty, with its express renunciation of the Burgundian alliance, had been signed, it was proclaimed by the heralds with sound of trumpet—under the windows of the Burgundian envoy. Contay was lodged with the Sire de "Leynires," a special favorite, though accused of a secret leaning to the duke of Burgundy. In the middle of the night, while the two nobles were wrapped in their "most beautiful sleep," they would be startled by a tremendous alarm in the corridor⁷¹—a rushing of feet, a beating of drums and sounding of horns, and cries of "Away, away! The Swiss are coming."⁷²—Witty, delicate-minded king!

"He never appears more pleased," writes our informant, "than when he is hearing some ill of the duke of Burgundy—the diminution of his forces, the falling away of his friends, or any misfortune or sinister event tending to the loss of his honor and reputation." It was a cause of especial joy that the Netherlands had refused their succors, and abandoned him to his fate.⁷³ And with reason; for if the people of those provinces had risen to their feet, and shown a determination to put forth that strength with which no one was better acquainted than Louis,

⁷¹ "Li maggior strepiti del mondo."

⁷² "Maxime quelli di Fiandra gli

⁷³ "Su, su, che li Alemani sono hanno negato lo subsidio richiesta." *qua.*"

how quickly would his soul, so alert, so anxious, so easily alarmed, have dropped from the pinnacle on which it was now perched, and crept into some dark recess! Fortunate monarch, to have so many servants executing his pleasure — the Swiss at one end of his rival's dominions, at the other the Flemings!

Having such agents at work for him, it was the opinion of the court that he would not and ought not to intermeddle in person. But in regard to his sentiments, as Petrasanta assured the duke of Milan, there was not the least room for doubt. "From what I have been able to learn and understand, I believe that his Turk, his Devil in this world, the one whom he most intensely hates, is the duke of Burgundy alone, with whom he can never live in amity — never, never, never!"⁷⁴ — *Piano, piano*, O penetrating diplomatist! We can believe it without this undiplomatic emphasis.

In a conversation with the king while he was going on horseback to the Church of "Our Lady of Lericia" at Tours, Petrasanta reverted to the affairs of Piedmont, using "the greatest moderation and dexterity possible," in order not to reveal his master's "passionate interest" in the matter, yet "leaving no string of the lute untouched." Louis replied that he had thought of it a great deal, but saw no way at present of displacing Philip of Bresse. If he should

⁷⁴ "E per quello ch'io ho potuto intendere et comprendere Io credo chel suo Turco, et suo Discolo a questo mondo quale esso ha exeso, sia solo il Duce di Borgogna, col quale may may may non habia ad essere amore."

put in one of his own people, it would create the greatest scandal in the world; for in that case no one but God could put it out of the heads of the Savoyards that he wished to usurp the state, and the whole world would be of the same opinion, which would be an infamy. Resuming the discussion in a subsequent interview, he remarked that he knew not what to do. He was well inclined towards his sister, his own flesh, and it was right that her son, his nephew, should have control of his own dominions. "Yet," he added, "if the duke of Milan and I could govern the country without any meddling or scandal from others, truly I should wish no one to have a hand in it but us two. I know well we should have only one mind — that there would be no disagreement between us. But as things now are, I think my brother must be content to endure Monsieur de Bresse. He has, I confess, some qualities that are not very laudable. But as he is between us, and I have admonished him to behave well to the duke of Milan, I think my brother will have to endure him and to leave the government in the hands of the uncles." Petrasanta would not press him for fear of arousing suspicions, but consoled his master with an assurance that the king would find himself in hot water as long as he upheld the present government in Savoy, the whole nation being opposed to it. When the expected deputation from the Estates had arrived, another and more vigorous remonstrance might be made.

It is doubtful, however, whether Louis exposed himself to this premeditated assault. He was already

growing restive under the searching eyes which had brought their own evidence that his brother intended no deceit. Being told that Sforza, in order to give due *éclat* to the renewal of the alliance, was about to send a second and more splendid embassy, he refused to stand such an imposition; it was altogether superfluous; there was no occasion, he politely added, for Petrasanta himself to stay any longer; whenever there was need of communication from either side, it would be easy to send a letter or message. "I do not know his real motive in this," says the reporter whose unceremonious dismissal excites our sympathy and regret; "but I am of opinion that his objection to receiving a solemn embassy proceeds from his aversion to pomp and his preference for private conversation with a single person; and that his disinclination to have any one remain permanently arises from his persuasion that your highness keeps such ministers — as spies."

We are favored, however, with the account of a final interview, which took place on the 2d of September. Louis had removed still farther from Tours, to a very small house, with not room enough for half his personal attendants, situated in a lonely region, but one well suited to the chase — a recreation in which, notwithstanding his bodily infirmities, — dizziness, palpitations, and so forth, — he still took "incredible delight." He had spent nine hours in hunting the day before, and, being continually foiled in the pursuit, had, as usual with him in such cases, given free vent to his vexation. His exultation was

the greater when he had at last captured the deer. He received his success as an omen that a longer, a more vexatious hunt was approaching its termination, and he returned home in the greatest glee, singing a newly composed ditty in ridicule of the mishaps of his Turk, his Devil in this world.⁷³

His good humor continued the next morning, and hearing Petrasanta's voice in an adjoining room, he came out from his cabinet, was very jovial, and used many familiarities. After some conversation of which the purport has been already given, he said he was doing all he could to liberate his sister, but her own flightiness and eagerness retarded the matter. This sending of envoys from Savoy and Piedmont would also have a bad effect; the duke of Burgundy would learn all that was going on, or, if he saw that anything was concealed, he would be the more inclined to draw back. Besides, he had grown so vacillating, sending one message at one hour and another at another hour, that there was no telling what he meant. "But by my faith," the king added, "he is mad — although I do wrong to use that word; but it is so; and, in fact, it has never been by his sagacity that he has stood, but by fortune and the force of money, and because the world was determined to have it so."⁷⁴ "Thanks to your majesty's sagacity,"

⁷³ "Con grandissima allegrezza tornò a casa cantando una canzone quale è stata fatta in obprobrio de le sconfitte ha riceputo il Duca di Borgogna." — We have not met with any French song on the battle of Morat.

Poor Villon — "ce Byron vagabond" — might have composed one more worthy of the theme than would have suited the taste of Louis.

⁷⁴ "Ma per la fede mia el è matto, benchio facio male a vossu questo

replied the envoy, "he is now reduced to a state in which he can neither stand nor walk without great discomfiture and shame — except through the help which your majesty's self is giving him." "What help?" was the sharp inquiry. Petrasanta mentioned the proposed interview, the promises of non-interference, and other points urged in a recent letter from his master, speaking, however, "so soberly and dexterously as not to afford the slightest scintilla of a suspicion" that Sforza himself was still wavering and uneasy. Louis replied that there was no occasion for anxiety; affairs would be discreetly managed; he was "following the hare with a cart" — an Italian phrase, intimating that he was surely, though slowly, running down his game.⁷⁷ "I am not obliged," he said, cutting short some further objections, — "I am not obliged, nor do I intend, to make any agreement with Burgundy. He has himself often broken the truce, so that by right I could, and still can, begin a war whenever I please. But I have thought it best to temporize, going straight on by the same path and at the same pace as heretofore, until it shall please God —"⁷⁸

Truly, this was not a magnanimous king. His baseness in adversity may have deserved more pity

vocabulo, pur el e così, ma el non e già stato per suo aspero, ma per fortuna et forza de denari, et perche gli homeni del mondo hanno voluto così."

⁷⁷ "Vesano vno temizio Italiano

chel voleva pigliare la lepore col carro."

⁷⁸ "Fina che a dio piacerà." Letters of Petrasanta to the duke of Milan, Aug. 12 — Sept. 2, *Notizenblatt*, 1856, n. 181-196.

than contempt. Nay, remembering that he did feel, did suffer acutely, we may admit a touch of heroism in the self-mastery that enabled him to take an apparent delight in his own shame. At all events there was a far deeper meanness in the real exultation to which he was now giving loose — in his petty insults to a foe whom, while pretending to despise him, he was still afraid to touch.

Yet doubtless it was the remembrance of past humiliations which gave its keenest zest to his present triumph. Times had indeed changed since he had sat, an indigent dependant, at the board of Philip the Good, bowing his thanks for every crust, wiping his grateful eyes with his sleeve. Times had changed since he had crouched before the victor of Montlhéry, the leader of feudal France, cringing, fawning, applauding his adversary's prowess, smiling at his own impotence. How haughtily, how sternly, how inflexibly, had the form he detested towered above him then! Now, like a spent pugilist, reeling, hitting wildly, blinded with his own blood, Charles was plainly about to succumb. He knew it himself; he had no hopes, no illusions, left. "He is manifestly conscious," wrote Panigarola, "of the greatness of the loss he has sustained."¹⁹ Yes, he was conscious of it — yet not the less resolved to struggle still, to lose more, to lose all,

¹⁹ "Manifestamente si comprende il grand dono [dono] a dato." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 370. — We accept the editor's interpretation of this passage; yet, if he has

printed it correctly, the meaning and application are different. As to the essential point, however, all the authorities agree.

rather than kneel or flee before the rival who had knelt and fled before him.

In the camp at La Rivière, though his labors and embarrassments were like those he had encountered at Lausanne, his position was very different. Then the world had crowded around him, if only to spy, to speculate, to censure and discourage. Now it shrank from his side, and left him to his fate. The troop of foreign envoys that had followed him so long was breaking up. Several took leave in a body on the 9th of September. Panigarola lingered a fortnight longer; but he too had received his recall, and, having gone with us to the edge of the cataract, will help to pilot us no farther.

Yet, if Charles had known it, eyes not unmoist with sympathy, though passionless and critical beyond most, were turned upon him from a distance. Philippe de Commines, who had known him so thoroughly, who had lived with him so intimately, could easily picture his present state — his altered fortunes, his lone despair, his still unconquerable pride. The comment of the historian is pathetic, the remedy he suggests simple, yet profound. What a relief for Charles, if he could but have been brought to unburden his oppressed heart, pouring out his plaint freely and without shame to some friend, some "especial friend" (such a friend, let us say, as Commines himself would have been — had been before he had fled to another service, when they had kept vigil together, and the perplexed and fiery spirit had yielded to the influence of the calmer and deeper one). But his best, most

certain refuge, as is pointed out, lay in searching his own conscience, detecting the true source of his misery, turning to God, humbling himself where there was no place for pride, acknowledging a chastisement in which there could be no wrong.⁸⁰ But this, alas! could not be. Charles had forgotten God. He had believed, it is true, in a Providence—in one that watched especially over the actions of princes.⁸¹ He had accepted and upheld the decrees of the church; had listened daily to his regular mass,—“his three masses”⁸² in times of leisure,—sternly rebuking the priests when they hurried through the rites, demanding whether this were giving his dues to the Master they professed to serve.⁸³ For himself, he had meant to be scrupulously just to God and to man. From God and from man he had expected justice in return. From man? But this was vain: man may be indulgent, may be cruel; just he cannot be. From God? Ah yes, God is always just. Man’s injustice is the vehicle of his justice. This it was that Charles had forgotten. He looked only at the instrument—at man; he forgot God.

It is a terrible thing to forget God. Yet there is something still more terrible. It is to be forgotten by him; to err unwarned, to sin unscourged; to have all flatter that the ear catches, all prosper

⁸⁰ Commynes, tom. ii. p. 40.

⁸¹ “Providence que, par sa force souveraine, a bienveillance et soin ès actions de ceux que sont Rois.” Speech, before quoted, at Nancy.—But even those who reject the ab-

stract belief in a Providence have a conviction that their own interests are the object of an unseen superintendence.

⁸² Duvernoy, *Ephémérides*, p. 141.

⁸³ Barlandas. — Heuter.

that the hand touches; to bask—to wither—in


One more glance at the most prosperous monarch since Charlemagne, before we follow the downward steps of his rival. Notwithstanding his horror of embassies, there was one—if not the most pompous, certainly the largest, ever sent to him—which he could receive without aversion or suspicion. The Swiss envoys, a dozen or more in number, arrived about the end of September. How they were welcomed, how treated, need we tell? Their stay lasted many weeks, and business was well-nigh forgotten in a perpetual round of festivities. The mean palace with its cages underneath, the grim park with its high walls and steel traps, wore for once an aspect of gayety and magnificence. Fountains played; tables were spread in the open air; ⁸⁸ costly entertainments—at the expense of the duke of Bourbon, the admiral, and other princes and nobles—celebrated the presence of the simple republicans whom the king delighted to honor.⁸⁹ Sitting at the banquet, with Hertenstein or Halwyl on one side, Silinen or Diesbach on the other, he never wearied of listening to the tale divine of Grandson and Morat, asking ever

⁸⁸ Schilling, illustration.

⁸⁹ The independent bearing of some of them, in contrast with their plain attire, seems to have taken even Communes by surprise. “J’en ay veu l’advoué,” he says, speaking of Schwytz and referring to Kätsy,

“ambassadeur avec les aultres, en bien humble habillement, et disoit-il son opinion comme les aultres.” (Tom. ii. p. 23.) Kätsy, as we have seen, had spoken his opinion to some purpose in the council of chiefs at Morat.

new questions, demanding fresh repetitions.⁸⁶ "Louder, louder, messieurs! I begin to grow a little deaf;" for at another table, remote enough to mark the lower rank of its occupants, near enough for them to share in the enjoyment, sits the Burgundian minister⁸⁷ — that same Contay who on a former occasion had overheard the like peals of jubilant laughter. Another visitor is announced — an envoy from René of Lorraine, with tidings of captured towns and an enemy in *extremis*. He too is made welcome, bidden to take a seat beside Contay, and to pour into *his* ear the grateful intelligence, in a good high key, loud enough to reach the royal ear.⁸⁸

Besides a present in money to the embassy collectively, Diesbach and some other members tasted separately of the king's bounty.⁸⁹ His verbal expres-

⁸⁶ Knebel. — Statler.

⁸⁷ "Do ist gewesen in gegenwertigkeit des hertzogen bottschafft von Burgund — hatt den eydgenossen gesehen die ere tun — dieselbige bottschafft ist gesetzt an einen ordren tisch für des kungs tisch." Letter of Valentin von Neuenstein, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 99.

⁸⁸ "Anbald der kung den tutsachen belis [geordnet von minem herren von Lothringen] ersehen hatt — hatt er inn tun setzen zu des hertzogen von Burgund bottschafft — inen befohlen sich mit einander zu underreden von disen kriegslauffen über lutt dass der kung zu mög weren." Ibid.

⁸⁹ Schilling's account is that twenty marks were given to each envoy,

and that a hundred marks additional were given to Adrian von Buben-berg in return for a collar of the order of Saint Michael found on the field of Morat. The collar had been sent at the request of Louis, and the money of course went into the treasury at home. But it was not without a design that Buben-berg's name was particularized by Schilling. His account is, however, incorrect. It appears from the copy of an official entry (Legrand MSS. tom. xix.) that the sum of a hundred and twenty marks was given to three of the envoys, Diesbach being one, but not Buben-berg, and that a hundred and sixty were distributed among their suite — by which we are probably to understand the other mem-

sions of gratitude exceeded all his former outpourings. Never to his latest hour would he forget what he owed to the Swiss or fail in a single item of his obligations to them. He should think himself at the summit of happiness, if he lived to see his son bound to them by the same engagements and ties of friendship.⁹⁰ When it came to a settlement of the account presented to him, a slight misunderstanding arose. In regard to the pensions, it appeared that the king and his ministers had reckoned them from the time of the ratification of the treaty, and had consequently considered all the past payments as made in advance; whereas the Swiss, calculating from the date of the instrument and the moment at which their actual service had begun, contended that there were arrears still due. Louis, though puzzled at first — arithmetical problems not being of the kind which he was quick at solving — was made finally to understand his mistake. But pleading the present heavy demands upon his purse, he asked for a delay till Easter: instead of four payments in the coming year, there should be five, of nine thousand

bars of the embassy. Bubenberg is mentioned only as the recipient of a hundred and twenty marks paid for the collar of Saint Michael. Whether Bubenberg was a man to be bribed was a question which Louis had an opportunity of solving on a later occasion.

" "Unvergessen sei das grosse Anerbieten des Königs geblieben, wie er den Bund nach seinem gantsen

Inhalt und alles, was er den Eidgenossen zu thun schuldig sei, bis an sein Lebensende getreulich halten wolle, und dass seine höchste Freude wäre, den Tag zu erleben, wo sein Sohn auch in solche Freundschaft und Einigung mit den Eidgenossen käme." Abschied der Botten so in Frankreich zum König gewesen, Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 624.

and nine francs each; and to insure punctuality, he would appoint a special commissioner at Lyons to honor the drafts.⁹¹ The remaining matter—that of the eighty thousand francs—was less easily arranged. According to the contract the Swiss were to be paid at this additional rate per annum, so long as they should be carrying on active hostilities without aid from the king. In their own opinion such had been the state of things all along. From the moment when they had made the first attack to the moment when they had repelled the last attack, they had sent repeated summonses without the least effect. Louis, on the other hand, knowing how much of the time they had been scarcely more active than himself, insisted on a heavy deduction. He would be liberal, however. He would estimate the whole time from the beginning of the Morat to the end of the Grandson campaign, a trifle over four months, and pay a round sum of thirty-two thousand francs. It so happened that the council of Berne, with a prescience of some such proposal, had instructed their own delegates to accede to it if they could do no better.⁹² After consultation, the envoys accepted the sum offered, while reserving to their government the right to insist on the full amount.⁹³

⁹¹ Ibid. n. 623.—On their way home, the envoys made inquiries at Lyons, but were unable to hear of any such commissioner.

⁹² "Und ob Ir nit witer mögen komen, so sol das geldt gerechnet werden nach zit und zit der usgan-

gen manungen." Deutsch Missiven-Buch D, 8. *MS.*

⁹³ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 623.—It is amusing to compare the official report made at the time with the account given out afterwards, through Schilling, by the

This having been settled, Louis inquired whether, in case the duke of Burgundy should undertake to recover Lorraine, the Confederates would send twenty thousand, or say thirty thousand men, to assist in driving him out and running him down. In the latter operation the troops might serve under the royal standard, receiving their regular pay per man. The envoys replied that they were not empowered to give an answer on this point; but they could assure him that the Confederates, mindful of their obligations, would faithfully execute every part of the engagement; he might, if he pleased, send an ambassador to negotiate on the subject.* Lucerne, which was secretly aspiring to that place in the alliance from which Berne appeared to have been deposed, had sent him word that the best way to attain his object would be to take the field first with his own forces.† But this, as we have seen, would have been, in his view, to interfere with the plans of Providence, whereas his ambition was limited to gently aiding in their accomplishment. Instruments, he might hope, would not be wanting. Without openly violating the truce, he thought he might venture to supply René with a few lances, as well as with money for hiring the sort of people who were good and useful in such wars, allow his agent to open recruiting offices in France, and even let it be known that any of his

council of Berne. According to this, Louis merely made the Swiss a present, out of his spontaneous generosity, to help in defraying the costs of a war in which they and he were allies.

* Ibid. ubi supra.

† Ibid. s. 606.

own subjects that enlisted would be paid out of the royal treasury."⁸⁶

Before the departure of the Swiss envoys another visitor arrived — no less a person than Yolande of Savoy. With singular decision Louis had cut the knot which his sister's busy fingers had been making inextricable. Charles d'Amboise, Sire de Chaumont, now governor of Champagne, had made a dash across the border, at the head of a body of horse, to set free the imprisoned princess.⁸⁷ It was a mere spell of enchantment which had held her. No warders, no soldiers, obstructed the rescuers. The only weapon on the premises was an old cross-bow, which the French carried off, though Yolande, disdaining the theft, left the full equivalent in money.⁸⁸ She reached her brother's residence about the 14th of October. "Welcome, fair Burgundian!" (*Madame la Bourguignonne*), was her greeting from the smiling Louis. "A good Frenchwoman, sire," was the ready reply, "willing to do whatever your majesty commands."⁸⁹ — O, without doubt! Otherwise the gates of Plessis will be found guarded by something stronger than enchantment!

One task imposed upon her — a good test of her sincerity — was to make herself agreeable to the king's friends, the representatives of those by whom she had been harassed and crushed. With her adroit and versatile mind, this was no very hard task. She

⁸⁶ Letter of Valentin von Neuenstein, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 89.

⁸⁷ Commines. — Haynin.

⁸⁸ Menebrés, append.

⁸⁹ Commines, tom. ii. p. 38.

solicited a renewal of the alliance, assuring them of her desire to live hereafter on the best terms with the Confederacy, and begged them on their way home to visit her son. The king, besides bucking these requests, wished his allies to ratify, by their consent, her restoration to the regency.¹⁰⁰ He was not anxious to prolong the period of her probation. In fact, he found her so clever, and they understood each other so perfectly, that he was growing impatient for her departure.¹⁰¹ A slight ceremony was all that remained to be transacted — an engagement on her part, confirmed by an oath on the Evangelists and the mass, to have no friends and no enemies but the king's, to enter into no contracts without his knowledge, and to hold no communication by writing or message with the duke of Burgundy; ¹⁰² on his part, a promise of protection, not requiring any solemn adjuration.¹⁰³ Brother and sister were now on the most affectionate terms, and both very glad to separate.¹⁰⁴

Yolande returned home early in November. Before bidding her a final adieu, let us glance at the short remainder of her career. She was not one of those rulers who forget nothing and learn nothing. On the contrary, she had her brother's aptitude for

¹⁰⁰ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. n. 624.

¹⁰¹ "Elle estoit tres saige, et s'entresongnoisacioient bien tous deux, et desiroit encores plus son parlement." Commynes, ubi supra.

¹⁰² Legrand MSS. tom. xix.

¹⁰³ Hist. de Bourgogne, tom. iv. preuves.

¹⁰⁴ "Furent bien joyeux de despartir l'un de l'autre, et sont demoures depuis comme bon frere et bonne seur." Commynes, tom. ii. p. 39.

profiting by adversity. By confining herself to the duty of repairing the disasters of the country, by conforming generally to the regulations of Louis while quietly evading such of them as interfered too nearly with her domestic authority and rights, by treating the Swiss with implicit deference and filling the pockets of their leading statesmen,¹⁰⁶ she was enabled at her death, in August, 1478, at the age of forty-five,¹⁰⁷ to leave the dominions which had been girt with so many perils, scorched by so fierce a flame, tranquil and nearly intact. One critical season had followed immediately on her restoration. It was not without a struggle that she wrested Piedmont from Philip of Bresse,¹⁰⁸ and then only to see it grasped by a far stronger and more treacherous hand. When Sforza perceived that all his scheming had only contributed to put an end to those disturbances through which he had looked to aggrandize himself, he was naturally very indignant. Having let slip the opportunity when Yolande's absence would have given him a pretext for occupying Piedmont, he now resolved to seize it before she could have time to re-establish her power. He had the winter before him, during which no soldiers, scarcely a messenger, from France, could cross the Alps to interrupt him. Venice he would venture to defy. He had informed the Senate, when questioned about his motives for abandoning the duke of Burgundy and renewing his alliance with the king, that Louis had advised him to

¹⁰⁶ Menetrea, *append.*

¹⁰⁷ Guichenon. — *Chronica Latina*

¹⁰⁸ She was born in the same Sabaudie, year as Charles of Burgundy.

make war upon them, and had pointed out the mode in which it could be easily and advantageously done.¹⁰⁸ Knowing the little confidence that would be placed in his own word, he had even shown their envoy the despatch from Petrasanta containing these suggestions.¹⁰⁹ Unless it wished to expose itself to the fate of the duke of Burgundy, the republic would understand the necessity for remaining quiet, and lowering its insolent tone towards princes.

In the conduct of his enterprise Sforza displayed his characteristic qualities. Every resisting garrison was put to the sword; every town entered was given up to the brutality of the troops. Yet he proclaimed all the while that his only purpose was to protect the province against foreign usurpation and to establish the rights of the young duke, his nephew.¹¹⁰ The municipalities were required to swear allegiance, not to the conqueror, but to the prince whom he was ousting. By the early part of December the whole country, except the inaccessible mountain region, had been overrun, and Sforza, after disposing his army in winter quarters, returned to his palace at Milan.¹¹¹

But again he had outwitted himself. The army which he had left in Piedmont was the instrument by which he had reigned and lived, grinding to the dust a

¹⁰⁸ "Monstrando etiam el partito et la via; che epia Maesta la confortava per piu facile modo ad cio conseguire." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii p. 385.

¹⁰⁹ "Gli monstro anco le medesime lettere, che intorno ad cio la naves havuta per la via del suo oratore." *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Sforza's wife was a sister-in-law of Yolande, that Princess Bona of Savoy, whom Louis XI. and Warwick are supposed to have chosen as a wife for Edward IV of England.

¹¹¹ Corio, *Storia di Milano*, tom. iii p. 390.

people among whom there still lingered recollections of freedom. On Saint Stephen's Day, the 26th of December, Sforza went with his suite to celebrate the festival in the church dedicated to the martyr. He was waited for. Scarcely had he entered the aisle when a knot of conspirators threw themselves upon him. A husband whom he had dishonored was among the first to strike. Every gash was in a mortal part. Pierced and mangled by fourteen daggers, the body of the tyrant was laid on the steps of the altar. He was in his thirty-fourth year — "the most elegant, accomplished, and sweet-spoken," the cruellest, most licentious, most perfidious person of his time; a born tyrant — or demagogue; for it is the circumstances only that differ; the characters are identical¹¹²

No revolution followed. The populace, unprepared, looked on in a state of stupor; the assassins, who had planned only the deed, talking of Roman examples and dreaming of eternal fame, were themselves bewildered and paralyzed. They were seized and put to death with excruciating tortures. The family of Sforza re-established its sway. A revolt in Genoa was put down. But it was necessary to recall the army, to evacuate Piedmont, to cultivate the most friendly relations with surrounding states, above all, to make an absolute submission to France.

¹¹² Ibid. p. 303-315. — Molinet, found in several other chronicles, tum. i. pp. 221-226. — The former and seems to have been a kind of account is that of an eye-witness, and includes the official investigations; that of Molinet is to be newsletter sent from Milan to different courts.

CHAPTER V.

OPERATIONS IN LOIRRAINE.—HENRI AMONG THE SWISS.—CHARLES
RECOVERS NANCY.

1476.

By his enemies, and by the world in general, the duke of Burgundy, during his stay at La Rivière, was regarded not merely as doomed, but as already entrapped and powerless to move.¹ At Basel and Strasburg, where the execrations poured upon his name would have shocked the ears of Louis of France, men were wild with exultation. "He is caught at last," they exclaimed. "On the north and on the south, on the east and on the west, he is environed by foes. He would fain get back to his Netherlands; but he is penned in between four walls, and hell is gaping beneath him."²

All at once this frantic joy was changed into a feeling of alarm, of dismay, almost of despair. On the 25th of September Charles had broken up his camp and begun his march across Franche-Comté into Lor-

¹ Basin, tom. ii. p. 401.

² Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 102.

raine. He had mustered about eleven thousand men³ — an insufficient force to cope with that of René; but another of from six to nine thousand, under the count of Chimay and other commanders, was waiting, on the borders of Luxembourg, to join him when he had opened a passage. Messengers sent to announce his approach to Bièvre, who was defending Nancy, would seem to have reached their destination. But the march was somewhat protracted by the scarcity of supplies, and after the frontier had been crossed, by the necessity of avoiding an encounter before the reënforcements had joined. Taking his course through Besançon, Vesoul, and Neufchâteau, the duke reached the neighborhood of Toul, twelve miles west of Nancy, on the 11th of October. Having penetrated so far to the north, with the Moselle between himself and the enemy, he had secured his communications with Luxembourg, from which he began at once to draw supplies and the expected succors. But he was also met by the intelligence that Nancy had surrendered three days before.⁴

The garrison had consisted of over a thousand men — chiefly pikemen and English archers. There had been no assaults to repel, no hunger to endure, no revolts to suppress. But from the first the soldiers, persuaded that no relief would be brought, that the cause which they were supporting was already lost, had shown an unruly and mutinous spirit. Several

³ Ibid. a 104.

tom II. p. 220. — Chrétien, p. 29. —

⁴ Ancienne Chronique, Lenglet, Huguenin jeune, p. 177.

of the officers were sick. One, an Englishman — Collepin, or more probably Colburne, by name — highly reputed for his valor, sagacity, and authority over the men, had been killed by a cannon-shot. Bièvre, a member of the house of Rubempré, connected by marriage with the Croys and through them with René himself, had owed his appointment partly to this fact, still more to his extreme humanity and gentleness of disposition. Charles had perhaps been guided in the selection by a remembrance of the obloquy he had incurred through the opposite temper of Peter von Hagenbach. If so, he had made a mistake. Hagenbach, in a case like the present, would have crushed the mutineers with an iron hand. Bièvre condescended to plead with them. All he could extort by his entreaties and appeals was permission to hold out for eight days longer. When the time had expired, although the relieving army was known to be at hand, he was forced to ask for a capitulation.^a

The fairest terms were readily accorded. Subjects of Lorraine who had taken the side of Burgundy were to suffer no molestation on that account, and the garrison was to march out with arms and banners, "John Milton" being paid the ransom of a prisoner whom he had taken.^b But no sooner had

^a Remy. — Calmet. — Commines. — Chrétien.

^b Legrand MSS. — Remy. — "Messeur Jean Milton" — more properly, we suppose, Sir John Middleton — had served for several years

under Charles, after whose death he returned to England, but subsequently took service, with others of his countrymen, under Maximilian. See Lenglet, tom. iv.

the procession cleared the gate than the Germans, of whom René's army was mainly composed, rushed upon it, and his personal intervention and exertions barely enabled him to quell the tumult and save his own honor. Embracing Bièvre without permitting him to dismount, he saluted him as a kinsman, and thanked him warmly for the good care he had taken of the province and for his mild treatment of the people. "Remain with us, fair uncle," he concluded; "you shall share our fortunes and our honors, such as they may be." The offer was of course declined. Bièvre lacked the energy to uphold a sinking cause, but not the courage and the loyalty to die for it.*

René had now recovered his capital. Yet he could not venture to enter it at the risk of being shut up and losing his communications with Alsace. At first he marched southward, in the direction of Neufchâteau, hoping to fall upon the duke of Burgundy before he should have been reënforced. Learning that he was too late for this, and that Charles, now his equal in strength, was already approaching the Moselle below its junction with the Meurthe, he hastened back to defend the passage. A series of manoeuvres ensued, Charles's object being to bring the enemy to battle or cut him off from his proper base, that of René to protect the capital without incurring the risk of a defeat beneath its walls. During the night of the 14th, the two armies were divided by the river, Charles holding the castle and village of Dieulewarde,

* Remy. — Huguenin Jeanne.

while René occupied the heights commanding the opposite bank. Some skirmishing took place; but the Burgundians showing an intention to cross at another point, René, afraid of being turned and thrown back upon Nancy, retreated down the right bank towards Pont-à-Mousson. Charles immediately crossed by a bridge of boats, and turning up the river, took a position at Condé,—now Custine,—his advance being pushed out on the roads leading to Alsace. On the same day a convoy from Strashurg was intercepted, and the escort of five hundred soldiers cut to pieces. Other parties which were following in the rear took the alarm, and, leaving their wagons, fled back across the Vosges. Charles, on the other hand, had secured a new base, in the bishoprick of Metz, which, friendly to him because of its old hostility to the dukes of Lorraine, supplied him abundantly with provisions.

He now marched in pursuit of René, encamping on the night of the 16th on the edge of a wood, through which the bustle and trumpet signals of the enemy were plainly audible. But in the morning René again retreated, falling back to Pont-à-Mousson, to secure the bridge and his communications with Nancy by the left bank. He saw, however, that he was outmanœuvred, having only the choice left of receiving battle at a disadvantage, retreating into Nancy, or evacuating the province. He decided on the bolder course. But the Alsatians, who had never been willing to encounter the Burgundians in the open field unless under the protection of the

Swiss, refused to fight, demanded their arrears of pay with threats of personal violence, and in the night of the 17th, catching sight of the enemy's camp-fires on the hills overlooking the town, crossed the bridge in disorderly flight, leaving behind all their cannon and baggage. René, compelled to follow, formed a rearguard with his French lances and such of his own vassals as had joined his standard. A thick fog, the next morning, favored the escape. At Liverdun it was necessary to recross the Moselle, and there being neither bridge nor ford, the foot-soldiers were carried over by the horse, — René himself sharing in the labor, and going and returning more than thirty times. Arrived in the environs of Nancy, he stopped only to send in his best troops and officers, and continued his flight to Saint-Nicolas, eight miles farther south. Hither he was followed by a deputation from the capital, to inquire what course was to be pursued, if the place were again besieged. For how long, he asked, was it provisioned? And being answered for two months, "Hold out so long," he replied, "and I will bring fresh succors or give up the contest."

Meanwhile Charles, after entering Pont-à-Mousson, had sent across the lances of his guard, under Larmache, in pursuit, returning with the rest of the army up the right bank. Crossing the Meurthe, he marched upon Saint-Nicolas, whereupon the fugitives resumed their flight, making no further halt till they had crossed the Vosges. Nancy was invested on the 22d. Thus in a few weeks the posi-

tion of affairs had been completely reversed. René was again an exile, his capital again besieged, the rest of the province, except the places along the Vosges, cleared of his armed adherents. The star of Burgundy had shone forth once more—a momentary gleam before its final extinction.⁸

Where René was to look for succors was a question admitting of but one answer. On his arrival at Basel he was told that the Alsatian towns would make fresh exertions on his behalf, provided he could obtain the aid of those without whom it would be vain to hope for success.⁹ The moment seemed propitious for another application to the Swiss. They had just had occasion to make a public announcement of their favorable sentiments towards the duke of Lorraine. For several months past three powers not often united, the pope, the emperor, and the king of Hungary, had been making a joint effort for the restoration of peace between the Confederates and the duke of Burgundy. The common object with all of them was the preservation of Charles, whose fall, as events had begun to indicate, would be likely

⁸ *Ancienne Chronique.* — Chrétien. — Remy. — Knebel. — Calmet. — *Strasburg Chroniques.* — Haguenin jeune. — Rodt.

Chrétien generally speaks of René's forces in this campaign as "Swiss," though it was more usual to speak of the Swiss simply as "Germana." The statement of Rodt and others that René had already enlisted a band of 1500 Swiss seems to us unfounded, and to have grown

out of this confused mode of designation.

⁹ "Lesquels après beaucoup de remontrances, respondirent finalement qu'ils estoient deliberez luy faire tout ce que par vertu de leur alliance ils pouvoient estre tenus, mais de tout le vouloient bien aduertir que sans les Suysas ils doubtoient que cela leur profitast de guerres." Chrétien, p. 83.

to damage the interests of each. Hungary would lose a powerful and faithful ally, the Empire a bar against the encroachments of France, the church a supporter on whom it could more safely rely than on its eldest son, the Most Christian king. For there had been of late an extraordinary change in the demeanor of Louis towards his spiritual head. Child-like submissiveness had been suddenly succeeded by an attitude approaching that of rebellion. Decrees had been issued forbidding the subjects of the king to send applications or appeals respecting benefices to Rome, or to address themselves to any one in France except the cardinal residing at the court.¹⁰ All members of the religious orders were prohibited from quitting the kingdom, even on the business of their establishments.¹¹ Under pretext of settling a dispute between the legate and the commander of the papal troops at Avignon, a French force had been sent to occupy the town and castle.¹² It was evident that, if his prosperity went on increasing at its present ratio, the new Charlemagne would soon display an arrogance of which he had not hitherto been suspected. To uphold the power that had so long and alone restrained him was, therefore, an object of general importance. A portion of the German nobility stood ready, with proper encouragement, to raise an army of auxiliaries for the purpose.¹³ But the lead-

¹⁰ Proclamation, June 16, 1476. Legrand *MSS.* tom. xix.

¹¹ *Defences a tous Religieux de sortir hors le Royaume même pour les chapitres de leurs ordres*, Sept., 1476. *Ibid.*

¹² *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. pp. 35, 36, 97.

¹³ Letter (probably intercepted) from Lieuhert Remmatt to the duke of Burgundy, Oct. 26, 1476. *MS.* (Archives of Lucerne.)

ers of the movement rightly discerned that Charles would need no such assistance, if his adversary could only be deprived of the band of myrmidons who were executing his work, while he himself looked on from behind with encouraging smiles.

Hässler, the imperial minister, the bishop of Forlì with his legatine commission, and the Hungarian envoy, George von Stein, made their head-quarters at Basel, going backward and forward, discussing, protocoling, recording each step in a progress which was essentially of the treadmill description.¹⁴ For the old difficulty recurred — how to reconcile parties who had never disputed, how to frame concessions where there had been no demands. The affair of Alsace seems not to have been touched upon, the emperor, who was in fact the proper arbiter of the case, having taken it into his own hands. Savoy, too, had dropped out of the category. The only tangible point on which to raise an issue for the sake of having something to decide, was that of Lorraine. The legate, with a sanguine spirit proceeding from his success in a former mediation, took upon himself the task of softening the Swiss, who would naturally listen with more deference to the voice of the supreme pontiff than to that of the Austrian emperor. When asked for his credentials from the opposite party, he was obliged to confess that for some time past he had held no direct communication with the duke of Burgundy,

¹⁴ Numerous documents in the von-Bücher, and the Archives of Eidgenössische Abchiede, Knebel, Lucerne.
the Lateinisch and Deutsch Missi-

with whose sentiments, nevertheless, he professed to be acquainted. Charles, he asserted, wished for peace, and was willing to give up Lorraine, provided René would "confess his fault" — in other words, would renew the engagements he had broken and again accept the Burgundian protectorate. Hereupon the Swiss replied that the evacuation of Lorraine must precede any negotiations for peace. Undaunted by this answer, the legate pressed for further conferences. He would not insist upon a formal truce, though he would use his best exertions to induce the other party to suspend hostilities. All he asked of the Confederates, as a preliminary step, was to manifest their willingness for peace. Having received some general assurances on this head, he professed his satisfaction, gave his blessing to the deputies, promised to report their good disposition to the pope and the emperor, and offered to distribute indulgences and other spiritual graces with which he had come provided.¹⁵ With mutual courtesies, offers of service, bows and smiles, the conference broke up.¹⁶ Meanwhile the diet had sent a communication to the king, informing him that the enemy was making new attempts to separate them from his majesty, but that he might rely on their unswerving fidelity.¹⁷

¹⁵ "Darauf hat er den Râthen und Rathsfreunden gemeiner Vereinigung den Segen ertheilt und sich erboten, da er mit vielen geistlichen Vollmachten ausgerüstet sei, ihnen auch Ablass und andere Gnaden zu thun."

¹⁶ "Sunt haben sich manigerley

wort, erbietung, dancksaugungen, behaltungen, beglumpungen und aust allerley verlaufen von beeden theilen, so hie zu melden verflüssig." *Edgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. s. 625-628.

¹⁷ "Wir haben ein louffer in unser aller kosten gan Frankenrich zu

Scarcely had the Swiss made known their intention not to abandon the duke of Lorraine, when he appeared in person before the council of Berne, and with streaming eyes related the events which had again reduced him to the condition of a suppliant, conjuring his allies to give him that effective assistance without which all their declarations in his favor would be empty words. His auditors, greatly affected, had fresh reason to lament that change of position which had deprived Berne of the power to initiate warlike enterprises. They were obliged to tell him that they could do nothing without the consent and participation of their Confederates, and to refer him to a diet about to assemble at Lucerne.¹⁸ The latter state was itself well disposed to his cause. At Zurich, whither he next proceeded, he met at first with a chilling reception; but having found an advocate in the warm-hearted Waldmann, he obtained at last a favorable answer.¹⁹ The decision, however, would rest with those whom the world was accustomed to consider as less important members of the Confederacy. An internal struggle, destined a little later to produce a violent wrench, was already

der eidgenossen boten vnd Inen zu erkennen geben die werbung des friden halb wie obstad, vnd ob der Herzog von Burgund vns gegen dem kung vervntriwen vnd fugeben wurd, dz wir der richtung an In begeren, vnd den kung vsetzen, als er vor getan, vns darin zu dem besten verantwarten. Das ist den von Bern empfolhen ze schriben vnd ze vertigen in vnser aller namen."

Edgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 616.—The letter written by Berne, enclosing documents connected with the negotiation, and giving assurances that no peace would be made, is in the Deutsch Missiven-Buch D, 7 a. *MS.*

¹⁸ Schilling, s. 366.—Berne to René, Deutsch Missiven-Buch D, 24 b. *MS.*

¹⁹ Remy.—Rodt.

disturbing the balance of power, arraying on opposite sides the larger cantons, with their town populations, aristocratic governments, and foreign connections, and the smaller, obscurer, but more numerous democracies. The original source of disunion lay, of course, in these differences of organization. But it was the French alliance and the Burgundian war which, by revealing dissimilar tendencies and conflicting interests, were creating a division where before there had been merely a distinction.²⁰ The feeling against Berne, in particular, was already so openly expressed, both in words and acts, that the council were making it a subject of formal complaint to the diet.²¹

At a session of the latter body, on the 23d of November, René brought forward a skilfully prepared memorial. He represented the hardship of his being the sole victim of a war into which he had entered, not from personal motives, but simply at the demand and on the guaranty of a league, of which the chief members had since retired from the contest. Even now he could make a separate peace and be restored to his dominion, if he would consent to abandon the Swiss.²² But having personally shared their peril

²⁰ See Herr Segesser's learned and engaging disquisition in the *Geschichtsblätter aus der Schweiz*, B. I.

²¹ "Auch soll Jedermann mit den Seinen verschaffen, dass sie aufhören, denen von Bern schimpflich zuzureden, wie das, nach klage der letztern, bisher geschehen ist. Bern soll die Namen solcher, welche dieses Gebot fortan übertreten, in Schrift nehmen und den betreffen-

den Orten zusenden." *Eidgenössische Abschiede*, B. II. s. 632.

²² "Wo er von eidgenossen vnd den loblichen bund verschetzt vnd sich zu dem Hertzogen von Burgund verpflichtet, so wer er dieser kriegem entladen, vnd wo er sich noch hubtag von vns zichen vnd dem Hertzogen von Burgun zustan, ds er da mit wol zu dem sinen komen."

and their triumph, he desired to preserve the alliance, counting on a like fidelity on their part. His last hopes were centred in them. If they would send out an expedition on a befitting scale, he would contribute forty thousand florins towards the expense.²³

Such a statement could not be heard with indifference. But the deputies, not having been empowered to act in the matter, were obliged to defer the answer to a subsequent meeting, specially called for the purpose. It was held on the 4th of December René, meanwhile, had returned to Basel to carry on his own preparations, leaving Herter to represent him at the diet. Receiving some sagacious hints²⁴ from a quarter where the Swiss character and views were better understood than by himself, he instructed his envoy to insist upon the greatness and urgency of the need, and the large—in fact imaginary—number of his own vassals who had already assembled in full reliance on Swiss help. But if, in spite of all this, a negative answer were returned, Herter was then to ask for simple permission to enlist five or six thousand men at the monthly pay of four florins a man.²⁵ Six thousand was the number of troops which the Swiss were bound, when called upon, to

²³ Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 630.

²⁴ Chrétien, p. 54.

²⁵ Letter to Herter, dated "Basle le vendredi devant le Saint Andreu" — Nov. 29 — and signed "Lud." Legrand MSS. tom. xix. — Lud

and Chrétien, René's secretaries, are taken by some writers for the same person. Chrétien, apparently, was the author of the "Dialogue" between the two, which is one of the most authentic chronicles of the epoch.

furnish to the king, whose rate of pay was four florins and a half. Louis, we perceive, thought his poor dependant might make more economical terms than himself.²⁶

The question of a general levy having been put, Lucerne, Zurich, and Solothurn signified their willingness to take part, if all the others should assent. Berne and Freyburg, having to protect their own territory against marauding bands, could send only a thousand men jointly. Uri wished for more information. Schwytz, Glarus, and Unterwalden declined, pleading the unsuitable time of year. It was thereupon voted to make the refusal unanimous. Herter then brought forward the alternative proposition — suggested, doubtless, by Berne, as the most convenient to itself, and the most likely to be favorably entertained.²⁷ It was voted to recommend its acceptance, on the ground that, if René were entirely forsaken, he would probably make terms with the duke of Burgundy, become the enemy of the Swiss, and be able, by his position on the borders of Alsace, to damage that country, and thereby raise the price of corn and other necessaries; so that the Confederates

²⁶ That the money was supplied by Louis (who else, indeed, would or could have supplied it?) was a matter of notoriety, and is stated by all the writers of the time. Chretien, it is true, mentions it as a happy accident that a messenger from France arrived just at this time with the pension of René; but Commines, good authority on this point, states that not only was the

money sent expressly for the purpose, but that royal envoys assisted in the negotiation.

²⁷ As Berne had been strenuously exhorting its Confederates to give the assistance required, and had assured René that it would be given (*Deutsch Missiven-Buch* D. 19-24), it is clear that in opposing the first proposition, it was merely clearing the way for that which was to follow.

would be ultimately obliged to send out forces at their own cost, not to restore, but to overturn him.²⁹

Reasoning so logical and leading to such a conclusion had an instantaneous effect. The truth is, that the populations of the smaller cantons, precisely on account of the unsuitable time of year, were greatly in need of employment, and had become possessed with a spirit of brigandage which was making them dangerous at home. When it had been stipulated that the wages should be raised to four and a half florins, that the first month's service should be paid in advance, and that René should pledge the dominion he was about to reconquer for the full amount,³⁰ recruiting went rapidly on. Berne furnished but a small contingent in proportion to its population,³¹ Lucerne and Zurich a somewhat larger number each, while the smaller cantons rolled up the total to eight thousand four hundred.³¹ It was the first instance of the Confederacy sending out troops in a body as avowed mercenaries in a foreign army. They carried with them no banners, had no regular

²⁹ "In Betrachtung, dass, wenn der Fürst ganz verlassen würde, er leicht aus Verdruss von uns und der Vereinigung abfallen und sich mit dem Herzog von Burgund richten und einigen möchte, und sofern dieses geschähe, so möchte dann der Hertzog von Lothringen täglich und stündlich im Elsass und Sundgau sein, die Lands verwüsten, uns Korn und Wein vertheuern und verursachen, das wir unsern Bundesgenossen in unsern Kosten zu Hülfe kommen

müsten." Eidgenössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 632.

³⁰ Rodt, B. II. s. 361

³¹ Rodt expresses his surprise at this, and, not understanding the motive, wrongly infers that the expedition was unpopular in that canton.

³¹ Chrétien, p. 35. — Edlibach (s. 163) adds that mere boys, to the number of a thousand, wished to enlist, but were turned back.

officers, and were accompanied by none of the recognized chiefs except Waldmann and Kätzy, who went as volunteers. Most of the men belonged, unfortunately, to the worst class—brave, like all of their nation, but young, averse to discipline, and ravenous for spoil. In Alsace they spread themselves through the towns and made a general pillage among the Jews, then, as now, exceedingly numerous and wealthy in that region. Money, jewels, wagon-loads of costly articles, were collected; books and writings in Hebrew, wherever found, were torn up or burned. A vessel loaded with two or three hundred of the rioters capsized on the Rhine, and a large number—a hundred and fifty according to some accounts—were drowned. René, who chanced to witness the mishap, while displaying his sympathy and aiding in the rescue, was insulted and denounced as the cause.³² In a state of despair, he wrote to the authorities at home, asking that no more of the same kind should be allowed to come, and begging for two thousand of the veterans with their banners and officers.³³

Before the march from Basel should begin, a second half-month's pay was to be disbursed. When René had emptied his purse, there was a deficit of twelve hundred florins. Louis had counted too confidently on saving the half florin, or some still smaller

³² Ibid. — Schilling. — Kuebel.

³³ "Begehrt, man möchte ihm noch 2000 der Alten zuschicken und etliche mit ihren Pannern, und das man ihm der Andern diessmal nicht mehr zulassen lassen." Eid-

genössische Abschiede, B. II. s. 639.

— Lucerne alone so far complied as to send Hassfurter with the standard of the canton. The others sent pious exhortations.

fraction.²⁴ The Swiss took what was given them, but refused to stir till the remainder was forthcoming. René, whose want of knowledge of their language made him unable to try persuasion, was advised to keep out of sight and leave them to come round of their own accord. After waiting a day or two they began to start for home with the plunder they had amassed. In this emergency the money was borrowed at Basel on the security of Oswald von Thierstein, who had been ousted from his government in Alsace and was to hold a command under René.²⁵

Their claims having been satisfied, the Swiss were now in an excellent humor, ready to render the full equivalent, to lose every limb, every life, in the service for which they had contracted. When René made his appearance with a halberd on his shoulder, and distributed drink-money to each company, he was greeted with hearty cheers.²⁶ The march began on the 26th of December, the weather being bitterly cold, — as was also the case at Milan,²⁷ where, at the same hour, Sforza was on his way to be murdered.

²⁴ Chrétien states that the sum sent at this time by Louis was only about 15,000 francs, being a part of the pension granted to René, who eked it out by the sale of his plate. Commynes says, 40,000, and is nearer the truth. In a list of pensions and gifts for the year beginning with September, 1476, — during which there was certainly no payment to René of a later date than December, — he is mentioned as having received 30,040 francs in addi-

tion to his pension. (*Legrand MSS.* tom. xix.) This was, therefore, the sum allowed by Louis for the hire of "five or six thousand" Swiss, for whom René had been instructed to apply. It was equivalent to about 22,000 florins — a month's pay for 5600 men, at four florins.

²⁵ Chrétien, p. 36. — Calmet, tom. v. p. 361.

²⁶ Chrétien, *ubi supra*.

²⁷ Corio, *Storia di Milano*.

The Alsatian troops had set out previously, and were waiting at Saint-Diey and other places in the Vosges. In all, the army numbered between nineteen and twenty thousand men, two thirds of them hired auxiliaries.³⁸ From three to four thousand were cavalry, partly nobles of Lorraine, partly French discharged for this purpose from the royal service. Strasburg had also furnished a troop of horse, but no infantry, the Swiss having refused to march or fight in company with such cowards.³⁹

The period for which Nancy had promised to hold out had already expired. To both the besieged and the besiegers it had been one of extreme hardship and obstinate endurance. Charles's army, originally twenty thousand strong, had dwindled down to less than half that number.⁴⁰ Food had continued tolerably abundant, notwithstanding the arrival in the territory of Metz of a body of French lances, sent partly for the purpose of preventing supplies, as far as it could be done without a direct infringement of the truce. But the weather had inflicted more serious injury. Alternate frosts and thaws had bound the camp in ice or deluged it with water, causing hun-

³⁸ "Toute mon armée estoit de dix-neuf à vingt mille hommes, dont les douze mille et plus estoient des mes soldes Alliez." *La vraie declaration du fait et conduite de la Bataille de Nancy.* — This account, purporting to be written by René, is printed, with some variations, in Calmet, in Lenglet, and at the end of Chrétien's chronicle.

³⁹ Knebel, 2^{te} Abth. s. 111, 113, 116.

⁴⁰ According to Commines, La-marche, and Molinet, to less than four thousand; nor can we oppose to these statements any resting on as good authority. Yet we are forced to reject them, or else to treat the subsequent events as fable. Basin, who was close to the scene of action, gives eight thousand as the effective force.

dreds to perish of cold, prostrating a larger number with disease, and leading to wholesale desertions. Active operations of any importance were rendered impracticable by the condition alike of the troops and of the ground. The only assault ordered was countermanded. Two batteries played from time to time upon the gates; but virtually the siege had been turned into a blockade. Famine within the walls might be trusted to do its work more rapidly and efficiently than winter without.

Instead of lasting two months, the stock of provisions had run short within one. The few horses in the place made but a meagre addition to the store. Dogs, cats, rats, vermin of all kinds, had become the regular diet. Several sallies were tried, without bringing any relief, except by reducing the number of consumers. It was easy to calculate the limits of this endurance. Charles, who learned from a French deserter the state of affairs, is said to have promised himself an entrance by the "Day of the Kings," — the 6th of January.⁴¹

Without a premature assurance from René of the success of his negotiations with the Swiss, the place would already have surrendered. He had intrusted the message to his *maitre d'hôtel*, Suffren de Baschi, a Provençal by birth, his companion and counsellor throughout his exile. In a dark night Suffren and his escort succeeded in passing through the lines and descending into the ditch. Their cry of "Vive Lor-

⁴¹ Remy. — Chrétien. — Calmet. — Knebel. — Huguenin jeune.

raine!" attracted the attention of the guards on both sides. A few of the party were drawn to the top of the wall; others escaped by flight; one, Suffren himself, was taken. Charles ordered him to be immediately hanged, adducing it as a rule of war that any one endeavoring to penetrate the lines after investment made himself liable to this penalty. That such was the practice cannot be doubted;⁴² and it was founded on reasons of which the validity was shown in the present case, messengers subsequently sent being deterred by what had happened from making the attempt. But unless the principle were admitted by all parties, it could only be enforced under danger of reprisals—the ground on which the execution is said to have been opposed by the Burgundian nobles. Suffren asked for an interview with the duke, promising disclosures that nearly concerned him. The application was frustrated by Campobasso,⁴³ to whom the prisoner was personally known, as well as the fact that he had recently visited the French court. He had it, no doubt, in his power to reveal to Charles that, besides being surrounded by open enemies, there was a traitor at his side, ready, if all other instruments failed, to accomplish the design of Providence and of Louia.

⁴² Commynes says it was the practice in Italy and Spain, but not in France. More probably such cases, in the latter country,—where, as he admits, war was waged in general with greater cruelty than elsewhere,—were determined less by any act-

ed rule than by the temper of the captors.

⁴³ Commynes. — The chronicles of Lorraine give a different account, derived, obviously, from Campobasso's own version.

The execution took place at dawn, in sight of the besieged, at whose request the body was given up for interment, a suspension of arms being granted for the purpose. There was but one prisoner in the town, who was hanged, on the next day, from the highest tower, with a placard in large letters affixed to the black robe put upon his person: "The first to carry to Suffren de Baschi tidings of the vengeance taken for his death." René, who had been strongly attached to his unfortunate servant, sent a circular to the places where he had garrisons, directing that all prisoners should be treated in the same manner. Under this order more than six score are said to have suffered, each labelled with a statement that he owed his death to the inhumanity of a master whom he had too faithfully served.⁴⁴ But the stain of reprisals so unmeasured was not to be thus shifted from its authors. The chroniclers of Lorraine, feeling the necessity for a better apology, assert that this cruelty, inconsistent with the character of René, was instigated by his German allies.⁴⁵

On the morning of the 4th of January the vanguard of the relieving army entered Saint-Nicolas, driving out a Burgundian detachment, of which a hundred and twenty, caught unawares, sought refuge in the houses and church. They were dragged out by the Swiss, who massacred some in the square, and tying the others in couples, hurled them over

⁴⁴ Remy, pp. 96-98. — Chretien, *Swiss*. But the circular is dated, *preuves*, pp. 56-60. *Scolstattadt*, Dec. 1st.

⁴⁵ Remy (*ubi supra*) says by the

the bridge. Signal lights were displayed in the steeple and on the heights, to make known the good news to the inhabitants of Nancy.⁴⁶ Two deserters came in—Swiss brigands, who, banished from their country, had served for years in the Burgundian army. They now gave valuable information as to its position and the roads and paths by which it might be approached. Having proved their familiarity with the ground, they were retained as guides.⁴⁷

This was not the only accession. Campobasso, with his two sons and about two hundred men-at-arms, had quitted the Burgundian camp two or three days before, and gone to join a French force lying near at hand. He was told that the royal orders against any infraction of the truce made it impossible to receive him, but that he would do well to offer his services to René.⁴⁸ Hereditary sympathies might have drawn him to the cause of a descendant of the house of Anjou,⁴⁹ under which his own family had gained and lost both fortune and honors. He had himself fought under successive princes of that line,

⁴⁶ Chrétien. — Remy.

⁴⁷ Tschudi, *Fortsetzung*. — "Hies einer der schindler von art, der ander Jörg schriber von Frowannold." Ertelin, fol. 96. — Before the battle of Morat the spies of Berns had reported that there were some Swiss among Charles's troops. (Deutsch Missiven Buch C. MS.) It would appear that five of these had deserted in October, or earlier, and offered their services as guides to their countrymen. (See the Dé-

pêches Milanaises, tom. ii, p. 379.)

There are many other indications leading to the conclusion that, throughout the war, the Burgundian army, so largely made up of foreign mercenaries from different quarters, had been infested with traitors.

⁴⁸ La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne.

⁴⁹ He is said by the chroniclers of Lorraine to have given this reason, among others, for his desertion.

in Italy, France, and Spain. From boyhood his career had been one of strange adventure, crossed by strange ill luck. His father, a distinguished soldier, had died a leper, after years of sequestration from his family and the world. The castle and town from which he derived his title had been upheaved by an earthquake. His wife had been false to him, and he was reported to have slain her with his own hand. He bore a name and boasted a kindred to which he had no real claim.⁵⁰ In war he had gained distinction by his skill, and a great influence over his fellow *condottieri*, remnants of the Angevine faction, but it had almost always been his fate to espouse a losing cause. His experience, skill, and facilities for recruiting had made him valuable to the duke of Burgundy, and had been liberally recompensed. But he had long had visions of a greater reward, to be obtained by the betrayal of a master whose hazardous enterprises, in the face of a crafty and powerful foe, must expose him to sudden reverses. Little is known with certainty of his secret communications with Louis. He had made overtures, which were at least not rejected;⁵¹ but an offer to take the life of Charles is said, perhaps with truth, to have been

⁵⁰ His real name was Gambatesa, and he had taken that of Montfort with the intention of claiming an estate which another branch of his family, about to become extinct, had obtained by intermarriage with the house of Montfort, counts of Termoli. These and other particulars of the early part of his career are

told, with much minuteness and ample research, in an unfinished work among the posthumous papers of the late M. de Gingins — *Le Comte de Campobasso, Etude historique et biographique. MS.* (Bib. cantonale Vaudoise.)

⁵¹ Letter of Louis, Lyons, June 5 [1476], Lenglet, tom. iii. p. 484.

declined.⁸² During the campaigns against the Swiss he had been absent, chiefly in Brittany, where he is reported to have spread unfavorable accounts, with the object of undermining Charles's credit with an old ally.⁸³ Since the defeat at Morat he had rejoined the duke, but, without betraying himself, had secretly thwarted efforts for increasing the strength of the army. It is evident from his whole course, as far as it can be traced, that he had meditated some deeper infamy than mere desertion, and that this had been adopted as a last and sudden resort.

On arriving at Saint-Nicolas, he offered his services to René, stipulating for the grant of a vacant fief as his reward. But the Swiss, who detested treason, and who wanted no associates in their work, objected strongly to his remaining with the army. He finally arranged with René to go round to the rear of the Burgundian camp, take his station at Condé, below Nancy, and cut off the retreat to Luxembourg by the bridge of Bouxières. The lordship of Commercy—the price he had demanded—was bestowed upon him before his departure.⁸⁴

There had been little need that the snare should

⁸² Commynes (tom. ii. pp. 53, 54) — who also assures us, as a fact within his personal knowledge, that Louis disclosed this offer, through Contay, to Charles, who replied that, if the fact were true, he should have heard nothing of it from the king. Most persons, we suspect, would be of the same opinion. Yet we cannot tell. Conscience has her vagaries, like the fancy and the heart.

⁸³ De Troyes.

⁸⁴ Schilling, s. 372. — *La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne*. — Commynes, tom. ii. p. 62. According to Remy and others, Campobasso offered to return to the camp, and at the height of the battle to fall upon Charles and assassinate him — a proposal rejected by René with horror.

be thus tightened. The prophecies of the world were at last to be fulfilled. Charles would not again clear a way through the toils, or rise after his fall to struggle afresh.

Louis knew that the end was at hand. In him too the world would not again be disappointed. He would even go beyond its expectations. He had troops in the neighborhood of Metz, troops in the neighborhood of Toul, an army on the borders of Burgundy, an army on the borders of the Netherlands. His preparations were complete, and he waited with a breathless yet subdued eagerness.

The burghers of the Rhineland — an excitable people, given to frenzies and agitations, to loud alternate bursts of exultation and despair — were again raising their cries and songs of triumph,⁵⁶ and would, this time, not have to change them into shrieks and wailings, at least until they awoke to a perception of the after results.⁵⁶ The more solid and phlegmatic citizens of Ghent and Bruges were quietly attending to their regular pursuits of business and of pleasure, in which, during his absence, they easily forgot the existence of their fiery and troublesome sovereign.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ "Jetzt ist er in der Unterwelt und wird nicht wiederauferstehen.... Ward zu Basel angeordnet, dass in allen Kirchen und Klöstern feierliche Messen gesungen wurden. Und ich Johannes Knebel habe die Messe gesungen am Hochaltare des Münsters, freudiger denn je." Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 125, 134.

⁵⁷ "In dieser Zeit rustet Herr

Ludwig, König von Frankreich . . . wiederum zum kriege. . . . So ist zu befürchten das eben durch der Berner Geld- und Haugner zuletzt dieses Land untergehen muss." Ibid. s. 100.

⁵⁷ "Quasi ad eam nihil attineret, torpentes et otiosi principis calamitatis spectatores." Basin, tom. ii p. 402.

These were the men who looked towards the future and had imbibed its ideas. In the camp before Nancy was a little band whose feelings and views belonged wholly to the past—or to what would henceforth be the past. Seldom at the height of his greatness had Charles been surrounded by a larger number of his most distinguished vassals. Stern, wilful, doomed, he was still their prince, their master, the last of his line, faulty, in their eyes, only in the excess of his boldness and loftiness of spirit.⁵⁸ Contay, Bièvre, Engelbert of Nassau, the Lalains, the Croys, the Montagus,—all who were not detained by disability or duty,—had clustered around him, to save him or to die with him.

To save him, if possible. A week before they had taken counsel together, and deputed the count of Chimay, the head of the house of Croy, to represent to the duke the inequality of the struggle, the hopelessness of the situation, the necessity of retiring while it was yet in his power. If he withdrew for the present from Lorraine, which it was impossible to hold, he might, by husbanding his resources, hope to raise in the spring a new and stronger army, and again take the field with chances of success.

Withdraw from Lorraine? That would be to give

⁵⁸ Lamarche, who was one of them, expresses what was no doubt the feeling of all. "Et pourra l'on dire cy-apres, que je le loue beaucoup, . . . pource que c'estoit mon maistre: et à ce je respon que je dy vérité, et que tel l'ay congnu: car

vices apparens de luy ne veindrent oncques à ma congnoissance: et si faute y a qu'il faloit que je congnoisse, ce fut de trop valoir, et de trop entreprendre." *Mémoires, Introduction.*

up the Burgundies. Wait till the spring? Would his enemies — his enemy — wait? Shrink from the battle? As well throw himself at the feet of Louis and beg for mercy! There was ruin on both sides; but on one it was ruin and death, on the other ruin and disgrace.

Charles grew excited, taunted his counsellor with a faltering spirit, refused to listen further, shut himself up in his pavilion, ordered that no one should be admitted except on occasions of military duty; he wished to be alone.⁸⁹

He had his wish; he was alone. Who more alone than he, in all the camp, in all the world? O, misery! Abandoned, betrayed, encompassed by foes — severed by a gulf from the faithful few! Within — the swellings of pride, the hissings of defiance, the goadings of fate! The world against him, God not with him — O, misery, O, misery!

— Was it, in truth, too late? Lorraine, the Burgundies, were lost beyond redemption. The aspirations of the past must be buried forever. But might he not, by bending to the storm, still save himself from total shipwreck? Might he not, by protracting the contest, weary down or outlive his antagonist? Might he not — Ah, no! Another might — another who had never soared so high to fall so low; who had never taken between his teeth the bit of destiny and felt its inexorable lash; whose heart, in either fortune, had beat with the steady pulsations of a machine; such a one — not he!

⁸⁹ Molinet. — Commines. — Baan.

Yet all men perhaps, lofty or lowly minded, have some hope, some vision, some scheme of life, which being shattered, they can but cower among the fragments, idly piecing them together, wounding themselves with the sharp edges.

CHAPTER VI.

BATTLE OF NANCY.—DEATH OF CHARLES.

1477.

THE "Vigil of the Kings"—Sunday, the 5th of January, 1477—had come, and the reveille sounded, calling men to wake and die.

Heavy rains, the day before, had washed the earth, the flooded rivers rushing over a frozen current beneath,¹—impetuous, noisy, full, like the tides of life rolling above the frozen sea of death. But the night had been calm and cold; at dawn the shrunken waters gurgled faintly under a new surface of ice, and the gathering clouds were charged afresh with snow.

Charles had been busy throughout the night. He had resolved neither to abandon the siege nor to await the attack in his camp, but to meet and repel the enemy's advance. His force being too small for him to leave a sufficient guard against sallies from the

¹ Remy, p. 123.

town, he had drawn off his troops as noiselessly as possible under cover of the darkness.¹

"A short half league" south-east of Nancy the road through Jarville and Laneuville to Saint-Nicolas entered a forest extending from the Meurthe on the east across the range of highlands bounding the horizon on the south and west. Near the verge of the wood, the road was intersected by a rivulet, called now, in commemoration of the events of the day, *Le Ruisseau de Bonsecours*. On both banks, to its junction with the Meurthe, it was thickly planted with hedges of thorn.²

Behind this stream the duke posted his troops—the artillery in front, on a mound commanding the road; behind it the infantry, — archers and pikemen, — drawn up in a single oblong square, in imitation of the Swiss. Here he took his own station, surrounded by his nobles and personal attendants, and mounted on a powerful black horse, called from its race and color *Il Moro*. Two slender bodies of cavalry composed the wings. The right, under Josse de Lalain, was placed on the high ground towards the source of the brook, but somewhat in the rear of the line; the left, under Galeotto, occupied a meadow, covered partially on the front as well as flank by the Meurthe, which here makes a double bend to the east and north, and is fordable in the angle. The evident object was to arrest and crush the enemy's columns

¹ "Le plus secrettement qu'il peut, et sans faire grand bruit." Duc de Bourgogne. La vraie Declaration.
² Eitterlin. — La Desconfiture du

while debouching from the forest. It was the sole chance of coping with a force so superior.¹

At Saint-Nicolas, after mass had been celebrated in the church, food and wine were served out in abundance, and consumed with gayety and relish by men familiar with dangers and now confident of an easy victory. At eight o'clock they began their march. The troops were about equally divided between the vanguard and the "battle," — the former comprising seven thousand spears and halberds and two thousand cavalry, the latter a thousand more foot and somewhat fewer horse. Eight hundred arquebusiers followed as a reserve. Herter led the van, with Thierstein as commander of the horse. René, with his suite, rode beside the main corps, on a spirited gray mare called *La Dame*. He wore over his armor a short mantle of cloth of gold embroidered with the double white cross of Lorraine, the sleeves trimmed with his colors — gray, white, and red. His standard of white satin, decorated with a painting of the Annunciation, floated among a group of banners in the centre.²

For him all around, all within, was bright. After a long train of misfortunes, bitter mortifications, cruel disappointments, the hour of assured triumph was at hand. Mingled with the exultation of that thought

¹ Remy. — *La vraie Declaration*. — *La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne*. — Gollut. — Calmet. — Heuterus. — While at La Rivière Charles had expressed his intention, when he should next encoun-

ter the Swiss, of opposing them with infantry formed, like their own, in a solid square. See the *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 351.

² Chretien. — *La vraie Declaration*. — Remy.

was a natural pride in seeing himself the sole chief of such an army.⁶ But the real leaders—Herter, Waldmann, Kätzy, Hassfurter—were not the men to commit the conduct of an enterprise like the present to inexperienced hands. After passing Laneuville a halt was called and a consultation held. Through scouts, deserters, and reconnoitring parties, the enemy's position and arrangements had been fully learned. The sentiment of the Swiss—expressed in the final charge of the authorities at home—was a determination to finish up the work,⁷ to end by a single and decisive stroke a war of which the gains and the glory had been counterbalanced by vexations and estrangements. At Grandson, with inferior numbers, they had met the enemy's attack and seen his forces scatter "like smoke dispersed by the north wind."⁸ At Morat, with equal numbers, they had struck his lines obliquely,—shattering, crushing, routing, yet not with the complete destruction necessary for the object. Now, with more than double his numbers,—their men all fresh and bold, his all dismayed and spent,—they had only to close upon and overwhelm him. It was arranged that, while the main body held back,—only a few skirmishers showing themselves on the road, which here inclined towards the river, making the passage strait and

⁶ In the account purporting to be his own, he says, or is made to say, "Il n'y avoit aucun Chef ni Lieutenant que moi," which was true, — nominally.

⁷ The phrase is used in several

letters of the Council of Berne. Deutsch Missiven-Buch D. MS.

⁸ "Semblent-ils fumée éparquée par vent de bise." The expression has a local significance and force.

perilous, — the vanguard, guided by the Swiss deserters,⁹ should strike off to the left, by an old road leading from Jarville up to a farm named *La Malgrange*, and thence by another turn to the outskirts of the forest directly on the Burgundian flank.¹⁰ These were the tactics of men who had the game in their hands, and who knew how to play it.¹¹

René was now told that the safety of his person, being a thing of high importance, required that he should take his station in the centre of the main

⁹ Etterlin, fol. 93.

¹⁰ Chron. de Lorraine, Calmet. — *La vraie Declaration. — La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne.* — The first-cited authority is the only one which mentions this plan as the result of a consultation. So far the writer is doubtless correct. But in ascribing the suggestion to a noble of the Vosges — a vassal of René — and representing the Swiss leaders as simply assenting to it, he is evidently, as on other occasions, guided merely by patriotic instincts. René says the movements were made by his own order — which settles nothing. In the *Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne* — an account somewhat carefully prepared within four or five days afterwards, probably by a French agent for transmission to the king — the plan is ascribed to Herter. In this account the army of René is always spoken of as “the Swiss.”

¹¹ Von Rodt makes a strange muddle of this manœuvre, and consequently of much that followed. He represents the flanking movement as a double one, — the main corps

turning left to the Malgrange, the vanguard to the right, between the road and the Meurthe. This, had it been practicable, would we conceive, have been a very silly operation. René, expressly stating that it was the van which went to the left, assigns as the reason the narrowness of the passage by the road “between the wood and the river.” Etterlin, who was in the van, says it drew off “vff die lincken hand . . . damit man vff ein höhe vnd by sytz an die vygend möcht komen;” which clearly means, to the left of the line of march, in order to reach the high ground on the right flank of the Burgundians — not, as the passage is construed by Von Rodt, against the enemy’s left, to gain a hill which had no existence. In fact, owing to the bend of the Meurthe, beyond Jarville, a deviation to the right of the road would have led the Swiss directly into the river. It is more probable, and seems to be implied by several of the accounts, that the chief part of the army, including all the Swiss, went to the left.

body, where a hundred men of the corps of Berne would serve as his body-guard.¹² When the hostile force was broken, he would be free to join in the pursuit.

It was noon when the march was resumed. Before the troops had reached the farm-house on which they were to pivot, the snow fell so thickly that no one could see beyond his nearest comrade.¹³ In crossing a stream which runs past the building, the new-formed ice soon broke beneath their heavy tread, and left them wading, floundering, sometimes swimming. The road, or "hollow way," as it is also called, seems to have differed from the forest only in being more difficult to traverse. It was overgrown with a stubby and prickly brush. When at last the clearing was reached, the ranks were in disarray and the men half frozen. Sitting down, they poured the water from their shoes and arranged their clothing and arms.¹⁴

Without having ocular proof of it they had reached their position, facing the enemy's right flank. Suddenly the squall passed over and the sun shone forth.¹⁵ The hostile forces were in full sight of each other. The Swiss horn, blown thrice with a


¹² Vie de René, Calmet, tom. v.

¹³ "Wass es so vast schneygt, das einer den anderen kum vor im mächtt gesechen." Euterlin, fol. 86

¹⁴ "Das die ordnung zertrent vnd yegklichem aere ward nieder ze sitzen ein schü ze Rumen vnd sich selber wider ze recht zebringen." Ibid.

¹⁵ "Also tett gott durch das verdienen der heiligen dryer künigen ein gross wunder zeichen, . . . vnd lies die sunn so schö schinen als wär es eyn summer tag gewesen."

Ibid. — The snow squall and sudden clearing are also described in the narratives in Calmet.



PLAN OF BATTLE OF NANCY

prolonged breath,¹⁶ sent a blast of doom into the ears of the Burgundians. Wheeling rapidly into line, the troops began to descend the slope at a quick run.¹⁷

On first catching sight of the foe in this unexpected quarter, the gunners made an effort to turn their pieces. But the process was then a laborious one, not to be effected in alarm and confusion.¹⁸ After a single wild discharge, killing but two men, the guns were abandoned.¹⁹

But the Swiss were now stopped by the hedge. Charles had time to make a change of front and send forward his archers.²⁰ The assailants suffered severely. Their weapons got caught in the brambles, and they were unable to break through.²¹ A troop of French horse was the first to clear a passage. It was met by a squadron under the Sire de la Rivière and driven from the field.²² Meanwhile Galeotto had been attacked and was giving way. Lalain was ordered to go to his support. But the arquebusiers, having come to the front, delivered a volley which arrested the charge. Many saddles were emptied. Lalain fell badly wounded. The affrighted horses galloped at random. Galeotto, who was soon after

¹⁶ "Ledit cor fut corné par trois fois, et poussé chacune fois tant que le vent du Souffleur pouvoit durer." *La vraie Declaration*.

¹⁷ "Tout à un coup se tournèrent le visage, . . . et sans s'arrêter, marchèrent le plus impétueusement de jamais." *La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne*. — "Luffend schnell

den berg hin ab." *Etterlin*, ubi supra.

¹⁸ "Die syengen an schryen vñ ir Büchse zum teyl schnell . . . her richten." *Etterlin*.

¹⁹ *Remy*. — *Edlibach*.

²⁰ *La vraie Declaration*.

²¹ *Etterlin*. — *Schilling*.

²² *Remy*, p. 123.

taken prisoner,²² made off with his men towards the ford.²³

Charles saw himself stripped of both his wings, assailed at once on both his flanks.²⁴ He had his choice between a rapid flight and a speedy death. Well then — death!

As he fastened his helmet, the golden lion on the crest became detached and fell to the ground. He forbade it to be replaced. *Hoc est signum Dei!* — “It is a sign from God,” — he said.²⁵ From God? Ah, yes, he knew now the hand that was laid upon him!

Leading his troops he plunged into the midst of his foes, now closing in on all sides. Among enemies and friends the recollection of his surpassing valor in that hour of perdition, after the last gleam of hope had vanished, was long preserved. Old men of Franche-Comté were accustomed to tell how their fathers, tenants and followers of the Sire de Citey, had seen the duke, his face streaming with blood, charging and recharging “like a lion,” ever in the thick of the combat, bringing help where the need was greatest.²⁷ In Lorraine the same tradition existed. “Had all his men,” says a chronicler of that province, “fought with a like ardor, our army must infallibly have been repulsed.”²⁸

²² In several accounts he is stated to have been killed. In this case, Nature must have permitted him to rise again and fight on the side of the French king. We have seen his autograph letters, of a later date, addressed to Louis.

²³ Remy. — Calmet. — *La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne.*

²⁴ Remy, p. 127.

²⁵ Ibid. p. 126.

²⁶ Gollut, col. 1308, 1310.

²⁷ Remy, p. 126. — So, also, a Swiss account says, “Er war gegen-

But no ; so engaged, so overmatched, what courage could have availed ? "The foot stood long and manfully," is the testimony of a hostile eye-witness.²⁹ But the final struggle, though obstinate, was short.³⁰ Broken and dispersed, the men had no recourse but flight. Some went eastward, in the direction of Essey, such as gained the river crossing where the ice bore, and breaking it behind them. The greater number kept to the west of Nancy, to gain the road to Condé and Luxembourg.³¹ Charles, with the handful that still remained around him,³² followed in the same direction. The mass, both of fugitives and pursuers, was already far ahead. There was no choice now. Flight, combat, death — it was all one.³³

Closing up, the little band of nobles, last relic of

wärtig wo die größte Gefahr, focht wie ein gemeiner." *Vaterländische Sammlungen. MS.* (Bib. cantonale Vaudoise.) The only writer who casts an aspersion on Charles's courage is the lying Knebel. Charles, according to his version, — or versions, for he gives half a dozen different ones, — took no part in the battle, but overlooked the field from a hill in the rear, and as soon as he saw his troops broken, went off in advance with the Great Bastard. They were overtaken by the horse. The Bastard, fighting manfully, overthrew his antagonist, while the duke was cut down with a sword.

²⁹ "Do sind des herzogen von Burgund flussvolk starck und lang bestanden." Letter of Valentin von Neuenstein, commander of the Basel

troops, Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 125.

³⁰ "Der Hertzog von Burgunn und die Sinen stalten sich . . . gar manlichen zu Wer." Schilling, s. 374. — One of the captains of the Basel troops tells the magistrates that none of their men were hurt. (Knebel, 2te Abth. s. 126.) This we can easily believe. But the smallest of the Swiss contingents — that of Unterwalden — had twenty-five killed. Businger, *Geschichte von Unterwalden*, B. II. s. 20.

³¹ Remy. — Calmet. — *Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne.*

³² Remy, p. 127.

³³ Hence, while most accounts represent him as following the retreat, Basin, with at least equal probability, asserts that he disclaimed to flee, and rushed into the midst of the Swiss bands. No one knew or

chivalry, charged into the centre of a body of foot. A halberdier swung his weapon, and brought it down on the head of Charles. He reeled in the saddle. Citey flung his arms round him and steadied him, receiving while so engaged a thrust from a spear through the parted joints of his corselet.²⁸

Pressing on, still fighting, still hemmed in, they dropped one by one. Charles's page, a Roman of the ancient family of Colonna, rode a little behind, a gilt helmet hanging from his saddle-bow. He kept his eye upon his master — saw him surrounded, saw him at the edge of a ditch, saw his horse stumble, the rider fall.²⁹ The next moment Colonna was himself dismounted and made prisoner by men who, it would appear, had belonged to the troop of Campobasso.

None knew who had fallen, or lingered to see. The rout swept along, the carnage had no pause. The course was strewn with arms, banners, and the bodies of the slain. Riderless horses plunged among the ranks of the victors and the vanquished.³⁰ There was a road turning directly westward; but it went to Toul — French lances were there. Northward the valley contracted. On one side was the forest, on the other the river; ahead, the bridge of Bouxières — guarded, barred, by Campobasso. Arrived there, all

could know with certainty. The Bourgogne. — Remy. — De Troyes. — Calmet.

place where he fell proves that he was among the last to give way. The chief slaughter even among the foot took place several miles farther on.

²⁸ Collut, col. 1310.

²⁹ La Défaite du Duc de p. 40.

³⁰ "Gens morts par terre, chevaux courans par les champs sans maistro, bahus, armeures, lances, javelines, arcs, et autres choses tombées par terres." Chretien,

was over. A few turned aside into the forest to be hunted still, to be butchered by the peasantry, to perish of hunger and cold. Others leaped into the river, shot at by the arquebusiers, driven back or stabbed by the traitors on the opposite bank, swept by the current underneath the ice. The slaughter here was far greater than on the field.³⁷ No quarter was given by the Swiss. But the cavalry, both of Lorraine and the allies, received the swords of men of rank, as well from the sympathy of their class as for the sake of ransom. When René came up the sun had long set. There was little chance, less occasion, for further pursuit. The short winter's day had had its full share of blood. Merciful Night came down, enabling a scanty remnant to escape.³⁸

Messengers arrived entreating the duke of Lorraine to hasten back to Nancy, and show himself to his longing people. When the pursuit had first begun, the citizens had sallied forth to take part in it. But having neglected in their impatience to assume the proper badge, they had been fiercely attacked by the Swiss and driven in, leaving some of their number dead. Now they thronged the gates and avenues, with lighted torches in their hands. It was seven o'clock when René appeared. The bells pealed out. Wild huzzas went up. Thousands of faces, gaunt with famine, were radiant with joy. It was

³⁷ "Le comte de Campobast avoit moitié que au champ de bataille." La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne.
 empesché le pont, . . . et ainsi que la foule des Bourguignons y venoit et arrivoit, elle trouvoit résistance. . . .
 Là fut le grand meurtre plus la

³⁸ Ibid. — Remy. — Calmet.

not that they had missed him, that they had pined for him, so much. But they had suffered for him. Suffered—O, yes! how greatly let that trophy they have raised in front of his palace tell—that lofty, grisly pile, composed of the skulls of the foul animals which for many weeks have been their only food!

Followed by the throng, René proceeded to the Church of Saint George, to offer up thanks for the victory which had restored him to the home and dominion of his ancestors. His palace had been rendered untenable by the Burgundian bombardment. He therefore took up his quarters at the house of a wealthy burgher. The doors were beset. There was no time for repose; all had so much to hear, so much to recount! The people were still starving, for though the army had brought ample supplies, they were too distant, and the cold was too intense, to seek them now. Nay, in the ecstasy of that night, the need, the means of relief, were forgotten.

The cavalry had returned to Saint-Nicolas. The Swiss were quartered in the Burgundian camp, where they found a fair share of booty, and abundance of food. They passed the night in revelry. Yet not all. Sharp as was the air, a thousand forms were dispersed over the field, stripping, snatching, gliding from heap to heap—too intent, too eager, to give a kindly thrust to the agonized wretch that prayed for death. O Night, thou art crueler than Day!

Morning again broke, bringing fresh consciousness, fuller confirmation, of the completeness of the victory.

The lowest estimate of the enemy's slain was over three thousand. Those who reckoned in the drowned, and all the bodies scattered over a space of four leagues, set it at eight thousand. Whatever the number, the last Burgundian army had been destroyed. The only prisoners were nobles — the Great Bastard, the count of Chimay, the count of Nassau, Josse de Lalain, Philip of Hochberg, Olivier de Lamarche, and others of no less degree. All, or nearly all, had sons, brothers, cousins, among the dead. It was the Strasburgers who had had the luck to receive the surrender of the count of Nassau, — Engelbert the Rich, — whose ransom was cheaply valued at fifty thousand florins. Most of the others were René's own, and would pour a welcome supply into his empty treasury. Into *his* treasury? Illusive expectation! The French king would claim all these prisoners as his. He who had made the war, who had paid for the war, would be the rightful, the only, gainer by it.³⁹

Save the Swiss — who, besides the spoil which they knew well how to win and how to hold, asked only for their modest wages. There was a third half month's pay, which they came for the day after the battle, being in haste to return home. René was still without funds. But he had recovered his duchy,

³⁹ "JOAN. Le roy fait doncques son profit de la victoire qu'auoit eu Monseigneur? LUD. Voire si grandement et profitablement que ce fut merueille. . . . JOAN. Quelle retribution eust mondit seigneur, qui auoit fait ce grand et inesti-

mable honneur et profit au roy-aume? LUD. Il y a desia plus de vingt-trois ans que ce fut, mais jamais n'ay peu appercevoir qu'il en receust gratuite recongnissance ne bien quelconque, ains très grand dommage." *Chrétien*, pp. 42, 43.

which was mortgaged for their dues, and they accepted his promise to send the amount after them to Basel, where their leaders would remain till its arrival. They took a friendly leave of René. "If the duke of Burgundy were still alive, and should return to disturb him, let him send for them again."

If the duke of Burgundy were still alive — that was the thought that now occupied every breast. If he were alive, no doubt but that he would return, no hope that the war was over. Messengers were sent to inquire, to explore. The field was searched. Horsemen went to Metz and neighboring places to ask whether he had passed. None had seen him, none could find him, none had anything to tell. Wild rumors started up. He had hidden in the forest, retired to a hermitage, assumed the religious garb. Goods were bought and sold, to be paid for on his reappearance. Years afterwards, there were those who still believed, still expected.

Yet intelligence, proof, was soon forthcoming. In the evening of Monday Campobasso presented himself, bringing with him Colonna, who told what he had seen, and gave assurance that he could find the spot. Let him go then and seek, accompanied by those who would be surest to recognize the form — Mathieu, the Portuguese physician, a valet-de-chambre, and a "laundress," who had prepared the baths of the fallen prince.

They passed out at the gate of Saint John, descending to the low, then marshy, ground on the west of the town. It was drained by a ditch, the bed of a

slender rivulet, that turned a mill in the faubourg. The distance was not great — less than half an English mile. Several hundred bodies lay near together. But these they passed, coming to where a small band, "thirteen or fourteen," had fallen, fighting singly, yet together. Here lay Citey, here Contay, here a Croy, a Belvoir, a Lalain, — as in every battle-field; here Bièvre, loved by his enemies, his skull laid open "like a pot."

These are on the edge of the ditch. At the bottom lies another body, — "short, but thickset and well-membered," — in worse plight than all the rest; stripped naked, horribly mangled, the cheek eaten away by wolves or famished dogs. Can this be he?

They stoop and examine. The nails, never pared, are "longer than any other man's." Two teeth are gone — through a fall years ago. There are other marks — a fistula in the groin, in the neck a scar left by the sword thrust received at Montlhéry. The men turn pale, the woman shrieks and throws herself upon the body. "My lord of Burgundy! My lord of Burgundy!" Yea, this is he — the "Great Duke," the destroyer of Liège, the "Terror of France!"

They strive to raise it. The flesh, embedded in the ice, is rent by the effort. Help is sent for. Four of René's nobles come, men with implements, cloths, and bier; women have sent their veils. It is lifted and borne into the town, through the principal street, to the house of George Marqueiz, where there is a large and suitable chamber. The bearers rest a moment — set down their burden on the pavement.

Let the spot be forever marked with a cross of black stones.³⁰

It is carried in, washed with wine and warm water, again examined. There are three principal wounds. A halberd, entering at the side of the head, has cloven it from above the ear to the teeth. Both thighs have been pierced by a spear. Another has been thrust into the bowels from below.

It is wrapped in fine linen and laid out upon a table. The head, covered with a cap of red satin, lies on a cushion of the same color and material. An altar is decked beside it. Waxen tapers are lighted. The room is hung with black.

Bid his brother, his captive nobles, his surviving servants, come, and see if this be indeed their prince. They assemble around, kneel and weep, take his hands, his feet, and press them to their lips and breasts. He was their sovereign, their "good lord," the chief of a glorious house, the last, the greatest, of his line.

Let René come — to see and to exult. Let him come in the guise of the paladins and *preux* on occasions of solemnity and pomp — in a long robe sweeping the ground, with a long beard inwoven with threads of gold!

So attired he enters, stands beside the dead, uncovers the face, takes between his warm hands that cold right hand, falls upon his knees and bursts into sobs. "Fair cousin," he says, — not accusingly, but self-excusingly, — "thou broughtest great calamities and

³⁰ This pavement is still restored. assertions in local guide-books, has from time to time, and, despite the never been wholly obliterated.

sorrows upon us; may God assoil thy soul!" "— Gentle René, good and gentle prince, God, we doubt not, hath pardoned many a fault of thine for those tender thoughts, those charitable tears, in the hour of thy great triumph beside the corpse of thy stern foe!

A quarter of an hour he remains, praying before the altar; then retires, to give orders for the burial. Let him who for a twelvemonth was duke of Lorraine be laid in the Church of Saint George, in front of the high altar, on the spot where he stood when invested with the sovereignty won by conquest, to be so lost!

Five days the body lay in state, visited by all the people. Different rumors were afloat as to the manner of the death. Some told a fantastical tale of a deaf knight, who had mistaken the cry of "Save the duke of Burgundy!" for "Live the duke of Burgundy!" and who died of grief when he learned whom his lance had pierced. No lance, no sword, no knightly weapon, had touched that body. Others, with more confidence, and on stronger grounds, asserted that Campobasso had left assassins in the camp;⁴² and, in truth, those thrusts with pikes, given apparently while he lay upon the ground,—at least that upward thrust, like the finishing, testing one, at the murder of his grandfather on the Bridge of Montereau,—may

⁴² "He deu! beau cousin, vos volonté, beau cousin, que vostre Ames ait Dieu! Vous nous avez malheur et le mien ne vous eut ré-fait moult maux et douleurs." — Or, according to another version, which perhaps represents the sentiment more perfectly, "A la mienne

volonté, beau cousin, que vostre malheur et le mien ne vous eut réduit, icy en cest estat!"

⁴³ "Ay congneu deus ou trois de ceulx qui demourerent pour tuer le dict duc." *Commisses*, tom. ii. p. 63.

well have been dealt by such hands. But the first and sufficient wound, the cleft made with the halberd, told its own tale. The Swiss themselves never doubted their workmanship, nor was their claim denied.

The burial took place on Sunday, the 12th, towards evening, with as much of pomp as René was able to bestow. The Burgundian nobles followed as mourners. All the inhabitants of the town, each holding a lighted taper, formed the cortége. He had lived forty-three years, one month, and twenty-six days. Bièvre was interred in the same building—not beside the master beside whom he had fallen, but with his relatives, the princes of Lorraine. The other bodies were buried on the battle-field. A simple stone cross, with an inscription, still marks the spot where that of Charles was found. A chapel dedicated to *Notre Dame de Bonsecours* was erected near the stream where the battle had begun. For three centuries the day was commemorated by ceremonies and processions. On these occasions it was a deputation of Swiss who carried the gauntlets, spurs, and other personal equipments, supposed to have belonged to the Duke of Burgundy.⁴³

Thou art right, Commynes!—with all his faults, his nature was noble. It has been said that no one

⁴³ The chief authorities for the final events are the contemporary narratives in Calmet; *La Desconfiture du Duc de Bourgogne*; Remy; reports and letters in Knebel, includ-

ing one from René to the Swiss; De Troyes; Molinet, *Souvenirs et Monumens de la Bataille de Nancy*.

mourned for him. It is false; many mourned — noble hearts everywhere; enemies who had fought without rancor or baseness, allies who had tested his fidelity, servants and companions who had known him better than the world. When the knights of the Golden Fleece assembled for the first time after his death, in the spring of 1478, and saw his escutcheon draped in black and inscribed with the word "Deceased," they burst into loud lamentations."

But many exulted? O, yes! dastards everywhere — the burghers of Alsace, who had feared, wronged, and defamed him; the burghers of Flanders, who had abandoned him to his fate; the French king and his —

—"Remember our faithful service to the king in the matter of the duke! Remember our faithful service to the king in running down and killing the duke of Burgundy! Who had never done any harm to us; no, neither he nor his forefathers! Gladly would he have continued our neighbor and our friend! Yet we declared him our enemy, and hunted him down!"⁴⁵

So spoke, six months later, the representatives of the Swiss Confederates, Hans Waldmann, Adrian von Bubenberg, and Heinrich Hofmann, to the Sire de

⁴⁵ "Fondirent en larmes en regardant ce très douloureux mot *trépassé*; car tant l'aymoient et de si bon cœur, que à dur donnoient credence à sa mort pitoyable." Molinet, tom. ii. p. 124.

⁴⁶ "Mit aller ermanung der truwen diensten so wir dem kung mit lib und gut bewisen und den hertz-

ogen vertriben und getott... die getruwen dienst so wir dem kung getan haben mit dem hertzogen von Burgund, den wir, doch er noch in vordern uns kein leid nie getan hab und gern unsser frund und nachpur gewesen wer, so vyent gemacht und den vertriben." *MS.* (Archives of Zurich.)

Craon, the representative of France — himself an agent in the business and cognizant of the facts. So these men wrote that they had spoken to the authorities and people at home — to the council of Zurich, to the council of Berne, to the General Confederacy.⁴⁶ And no man told them that they had lied — that they had slandered the honor of their country!

As for those — if those there were — who had no cause either to mourn or to exult, their feeling found expression in the commonplaces that strike so forcibly in presence of the event. "He had been so great, and had fallen so low — so proud, and had perished so miserably — so ambitious, so warlike, so restless, and was now at rest, at peace, forever!"⁴⁷

Yes, he was at rest; the "Great Disturber" was gone; and now surely the world, which he alone had distracted and kept in tumult, would enter upon an era of stillness and repose. So at least thought the people of the Rhineland, flinging up their caps and raising their loud huzzas. So thought *not* the wise senators of Venice. To them the death of a prince who had borne so great a charge, who had formed and who had resisted schemes so vast, combinations so extensive, seemed an event pregnant with momentous consequences, calculated to exercise for "more than one year" the minds of keen observers accustomed to forecast the future.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ The letter — a long and interesting one, throwing light upon events that require a fuller treatment than they have yet received — is signed and addressed in the order

in which we have given the names.

⁴⁷ "Te piguit pacis tantisque quietis in vita,
his Jacis, Carnis, Junque quietis tibi."

⁴⁸ "Subgiornem che questo caso

And they were right. The convulsions, the changes, he had occasioned, were slight in comparison with those which he had prevented. That vault at Nancy proved to be, not the tomb, but the cradle, of wars—wars that were stilled only to break out afresh, wars that drew into their vortex many quarrels of a different origin, which they embittered and perpetuated. The great rivalries and struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could never have raged so fiercely and so widely if there had stood between the two chief parties, instead of a crowd of minor wranglers all feeding the flame, a third of equal greatness, holding the balance, interested in quenching the strife.

Across that stormy sea the eye glances to rest upon a single spot. In the middle of the sixteenth century there was a momentary lull. The emperor and the French king, each the representative of many mingled claims and inherited ambitions, were alike weary of the contest. One, worn out with labor, looked forward to the repose of the convent; the other, steeped in pleasure, would fain have avoided his destiny.

Two sisters, widowed queens, great-granddaughters of Charles of Burgundy, governed as regents in the Netherlands and in Lorraine. In a correspondence between them it had been arranged that the remains of their common ancestor should be removed from the foreign soil where they had so long been moulder-

del Duca de Burgogna non poteva dare da pensare ad chi ha intelletto essere altro che importantissimo et et cogitare le cose future per piu ponderoso, perchè el menava con se che per un anno." *Dépêches Milanaises*, tom. ii. p. 397.

ing — earlier requests for their delivery having been refused — to a land where his descendants still held away. A commission, consisting of high ecclesiastics accompanied by the king-at-arms of the Golden Fleece, proceeded accordingly to Nancy, and on the 20th of September, 1550, entered the Church of Saint George to execute their instructions. In accordance with these, no throng of spectators was admitted, no pompous ceremony employed. But the organ played a requiem, mass was sung, and Toison d'Or, in his robes of office, wearing the collar of the Order, and holding in his hand a lighted wax candle, made an offering at the altar. By the glare of two torches the grave was opened to the depth of six feet, and the coffin exhumed. It crumbled when touched. The contents consisted of bones and dust. They were reverently taken out, wrapped in white linen, and placed in another coffin. Without further delay, the bearers took their departure, declining any procession or escort.*

They carried their burden to Bruges. That town was no longer a seat of wealth, a scene of grandeur, the chosen place of nuptial festivities for the princes of the land. But, in the richness of its decay, it was not unsuited to be the place of their burial. The remains of Mary of Burgundy lay entombed in the Church of Notre Dame. Those of her father were deposited beside them, in a sarcophagus of the same

* Documents in Legrand MSS. the Archives du Royaume, at Brussels. xix. — The originals are in vols.

material and form. It bears little resemblance to those which had enshrined the relics of his ancestors. Gothic art had gone out with chivalry ; the glitter of the Renaissance had succeeded. The body of the tomb is of black marble, the effigy and ornaments are of gilt copper. Along the sides are rows of escutcheons, emblazoned with the numerous quarterings of Charles. At the foot is an inscription, which enumerates his glories and successive achievements — his successive defeats and final overthrow. At the head is another tablet. It contains the motto which he had adopted at the time of his accession, when the future was radiant with triumphs, to be won, to be enhanced, by arduous struggles. *Je l'ay emprins — bien en arienne !* — “I have undertaken it — may good come of it!”
... Alas ! Alas !

END.

62.15

